Foreword

Our nation is at war. Warriors must plan and orchestrate irregular warfare as joint, multinational, and multi-agency campaigns, beginning with the first efforts of strategy development and concluding with the achievement of the desired endstate. As Airmen, we have a unique warfighting perspective shaped by a century-long quest to gain and maintain the high ground. We must be able to articulate Air Force capabilities and contributions to the irregular warfare fight, with its unique attributes and requirements. Employed properly, airpower (to include air, space, and cyberspace capabilities) produces asymmetric advantages that can be effectively leveraged by joint force commanders in virtually every aspect of irregular warfare. Irregular warfare is sufficiently different from traditional conflict to warrant a separate keystone doctrine document. While the fighting experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan should weigh heavily in the development of our doctrine, we intend this doctrine document to be broad, enduring, and forward-looking, rather than focusing on any particular operation, current or past.

Purpose

Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-3, Irregular Warfare, establishes operational-level doctrinal guidance for irregular warfare (IW). IW is not a lesser included form of traditional warfare. Rather, IW encompasses a spectrum of warfare where the nature and characteristics are significantly different from traditional war. IW presents unique challenges to military forces requiring innovative strategies for employing Air Force capabilities. Effectively combating and conducting IW is critical to protecting the US and its vital interests.

Application

This AFDD applies to the Total Force: all Air Force military and civilian personnel, including regular, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard units and members. Unless specifically stated otherwise, Air Force doctrine applies to the full range of operations.

The doctrine in this document is authoritative, but not directive. Therefore, commanders need to consider the contents of this AFDD and the particular situation when accomplishing their missions. Airmen should read it, discuss it, and practice it. Due to the political nature of IW, Airmen must be able to articulate Air Force capabilities to civilian leadership and decision makers.

Scope

This doctrine focuses on the operational and strategic aspects of IW and differences in the application of force from traditional warfare. Understanding the strategic context of IW is the first step in determining how best to employ forces. The document describes Air Force capabilities and operations required to effectively defend and counter adversaries. Effectively employing these capabilities relies on the development of coherent strategies and plans providing the appropriate force at the appropriate time. The complex nature of IW requires the combined capabilities of all military Services, government agencies, and partner nations. While this document focuses on Air Force doctrine, IW is inherently a joint and interagency fight.

IW Truths for Airmen

Across the range of IW scenarios there is a set of overarching concepts that provide the foundation for planning and employing Air Force capabilities. These "truths" do not apply to all conceivable situations; however, they do represent broad concepts that Airmen should consider. These overarching concepts either reflect a best practice in evolving IW concepts or base themselves on significant lessons learned from operations that failed to meet expectations.

1. The Air Force must be prepared to simultaneously conduct irregular and traditional warfare operations. The nature of a single conflict can easily shift between types of warfare. Failure to understand or anticipate these shifts often leads to fighting the wrong type of war, or focusing on the wrong effects for a given conflict. IW and traditional warfare are not mutually exclusive and both are often present in the same conflict. Finding a critical balance in capabilities is essential to overall success in both conflicts.

2. IW is a different form of warfare and not a lesser form of conflict within traditional warfare. The struggle for legitimacy and influence over a relevant population is the primary focus of operations, not the coercion of key political leaders or defeat of their military capability. In conducting operations, adversaries commonly use tactics to provide asymmetric advantages that erode the US population's support for the conflict. These tactics often diminish the effectiveness of traditional military modes of attack. Therefore, while many IW tactical-level airpower applications may not be distinguishable from traditional operations, the desired effects at the operational and strategic levels may require a different mindset in order to better plan, understand, and coordinate Air Force capabilities.

3. IW is intelligence-intensive. Providing actionable intelligence is challenging. The ability to hide among the population, the tactics employed, and the distributed nature of insurgent organizations make finding, identifying, and engaging targets difficult. Intelligence efforts may focus on non-traditional areas such as cultural, social, political, and economic issues rather than military capabilities and key leaders. Fusing information obtained from multiple sources, methods, and levels is required to provide timely, accurate, and relevant intelligence to all levels.

