Small Wars Journal

Blogger's Roundtable: PRTs in Iraq

Sat, 08/04/2007 - 8:32am
The Small Wars Journal / Small Wars Council participated in a Blogger's Roundtable on Friday with Philip Reeker, US Embassy, Baghdad. The subject was Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq.

Participants included Andrew Lubin of On Point, Grim of Blackfive, Dave Dilegge of Small Wars Journal / Small Wars Council, Austin Bay, Richard Fernandez of The Belmont Club, David Axe of Aviation Week, Charlie Quidnunc of Wizbang and Jason Sigger of Armchair Generalist.

As soon as DoD posts the transcript of this roundtable we will place a link here.

SWJ BLUF (On Edit - this is my take-away from the roundtable - opinion on the matter)

The PRTs are a critical component of the population-centric "new strategy" for Iraq to include one of its tactical elements -- "the surge". Criticisms of those executing the grassroots (local level) nature of the PRT program are not only unwarranted, they are detrimental to the success of ongoing operations.

A reality check boils down to reconciliation on a national level is not moving forward -- those "in-country" are painfully aware of the "Washington Clock" and are exploiting the only viable option available - working at the local level to provide at least a solid base in terms of rule of law, infrastructure, economic development, governance, and public diplomacy. National-level reconciliation might very well be enabled by these grassroots efforts.

Hindsight 20 / 20 as it is, maybe a bottom-up approach should have been a lynchpin of OIF from the very beginning.

Mr. Reeker led off the roundtable with an overview of the PRT program. See this earlier SWJ post for PRT background details.

SWJ Blogger Roundtable Notes

Q. Normal makeup of a PRT and specifics on Anbar PRT? (On Point)

A. Constant challenge of security vs. openness. Do what you can, but for the most part PRTs can get out with escorts. DoS security regulations not designed for Iraq, wouldn't even be in Iraq if regulations were adhered to. But, the military can get out and about so State is too per Amb. Crocker -- it is a priority.

Makeup of PRTs differ from one province to another. Based on needs of particular team. PRTs can ask for what they want. Typical / standard -- Civilian leader, Deputy (military), Rule of Law Coordinator, Economic Advisor, Agriculture Advisor, Security, Civil Engineering, Local Governance Team, Public Diplomacy Assistant. Again, each PRT differs depending on location, on-ground sit and whether embedded with BCT or not.

Q. PRT recruiting process - needs? (Blackfive)

A. Will get back with contact in Washington for PRT recruiting. Mil-Bloggers have an audience with backgrounds / experience that would be good for PRTs.

Q. Are PRTs engaged in any direct political work to influence the grassroots to marry up with the higher level political goals of the United States and Iraq? (Belmont Club)

A. Political process has been much more difficult than anticipated. But on the local level there have been some major positives steps. Anbar -- reconciliation (Tribal Chiefs accommodations -- common interests). Whether local progress can seep into central government efforts is a very good question -- very hard. Result of legacy Baathist rule that destroyed / disrupted social structures. Progress requires time.

Q. PRT training and / or education prior to deployment? (Small Wars Journal)

A. Will follow up with more details. They go through a PRT course at possibly the Foreign Service Institute, security course (s). Trying to add more of culture / regional courses. Specialized members bring their expertise with them. Once they get in Iraq they go through orientation training at the Embassy. When join PRT they enjoy "being on their own" -- setting their own priorities.

Q. Goldwater / Nichols II for Civilian Agencies (Interagency) -- would it be of use now in Iraq? (Austin Bay)

A. Worthy points, initiative to create rapid reaction capability at State (Amb. Pascal's earlier efforts -- Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization). Teams with specialization (like military) and capability to rapidly deploy. Identified as what we need -- but do not give up traditional diplomacy. State does not have the personnel / resources like the military. State stepping up to the challenge. Efforts to integrate USAID, Treasury, Justice, etc. New territory for State, whatever comes out of Iraq we will have learned some new ways of doing things in the Interagency realm.

Q. Do we have the time to be doing the grassroots efforts while learning 3 ½ years into OIF? (Austin Bay)

A. Much harder than many people anticipated -- time is an issue. Hindsight is 20 / 20, we are were we are and we are on it -- do what we can do to help the Iraqis.

Q. Grassroots effort to reform Iraq at the local level is doomed until national reconciliation, how do you react to that assessment that "grassroots" is a wasted effort? (Aviation Week)

A. We've seen progress at the local level. Is it enough? No, but if you only try to reform from the national level outwards that won't work either. So we've gone back to the most basic elements -- tribes, family. No perfect answers but you have to think about it from both ends. PRTs designed to go out to the local level to get things moving. Also working the central level.

Q. How do those in the opinion-writing business who support the surge explain how would things be so much better if we stay around 18-24 months. Do you need a diplomacy surge? (Whizbang)

A. The diplomatic surge, if you want to call it that, was designed for three phases until the end of the year, up to 600 people on staff in the PRTs. That goes on while we try to focus on getting the Iraqis to take advantage of the surge.

Update: Blogger's Roundtables and PRTs in Iraq - MountainRunner

... I want to talk about the loop I didn't even know existed three weeks ago. The loop is DOD's connection to new media, providing information directly to influential bloggers as well as traditional media. It is doing a tremendous job of making resources available to new thought leaders that have either direct or (often deep) indirect connections to traditional media, not to mention John Q. Public in the US and around the world.

DOD's outreach program is smartly run. The Chief of New Media Operations, Charles "Jack" Holt, is an old hand at public affairs and in personal conversations gets the perception problems of the US military with both the domestic US audience and where they are operating. He knows and has seen Americans on deployment in hotspots in the Former Yugoslavia Republic, as it true today and even when things were safer in Iraq, American forces roll up in full battle rattle ready to engage the enemy and not the public. It is the latter that requires the engagement and the attention.

Compare this effort by the DOD by State's. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams, the topic of the Friday, Aug 4 call, is focused on this engagement with the people, resulting in what Grim at Blackfive.net noted was an unusual appearance of State on the DOD conference call. But where else would the PRTs go to get the word out? State isn't doing outreach. They don't even know how. Karen Hughes' office, the Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, uses "four or five" bloggers to surf the blogosphere, find misleading and wrong statement, and correct them with official US government statements.

Pressured to do the same, DOD's Jack Holt decided to provide access to thought leaders in the blogosphere directly, providing unvarnished, unfiltered information into the debate...

Selected PRT Background Links

Provincial Reconstruction Teams - Department of State Fact Sheet

Expanded Provincial Reconstruction Teams Speed the Transition to Self-Reliance - White House Fact Sheet

Provincial Reconstruction Teams - Wikipedia

Initial Benchmark Assessment Report - White House

Reconstruction in Iraq: The Uncertain Way Ahead - Center for Strategic and International Studies

Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq - United States Institute of Peace

Military Must Fill Iraq Civilian Jobs - Washington Post

Pentagon to Fill Iraq Reconstruction Jobs Temporarily - New York Times

Negroponte Advises New Diplomats to Seek Challenging Posts - New York Times

Iraq Rebuilding Short on Qualified Civilians - Washington Post

The President's Civil Reserve Corps - MountainRunner

Iraq- PRTs Help Iraqis with Rule of Law and Connecting With Central Government - Civil-Military Relations Blog

Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project - PCR Project Blog

Interagency Transformation, Education & AAR - National Defense University

Agency for International Development - Department of State

Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization - Department of State

SWJ Reference Library Interagency Page

Current PRT Job Opportunities - Department of State

Current PRT Job Opportunities - Department of Defense

Talk About It

Discuss at Small Wars Council

OIF Update Brief - 3 August 07

Fri, 08/03/2007 - 7:53pm

AFPS - Jim Garamone: Speaking to Pentagon reporters via teleconference from Ramadi, the capital of Iraq's Anbar province, Army Col. John Charlton, commander of 1st Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, said counterinsurgencies are fought and won "neighborhood by neighborhood, with the focus on protecting the population and improving conditions in the community."

