To some significant degree, intelligence and firepower substitute for each other. From "The Possibilities For Clean Counterinsurgency," your blogger's undergraduate thesis written in the 1982-83 academic year, when I was 21:

In war between insurgents and an authority, a small increment in intelligence affects considerably the destructive capability of either fighting force. Early in the conflict especially, the insurgency will not have firepower to take the place of intelligence; a young rebellion thus depends utterly upon good information. The counterinsurgency, on the other hand, usually enjoys a tremendous advantage in firepower, but faces great difficulty obtaining good information about the whereabouts of its enemy. It is as if the man were hiding not in one house, but in an entire village of houses, any of which might be boobytrapped.

The problem for the counterinsurgency is that excessive application of its firepower (because it is at an intelligence disadvantage) will further increase the intelligence advantage of the insurgency. I (and undoubtedly others before me) called this the coercion/intelligence dilemma. Twenty-one year old me again:

Revolutionary theorists like to claim that guerrillas are but the military arm of a population at war with the controlling power. If that were true, many of the wars of the last forty years would have been much shorter than they were. In fact, most insurgencies begin with a nucleus of determined activists, and they usually confront a government that represents but a small fraction of the population (or a demographically discrete plurality or majority). In between the two groups lie the masses of the people, who rarely want anything more than to grow their food and say their prayers.

Neither side needs the love or loyalty of the population nearly as much as its cooperation. The insurgent must have nondenunciation so that he may carry on his war against the authority from the midst of the people. The counterinsurgent needs information, so that he may determine the nature, power and membership of the insurgency. Because a credible threat of sanction (death or torture, for example) frequently outweighs love or loyalty, the side that imposes stiff penalties for noncompliance will often win the cooperation of the people away from the side that inspires merely moral support for the merits of its cause. To the extent that cooperative action and the support of opinion among the population differ, there has been effective coercion.

Much More at TigerHawk

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Coercion -- The Belmont Club

Tigerhawk's post is so full of insight it is hard to know where to begin. But here's a starting point. Counter-terrorist warfare is never won by merely by rising to a supreme height of moral magnificence. Sadly, war requires coercion in one form or another. But as Tigerhawk cogently argues, coercion cannot be applied indiscriminately. It is most effective when combined with a kind of justice because the smart noncombatant, can avoid arbitrary punishment by adhering to the rules of the just, or at least predictable party. The party governed by decency and law. But the real order of things can be misrepresented by lies. The consequence of habitually making wild accusations against the Coalition, such as were brought against the Haditha Marines; sensationalizing relatively events as torture, running the relatively few cases of actual torture for weeks on the front pages; sponsoring contests to concoct stories like tank drivers running over pet dogs and claiming that hundreds of thousands of Iraqis have been killed by aerial bombardment as "excess deaths" was to imprint the image of a mindless, brutal coalition on the Iraqi side. Thus the Leftist enablers of terror successfully portrayed the more just -- albeit imperfect side -- as being unpredictably coercive.

Only after the Iraqis discovered, by sad and bitter experience, what a crock of s..t this narrative was, by repeated atrocity at the brutal hands of al-Qaeda, did they understand they had it all wrong. It was the al-Qaeda which cut your face off with cheese wire; al-Qaeda which shot you for mixing tomatoes and cucumbers in the market bag; al-Qaeda which blew up any and every public assembly; al-Qaeda which routinely tortured innocents in slaughterhouses and had a manual to do it with; al-Qaeda which beheaded innocent children. Only after all the fake memes were repelled and was some semblance of the truth established; and only then did the tipping point start to come.

The bottom line is that in fighting bad hombres it pays to have a six gun, a white hat and to shoot straight. The problem is getting some of the papers to tell it that way.

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SWJ Tip: Bookmark both blogs while you're there...

Discuss at Small Wars Council

The review (requires subscription to New York Times Select) is quite long and well worth reading. Here is an excerpt concerning FM 3-24.

The book to begin with in looking for a revised 21st-century strategy is, unexpectedly, the landmark U.S. ARMY/MARINE CORPS COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL (University of Chicago, paper, $15). It was released as a government document in December 2006, but owing to its enormous popularity (1.5 million downloads in the first month alone), it has now been published by a university press, with a provocative, highly readable new foreword and introduction that testify to the manual's "paradigm-shattering" content.

When the terrorists struck on 9/11, the United States military was singularly unprepared to deal with them. One reflection of the Pentagon's mind-set at the time was the fact that the Army counterinsurgency manual had not been updated since 1986 and the Marine Corps guide had not been revised since 1980.

This lack of preparedness showed. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the armed forces did not have the appropriate intelligence, linguistic capabilities, weapons, equipment, force structures, civil affairs know-how or capacity to train security forces in other countries. "It is not unfair to say that in 2003 most Army officers knew more about the U.S. Civil War than they did about counterinsurgency," Lt. Col. John A. Nagl writes in the foreword to the University of Chicago edition. But while the Bush administration dug in, refusing to admit how ill-suited its premises were to the new century, American military officers revised their old doctrines on the fly.

The leading architect of the manual was David Petraeus, then a lieutenant general, who commanded the 101st Airborne Division in the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003 and took responsibility for governing Mosul, Iraq's second-largest city, immediately thereafter. He is now the overall American commander in Iraq. Petraeus emphasized economic and political development and is said to have asked his soldiers, "What have you done for the people of Iraq today?" He worked with another military man who also saw that his job would have to be more than strictly military — Lt. Gen. James Mattis, who commanded the First Marine Division during the initial invasion and then in 2004 returned to help stabilize Anbar Province. His division motto was "No Better Friend, No Worse Enemy — First Do No Harm." In February 2006, while the new counterinsurgency doctrine was still being drafted, and while international criticism of American military excesses mounted, Petraeus invited journalists, human rights lawyers, academics and practitioners of counterinsurgency to Fort Leavenworth to vet a draft, initiating what participants characterized as one of the most open and productive exchanges of ideas they had ever witnessed.