4. Unity of effort across all instruments of power is essential to overall strategic success. Success in IW depends on a high degree of integration of the military with other elements of national power within a national security strategy. Organizationally, the instruments of national power—DIME—should operate in close cooperation among joint, interagency, intergovernmental, In situations where IW operations are distributed among multiple distinct environments, a single, theater-level commander of Air Force forces/joint force air component commander (COMAFFOR/JFACC) commanding airpower may not always provide the adequate degree of situational awareness and flexibility in rapidly evolving operations. In some cases, the COMAFFOR/JFACC may delegate some aspects of planning and decision-making to subordinate Airmen positioned at lower levels within the theater air control system (TACS). Increasing the role and authority of subordinate Airmen may provide more innovative and effective uses of Air Force capabilities. In other situations, the JFC may establish a subordinate JTF for a given operation involving the attachment of certain Air Force assets.

Operational control (OPCON) of these forces should be delegated by the JTF commander to the attached COMAFFOR. While this C2 arrangement may enhance flexibility and responsiveness, the theater-level COMAFFOR should consider the theater-wide impact of attaching Air Force forces to a given JTF. Ultimately, as the US military becomes involved in more IW operations, critical mission analysis should be used in order to determine the appropriate C2 arrangements to provide the most effective and efficient use of Air Force capabilities and multinational (JIIM) organizations. In some circumstances, Airmen should be prepared to assume non-traditional roles until other JIIM organizations are able to assume these roles. Providing security, basic services, and other forms of development needs to be coordinated and integrated.

5. Integrated C2 structures enable flexibility at all levels and are vital to successful counterinsurgency operations. The complex operating environment of IW requires rapid, adaptive application of capabilities at the operational and tactical levels. Conducting multiple, separate operations against different IW adversaries in a single theater may require that the combatant commander (CCDR) establish multiple joint task forces (JTFs). It must be emphasized that key assets, especially intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), special operations forces (SOF), and all other low density/high demand (LD/HD) systems, are scarce resources and their use must be prioritized to those efforts that most directly affect the achievement of the CCDR's or JFC's strategic objectives. This prioritization decision is best accomplished through centralized control and decentralized execution.

6. Effective working relationships between people and organizations are key to success in IW. Coordinated effort across the spectrum of operations is vital and success often hinges on effective interpersonal relationships. IW operations often use small teams of integrated airpower functional experts working in concert with PN forces, as well as acting as liaisons to the PN, to integrate and bring together the full range of Air Force capabilities.

7. Operational effectiveness can be very difficult to measure; thus, feedback through a strong operations assessment and lessons learned process is essential to strategic success. Complex localized conditions and issues require an adaptive strategy and assessment process. Measuring effectiveness of lethal and non-lethal operations is challenging. Determining which operations are effective and modifying those that are not are critical to adjusting strategy.

8. The adversary may be highly complex and adaptive. The adversary often adopts a decentralized, broadly networked organization that operates semi-independently, taking advantage of local issues and conflicts that can be radically different in adjacent locales. Additionally, adversaries are adept at operating within the seams of military and political boundaries. To counter these tactics, military operations must be timely, precise, and coordinated. This often necessitates that military planning and intelligence processes be conducted and aggregated at a much lower level than in traditional warfare, but still requires operational level guidance from the JFC. Ultimately, the management of scarce resources to generate the most appropriate effects against a highly adaptive adversary remains critical to overall success.

Counterinsurgency (COIN) Truths for Airmen

1. Legitimacy and influence are the main objectives. Whether conducting COIN, support for COIN, or shaping and deterring operations, the legitimacy of the PN government is critical. Legitimacy ultimately rests with influencing the perception of the relevant population and often is a function of the government's ability to maintain security while addressing valid grievances of that population. In most conflicts, the center of gravity is the population and establishing or maintaining the legitimacy of their government is often the effect desired. While the government must maintain legitimacy, insurgents can diminish the popular support of the government by addressing the population's grievances, real or perceived, or by eroding the government's ability to maintain security. Recognition of tools at the insurgents' disposal, like coercion and terrorism, is important due to their use as a way to erode popular support for the legitimate government.

2. The Air Force provides critical capabilities that enable joint force operations in COIN. The COMAFFOR enables the JFC to achieve key objectives. Often, the effects desired in COIN will directly support ground operations (military and civilian) requiring proper integration and coordination. In other situations, Air Force capabilities may be used to achieve effects interdependently. Airmen should identify new and innovative ways to use those capabilities and advocate them to the JFC.