The turnaround in Anbar province has been remarkable, the colonel said. Ramadi was the center of the insurgency a few short months ago. When the brigade arrived in the province, insurgents launched an average of between 30 and 35 attacks per day. "Now our average is one attack a day or less," Charlton said. "We have experienced entire weeks with zero attacks in our area and have ... a total of more than 80 days with no attacks in the city."

Charlton attributes this success to the close relationship that has developed between Iraqis and coalition and Iraqi forces. He said Iraqi security forces have been receiving tips from the population and have uncovered hundreds of arms caches.

It was not easy to get to this point, he said. When the brigade arrived eight months ago, soldiers and Marines launched large-scale operations to drive al Qaeda in Iraq and insurgents out of the city. Once that was accomplished, the command moved to holding the areas they had liberated. They established joint security stations to help secure and stabilize communities. At the stations, coalition and Iraqi security forces live side by side. They patrol together and learn from each other.

The population sees this interaction, and this establishes the perception of security in the minds of the population, Charlton explained. "Once they feel safe, the people begin to provide intelligence to the police, and security continues to improve steadily," he said.

Construction and infrastructure improvements also must occur in the areas for the efforts to be successful. "This is done through day-labor programs, small-business development, engagement with the local sheikhs and imams, and information operations focused specifically on that community," the colonel said.

He noted that an embedded provincial reconstruction team in the brigade is helping to build the economy and improve governance efforts in the province.

But al Qaeda has not given up. They have been defeated and driven from the province, but they want to get back, the colonel said. After the unit received intelligence reports that al Qaeda was going to try to infiltrate back into Ramadi, soldiers and Marines increased patrols in the south and found them June 30.

"There were about 60 to 70 well-equipped and well-trained terrorists who were moving towards the city in two large trucks," Charlton said. "They all had new equipment, weapons, and many were wearing suicide belts.

The terrorists' targets were Iraqi police and tribal leaders whose influence and help are crucial to the counterinsurgency effort. "We attacked these terrorists using ground forces and attack helicopters, resulting in the destruction of that force," Charlton said. "If this force had made it into the city, it would have been a tremendous victory for al Qaeda. We successfully defeated their attack, but we know that they will try again in the future."

Charlton said he is impressed with the performance of the Iraqi police and soldiers in his region. "Every day they get better at performing their security operations; most importantly, they are making their presence known and felt in the region," he said.

Police are recruited locally and stay in their cities and towns. Charlton said they are invaluable in identifying who belongs in the region and who is out of place. "A year ago, there were less than 200 police officers operating in two police stations here in Ramadi," he said. "That number has grown to approximately 7,400 officers operating in more than 30 police stations and substations throughout our area."

He said the challenge is ensuring the police are fully equipped, paid and consolidated into police stations. The police rely heavily on coalition logistics and support. "We expect the equipment issues to improve soon, and we are working hard to get their logistics and command-and-control systems in place," he said. "One thing that is not lacking is the courage and the dedication of the Iraqi police and the Iraqi army in al Anbar."

The fight for Iraqi soldiers and police in Anbar is personal, the colonel said. "They know that al Qaeda is targeting them, their families and their tribes," he said.

Charlton also cited support the coalition has received from tribal leaders and sheikhs. "Their support of coalition troops and their distaste for al Qaeda has been incredibly helpful," he said. "If a tribal leader tells members of the tribe to join the security forces, they will join the security forces. Their support has been absolutely phenomenal."

Reconstruction and governance are priorities for the command, and progress is being made in these areas, the colonel said. There was no city government before April. In three months, the government has been established and leaders are providing essential services to the population. "In areas that were battlefields only a few months ago, city electrical employees are now repairing transformers and power lines; sanitation workers are fixing sewer leaks caused by the hundreds of buried (improvised explosive devices) that have gone off over the last few years," Charlton said.

Iraqis have repaired most of the electrical grid inside the city, and they have cleared about 50 percent of the rubble from battle damage.

More:

3 August Blogger Roundtable with COL Charlton - Transcript

3 August Blogger Roundtable with COL Charlton - Audio

Organizing for Counterinsurgency at the Company and Platoon Level

Thu, 08/02/2007 - 2:30pm
Captain Jeremy Gwinn, US Army

In today's military, the requirement to conduct tasks far outside traditional specialties is an accepted reality. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have taught leaders across the services the need for flexibility and creativity both in action and organization. The recently published FM 3-24 (MCWP 3-33.5) Counterinsurgency (COIN) manual provides an excellent framework for leaders to understand the demands of the COIN environment and draw from recent lessons. With regard to organizing for COIN, the manual makes several valuable recommendations such as establishing a company level intelligence section and identifying a political and cultural advisor. My purpose here is to go one step further, providing additional, specific recommendations for company level leaders organizing for counterinsurgency operations. Some of the ideas presented involve actual changes to task organization, while others involve developing skills internally that, by doctrine, only exist in specialized attachments. These steps are by no means prescriptive, but intended as a starting point for discussion among officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) at the company level.

Why Organize for COIN?

The first step to optimizing the platoon or company organization for a COIN mission is an understanding of why reorganization is necessary. Units generally deploy as Brigade Combat Teams or similar task forces with a full complement of support: Civil Affairs (CA) Teams, Tactical Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Teams, Tactical Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Teams, as well as organic S2 (intelligence) sections, etc. These assets are task organized to the battalion and sometimes company level so that everyone gets his slice of support. Then why the necessity to develop these capabilities among infantrymen, tank crewmen, military policemen, or anyone else conducting COIN?

1. The special assets will not always be available. Though the attachments are task organized down, they are typically not available to a company commander or platoon leader on-call 24 hours a day. For instance, a company commander can receive CA team support with several days lead time to perform a major assessment or humanitarian distribution. If, however, in the course of a patrol, a platoon leader discovers a small school in serious need of repair or re-supply, he would probably not have a CA officer nearby to help assess the need. If the school sits in a key location of popular support for the insurgency, then a good assessment conducted at the platoon level with rapid follow-through of support may deal a harsher blow to the enemy than any tactical victory. The pace of operations for units in Iraq and Afghanistan is simply too fast to always say, "We'll request CA and get out here next week." If this is the case, the unit will constantly be playing catch-up.

2. The importance of the special roles must be internalized by every counterinsurgency Soldier. When the PSYOP team, HUMINT team, and CA team are the only ones doing PSYOP, HUMINT, and CA, riflemen in the platoons tend not to give these roles much thought. In these cases, our Soldiers, who probably know the area and the people better than anyone else, become reduced to just pulling security for the attachments while they do their jobs. When these capabilities are developed internally, Soldiers and their leaders understand that their jobs are much more than just clearing buildings and engaging targets. They will take ownership of these additional responsibilities. Even the most junior rifleman should understand that the hundreds of interactions he has each day with locals can have more impact on the attitudes of the population than anything the task force PSYOP officer could do. The same is true in many other areas such as intelligence collection, media interaction, CA, and others.

3. An organic unit will perform better than an ad hoc one. For obvious reasons, an organic company or platoon will encounter less friction than one that is cobbled together, often at the last minute. Maneuver units and their habitual attachments still need to train together and be prepared to operate as a team, because there will be times that it is necessary. Still, if a leader can reduce the number of attachments without losing critical capabilities, he can dramatically reduce risk and increase the odds of success. All too often, a platoon or company departs for an operation with so many attachments that the ungainly convoy resembles a battalion. Not only does such an operation create an unnecessarily large signature, it is difficult to control and account for, especially in enemy contact.