The fundamental premise of the manual is that the key to successful counterinsurgency is protecting civilians. The manual notes: "An operation that kills five insurgents is counterproductive if collateral damage leads to the recruitment of 50 more insurgents." It suggests that force size be calculated in relation not to the enemy, but to inhabitants (a minimum of 20 counterinsurgents per 1,000 residents). It emphasizes the necessity of coordination with beefed-up civilian agencies, which are needed to take on reconstruction and development tasks.

The most counterintuitive, as well as the most politically difficult, premise of the manual is that the American military must assume greater risk in order to gather much-needed intelligence and, in the end, achieve greater safety. The emphasis of the 1990s on force protection is overturned by the assertion of several breathtaking paradoxes: "Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be."

More:

The Evolution and Importance of Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency - SWJ Blog by John Nagl

FM 3-24 Available in Hard Copy - SWJ Blog by John Nagl

Matt Bennett writes in Third Way Dispatch (The Peter Pandemic Takes Its Toll: H.R. McMaster is Passed Over) of a type of reverse Peter Principle where genuinely gifted and brilliant public servants who are kept far below the level to which they should ascend.

... There are, no doubt, scores of such talents in the federal bureaucracy, held down from their rightful rise by political calculation, petulance or oversight. But one recent and egregious example is the Pentagon's failure to promote (for a second time) Army Colonel H.R. McMaster.

Now you may be thinking, wasn't it H.R. McMaster that led the pacification of Tal Afar, an operation so successful that Bush devoted an entire speech to it just last year? Didn't I read about McMaster's brilliant strategy in a long New Yorker piece about him? Wasn't it McMaster who won a Silver Star in the Gulf War, leading troops so bravely and well that Tom Clancy wrote it up? And surely it was McMaster who's PhD dissertation became a hugely influential book, Dereliction of Duty, that the then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs made required reading for senior military types?

Well brace yourself -- the answer to all of your questions is yes. McMaster is a brilliant tactician, a decorated hero, a soldier's soldier, and a master of the very kind of war we're fighting in Iraq -- the counterinsurgency. In fact, he's back in Iraq now, helping soon-to-be-fall-guy David Petraeus try to fend off further disaster. But somehow McMaster's "superiors" -- the suits at the Pentagon who helped bring us the Fiasco that McMaster is attempting to clean up -- have decided that he isn't flag officer material...

Update: From the link (Colonel John Boyd: To Be Or To Do?) provided by Claymore in comments below:

Of all the things Boyd wrote or said, we probably get the most requests for his "To be or to do?" invitation. Although Boyd associated with many junior officers during his Air Force career, there were a few, perhaps half a dozen, that he had such respect for that he invited them to join him on his quest for change. Each one would be offered the choice: Be someone -- be recognized by the system and promoted -- or do something that would last for the Air Force and the country. It was unfortunate, and says something about the state of American's armed forces, that it was rarely possible to do both.

Boyd's biographer, Robert Coram, collected the invitation from an officer who got it and selected the "to do" option, and he confirmed its essence from several others.

"Tiger, one day you will come to a fork in the road," he said. "And you're going to have to make a decision about which direction you want to go." He raised his hand and pointed. "If you go that way you can be somebody. You will have to make compromises and you will have to turn your back on your friends. But you will be a member of the club and you will get promoted and you will get good assignments." Then Boyd raised his other hand and pointed another direction.

"Or you can go that way and you can do something -- something for your country and for your Air Force and for yourself. If you decide you want to do something, you may not get promoted and you may not get the good assignments and you certainly will not be a favorite of your superiors. But you won't have to compromise yourself. You will be true to your friends and to yourself. And your work might make a difference." He paused and stared into the officer's eyes and heart. "To be somebody or to do something. In life there is often a roll call. That's when you will have to make a decision. To be or to do. Which way will you go?

Update 2: In response to an e-mail that questioned blaming the administration and "pretending to know more than selection boards is something again" for COL McMaster's non-selection to BG - I wrote this:

Matt Bennett of Third Way Dispatch is the one who blames the administration for COL McMaster not pinning on BG...

While I agree that "pretending to know more than selection boards is something again" I submit that many expressing opinions on this matter have at least some knowledge of selection boards. They have served on selection boards and, of course, have been either promoted or passed by the same. Opinions on the merits of this recent BG board are, in my humble opinion, informed.

Moreover, this issue goes well beyond one Soldier not advancing to flag. It has a lot to do with perception and I maintain this non-selection sends the wrong signal to the Iron Majors, Captains and Lieutenants - the one-third who "get it" and another third who are trying to get it when it comes to COIN. They are the ones who are debating on whether to stay in the Army or Marine Corps or move on. I mention Marine Corps here because I have received e-mails from Marines who are as disappointed by this as their Soldier brothers-in-arms.

COL McMaster bordered on "rock star" status to many of them - they studied his works and followed his career and he provided inspiration that developed into hope that we still might turn OIF around even with the missteps of earlier years.

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H/T to Phillip Carter - Intel Dump (E-mail)

H/T to Noah Shachtman - Wired Magazine's Danger Room (Link)

Discuss at Small Wars Council - No happy campers here...

More Discussion - At World Affairs

More:

Is the Pentagon Anti-Petraeus? - Time Magazine's Swampland (Joe Klein)

H.R. McMaster Passed Over - Reverse Peter Principle? - Outside the Beltway (James Joyner)

Col. McMaster - The Washington Monthly's Political Animal (Kevin Drum)

Stunning News on a Non Promotion - PrairiePundit (Merv Benson)

Is McMaster's Non-Selection Army Seppuku? - ROFASIX (NOTR)

They're Breaking My Army - Armchair Generalist (Jason Sigger)

You, Sir, are no Vinegar Joe Stilwell - Tapped (Robert Farley)

William S. McCallister

The London Times story "Al-Qaeda faces rebellion from the ranks" provides me an opportunity to further explain the usefulness of the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) engagement model (briefing here) and its application not only when conducting counterinsurgency in a tribal society but in the fight against al-Qaeda. It is also a tool that may explain (in social system terms) the dynamics of the alleged power-struggle within al-Qaeda and its motivating factors (in terms of cultural operating codes and coordinating messages).