3. Military actions are a necessary part of any COIN strategy; military actions that affect the adversary's will or capability must be integrated with the JFC's objective to influence the populace. In order to achieve the JFC's strategic and operational objectives, traditional approaches to warfare must often be reversed, first weighing the impact on the relevant population and then determining the impact of operations on an adversary's will and capability. There may be times when a conscious decision not to respond to enemy provocation may be more effective toward achieving strategic goals. In COIN, strategic success is defined by successfully discrediting the hostile ideology rather than by achieving military tactical victories.

4. A key adversary strength is the ability to hide within the populace—countering many key advantages of traditional military power. Interpersonal relationships built through sustained interaction with the populace and partner operations with indigenous forces are critical to understanding the nature of the conflict and ultimate victory in the IW fight. Developing these relationships can effectively strip the insurgency of its most valuable asset—the support of the population. The inability to distinguish insurgents from the general population allows adversaries the freedom to organize and attack while creating a dilemma for counterinsurgency forces trying to identify insurgents. Cooperation of the general population provides valuable intelligence on the whereabouts of insurgents. This intelligence enables counterinsurgency forces to identify insurgents, making them easier to identify and target.

5. COIN is a protracted affair. While traditional war has tended to become shorter in duration due to technology and lethality, COIN has remained protracted in nature. Insurgencies can last for years, even decades. Insurgents and terrorists often use time as a primary weapon in order to develop capabilities and build popular support. Protracting the conflict gives insurgents greater latitude in determining where and when operations will take place. They also use time as a weapon to undermine support for a government (either the established government they are trying to overthrow or popular support for an intervening government). Every day an insurgent or terrorist organization exists threatens the stability of the status quo. Time is typically on the side of the insurgents because they can often achieve their goal simply by surviving and exhausting government efforts, resources, and national/coalition political will. Time is also required to establish and develop a PN's capacity to conduct COIN.

-----

Discuss at Small Wars Council

Dispatch from Task Force Justice

I visited Forward Operating Base Justice, located in the northwest Baghdad neighborhood of Khadamiyah, in April. Its commander is Lieutenant Colonel Steven Miska. I recently asked him for an update on developments in his AOR (Area of Responsibility) that I could share with Contentions readers...

Go to the link to read about Asian World Cup soccer, immigration, reconciliation, militia influence and the media.

Key Quotes

Did you see the CNN coverage live from FOB Justice of the Iraqi Soccer game? We threw a great party with all of our local nationals. You would have thought we were at an Army-Navy tailgate. We went downtown after the game and spoke to people on the street. Khadamiyah was absolutely nuts. Lots of fun and a cathartic experience for the Iraqis to see their team accomplish something across the sectarian divide. Hopefully, more good can come from the victory.

The fight is complex. The challenges are hard to boil down into 9-second sound bites or catchy headlines. However, we do spend a lot of time educating reporters, in addition to VIPs. We have a few die-hard reporters that travel to the fight and get a view from the ground on the challenges and opportunities facing our forces and the Iraqis. Most of the journalists I meet are tremendous professionals who make personal sacrifices to provide transparency in a society that needs media spotlights everywhere. The press is instrumental is helping keep the good people honest and the bad guys from committing even more egregious transgressions. Many of our media colleagues have brought attention to significant challenges like immigration, the need for diplomacy around the periphery of Iraq, detainee abuse, and other challenges. We need to encourage them and help them gain access to the stories that will shape human behavior in positive directions.

Rational Optimism on Iraq

See, for instance, this article by Robert Burns, the Associated Press's veteran military writer. Burns has just returned from his 18th trip to Iraq to report: "The new U.S. military strategy in Iraq, unveiled six months ago to little acclaim, is working."

Or this new report by Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He traveled to Iraq with Michael O'Hanlon and Kenneth Pollack of the Brookings Institution recently, and while his findings are not quite as positive as theirs, he nevertheless writes: "While all the half-truths and spin of the past have built up a valid distrust of virtually anything the Administration says about Iraq, real military progress is taking place and the U.S. team in Baghdad is actively seeking matching political and economic progress."

Key Quotes

Unfortunately, that matching political progress has not yet materialized. To be sure, there have been surprising and encouraging gains at the local level where Sunni tribes are increasingly turning against al Qaeda. But at the national level the political gridlock is worse than ever.

Of course, no serious proponent of the "surge" expected that Iraqis would get their act together overnight. In fact, the theory has always been that gains in security are a necessary prerequisite for the major political factions to make compromises. Since the gains in security are just beginning, it is far too soon to say that political progress won't happen, too.