Special Operations Forces have long understood the need for multiple roles and special skills at the small-unit level. Due to the decentralized nature and low-level (usually section or platoon) of our operations in the COIN environment, our conventional units are well-advised to follow suit. This does not mean that attachment support is no longer needed at company level and below. Men and women in these units are specially trained and absolutely critical to success. We can, however, do better by developing similar capabilities organically and determining a threshold for how and when to use the attachments.

Civil Affairs

FM 3-24 recommends that platoons and companies create a political and cultural advisor position. This role can be combined with a CA specialist position. At company level, the duty typically falls to the Fire Support Officer (FSO). At the platoon level, however, the CA role breaks down. In some cases, the job may fall to the Forward Observer, but much of the time, this man is ill-suited to the responsibility. Leaders should thoughtfully select a Soldier based on maturity and organizational skills, not just on rank or Military Occupational Specialty. At the platoon level, duties would include:

1. Maintaining a file on key leaders (civil and religious) in the Area of Operations (AO).

2. Note-taking for the platoon leader during interactions.

3. Conducting simple need assessments and compiling for project nomination.

4. Organizing small quick-impact packages.

5. Reporting CA related information to the Company FSO

Regardless of rank, this Soldier should report directly to the platoon leader for operational purposes.

To facilitate downward information flow, the company and platoon CA specialists can give briefings on relevant political or cultural information and fulfill information requests, both tasks which leaders unnecessarily do themselves much of the time. In preparing Soldiers for this duty, the unit's CA team is an invaluable asset, and lateral information flow between the unit and the team should be continuous. Perhaps the most important thing that company and platoon CA specialists should learn from the unit's CAT-A is the project nomination process. Because most projects must be nominated and tracked through traditional CA channels, these Soldiers should understand how to identify potential projects and what information will be required.

Psychological Operations

The role of PSYOP within our companies and platoons will, by their nature, be less well-defined than that of CA. The three critical PSYOP capabilities at this level are:

1. Spread a message through face to face interaction.

2. Exploit an event for information purposes.

3. Prevent the enemy from exploiting an event for his information purposes.

The capability to spread a message is every Soldier's responsibility. The leader's responsibility is ensuring the content and consistency of the message. In COIN operations, information and perception are often more important to achieving success than tactical wins. For this reason, a Soldier should know his unit's information themes before departing on patrol as assuredly as he knows where his ammunition is located. Even though only key leaders generally have interpreters, every Soldier walking the streets can convey a powerful message through his actions and gestures. Arm this man with a few key phrases in the local language and the capability is multiplied.

Exploiting an event, such as a terrorist attack or a coalition operation, is absolutely critical in the counterinsurgency fight. In fact, the information effort that follows an action is often more important that the action itself. This is not license to lie or use excessive spin, which will be seen through and must be avoided, but rather a requirement to tell our side of the story as rapidly and persuasively as possible. US forces should be assured that if they fail to do so, the insurgents will seize the initiative with their own story, unconstrained by the truth.

Company level leaders must not defer this responsibility to the PSYOP team. By preparing and organizing for PSYOP, company commanders and platoon leaders can take advantage of their superior knowledge of the area, people, and events to take the initiative in the information battle. For example, in neighborhoods that experience frequent Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks, the local population undoubtedly pays a price in civilian wounded and property damage. Even though the IEDs are clearly the work of insurgents, the enemy could easily exploit the events to his favor, creating the impression that the US presence degrades neighborhood safety. If US forces respond to IED attacks with undisciplined and indiscriminate force, then the insurgent message is strengthened. The US unit must persuasively disseminate its own message: the insurgents have no regard for the safety and property of the population. Combined with medical assistance to the civilian wounded and presented in a sincere and sympathetic manner, the message can be powerful. While the temptation exists for the platoon leader or company commander to be the primary communicator in these situations because they have interpreters, this is not ideal. The platoon leader must coordinate the activities of the entire platoon. Instead, identify a team or squad to disseminate the message using the platoon leader's interpreter. Depending on the situation, the team may go door to door in the surrounding area or just talk to people gathered in the street. Other duties that should be delegated by the platoon leader are medical aid, crater analysis, and, of course, security. These duties will probably rotate and may not even be identified ahead of time. They key is that the platoon leader and his NCOs understand those actions that must be quickly accomplished after an exploitable event takes place.

Media Affairs

For interacting with members of the media, commanders cannot rely only on themselves and other company senior leaders. On the contrary, every Soldier should be comfortable and trusted in this important role. When embedded journalists are placed with a commander or platoon leader, as is usually the case, they will actively seek out opportunities to talk to the lower ranks. This is due to the common perception among the media that an officer or senior NCO will only regurgitate talking points and not speak honestly or candidly. Likewise, simply giving our junior Soldiers a list of media talking points is insufficient. The more a journalist perceives an attempt by leadership to direct the comments of the lower ranks, the more he will believe the unit has something to hide. The resulting story will reflect this bias. We should encourage (and train) our men to speak candidly to the media within the bounds of operational security, at the same time ensuring they understand that it is not the time to vent frustrations. The vast majority of Soldiers are proud of the work they do in combat, and should use media interactions to focus on their accomplishments and those of their unit, keeping comments within the scope of his duty position.

Intelligence

With few exceptions, collection at company level and below will be HUMINT. Our Soldiers constitute an invaluable collection asset by what they observe on a daily basis. The value of their observations, however, depends on whether they know what to look for. Requirements will constantly change, so leaders should implement a routine of disseminating information requirements and reporting observations during and after the mission.

The most valuable collection asset in the COIN environment is the local population. Leaders should strive to develop relationships with —locals, placing a priority on the safety of the informant and not attempting to rush the process. In places where mobile phone service is available, make maximum use of this resource for communicating with local contacts. The availability of Micro/Small Rewards or similar funds can also be helpful, but in many cases, locals are un—to accept money for assistance, due to feelings of guilt and increased danger if they are officially in the pay of US forces. While non-Tactical HUMINT Team units are generally not authorized to develop source networks, they can still build relationships that glean useful information about the population and the enemy. Leaders should rely on judgment to determine when a relationship reaches the point where the contact should be passed on to the Tactical HUMINT Team as a potential source, and the Tactical HUMINT Team can help determine this threshold.

Effective intelligence analysis at the company and platoon level means maintaining a current understanding of the situation in the unit's AO. The goal is to paint a nuanced picture of attitudes, intentions, and how the enemy operates with relation to the population and terrain. The picture should be a composite of all available information, including, most importantly, the knowledge contained within the company. When done properly, this product will surpass any Situation Template (SITEMP) created by the battalion S2. For this reason, SITEMPs at all levels should be driven from the bottom-up and company commanders should feed their own analysis to the S2. Some steps to help achieve the desired result are:

1. Regular debriefs at squad and platoon level.

2. Open discussions among company key leaders (at least platoon sergeant and above). A less formal setting will tend to illicit more thoughtful analysis and debate about the enemy situation.

3. Maintain a company graphic SITEMP as an evolving product. Avoid focusing on historical events. Strive to interpret enemy logistics and attack patterns, as well as attitudes and intentions of both the enemy and the population.

Intelligence analysis is one area that is so critical, the company commander may choose not to delegate, provided he has received sufficient input from below. The FSO will likely assist, as he is heavily involved in the battalion targeting process, but it is ultimately a commander responsibility. Good analysis at the company level will naturally lead to bottom-up target nomination, so the FSO should be prepared to build target packets for input to battalion. Additionally, the FSO can be helpful in tracking local contacts and building profiles on potential targets.