Baseline Assumptions

1. Al Qaeda is "tribal".

2. Behavior of individual members governed by tribal ethos i.e., cultural operating codes and coordinating messages.

3. Micro-motives determine macro-behavior of the system as a whole. Simple rules govern play.

4. Al Qaeda network is a "living-breathing organism". It shapes and is shaped by the environment.

5. The network is NOT hierarchical. Leadership in this system, as in tribal society, is based on the "ability to attract and keep followers" vice "ability to enforce".

Cultural Operating Codes

1. Shame/Honor.

2. Segmentation of tribes.

3. Patronage.

4. Territory.

Coordinating Messages

1. "No stability without us".

2. "What have you done for me lately...what will you do for me tomorrow?"

Below is an example for the application of the model by way of comparison.

The Dulaym tribal federation in Anbar was shaped by Saddam to fit the needs of his patronage/security system. With the removal of Saddam the federation entered into a period of transition and realignment (there is opportunity in chaos). The various sub-tribes of the federation began to jockey for position as new centers of power within the federation (system) started to emerge. This competition or realignment phase is on-going as we speak and will in time reach, in Gertrude Bell's words, its own "splendid equilibrium" ("When the tribes are at their best they live in splendid equilibrium").

Dynamics of the System / Model

Power holders do not and can not hold mutual or agreed ambitions and so are in perpetual and violent competition as they test one another. A commitment to one by definition incurs opposition of an ally's rival. It is impossible in practice for a power holder to have an assortment of clients, and therefore parties fluctuate between loss and gain. All members of the system are employing the same tactics of seeking more powerful sponsors, recruiting others and countering potential challengers by all means available such as conspiracy, assassination and murder (assassination is akin to a no-confidence vote and murder an accepted mechanism to maintain a semblance of competing party membership parity). Any power holder will switch sponsorship if advantage can be gained and is vulnerable in turn by an internal challenger whom might switch sides if it benefits him. The system is self-regulating and places constraints on the incumbent and challenger alike. The moment the challenger initiates action and begins to eliminate rivals, he begins to encounter opposition. The stakes increase until failure to deal decisively with a rival becomes tantamount to one's own death sentence. The system/model is not populated with "moderate" actors and is in a constant state of flux. The various actors continuously assess their relative power position in relation to their allies and opponents. They strengthen relationships with select allies, let others lapse; and mobilize new ones to keep their networks operational. Conflict is the norm and an accepted part of the system and serves as a means to activate and evaluate relationships.

The current emphasis in the media on the Abu Risha tribal leader Sheikh Sattar as the leader of the Al Anbar "Awakening" does not take into consideration that he and his followers are members of a larger social system. In accordance with the model outlined above, he is subject to the "self-regulating" tendency of the system as a whole, in this case the Dulaym Federation and by extension the other tribal federations such as the Shammar, etc throughout Iraq. We monitor this dynamic closely in Anbar province and do not assume that he is the key component of the awakening movement in Anbar much less of the Sunni Arabs in Iraq in general. He is one of the main catalysts in the movement but remains subject to the laws of the system at large.

A similar view can be taken in regards to the rise of Zarqawi within the al Qaeda network before his death. He too was subject to the same dynamic outlined above as are the numerous "independent" leaders of the network today. The alleged power struggle within al Qaeda in my opinion therefore is part and parcel of the system as a whole and subject to the same laws and principles we are experiencing in Anbar province in our interactions with the Dulaym Federation.

What are the implications for our fight against the al Qaeda network? It may not necessarily take a network to fight a network but rather a "virus". While I do not advocate that the "network versus network" paradigm (tank against tank) should be abandoned outright, I do strongly urge the development of appropriate "viruses" to target the network within the cultural frame of reference of its individual members.

Despite the myriad and contradictory accidents that push history this way and that, there stands behind the entire confusion a meaningful pattern and progression, a deeper historical process that is constant in its action. Recognizing past patterns provides a semblance of predictability of possible future outcomes and assists in the development of indicators to measure progress towards a potential outcome while still firmly rooted in the present. Even in a historical process influenced by random chance, law-like patterns can still emerge. History and chance are fully compatible with the existence of law-like order and patterns. The challenge is to recognize the general in the particular and the eternal in the transitory.

William S. McCallister is a retired military officer. He has worked extensively in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. While on active duty, Mr. McCallister served in numerous special operations assignments specializing in civil-military, psychological and information operations. He is a published author in military affairs and tribal warfare and has guest lectured at Johns Hopkins University and presented numerous papers at academic and government sponsored conferences such as the Watson Institute, Brown University; Department of the Navy Science and Technology and DARPA; and the Central Intelligence Agency. He has also appeared as a guest on National Public Radio (NPR). Mr. McCallister is currently employed as a senior consultant for Applied Knowledge International (AKI) in Iraq. He continues to study current events in Iraq in tribal terms, including the tribal art of war and peace, tribal mediation processes, development of tribal centers of power, and tribal influence in political developments. He has applied his study of tribal culture in assessing Iraqi reconstruction efforts, as well as insurgency and counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and the Global War on Terror.

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Discuss at Small Wars Council

... From the BBC translators, an editorial by Saleh Eskandari headlined "spying squirrels," published July 10 by the Iranian newspaper Resalat.

"A few weeks ago, 14 squirrels equipped with espionage systems of foreign intelligence services were captured by [Iranian] intelligence forces along the country's borders. These trained squirrels, each of which weighed just over 700 grams, were released on the borders of the country for intelligence and espionage purposes. According to the announcement made by Iranian intelligence officials, alert police officials caught these squirrels before they could carry out any task...

News Item: Giant Man-Eating Badgers in Basra

British military officials are denying reports that they released, we kid you not, "strange man-eating bear-like" badgers to sow fear among the residents of Basra, Iraq.