Geeks against Jihad

Thomas X. Hammes is a retired Marine colonel and the author of a well-regarded work on modern war: The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century. He is also a fellow participant in an online discussion forum on military affairs called the Warlord Loop. I was so taken with one of his recent postings on how to battle jihadists on the Internet (a major venue for Islamist organizing and proselytizing) that I asked him if he would adapt it for contentions readers. He kindly agreed....

Key Quotes

(Hammes) While we have a few Americans who take similar action against mufsidoon (evildoers) web sites, why don't we encourage Americans/western "geeks" to go after these websites? Exploit them, disrupt them, shut them down, post false information, and create distrust. This will not be a government controlled or directed effort. Essentially, I am suggesting a leaderless effort that allows Americans to use their creativity, technological skills, and the rabid dedication some people will apply to such a project. The mufsidoon are coming after all American citizens; this is a way some Americans can fight back.

(Boot) Like all great ideas, this one sounds blindingly obvious: use a network against a network, pit our computer geeks against theirs. But while there are some private groups (such as the SITE Institute) that monitor jihadist activity on the Internet, I haven't heard of any that actually attack jihadist web sites. Maybe it's already being done on a small scale, but much more could be done to target the thousands of Islamist web sites. Hackers, take it away...

8 August - U.S. Soldiers Partner With Iraqi Troops in Mahmudiyah with U. S. Army Lt. Col. Robert Morschauser.

AFPS (Donna Miles) - U.S. soldiers leading operations in and around Mahmudiyah, Iraq, have "cracked the code when it comes to working with the Iraqi army," their task force commander said today.

Army Lt. Col. Morschauser, battalion commander for the 10th Mountain Division's 2nd Brigade, 2nd Battalion, 15th Artillery, said his unit is doing more than simply training Iraqi soldiers. It's partnering with them at all levels -- and yielding results.

"Our unit is heavily focused on the extremely important task of supporting and advising and providing advanced training to our Iraqi army partners so that they can operate autonomously in the near future," he said from Mahmudiyah during a conference call with online journalists and "bloggers."

That focus isn't limited to military transition teams within the task force, he said. "Our brigade has placed our entire battalion toward this mission, rather than a traditional 11-man MTT."

This arrangement brings a full task force of manpower to the training mission, enabling the soldiers to serve as partners rather than just advisors to the 6th Iraqi Army Division's 4th Brigade, Morschauser said... More -- Roundtable Audio -- Transcript -- Bio

8 August - Coalition Successes Mount Against al Qaeda in Iraq with U.S. Army Brig. Gen. Kevin J. Bergner.

AFPS (John Kruzel) - Coalition and Iraqi security forces captured or killed 18 senior al Qaeda members in July, a Multinational Force Iraq spokesman said today.

Of the 18, six were terrorist unit commanders known as "senior emirs," and seven were either foreign fighters or weapons distributors. Troops detained or killed three cell leaders and two members who manned an al Qaeda media operation, Army Brig. Gen. Kevin Bergner told online journalists and "bloggers" during a conference call.

"There has been some tactical momentum achieved in July and into the first week now of August," he said. "And we have continued to see the results of some of those successful operations."

The most noteworthy terrorist nabbed recently is al Qaeda's No. 1 Iraqi operative, Khaled al Mashhadani, whom coalition forces captured July 4, the general said. Mashhadani rose through the al Qaeda ranks by directing media and communications operations, and he helped create an online virtual organization called the Islamic State of Iraq, Bergner said in a previous briefing... More -- Roundtable Audio -- Transcript - Briefing Slide - Bio

Concerning my SWJ Blog post - The MEF Engagement Model and Al Qaeda -- Brian H. comments:

I think the analysis is somewhat overblown and abstract. There are other forces at play, now, in particular the existence of a central government which is selected formally by democratic means. The current compromise with sectarian or tribal blocs is unstable and will gradually or quickly erode under the pressure to actually perform. This provides a kind of power base for the Sattars of the world which is distinct from the traditional system; specifically, the ability to bridge the needs and wishes of a populace and the power levers and structures of a formal central government (and/or provincial government, as elections for those proceed.)

So the dynamics of tribal dominance and power-playing will probably fall into a degree of eclipse as it becomes clear they cannot access resources and make enduring agreements with wider communities inside Iraq. It will be telling if Sattar makes a move to become an "independent" player in the democratic mode. This would signal that evolution is proceeding apace.