Outside of the company, information and intelligence flow is equally critical. Platoon leaders and platoon sergeants should be comfortable not only interacting with counterparts from other companies, but also with members of the battalion S2 section. The company commander need not be an information bottleneck, so he should not be the only member of the company permitted to ask the S2 or his staff a question.

Advising Local Military and Police Forces

Even if the unit is not specifically tasked with a MiTT (Military Transition Team) mission, they will likely have occasion to conduct combined operations with local forces. These operations can be highly effective and preferable to US-pure operations due to the local knowledge of the indigenous forces and greater likelihood of acceptance by the local population. At the same time, many of the local military and police forces in Iraq and Afghanistan still require mentorship and supervision to behave professionally, lest combined operations create a worsened impression of both indigenous and US forces.

The issue of command structure in combined operations can be sensitive. As a general rule, US company commanders will not have direct command over the local force, but should seek a partnered relationship with the indigenous commander. Such a relationship can clearly raise unity of command concerns. As with so much else in COIN, no definitive solution exists. Instead, US commanders must artfully strike a balance between unity of command and the need to respect the authority of the local commander. In organizing and preparing for these operations, commanders should consider some basic tips:

1. Let the local force take the main effort. For actions on the objective (as in a raid or cordon and search), put a small group of US Soldiers (no more than a fire team in any one place) with the locals to advise, but do not undermine the authority of the indigenous leader.

2. Give the local forces the lead on tactical questioning and interrogation, while monitoring the process closely.

3. Take advantage of US vehicles' superior protective capability when determining convoy placement.

4. Keep radio communication with the leader of the local forces during an operation. This sounds obvious, but is often not done. The local forces can usually spare a radio for a US leader's interpreter to monitor.

5. In the planning process with local forces, be very specific regarding level of force to be used and measures to minimize property damage. They will try hard to impress their US partners, but in the absence of guidance tend to err on the side of too much force and too much damage.

6. Conduct prior coordination with the MiTT to avoid redundancy and confusion. These teams are generally small and not sufficiently manned to provide supervision in multiple locations during an operation. If a local military or police unit does not have US advisors, then working to establish a relationship for combined operations is even more critical.

As a guiding principle, US commanders should let the indigenous forces do as much as possible, even though the US tendency is often to try to do it all ourselves. The presence of indigenous forces in an operation should not merely be a superficial attempt to give it a "local face". Mission success for combined operations can be defined as meeting tactical objectives while furthering the capabilities and perception among the populace of the indigenous force.

Conclusion

Our conventional forces have been conducting counterinsurgency operations for over five years and have adapted tremendously well to the unconventional environment. Even units that received no specific COIN training prior to deployment have, in the great tradition of our military, improvised and adapted in the course of ongoing operations.

Our training centers are now providing deploying task forces an incredibly realistic counterinsurgency experience prior to deployment, and the onus is on junior leaders to adapt their organizations before they arrive in combat. The effectiveness of pre-deployment training is multiplied when companies and platoons develop specialized capabilities organically. This is the primary level of activity in counterinsurgency and the level where tactical wins or losses contribute to the strategic outcome.

CPT Gwinn has commanded an infantry company in Afghanistan and Iraq with the Army's 10th Mountain Division, and is currently attending graduate school en route to instruct at West Point.

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Discuss at Small Wars Council

Iraq Weekly Briefing: Reconstruction, Economic and Political Update

Wed, 08/01/2007 - 2:28pm

Paul Brinkley, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, and Philip Reeker, US Embassy, Baghdad, join BG Kevin Bergner, Multi-National Force-Iraq spokesman, in an expansion of the normal weekly Iraq update. Bergner starts off with a security update then turns over to Reeker and Brinkley who discuss reconstruction, economic and political efforts underway to assist the government of Iraq. Of note - Brinkley provides a detailed update on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Q&A follows the formal brief.

SWJ PRT Briefing Notes:

- Unique experience in that the civilian and military sides are working so close together and a perfect example is the PRTs

- PRTs are an important focus of the overall mission in Iraq

- PRTs: Small civilian-military units designed to assist local and provincial governments to govern effectively and deliver essential services

- PRTs designed to bolster moderates, promote reconciliation, support counterinsurgency operations, foster development and build the capacity of local government officials to perform their duties

- Emphasis on shaping the political environment rather than building infrastructure

- Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) and PRTs work together as one team receiving guidance from Amb. Crocker and Gen. Petraeus

- BCT commander has lead for security and movement

- PRT leader has responsibility for political, reconstruction and economic issues

- PRTs are joint coalition efforts. Includes civilian and military members from U.K., Italy and Korea

- PRTs help extend reach of Iraqi government in key provinces and help build the stability necessary for full-turnover to Iraqi control

- Empowers the provincial governments

- Iraqis lead process on project funding and implementation

- PRTs act as a "kick-start" for developmental processes

- PRTs support decentralization of government services

- Five PRT thematic areas of focus: rule of law, infrastructure, economic development, governance, and public diplomacy

- "Short-term solutions to long-term development challenges"

- 25 PRTs to-date: 10 original full-sized teams (30-60 personnel), 5 smaller teams (4-14 personnel) and 10 new embedded teams (up to 8 and adding specialists)

- Numbers do not include military movement and support personnel

- Looking at adding additional teams as necessary / requested

Selected PRT Background Links:

Provincial Reconstruction Teams - Department of State Fact Sheet

Expanded Provincial Reconstruction Teams Speed the Transition to Self-Reliance - White House Fact Sheet

Provincial Reconstruction Teams - Wikipedia

Initial Benchmark Assessment Report - White House

Reconstruction in Iraq: The Uncertain Way Ahead - Center for Strategic and International Studies

Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq - United States Institute of Peace

Military Must Fill Iraq Civilian Jobs - Washington Post

Pentagon to Fill Iraq Reconstruction Jobs Temporarily - New York Times

Negroponte Advises New Diplomats to Seek Challenging Posts - New York Times

Iraq Rebuilding Short on Qualified Civilians - Washington Post

Iraq- PRTs Help Iraqis with Rule of Law and Connecting With Central Government - Civil-Military Relations Blog

Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle? - Parameters

The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified - United States Institute of Peace

Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Military Relations with International and Nongovernmental Organizations in Afghanistan - United States Institute of Peace

Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project - PCR Project Blog

Interagency Transformation, Education & AAR - National Defense University

Agency for International Development - Department of State

Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization - Department of State

Humanitarian Information Unit - Department of State

SWJ Reference Library Interagency Page

Current PRT Job Opportunities - Department of State

Current PRT Job Opportunities - Department of Defense

Withdrawal from Iraq

Mon, 07/30/2007 - 9:10pm
Statement of the Honorable Francis J. West, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives

Subject: Withdrawal from Iraq

July 25, 2007

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member and Members: It is an honor to appear before this subcommittee. The subject today is "Alternatives for Iraq". The President and the Congress agree about the desirability of a withdrawal of US forces; the issue is under what conditions. It makes a vast difference to our self-esteem as a nation, to our reputation around the world and to the morale of our enemies whether we say we are withdrawing because the Iraqi forces have improved or because we have given up.

That issue towers above any discussion of tactics, logistics diplomacy or even timing. The Iraqi Study Group and former Secretary of State Kissinger have suggested that negotiations might yield an honorable withdrawal - some sort of compromise that extracts American soldiers while not precipitating a collapse inside Iraq. But it's not clear what convergence of interests with Iran or Syria would persuade them to cease supporting insurgents. And inside Iraq, the Jesh al Mahdi extremists and al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) must be destroyed, not placated.