"We have not released giant badgers in Basra, and nor have we been collecting eggs and releasing serpents into the Shatt al-Arab river," Maj. David Gell tells reporters, according to The Guardian...

SWJ / MountainRunner Exclusive: Project ACORN

Interesting take and worth the read - here is an excerpt:

I grew up during the Vietnam era and belong to a generation of educated liberals who came of age with a visceral dislike of the military. In the seventies and eighties, it was almost a reflex on Ivy League university campuses, where officer training was sometimes banned, to regard anyone in uniform as funny, if not sinister. At the same time, on military bases, anti-intellectualism became a badge of honor, a subscription to The New Yorker the mark of an oddball, and the words "liberal" and "academic" terms of abuse.

Here's a crude generalization: after the sixties, intellect and patriotism went separate ways, to the detriment of both. This mutual hostility made intellectuals less responsible and soldiers less thoughtful. We've come to think of this antagonism as natural and inevitable, as it is between cats and dogs, but in fact it was a product of recent political and cultural changes in American life. The estrangement was compounded by professionalization on both sides and the adoption of inward-looking and jargon-ridden specializations: the all-volunteer military and the social-theory crowd became equally isolated American subcultures.

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have begun to close the divide. I think the reasons are these: first, September 11th made military service more attractive to the kind of college students who used to find it unthinkable. It's no longer unusual to have a friend whose son recently went from studying photography at the Pratt Institute to searching for weapons caches south of Baghdad. Second, the nature of these wars demands a soldier who is more than an artilleryman with an engineering degree. After the military's failure in Vietnam, it tried to turn war into a matter of firepower and technology—which is why, when the Sunni insurgency began to take off in the summer of 2003, American forces had no idea how to react and made matters far worse. By 2004, battalion commanders in Salahuddin were begging the Pentagon for information about the nature of Iraqi society. This year, the Army is actually deploying teams of social scientists with units in Baghdad and Afghanistan. The soldiers whose reputations have been made and not destroyed in Iraq—General David Petraeus, Colonel H. R. McMaster, Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl—have doctorates in the humanities. The best soldiers I met in Iraq were eager to share critical views with professors and journalists. This past spring, when McMaster led a group of officials and private citizens to Iraq to assess progress there, he picked as one member an anti-war British political-science professor who happens to know a great deal about the country. Desperate times breed desperate measures.

Excerpt

Charlie, I guess we would love to have that crystal ball, and so would the people in Congress who are trying to decide this matter. Some parts of that I do agree with. I think it's pretty clear that the majority Shiites are increasingly confident that if the U.S. troops go, they will have the upper hand. The 60 percent majority they have, the control of the armed forces that they have. The oil resources in the south would give them quickly an upper hand in what would be in effect an all-out civil war.

I think there's quite a lot of reasons to worry about whether or not they're right about that, not to worry about it, to question it. The Sunnis are not going to roll over. The Sunnis are good fighters. They ruled this country for most of the last 1,200 years or this -- at least this terrain. They have the backing of the hinterland of the - of the Sunni Arab world, and I think the outcome would be very much in doubt.

But the one thing I think that virtually all of us who - who work here or have worked here for any length of time agree is that the levels of violence would eclipse by quite a long way the bloodshed we've seen to date.

Well, I think, quite simply that the United States armed forces here -- and I find this to be very widely agreed amongst Iraqis that I know, of all ethnic and sectarian backgrounds -- the United States armed forces are a very important inhibitor against violence. I know it's argued by some people that they provoke the violence. I simply don't believe that to be in the main true. I think it's a much larger truth that where American forces are present, they are inhibiting sectarian violence, and they are going after the people, particularly al-Qa'ida and the Shiite death squads, who are provoking that violence. Remove them or at least remove them quickly, and it seems to me -- controversial as this may seem to be saying in the present circumstances, while I know there's this agonizing debate going on in the United States about this -- that you have to weigh the price. And the price would very likely be very, very high levels of violence, at least in the short run and perhaps, perhaps - perhaps for quite a considerable period of time.

... The magazine's editor, Franklin Foer, disclosed in an interview that Beauchamp is married to a New Republic staffer, and that is "part of the reason why we found him to be a credible writer." Foer also said Beauchamp "has put himself in significant jeopardy" and "lost his lifeline to the rest of the world" because military officials have taken away his laptop, cellphone and e-mail privileges.

.... As both the military and the magazine investigate Beauchamp's allegations, a personal blog surfaced in which Beauchamp said last year that each morning he feels "retarded for joining the army," "a little more liberal than the day before" and "a tool for global corporations."

... Beauchamp did not provide any documentation for his three published columns. He is married to a reporter-researcher at the New Republic, Elspeth Reeve.

Beauchamp's writing was challenged by the Weekly Standard and conservative bloggers after he wrote vividly, and profanely, of soldiers mocking a woman disfigured by an injury, getting their kicks by running over dogs with Bradley Fighting Vehicles and playing with Iraqi children's skulls taken from a mass grave...

As conservative bloggers yesterday continued to challenge the veracity of Beauchamp's accounts, Foer said: "It is really unfortunate that someone like Scott, who was really only trying to tell his particular story, has become a pawn in the debate over the war and the Weekly Standard's efforts to press an ideological agenda."

Weekly Standard writer Michael Goldfarb responded: "The piece struck me as implausible, and what we did is to raise questions that are completely legitimate. There's nothing ideological about raising these questions when people make claims and don't back up the charges."

27 July Real Clear Politics - Pvt. Beauchamp: In Big Trouble Either Way by Jack Kelly.

If what Private Scott Thomas Beauchamp wrote in the New Republic isn't true, he's in trouble, and so is the magazine.

If what Pvt. Beauchamp wrote is true, he's in bigger trouble...

Now that they've demonstrated their diarist is a real soldier, the New Republic's editors feel vindicated. But the issue is not whether Pvt. Beauchamp is a soldier. It's whether he's telling the truth or not. And his story stinks to high heaven. No one else at the base ever seems to have a seen a woman who fits the description of the woman in the chow hall. No mass graves have been discovered during the time Pvt. Beauchamp has been at FOB Falcon. It is physically impossible for the driver of a Bradley to see a dog to the immediate right of his vehicle.