As my reply is rather long for the comments section at the original site I'll post it here:

Dear Brian,

Thank you for your comments and the opportunity to engage you in conversation concerning perceptions and culture. I understand that your comments did not specifically address perceptions or culture for that matter but that is precisely the starting point for this conversation as well as any discussion concerning the conundrum that is Iraq or the global war on terror for that matter. Please accept my response in the spirit intended, specifically to further the discussion. "I would not speak so boldly if it was my due to be believed."

I will address your first sentence directly. You state that "the analysis is somewhat overblown and abstract". Firstly, it is not a stand-alone analysis but a model. The model is intended as a tool; a means to structure our analysis as to what may actually be happening on the ground and why. It is intended to be an abstraction. It is a model and therefore an abstraction of the culture and society we are engaging. You may well be correct in your assessment that the model is overblown so I won't argue that point. I will ask that we might discuss your definition of "overblown" over drinks... I'll buy.

I firmly believe that the vital component of any COIN design is to effectively communicate intent within the cultural frame of reference of the target audience. Your comments lead me to believe that you have misunderstood the intent of the "model" which leads me to further suppose that you may not have actually studied the "engagement model" itself for it explicitly states that we are not talking about "tribes" but a "tribal ethos". The briefing introduces the concepts of "cultural operating codes" and coordinating messages" and how these influence and shape behavior in a tribal society, or stated differently, a society whose behavior is based on the tribal ethos.

The greatest challenge we all face, and many of your comments reflect this challenge, is our reluctance to see the "other" as they are or believe themselves to be and those motivating factors that shape behavior and decisions. Not everyone thinks or behaves the way we do. It is interesting to note that in your case I have failed to effectively communicating intent and will attempt to adapt my approach to fit your cultural frame of reference.

Before I delve into your points at hand I must ask you to "think-outside" your cultural frame of reference box for a moment and enter the Iraqi box. Secondly please take some time and consider the political formula and social contact that governs relationships between individuals, groups, organizations and institutions in the United States. I have my own thoughts on the matter, but I ask that you define these in your own mind. Then I ask you to consider whether the various ethnic and sectarian populations in Iraq adhere to the same formula and whether their actions are governed by a similar social contract. The answer to that question establishes the baseline for further discussion. I submit to you that the various ethnic and sectarian populations in Iraq do not adhere to the same political formula or social contract as we do and it is therefore hazardous to judge, characterize and shape events, whether social, political, economic or martial without taking the Iraqi cultural frame of reference into account. The subsequent discussion therefore is from an Iraqi point of view or at best an appreciation of the Iraqi point of view that an outsider like myself might believe it to be.

Before I address each one of your specific points I must reintroduce the cultural operating codes, coordinating messages as well as the dynamics of the system model as a reference. Cultural operating codes are rules of conduct that define the range of actions and the ideas of individuals and groups within a social system. They determine what to do and what not to do, how to do it or not to do it, whom to do it with or whom not to do it with. They dictate under what circumstances behavior will shift and change. Coordinating messages are culturally-accepted themes that resonate among members within the society and shape their behaviors and decisions. The system model is based on David Pryce-Jones' livelong study and experience in the Arab world. The operating codes and coordinating messages are mine and are based on years of personal study and four years of continuous service in Iraq; much the result of trial and error and adventure learning, especially in regard to my personal interactions with tribal and political leaders.

System Model

Power holders do not and can not hold mutual or agreed ambitions and so are in perpetual and violent competition as they test one another. A commitment to one by definition incurs opposition of an ally's rival. It is impossible in practice for a power holder to have an assortment of clients, and therefore parties fluctuate between loss and gain. All members of the system are employing the same tactics of seeking more powerful sponsors, recruiting others and countering potential challengers by all means available such as conspiracy, assassination and murder (assassination is akin to a no-confidence vote and murder an accepted mechanism to maintain a semblance of competing party membership parity). Any power holder will switch sponsorship if advantage can be gained and is vulnerable in turn by an internal challenger whom might switch sides if it benefits him. The system is self-regulating and places constraints on the incumbent and challenger alike. The moment the challenger initiates action and begins to eliminate rivals, he begins to encounter opposition. The stakes increase until failure to deal decisively with a rival becomes tantamount to one's own death sentence. The system/model is not populated with "moderate" actors and is in a constant state of flux. The various actors continuously assess their relative power position in relation to their allies and opponents. They strengthen relationships with select allies, let others lapse; and mobilize new ones to keep their networks operational. Conflict is the norm and an accepted part of the system and serves as a means to activate and evaluate relationships. Leadership in this system, as in the tribal system, is based on the "ability to attract and keep followers" vice "ability to enforce". The social system is subject to its own cultural operating codes and coordinating messages and therefore subject to analysis and shaping.