Separate from AQI, though, there are a dozen other Iraqi insurgent groups. At the local level, there have been productive negotiations with the tribes, undoubtedly including some of these insurgents. These bottom-up understandings, focused against AQI, occurred because military action changed the calculus of the tribes about who was going to win. Successful negotiations flowed from battlefield success, not the other way around.

In Anbar, our commander, Major General Walt Gaskin, believes we have turned the corner, with weekly incidents dropping from 428 in July of '06 to 98 in July of '07. In Baghdad and its outskirts, that's exactly what General Petraeus intends to do with his surge strategy - bring security to the local level and break the cycle of violence.

America is divided between two schools of thought about Iraq. The first school - let's call them the Anti-Terror Camp - identifies the jihadists as the main enemy. General Petraeus has said that "Iraq is the central front of al Qaeda's global campaign." AQI is "public enemy number one" because it slaughters thousands of innocent Shiites in order to provoke a civil war. CIA Director Gen. Michael Hayden believes that a US failure in Iraq will result "in a safe haven (for al Qaeda) from which then to plan and conduct attacks against the West".

Although AQI is a minority insurgent faction, it is unmatched in savagery. I watched Fallujah descend into hell when the Marines pulled back in May of 2004. Our troops called it the "M & I" campaign: Murder and Intimidation on an astonishing scale. In this war, the moral is to the physical as 20 to one. Most of the Iraqi forces and the tribes don't have yet the self-confidence and experience to stand alone against those killers.

Al Qaeda, however, is losing heavily in Anbar, is on the defense in Baghdad and is fleeing north toward Baqubah. The Anti-Terror Camp believes that fracturing AQI and the Jesh al Mahdi death squads will set the conditions that enable US withdrawal, leaving Iraqi forces to enforce reasonable stability, albeit with continued violence. Based on my observations in a half dozen Sunni cities and in Baghdad over the years, I subscribe to the Anti-Terror Camp.

The Sectarian Camp, on the other hand, believes Iraq is being torn apart by religion, not terrorism. Removing the terrorists will not remove the root cause of the violence. An intransigent hostility between the Shiites and Sunnis will lead inevitably to a full civil war and sweeping ethnic cleansings - regardless of the current surge. So we should get out, because the situation is hopeless.

It is problematic whether the sectarian conflict has metastasized into the body polity, and the top levels of the Iraqi government have certainly performed poorly. But if we declare we're leaving on that account, chaos will ensue. When President Thieu in 1975 pulled back just one division, the whole country erupted in panic. If we pull out because we say the Iraqi government has failed, Prime Minister Maliki will pull back and retrench his forces. When he does, the potential for panic flashing across the country in a few days is real.

Iraq has a wide-open highway network that facilitates spontaneous mass movement. In April of 2004, I was with the task force of 200 armored vehicles that General Mattis sent 200 miles, from north of Ramadi all the way around Baghdad, in order to stop the pandemonium and armed bands spontaneously cascading down the highways. This will happen again if we leave before the Iraqi Army is ready to take over.

Conversely, if we believe the Iraqi forces are dominating the insurgents and can contain the centrifugal forces of the Shiite militias, then we'll withdraw combat units beginning in 2008 -- but leave a hefty presence behind. I am referring to advisers, logisticians and anti-terror combat units. We have 24,000 soldiers in Afghanistan; we would need many more than that in Iraq for years to come. Personally, I'd like to see us say we plan on having American troops in Iraq indefinitely - and repeat that every time we withdrew some of our troops. I'd like to undercut AQI's morale by saying, we're going to continue killing and imprisoning you until there are none of you left.

In summary, I would make four points.

First, General Petraeus is our wartime leader. He has a smart, experienced staff. He will provide to you a fulsome, balanced assessment in September - far superior to anything you will hear in the interim.

Second, how you, our elected leaders, depict our withdrawal will have profound consequences. To a very large extent, you will shape the narrative, determining how our great nation is perceived and how friends and enemies respond to us.

Third, if the rationale for withdrawal is because Iraq seems hopeless, then leaving behind a residual force is fraught with peril. You cannot quit, and expect to manage what happens after you quit. Iraq, if it perceives it is being abandoned, could fly apart quickly.

Fourth, the rationale for withdrawal drives everything that comes thereafter. Why are we withdrawing? Is it because we as a nation have given up, concluding that full-scale civil war is inevitable; or has our military succeeded, allowing Iraqi forces to maintain stability?

I do not see a compromise "middle ground" between those two rationales.

Thank you.

-----

House Armed Services Committee

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Guidelines for NGHO -- U.S. Military Relations

Mon, 07/30/2007 - 8:12pm
On 24 July the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) rolled out their guidelines for relations between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations (NGHO). From the USIP publications page:

On July 24, 2007, leaders of the U.S. military and NGO community celebrated a promising moment for civil-military relations in peace operations: the rollout of Guidelines that will serve as "rules of the road" for how the two entities operate in hostile environments.

Facilitated by the U.S. Institute of Peace, the Guidelines seek to mitigate frictions between military and NGO personnel over the preservation of humanitarian space in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. Principles in the Guidelines include ensuring that military personnel wear uniforms when conducting relief activities to avoid being mistaken for nongovernmental humanitarian organization representatives. Conversely, it recommends that humanitarian relief personnel avoid traveling in U.S. Armed Forces vehicles with the exception of liaison personnel to the extent practical.

The heads of both the U.S. military and InterAction (an umbrella organization for U.S. NGOs) have endorsed the Guidelines and will be disseminating them throughout their organizations. Two years in the making, the effort represents "a desire from both sides to move beyond polemics to proactive problem solving," said Jeb Nadaner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations at the Pentagon. NGO leaders likewise expressed optimism at the potential for change. "We do not want to understate the importance of this document for us," said Sam Worthington, InterAction President and CEO. "We believe that these guidelines will serve a purpose beyond U.S. NGOs to our global partners."

The initiative was launched in March 2005 when Amb. Carlos Pascual, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the U.S. State Department, asked the Institute to establish a Working Group on Civil-Military Relations in Non-permissive Environments. What began as a dialogue between military and NGO leaders has resulted in a pioneering effort upon which both sides hope to expand. Military and NGO leaders intend to promulgate the Guidelines throughout their communities via media and education channels: NGOs will publish the Guidelines in their newsletters and literature; the military will incorporate the Guidelines into joint military doctrine publications. The next challenge lies in implementing the Guidelines in the field and creating a monitoring mechanism by which the Guidelines can be continuously tested and revised.

For the U.S. Armed Forces, the following guidelines should be observed consistent with military force protection, mission accomplishment, and operational requirements:

1. When conducting relief activities, military personnel should wear uniforms or other distinctive clothing to avoid being mis­taken for NGHO representatives. U.S. Armed Forces personnel and units should not display NGHO logos on any military cloth­ing, vehicles, or equipment. This does not preclude the appro­priate use of symbols recognized under the law of war, such as a red cross, when appropriate. U.S. Armed Forces may use such symbols on military clothing, vehicles, and equipment in appropriate situations.

2. Visits by U.S. Armed Forces personnel to NGHO sites should be by prior arrangement.

3. U.S. Armed Forces should respect NGHO views on the bearing of arms within NGHO sites.

4. U.S. Armed Forces should give NGHOs the option of meeting with U.S. Armed Forces personnel outside military installations for information exchanges.

5. U.S. Armed Forces should not describe NGHOs as "force mul­tipliers" or "partners" of the military, or in any other fashion.

6. U.S. Armed Forces personnel and units should avoid interfer­ing with NGHO relief efforts directed toward segments of the civilian population that the military may regard as unfriendly.