It would be better for Pvt. Beauchamp if he made his stories up. It breaks no military rule to BS gullible liberal journalists. But if Pvt. Beauchamp is telling the truth, he and his buddies have broken so many articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice that I haven't space to list them all...

Update 4: Reaction From FOB Falcon - The Weekly Standard

Mike-

We are in the midst of a formal investigation into the allegations Pvt Beauchamp has made. That's all I can say for now.

Respectfully,

Kirk

Major Kirk Luedeke

Public Affairs Officer

4th IBCT, 1st ID

DRAGONS

Update 3: I'll Return an Author - Scott Thomas Beauchamp Blog (and one who most certainly needs an editor - oh that's right - he found one):

bavarian stories in some sort of rounded metaphysical order...personality death stories intersecting with poesy home memory reflections. You begin with a place and an action and let it carry in every direction till the words are vibrating on the page, dripping in thick robust delapidated barnhouses of adjectives and pronouns...no time for the subtle gray faced calculations of a PERFORMED intimacy...go...but remember what Kerouac forgot: revision is spontaneous also.

a brief coming back to america introduction, stories about soldiers, prositutes, innocent students rendered featherless by dark rivets of experience and the decadence of human pursuits in every vein...and then there's the veins...follow 'em.

Cut your wrist let it bleed onto the paper in unique soulpatterns of mindthoughts. after the coming back to america introduction theres sgt. Leclaire with his dick blown off and the house 12 working girl with her stuff blown out in the other direction and both lost darkeyes brooding on prisonfleshes of human animal bodies the bridge across being only that connection spark instant also lost as quickly. a revery of mothertalk and love looks back in the soft american night. the awol in bamberg lying to make himself into someone who can actually touch another persons lips to his heart to feel. a grandma memeory of cracked heavy crystal balls and smoke serpitine around stacks of tarot cards. the smell of the antiseptic physical therapy room filled with limbless veterans, some missing half a face, and one wearing a god bless america t-shirt...of course this was all before the war, but the war is closer here and an everlengthening shadow over my half closed eyes...but this is all in our time, here and coming back to america...

Update 2: Re: What's That Now - NR's The Corner Key Quote:

Mark Steyn: Scott Thomas Beauchamp complains that his character has been called into question. Just for the record, here is Private Beauchamp's character in his own words:

"I think she's f*****g hot!" I blurted out.

"What?" said my friend, half-smiling.

"Yeah man," I continued. "I love chicks that have been intimate—with IEDs. It really turns me on—melted skin, missing limbs, plastic noses..."

"You're crazy, man!" my friend said, doubling over with laughter. I took it as my cue to continue.

"In fact, I was thinking of getting some girls together and doing a photo shoot. Maybe for a calendar? 'IED Babes.' We could have them pose in thongs and bikinis on top of the hoods of their blown-up vehicles."

My friend was practically falling out of his chair laughing. The disfigured woman slammed her cup down and ran out of the chow hall, her half-finished tray of food nearly falling to the ground.

In English libel law, Private Beauchamp would be regarded as a man with no reputation to defame.

Update: For what it is worth - just posted to The New Republic's The Plank

My Diarist, "Shock Troops," and the two other pieces I wrote for the New Republic have stirred more controversy than I could ever have anticipated. They were written under a pseudonym, because I wanted to write honestly about my experiences, without fear of reprisal. Unfortunately, my pseudonym has caused confusion. And there seems to be one major way in which I can clarify the debate over my pieces: I'm —to stand by the entirety of my articles for the New Republic using my real name.

I am Private Scott Thomas Beauchamp, a member of Alpha Company, 1/18 Infantry, Second Brigade Combat Team, First Infantry Division.

My pieces were always intended to provide my discreet view of the war; they were never intended as a reflection of the entire U.S. Military. I wanted Americans to have one soldier's view of events in Iraq.

It's been maddening, to say the least, to see the plausibility of events that I witnessed questioned by people who have never served in Iraq. I was initially reluctant to take the time out of my already insane schedule fighting an actual war in order to play some role in an ideological battle that I never wanted to join. That being said, my character, my experiences, and those of my comrades in arms have been called into question, and I believe that it is important to stand by my writing under my real name.

--Private Scott Thomas Beauchamp

It is either quite naive or just simply false for Beauchamp to have thought that his article would not be seen as a reflection of the entire U.S. Military by many.

It is also noted here that the plausibility of the events he described were questioned by people who HAVE served and ARE serving in Iraq.

And here is the Catch-22 - Beauchamp jumps on his bandwagon about how those who doubted the validity of his account somehow questioned his character, his experiences, and those of his comrades in arms. Okay then, if the accounts are true then his character and experiences are doubly in question and deserve to be investigated.

More

A Statement From Scott Thomas Beauchamp - TNR

Re: What's That Now - NR's The Corner

Scott Thomas Exposed - OPFOR

Scott Thomas, Franklin Foer, and The New Republic - Beatdowns All Around - Blackfive

Doubting Thomas: Simple Questions for the New Republic - Confederate Yankee

"Scott Thomas" Steps Out of the Shadows - Michelle Malkin

Scott Thomas Speaks - Power Line

Scott Thomas Revealed - Hot Air

Private Scott Thomas Beauchamp: Still Wondering About the MFA - Blackfive

Reaction From FOB Falcon - The Weekly Standard

Source: TNR Is A Lot More Worried Than They're Letting On - Ace of Spades HQ

Sir Real Scott Thomas - Beauchamp's Blog

22 July Washington Post - Bloggers Raise Red Flags Over New Republic's 'Baghdad Diarist' by Howard Kurtz.

The column in the New Republic, described as being penned by a U.S. soldier in Iraq, is filled with tales of petty, stomach-churning behavior.

The "Baghdad Diarist," writing under the pseudonym Scott Thomas, says he was "shocked by my own cruelty" as he recounts soldiers getting their kicks by running over dogs with Bradley Fighting Vehicles and playing with Iraqi children's skulls taken from a mass grave.

But now the liberal magazine, responding to questions raised online by the Weekly Standard and other conservative Web sites, is looking into whether the soldier's account in this and two earlier columns can be substantiated...

Marine reservist and freelance journalist Matt Sanchez received this response from the 4th ICBT Public Affairs Officer to an e-mail Sanchez sent concerning the "Thomas Affair":

Major Kirk Luedeke

Public Affairs Officer

4th IBCT, 1st ID

DRAGONS

Here are the facts as best I have established them, along with the actions I have taken here at Falcon.

1. I was notified of the New Republic blog entries yesterday (Friday) by documentarian JD Johannes, who had spent time with us as an embed in May. He was concerned about the reports, but also expressed doubt in their veracity. He provided the New Republic and Weekly Standard response to the blog entry links.

2. I was able to immediately refute the assertion that a mass graveyard of children's skeletons was found; an event such as this would have been reported during the construction of Coalition Outpost Ellis, the only such COP that exists in the area the blogger described (rural, south of BIAP).

3. The stories of the burned woman and hitting dogs with Bradleys can't be as decisively disputed, however, I have not encountered a woman matching that description at any time on Falcon since arriving here on 17 Feb. You would think that someone with such visible wounds would stand out in memorable fashion. This doesn't mean that she wasn't a visitor at some point, but I find the account of Soldiers mocking her dubious at best.

4. I immediately notified MAJ Lamb of MND-B PAO, who advised me to send him the link and pertinent information on the New Republic's blog posts, which I did. He informed me of his intent to engage the CENTCOM blog team to see if they could take action, and at the very least, make them aware of the situation.

5. I contacted the only unit in our brigade that has Bradleys, 1-18 IN, and advised their XO of the situation, recommending that they talk to their Soldiers about Army values and the Warrior ethos, reminding them of the rules for blogging in uniform and also reminding them of integrity and telling the truth. The bottom line: If you put something out there you should be —to put your name next to it and stand by it. That he and New Rpublic are insisting on anonymity is very telling here.

Per COL Boylan's request, I have prepared the following:

1. There was no mass grave found during the construction of any of our coalition outposts in the Rashid District at any time. Such a discovery would have prompted an investigation and close attention paid at levels higher than ours to making sure that the victims were properly interred and attempts would have been made to determine their identities. It is difficult to fathom that a unit's leadership would condone Soldiers disrespecting the remains of anyone in the fashion described.

2. Due to the threat of IEDs, our combat vehicles are driven professionally and in control at all times. To be driving erratically so as to hit dogs or other things would be to put the entire vehicle's crew at risk and would be gross dereliction of duty by the noncommissioned officer or officer in charge of the vehicle. Drivers aren't allowed to simply free-wheel their vehicles however they see fit, and they are *not* allowed to be moved anywhere with out a vehicle commander present to supervise the movement. Therefore- claims of vehicles leaving the roadways to hit animals are highly dubious, given the very real threat of IEDs and normal standards of conduct.

3. As for the alleged woman with severe burn scars, we have nobody matching that description here at FOB Falcon. As Soldiers, we practice the value of Respect: "Treat people as you want to be treated." If the blogger and his friends can't live the Army value of respect, I have little doubt that someone around them who does would have made an on-the-spot correction. The Falcon dining facility is not a spacious one. Anyone being rude, loud or raucous calls immediate attention to himself. It is hard to fathom that anyone would be able to get away with such callous behavior without somebody intervening and stopping it from happening.

More

"Shock Troops" - The New Republic

Note to Readers - TNR Editor

Fact or Fiction? - Weekly Standard

Stephen Glass Meets the Winter Soldiers - National Review

Who Is the 'Baghdad Diarist'? - ABC News

Who is TNR's Mysterious Author 'Scott Thomas'? - American Thinker

Johannes to Thomas, Radio Check, Over - Outside the Wire

Battle Buddies - Mudville Gazette

More Battle Buddies - Mudville Gazette

TNR Correspondent a Fake? - Blackfive

War Stories - DadManly

Doubting Thomas - Powerline

Literally: The Scott Thomas "Smoking Gun" - The Jawa Report

"Scott Thomas:" The New Winter Soldier? - Michelle Malkin

Both New Republic and Weekly Standard Missing Elementary Journalism - Democracy Project

Discuss at Small Wars Council

I have been studying and working with various tribes in Iraq for the last four years plus and am currently serving as the "tribal" advisor for II MEF in Anbar. Concerning recent commentary on US forces as a "tribe" - it is old news as far as I am concerned.

We are and have been a major if not the major "tribe" for the last four years. Paul Bremer, former head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, was referred to by Iraqi Sheikhs seeking an audience to pledge their loyalty and seeking patronage as the "Sheikh of Sheikhs" when they came to the palace in search of a meeting. I personally participated in coordinating a meeting with 400 Sheikhs and CPA officials for a traditional "tribal meeting" in Hillah four years ago.

We are engaged in a counterinsurgency in a tribal society. It has taken us four years to realize that we must execute operations within the existing cultural frame of reference. To quote T.E. Lawrence - Irregular warfare is more intellectual than a bayonet charge.

I've attached a reading list for executing counterinsurgency in a tribal society. Also attached is a PowerPoint brief that describes a methodology I developed on structure analysis to assist in gaining an appreciation for the operational environment.

The methodology is now in use in Anbar province and in the process of being "socialized" among the incoming MEF staff and commanders scheduled to replace the units currently serving in Anbar.

Reading List for Counterinsurgency in a Tribal Society

Researched and Compiled by William S. McCallister

Background

The design and execution of a counterinsurgency campaign in tribal society must reflect the opponent's cultural realities, his social norms and conventions of war and peacemaking. The fight in Anbar province is a "clash of martial cultures" and reflects two divergent concepts of victory and defeat and "rules of play". The conventions of war and peace for both sides are based on unique historical and social experience and are expressed in each side's stylized way of fighting and peacemaking. The central tenet in the design and execution of counterinsurgency operations is that it must take into consideration an opponent's cultural realities so as to effectively communicate intent.