7. U.S. Armed Forces personnel and units should respect the de­sire of NGHOs not to serve as implementing partners for the military in conducting relief activities. However, individual NGOs may seek to cooperate with the military, in which case such cooperation will be carried out with due regard to avoid­ing compromise of the security, safety, and independence of the NGHO community at large, NGHO representatives, or public perceptions of their independence.

For NGHOs, the following guidelines should be observed:

1. NGHO personnel should not wear military-style clothing. This is not meant to preclude NGHO personnel from wearing protec­tive gear, such as helmets and protective vests, provided that such items are distinguishable in color/appearance from U.S. Armed Forces issue items.

2. NGHO travel in U.S. Armed Forces vehicles should be limited to liaison personnel to the extent practical.

3. NGHOs should not have facilities co-located with facilities in­habited by U.S. Armed Forces personnel.

4. NGHOs should use their own logos on clothing, vehicles, and buildings when security conditions permit.

5. NGHO personnel's visits to military facilities/sites should be by prior arrangement.

6. Except for liaison arrangements detailed in the sections that follow, NGHOs should minimize their activities at military bases and with U.S. Armed Forces personnel of a nature that might compromise their independence.

7. NGHOs may, as a last resort, request military protection for convoys delivering humanitarian assistance, take advantage of essential logistics support available only from the military, or accept evacuation assistance for medical treatment or to evacuate from a hostile environment. Provision of such mili­tary support to NGHOs rests solely within the discretion of the military forces and will not be undertaken if it interferes with higher priority military activities. Support generally will be provided on a reimbursable basis in accordance with appli­cable U.S. law.

-----

Links:

Guidelines for NGO -- U.S. Military Relations Pamphlet - (USIP)

Guidelines NGO -- U.S. Military Relations Handout - (USIP)

Small Wars Journal Reference Library

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Telegraph: SWJ Best Fiction Award Winner of the Week (Updated)

Sun, 07/29/2007 - 11:43pm
Damien McElroy, foreign affairs correspondent for the U.K.'s Telegraph, "headlines" today: Iraqi leader tells Bush: Get Gen Petraeus out:

Relations between the top United States general in Iraq and Nouri al-Maliki, the country's prime minister, are so bad that the Iraqi leader made a direct appeal for his removal to President George W Bush.

Although the call was rejected, aides to both men admit that Mr Maliki and Gen David Petraeus engage in frequent stand-up shouting matches, differing particularly over the US general's moves to arm Sunni tribesmen to fight al-Qa'eda.

One Iraqi source said Mr Maliki used a video conference with Mr Bush to call for the general's signature strategy to be scrapped. "He told Bush that if Petraeus continues, he would arm Shia militias," said the official. "Bush told Maliki to calm down."

At another meeting with Gen Petraeus, Mr Maliki said: "I can't deal with you any more. I will ask for someone else to replace you."

One problem - the events as reported in the Telegraph never happened. This from COL Steve Boylan, MNF-I CG Public Affairs Officer, in an e-mail he sent earlier today to McElroy:

Gen Petraeus and the Prime Minister have never had a stand-up shouting match, and only once has Gen Petraeus even raised his voice. This is a totally fabricated story, and you should have sought a comment from me, at the least to validate the information from your so-called aides as sources.

Gen Petraeus has never stated or even hinted at a "stormy relationship." Saying that they do not pull punches is very different from stormy. That means they have very frank, open and perhaps direct conversations based on what is at stake here and what is needed and should be expected from both.

I formally request that the record be corrected! Gen Petraeus and other key staff have sat in on every video teleconference with PM Maliki and President Bush and never has this been even hinted at. In addition, PM Maliki has never said what is quoted here to Gen Petraeus.

This must be corrected immediately and if your sources are not —to go on the record has I have here, then there must be something wrong with the sources.

Update: 28 July Los Angeles Times - Baghdad, Top U.S. Commander Downplay Reported Tensions by Molly Hennessy-Fiske.

U.S. and Iraqi officials acknowledged today that differences existed between Prime Minister Nouri Maliki and the top U.S. commander but denied that the Iraqi leader wanted Gen. David H. Petraeus removed.

"They are working together, even if there are differences," said Sami Askari, one of the prime minister's aides and a member of his Shiite Dawa Party...

News reports Friday quoted a Shiite politician who is close to Maliki and affiliated with anti-U.S. cleric Muqtada Sadr as saying that Maliki had told Petraeus he couldn't work with him and wanted him replaced.

"I don't know where that is coming from," Petraeus said. "He and I have truly had frank conversations, but he has never yelled or stood up" from the table. "This is really, really hard stuff, and occasionally people agree to disagree."...

Update 2: Hat Tip PrairiePundit (Merv Benson) - Paper Backs Off Maliki-Petraeus Row

I think they are admitting that the earlier report was based on a rumor.

General Petraeus Rebuts Iraq Row Claim - London Daily Telegraph (Damien McElroy)

America's top general in Iraq yesterday quashed reports of a breakdown in his relationship with Iraq's prime minister over American support for Sunni Muslim fighters battling al-Qa'eda.

General David Petraeus poured scorn on a claim by an Iraqi politician that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki requested his dismissal after bitter rows. "I don't know where that is coming from," Gen Petraeus said. "He and I have truly had frank conversations but he has never yelled or stood up. This is really, really hard stuff, and occasionally people agree to disagree."

Col Boylan said Mr Maliki had embraced the policy but dissidents were trying to throw "sand in the gearbox" with claims the two were at loggerheads.

While exchanges between the two had been "direct," the discussions fell a long way short of Mr Maliki telling Gen Petraeus he could no longer work with him.

More:

U.S. Denies Petraeus has Poor Ties with Iraq PM - Reuters (Ross Colvin)

Heat Rises Between Iraq PM and Petraeus - AP (Steven Hurst and Qassim Abdul Zahra)

A Bogus Story (Updated) - American Thinker (John Dwyer)

"Sporty Exchanges" - Intel Dump (Phillip Carter)

Manufactured Conflict in Iraq - PrairiePundit (Merv Benson)

Waging Information War - Outside the Beltway (Dave Schuler)

What Is Truth? - The Glittering Eye (Dave Schuler)

Earlier SWJ Fiction Award Winner - Guardian Article Misrepresents the Advisers' View

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Secretary Gates Addresses the Marine Corps Association

Fri, 07/27/2007 - 1:57pm
I was privileged to be in attendance and consider it one of the most effective presentations I have ever heard. Secretary Gates was humorous, showed great humility, used historical examples effectively, offered some interesting thoughts on what we have leaned from the ongoing conflicts, and was sincerely moved when he talked about our losses on the battlefield. He gave me a glimmer of hope for recovery of our too long abused defense establishment.

--Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper (USMC Ret.)

Marine Corps Association Annual Dinner

As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Crystal Gateway Marriott Hotel, Arlington, VA, Wednesday, July 18, 2007

Thank you, General Palm, for that kind introduction. And let me express my appreciation to the Marine Corps Association for inviting me to speak at your first annual dinner. I'm honored to be in the presence of so many who have devoted their lives to the defense of this country.

Senator Warner, General Magnus, it's good to see you. I must say that Senator Warner is a special friend. He's introduced me to the Senate for confirmation four times. [Laughter] If it's not a record, it has to be close to a record. And I have to say the first time was more than 20 years ago. That dates us both, but I would have to say I think he is a special friend and a great American. So thank you for being here tonight. [Applause]

Well, I can't tell you what a pleasure it is to be back in Washington again. [Laughter] A place where, as Senator Alan Simpson used to say, "those who travel the high road of humility encounter little heavy traffic." [Laughter] Or as others would say, "where there are so many lost in thought because it's such unfamiliar territory." [Laughter] Where people say I'll double-cross that bridge when I get to it. [Laughter] The only place in the world you can see a prominent person walking down lover's lane holding his own hand. [Laughter, Applause]

They say Washington's a city of monuments. I have to say the most monumental things that I've seen in over 40 years is the egos of some of the people I've worked for, and I have to tell you the most monumental ego was the first president I worked for, Lyndon Johnson.