The study of the "tribal terrain" is a challenge. The reason - comprehensive research materials on Iraqi tribal organization, tribal diplomacy, and the art of tribal war and peacemaking are sparse. The majority of reading materials therefore are general and regional in nature and require "reading between the lines" to gain an appreciation for tribal organizing principles, cultural operating codes, and the tribal art of war and peace. The material is intended to assist the student of the tribal art of war and peace in developing an analytic structure for assessing personal experiences, observations and unit after action reports. The ultimate objective is to assist the warfighter in assessing the effectiveness of counterinsurgency tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and cultural criteria to determine why certain approaches succeed or fail.

The reading list is organized into four major sections - Psychological Dimensions and Human Factors, Tribal Dynamics, the Arab Art of War, and Additional Readings.

Psychological Dimensions/Human Factors

Books

The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements by Eric Hoffer.

This book deals with some peculiarities common to all mass movements, be they religious movements, social revolutions or nationalist movements. Highlights certain essential characteristics which give all movements a family likeness.

Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies by Special Operations Research Office of the American University.

This book contains a detailed description of the organization and operations of underground movements with special attention to human motivation and behavior, the relation between the organizational structure of the underground, and the total insurgent movement.

The Multiple Identities of the Middle East by Bernard Lewis.

This book deals with the critical role of identity in the domestic, regional, and international tensions and conflicts of the Middle East today. It examines religion, race, and language, country, nation and state and shows how imported Western ideas such as liberalism, fascism, socialism, patriotism and nationalism influenced Middle Easterner's ancient notions of community, self-perceptions and aspirations.

Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq by Hanan Makiya.

This book describes how Saddam Hussein's "Ba'athist" Iraq was established, ruled and maintained by fear. The Ba'athist developed the politics of fear into an art form, one that ultimately served the purpose of legitimizing their rule by making large numbers of people complicit in the violence of the regime. The Iraqi Ba'athists were a wholly indigenous phenomenon, and the longevity of their rule can be understood only against the background of public acquiescence or acceptance of their authority. This book gives the reader an appreciation for the "ideology of violence" inherent in the numerous anti-Iraqi forces such as the 1920th Revolutionary Brigade and Iraqi insurgent groups affiliated with Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQIZ).

Articles

A Theory of Fundamentalism: An Inquiry into the Origin and Development of the Movement by Dr. Stephen C. Pelletiere.

The New Totalitarians: Social Identities and Radical Islamist Political Grand Strategy by Dr. Douglas J. Macdonald.

Martyrdom Operations and Their Apocalyptic Imagery by Professor Charles Strozier and Fabienne A. Laughlin.

Tribal Dynamics

This section focuses on Iraqi tribalism, such as tribal organizing principles and the dynamics that coordinate and regulate the behavior of intra- and inter-tribal and state relations. The readings are intended to introduce and facilitate further study of the complex relationship between tribes and the central government. This section is divided into seven sub-sections; tribal organization (principles and cultural operating codes), concepts of shame and honor, tribal warfare (causes of and how the tribe organizes for war), Islamic rulings in warfare which form the basis for the conventions of tribal war, concepts of truce in Islamic sources, tribal diplomacy and patronage.

1. Tribal Organization

Books

Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East edited by Faleh A. Jabar and Hosham Dawod.

This book is a compilation of papers presented at the 1999 ICF sponsored "Tribes and Power" seminar conducted at the School of Politics and Sociology, Birkbeck College, London University. The reader will gain an appreciation for the "tribal factor" which has not only been strengthened but has become decisively manifest in Iraq. Saddam Hussein reinstated an already active tribal value system and their tribal networks in mobilizing allegiances and in an attempt to restructure modern political social institutions. Tribal networks have not only endured but have taken new and varied forms.

The Emergence of States in a Tribal Society: Oman under Sa'id bin Taymur, 1932-1970 by Uzi Rabi.

The author presents a historically detailed but theoretically nuanced study of the evolution of Oman under the leadership of Sa'id bin Taymur. The book details the creation of a Unified Tribal State, an administration that unified Oman while negotiating with powerful tribal forces within Omani society. This book provides the reader with a theoretical framework to structure U.S. military -- tribal relationships in Iraq.

Power Point Presentation

Tribal Analysis Strategy, Iraq by William S. McCallister.

2. Concepts of Shame and Honor

Books

Honor: A History by James Bowman.

Research draws from a wealth of sources across many centuries to illuminate honor's curious history in Western culture. The author stresses that Western concepts of honor are different from that found elsewhere in the world.

Acquaintance with our own culture of honor is indispensable for understanding the tribal honor/shame culture of the Islamic world.

3. Tribal Warfare

Articles

Declaration of Tribal War by the Southern Confederation of Tribes.

The Iraq Insurgency: Anatomy of a Tribal Rebellion by William S. McCallister.

Victory in Iraq, One Tribe at a Time by Amatzia Baram.

The Role of Tribes at the Council on Foreign Relations website.

Strategic Implications of Communal Warfare in Iraq by W. Andrew Terril.

4. Islamic Rulings on Warfare

Articles

Islamic Rulings on Warfare by Youssef H. Aboul-Enein Sherifa Zuhur.

Just War: An Islamic Perspective by Imam Sayed Moustafa Al-Qazwini.

Islam and the Theology of Power by Khaled Abou El Fadl.

5. Concept of Truce in Islamic Sources

Articles

"The Concept of Hudna (Truce) in Islamic Sources" by Dr. Mustafa Abu Sway (Preliminary Article).

Rituals of Reconciliation: Arab-Islamic Perspective by George E. Irani and Nathan C. Funk.

6. Tribal Diplomacy

Books

The Political Language of Islam by Bernard Lewis.

This book traces the development of Islamic political language from the time of the Prophet to the present and highlights the difference between Western political thinking and theory and clarifies the perception, on-going discussion, and practice of politics in the Islamic world.