Johnson once had the chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ludwig Erhard, to the LBJ ranch, and Erhard at one point said, "Well, Mr. President, were you born in a log cabin?" And LBJ responded, "Why no, Mr. Chancellor, I was born in a manger." [Laughter, Applause]

Or the time he gave a stag dinner in the White House and Bill Moyers was there and Moyers was a White House staffer seated below the salt, where White House staffers belong. [Laughter] And Johnson asked Moyers to ask the blessing and Moyers started to pray and a few seconds into the prayer, Johnson lifted his said, looked down at Moyers and said, "Bill, I can't hear you." And Moyers, without lifting his head, looked and said to the president, "That's cause I'm not speaking to you." [Laughter]

It's also a city of monumental embarrassments. Like the first time that President Nixon met with Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir. He had just appointed Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State. And Golda Meir had with her her foreign minister, Abba Eban, who had a doctorate from Oxford University. And Nixon turned to Golda Meir and said "Just think, Madam Prime Minister, we now both have Jewish foreign ministers." And Golda Meir looked at him and said, "Yes, but mine speaks English." [Laughter, Applause]

But I think the most embarrassing moment during my career was when Nixon visited Italy and he met with the Pope, and Melvin Laird was along as Secretary of Defense. Kissinger and Nixon decided that Laird shouldn't be invited to the meeting with the Pope, as sort of the Minister of War.

And so, Nixon was in the next morning having his private audience with the Pope, and the rest of us were waiting outside. And who should come striding down the hall smoking an enormous cigar but Laird. He had clearly found out about the meeting, probably through good military intelligence. [Laughter]

And Kissinger was kind of beside himself, but he finally said "Well, Mel, at least extinguish the cigar." So Laird stubbed out his cigar and put it in his pocket.

The American party a few minutes later went in to their general meeting with the pope. Pope was seated at a little table in front, Americans in two rows of high-backed chairs. Back row, Kissinger on the end; Laird next to him. A couple of minutes into the Pope's remarks, Kissinger heard this little patting sound, and he looked over, and there was a wisp of smoke coming out of Laird's pocket. [Laughter] The Secretary of State thought nothing of it. A couple of other minutes went by and the secretary heard this patting sound, slapping going on, and he looked over and smoke was billowing out of Laird's pocket. The Secretary of Defense was on fire. [Laughter]

The American party heard this slapping, and thought they were being queued to applaud. And so they did. [Laughter]

And Henry later told us, "God only knows what his Holiness thought, seeing the American secretary of defense immolating himself, and the entire American party applauding the fact." [Laughter, Applause]

Well, it's hard to believe that it was only seven months ago -- to the day, as a matter of fact -- that I began my current job. And as many of you know, navigating the Pentagon can be quite a challenge.

Newsman David Brinkley used to tell the story of the early days at the Pentagon, when a woman told a Pentagon guard she was in labor and needed help quickly in getting to a hospital. The guard said, "Madam, you should not have come in here in that condition." And she answered, "I wasn't in that condition when I came in here." [Laughter]

One of the main reasons I have managed to get around -- and get by -- at the Department these past seven months, is a great officer who has the distinction of being the first Marine Corps Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This summer, General Peter Pace marked 40 extraordinary years of active service. Pete's traveling overseas this evening or he would be here tonight. In fact, he told me that I should accept the invitation to this event.

I'm sure most, if not all of you, are unhappy that Pete will not continue on for a second term as chairman. I am as well. Pete Pace has been my friend, my partner, and my mentor. I trust him completely; I value his candor; and, I enjoy his sense of humor.

I told Pete several months ago that it was my intention that we work together until I left on January 20, 2009. I can't tell you how much I regret that the current environment here in Washington did not make that possible. I am deeply grateful for Pete's 40 years of devoted service to our country, a sentiment I am confident is shared by you and by all Americans.

Last month, after visiting with U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, I had a chance to speak at Normandy on the 63rd anniversary of D-Day. It was a powerful experience to stand among those crosses -- thousands of them, row upon row -- and reflect on the magnitude of what had been accomplished on that day -- and at what cost.

The story behind how America developed the means to put men on those beaches is, I think, instructive. In the late 1930s, the Marine Corps was still grappling with how to move troops from ship to shore under hostile fire. At the time, and after the disastrous Gallipoli campaign of the First World War, such a maneuver was considered foolhardy at best, and suicidal at worst. In 1937, a Marine 1st Lieutenant, Victor Krulak, was stationed in China. And during a Japanese amphibious assault on Shanghai, Krulak borrowed a tugboat to get a better look. He saw -- and clandestinely photographed -- Japanese men and equipment coming onto the beach from a landing craft with a retractable ramp.

Lieutenant Krulak sent those photos and an accompanying report back to Washington. You can imagine what happened next. They gathered dust in a cabinet, with a note labeling them, and I quote: "the work of some nut in China."

Krulak eventually returned to Washington, and doggedly pursued his idea until a Marine general hooked him up with an eccentric New Orleans boat maker named Higgins. The result, as all of you know, was a landing craft with a retractable ramp that was introduced by the thousands and was used to carry Allied forces to liberate Europe and much of Asia.

Krulak's was, of course, a legendary career: Navy Cross; counterinsurgency advisor to the Joint Staff; commander of the Fleet Marines in the Pacific during the Vietnam War; and, father of a future Marine Commandant, Chuck Krulak, with whom I met yesterday. Victor Krulak's story and accomplishments teach us a good deal:

- About learning from the experiences and setbacks of the past;

- About being open to take ideas and inspiration from wherever they come; and

- About overcoming conventional wisdom and bureaucratic obstacles thrown in one's path.

In the years since September 11th, hundreds of thousands of our troops have done all these things and more in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere around the globe. There are the Marines who set up a daily news report over loudspeaker -- "the Voice of Ramadi" -- to counter the hostile propaganda blaring out of some of the mosques. Then there is an Army staff sergeant, a field artillery radar specialist, who was elected a sheik by Iraqi village elders for his work in their communities. He was given white robes, five sheep, and some land; he was advised to take a second wife -- a suggestion frowned upon by his spouse back in Florida. [Laughter]

But in these campaigns, the men and women wearing our nation's uniform have assumed the roles of warrior, diplomat, humanitarian, and development expert. They've done so under the unblinking, unforgiving eye of the 24-hour news cycle while confronting an agile and ruthless enemy. And they've done it serving in a military that has for decades been organized, trained, and equipped to fight the "big wars" rather than the small ones. They have shown what General Victor Krulak later wrote was the "adaptability, initiative and improvisation [that] are the true fabric of obedience, the ultimate in soldierly conduct, going further than sheer heroism."

For the next 10 minutes or so, I'd like to offer some thoughts on where our military -- and our government -- must apply the lessons that we've learned from the ongoing conflicts to build the capabilities we will need in the future. These points are clear:

- Our military must be prepared to undertake the full spectrum of operations including unconventional or irregular campaigns -- for the foreseeable future.

- The non-military instruments of America's national power need to be rebuilt, modernized, and committed to the fight.

- And third, we must think about, envision, and plan for, the world, the future -- of 2020 and beyond.