Articles

The Code of Hammurabi translated by L.W. King.

Babylonian Law--The Code of Hammurabi by Claude Hermann Walter Johns.

Islamic Mediation Techniques for Middle East by George E. Irani.

Negotiating in the Bazaar by Moshe Sharon

Islamic Army in Iraq Pursues Strategy of Negotiation and Violence by Lydia Khalil.

Distrust Breaks the Bonds of a Baghdad Neighborhood in Mixed Area, Violence Defies Peace Efforts by Sudarsan Raghavan.

Important Islamic Terms, Concepts and Definitions at the Living Islam website.

7. Patronage

Articles

Hereditary Republics in Arab States by Brian Whitaker.

Legal and Judicial Reform in the Arab World: A Primer by Sharif Ali Zu'bi and Zeid D. Hanania.

The Arab Art of War

Arab insurgency history and theory draws on its own unique dynamic and historical experiences. An appreciation for our opponent's cultural perspective on insurgency warfare is key in tailoring our own counterinsurgency campaign. Three Arab insurgency models are of particular interest: Algeria, Hezbollah, and the Palestinian Intifada. The inclusion of the "Battles of Islam" during the time of the Prophet Muhammad in this section is intended to give the reader an appreciation for the tribal warfare "ideal" and similarities to classical insurgency concepts. Also included in this section is the work of Sayyid Qutb, regarded as the architect and strategist in the development of modern Jihadi Salafi ideology. He has been cited as the figure that has most influenced the al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden.

Books

The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Conflict by Dilip Hiro.

This book details the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq conflict; the longest conventional war in the 20th century. The Iran-Iraq conflict was rooted in the competition and rivalry between Iran and Iraq going back to the days of the Ottoman Turkish empire (1517-1918) and the Persian empire under the Safavids (1501-1722). This book gives the reader a historical appreciation of present-day Iraqi politics and Iranian intervention in Iraq. The nature of this competition and rivalry remains unaltered, only the context in which it occurs has changed.

Milestones by Sayyid Qutb.

In true Salafi style, Qutb re-analyzed the Quran to draw inspiration for present day Jihadi Salafi ideology. He studied the methods the Prophet Muhammad and his jamaat (movement) used to realize their own jahili society. Sayyid Qutb believed that God had revealed his plan to Muhammad in a specific sequence (hence 'Milestones' or 'Signposts' on the Road), which the contemporary jamaat needs to follow if it is to restore the Muslim world to its past glory.

Articles

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria by Constantin Melnik (April 23, 1964).

Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency by Roger Trinquier.

Islamist Terrorism in Northwestern Africa: A "Thorn in the Neck" of the United States? by Emily Hunt.

The "Islamist Terrorism in Northwestern Africa" article introduces the Algeria based Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC)". The GSPC is a radical Algerian network, allied with al-Qaeda. Although relatively unknown in the United States, the GSPC represents one of the top terrorist threats in the northwestern corridor of Africa with connections in Europe, as well as aspiring militant groups in the United States.

Hezbollah (Power Point Presentation) by Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S.).

Hezbollah by Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S).

Hezbollah Command Leadership: It's Structure, Decision-Making and Relationship with Iranian Clergy and Institutions by Magnus Ranstorp.

An understanding of Hezbollah's structure provides a greater insight into the organization, function and roles of the Organization of the Martyr Sadr (OMS) and its military wing Jaysh al-Mahdi and its links to Hezbollah.

Hezbollah's External Support Network in West Africa and Latin America by Douglas Farah.

The Palestinian Intifada: An Effective Strategy? by James F. Miskel.

Hamas and Hezbollah: The Radical Challenge to Israel in the Occupied Territories by Dr. Stephen C. Pelletiere

Insurgency in Iraq: A Historical Perspective by Dr. Ian F.W. Beckett.

Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency by Dr. Max G. Manwaring

The Battles of Islam at the Official Classical Islam website.

Inclusion of this website is intended to promote the study of warfighting and diplomacy during Islam's formative years, as well as to encourage discussion as to the Prophet Muhammad's exploitation of insurgency tenets in Islam's ascendancy and defeat of larger, more powerful tribal confederations. Present day Salafist operations in Iraq and around the globe parallel Muhammad's strategy of conquest. A closer study of Osama Bin Laden's strategy and operations of al-Qaeda point to similarities with the Prophet Muhammad's exploitation of classical insurgency concepts. An appreciation for the linkages over time provides insight into the strategic blueprint, ideational foundations, policy choices, and tactics, techniques and procedures of the Salafist "Islamic State of Iraq".

Additional Readings

Tribal power is inversely related to the strength of the central government. When the central government is strong, tribal power is diminished. The core competencies of a functioning state are its military, police, civil service and judicial system. In a tribal society, when the central government is weak or non-existent and unable to fulfill its responsibilities, the tribal system will assume this function. The following articles are provided to assess the ability of local government to realize its core competencies and to monitor the strength of tribal power.

Articles

State Collapse and Ethnic Violence: Toward a Predictive Model by Pauline H. Baker and John A. Ausink.

Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators by Robert I. Rotberg.

War Making and State Making as Organized Crime by Charles Tilly.

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William S. McCallister is a retired military officer. He has worked extensively in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. While on active duty, Mr. McCallister served in numerous special operations assignments specializing in civil-military, psychological and information operations. He is a published author in military affairs and tribal warfare and has guest lectured at Johns Hopkins University and presented numerous papers at academic and government sponsored conferences such as the Watson Institute, Brown University; Department of the Navy Science and Technology and DARPA; and the Central Intelligence Agency. He has also appeared as a guest on National Public Radio (NPR). Mr. McCallister is currently employed as a senior consultant for Applied Knowledge International (AKI) in Iraq. He continues to study current events in Iraq in tribal terms, including the tribal art of war and peace, tribal mediation processes, development of tribal centers of power, and tribal influence in political developments. He has applied his study of tribal culture in assessing Iraqi reconstruction efforts, as well as insurgency and counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and the Global War on Terror.