This is necessary because in the decades ahead, the free and civilized world will continue to look to the United States for leadership, despite all of the challenges today. Churchill once said that "the people of the United States cannot escape world responsibility," what he called the "price of greatness." This responsibility calls on us to prepare for threats other than those on our television screen every night, challenges that are on or beyond the horizon.

America's conventional forces -- air, land, and sea -- will continue to be called on to deter cross-border aggression, protect the sea lanes and energy supplies, and send a message of strength and resolve to friends and potential enemies -- be they nation-states or other actors. These formations must move with speed and agility to a range of potential fights, with deployment times measured in weeks or days rather than weeks and months.

Above all, it's clear the United States and our allies will continue to be threatened by violent extremists, almost always operating in countries with whom we are not at war. The ambition of these networks to acquire chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons is real, as is their desire to launch more attacks on our country and on our interests around the world. And as we saw most recently in the United Kingdom, the barrier to entry -- in resources and sophistication -- remains low when the goal is simply to disrupt or terrorize.

In recent years, America has fully joined the battle in a war that was declared on us a long time ago.

I remember vividly a day in December 1991, when as CIA Director I -- along with then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney -- attended an arrival ceremony at Andrews Air Force Base. We were there to receive the remains of two men -- two of our nation's "bravest sons" -- who had been kidnapped, tortured, and murdered by terrorists in Lebanon. One was William Buckley, CIA station chief in Beirut. The other was Marine Lieutenant Colonel William Higgins, who served with the U.N. peacekeeping force in Lebanon.

These two Americans were murdered by the same Hezbollah-linked extremists who killed hundreds of Americans in 1983 at the Marine barracks and U.S. embassy in Beirut. It is important to remember that until the morning of September 11, 2001, Hezbollah had been responsible for the deaths of more Americans, our countrymen, than any other terrorist group in the world.

Now we must deal with an even more deadly threat. Since Al Qaeda attacked America nearly six years ago, our armed forces have been tasked with removing hostile regimes and booting out terrorist networks in Iraq and Afghanistan; initially quick military successes that in both cases have led to protracted stability and reconstruction campaigns against brutal and adaptive insurgencies.

And though these conflicts will not last indefinitely in their current form and scale, we must expect our military to be called to other irregular campaigns in the future.

What we now call "asymmetric war" has become a mainstay of the contemporary battlefield, if not its centerpiece. Indeed, after Desert Storm and the initial military success of Operation Iraqi Freedom, it is hard to conceive any country challenging the United States using conventional military ground forces -- at least for some years to come.

However, history shows us smaller, irregular forces -- insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists -- have for centuries found ways to harass and frustrate larger, regular armies and sow chaos.

Today, the "three block war" that Commandant Chuck Krulak predicted in the 1990s -- where small units would simultaneously conduct combat, stability, and humanitarian operations in urban landscapes -- has become a daily reality for American servicemen and women. In these situations, America's traditional edge in technology, firepower, and logistics provides important tactical advantages, but not the necessary strategic success.

Direct force will no doubt need to be used against our adversaries -- ruthlessly and without mercy or apology. But it is also clear that in these kinds of operations, we are not going to kill or capture our way to victory.

Today in Iraq, General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker are implementing a strategy based on targeting Al Qaeda, co-opting some insurgents and marginalizing others, and providing basic security and an improved quality of life for the Iraqi people. It will take patience and persistence, and some level of American force and assistance, for some time.

Looking forward, tasks such as standing up and mentoring indigenous armies and police -- once the province of Special Forces -- are now a key mission for the military as a whole. The same is true for mastering foreign language and civil affairs tasks such as reviving public services and promoting good governance. They have moved from the margins to the mainstream of military thinking, planning, and personnel policies, where they must stay. But as much as the armed forces must be prepared to take on these tasks, the fact remains that much of the necessary expertise belongs in other parts of our government.

We're still struggling to overcome the legacy of the 1990s, when so many of the key non-military capabilities in the American government -- in diplomacy, strategic communications, international development, and intelligence -- were slashed or eliminated following the end of the Cold War.

During the 1990s, the State Department froze new hiring of Foreign Service officers. I was in the White House in the Carter administration after the fall of Iran, and we had a group called the political intelligence working group and we examined what had happened. And among other things, we determined that in 1979, in the embassy in Riyadh, we had two Foreign Service officers who spoke Arabic and they spent 40 percent of their time squiring around CODELs.

The United States Information Agency, which had been an enormously successful organization for communicating America's values and message around the world, was abolished in the 1990s as an independent entity and folded into the State Department -- a shadow of its former self. The Agency for International Development saw deep staff cuts -- its permanent staff dropping from a high of 15,000 to 3,000 today, becoming essentially an outsourcing and contracting agency.

Today, the total number of U.S. government civilian employees working in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in both Iraq and Afghanistan is approximately two hundred.

So, the goal for us must be an integrated effort, a reinvigoration of all elements of national power. It will require a serious commitment of resources and priorities from the Congress and the country. I believe we have little choice if we are to secure our nation and our freedoms in the years ahead.

I've spoken tonight about what the Pentagon calls the "non-kinetic" aspects of war. It is a sad reality, however, that throughout human history, some have always thought and sought to dominate others through violence and crimes against the innocent. When all is said and done, they understand and bow not to reason or to negotiation, but only to superior force. Thus we should never lose sight of the ethos that has made the Marine Corps -- where "every Marine is a rifleman" -- one of America's cherished institutions and one of the world's most feared and respected fighting forces. [Applause]

I began my remarks this evening with a story about an extraordinary young Marine officer, Victor Krulak; I will close with another.

On one wall of my conference room there is a large, framed photo of a Marine company commander taken during the first battle of Fallujah, in April 2004. He's speaking into a radio handset while giving directions to his men as combat rages just blocks away. It's a shot that could have been taken of any number of Marines in any number of places over the last century -- at Tarawa, at Inchon, or of Lieutenant Peter Pace at Hue, in 1968.

During that Fallujah battle, Captain Douglas Zembiec and some men from his Echo Company were on a rooftop drawing rocket propelled grenades from all directions. They tried to radio a tank crew for support, but couldn't get through. Zembiec raced out onto the street through withering fire, climbed onto the tank, and directed the gunner where to shoot.

After the battle, he said that his Marines had "fought like lions," and he was soon himself dubbed "the Lion of Fallujah." [Applause] He was an unabashed and unashamed warrior, telling one reporter that "killing is not wrong if it's for a purpose, if it's to keep your nation free or to protect your buddy." Zembiec's battalion operations officer described him as someone who "goes out every day and creates menacing dilemmas for the enemy." [Laughter]

A newspaper profile at the time described him as a "balding, gregarious man who, in glasses, looks like a high school science teacher." [Laughter]

After returning from Iraq, Doug was promoted and given a desk job at the Pentagon. He chafed at the assignment, volunteered to deploy again, and was sent back to Iraq earlier this year. This time, he would not return -- to his country or to his wife Pamela and his one-year old daughter.

In May, the Lion of Fallujah was laid to rest at Arlington and memorialized at his alma mater in Annapolis. The crowd of more than 1,000 included many enlisted Marines from his beloved Echo Company. An officer there told a reporter: "your men have to follow your orders; they don't have to go to your funeral."

Every evening, I write notes to the families of young Americans like Doug Zembiec. For you, and for me, they are not names on a press release, or numbers updated on a web page. They are our country's sons and daughters. They are in a tradition of service that includes you and your forebears going back to the earliest days of the republic.

God bless you, the Marine Corps, the men and women of our armed forces, and the country we have all sworn to defend.

Thank you. [Applause]

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Biography

Robert M. Gates

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