Cultural Operating Codes

1. Shame/Honor

2. Segmentation of tribes

3. Patronage

4. Territory

Coordinating Messages

1. "No stability without us"

2. "What have you done for lately...what will you do for me tomorrow?"

"There are other forces in play, now, in particular the existence of a central government which is selected formally by democratic means." I submit to you that the "forces" in play are the cultural operating codes and coordinating messages and not the "existence of a central government which is selected formally by democratic means". Have you asked an Iraqi lately what he considers "democracy" or what he thinks about the democratically elected central government?

"The current compromise with sectarian or tribal blocs is unstable and will gradually or quickly erode under the pressure to actually perform." What are the assumptions on which this statement is based? The system works on establishing patronage/security relationships. Holders of power and their allies in the various ministries such as the Ministry of Health, Education, Interior or Defense for that matter are not beholden to the entire polity but only to those in their respective patronage/security system. The development of a patronage system is the result of the segmentation process that occurs as related groups join or alliances of interests are created. All parties, whether Da'wa, Fadilah, Organization of Martyr Sadr (OMS), Iraqi Islamic Party, Supreme Council of an Islamic Iraq, etc, are maneuvering and establishing their relative power positions in relation to their allies (based on the segmentation principle) and opponents. I venture to say that your comment is based on the assumption that the central government will assume responsibility for the welfare of all Iraq's inhabitants. This is not the case.

The concept of "the people" that is implied when reading between the lines is an American concept...not Iraqi. Secondly, your position that "the current compromise with sectarian or tribal blocs is unstable and will gradually or quickly erode" is too simplistic especially since "compromise" and alliances (expressed in patronage relationships and territorial control) is the very foundation upon which the political system is based. It will experience fluctuations as relationships evolve and alliances are renegotiated but it will not gradually or quickly erode. It did not do so under the Saddam regime nor will it do so now.

"This provides a kind of power base for the Sattars of the world which is distinct from the traditional system; specifically, the ability to bridge the needs and wishes of a populace and the power levers and structures of a formal central government (and/or provincial government, as elections for those proceed.)" I agree that patronage and the leader's ability to attract (segmentation principle) is the foundation of any potential power base in this part of the world, specifically the ability of a leader or leading family to provide for their specific kinship group and affiliated allies and associates. It is even more important to obtain coveted posts such as ministry posts that provide access to "honor, guns and money" and ability to sustain the patronage relationship and retain power. I personally observed meetings between Sheikh Sattar and the Anbar Governor where discussions focusing on access to the levers of power, read access to funds and contracts, were highly contentious. Sheikh Sattar required access to the sources of patronage in order to "attract" more followers and the Governor sought to block his access so as to be able to "attract" followers to his group. This dynamic is played out across the political spectrum at each level of governance whether at the national, provincial, district or local levels. If you like I am also prepared to address the dynamics in play if we wish to discuss "elections" in more detail. Suffice it to say the same dynamic, operating codes and coordinating messages are in play in this field as well as is the system's model available for reference above.

"So the dynamics of tribal dominance and power-playing will probably fall into a degree of eclipse as it becomes clear they cannot access resources and make enduring agreements with wider communities inside Iraq. It will be telling if Sattar makes a move to become an "independent" player in the democratic mode. This would signal that evolution is proceeding apace." I do not wish to sound arrogant or condescending but on what information do you base your comment that "the dynamics of tribal dominance and power-playing will probably fall into a degree of eclipse".

Firstly, the tribal system in general and its individual actors (tribes and sub-tribes) in particular react early to keep any one tribe from attaining tribal dominance. If my four years of studying the tribal system and dealing with tribes in Iraq has taught me anything it is that David Pryce-Jones' model is accurate to a T. Although the western press continues to focus exclusively on Sheik Sattar and the Sahawa al Anbar movement, it seldom addresses the push-back the Albu Risha (Sheikh Sattar's tribe) are experiencing from other tribes in his quest to renegotiate his tribes' relative power position within the Dulaym Federation as a whole. Quoting Gertrude Bell at this point is appropriate "the tribes are at their best when in splendid equilibrium".

Secondly, the quest for "agreements" between tribes (segmentation principle) in their quest for access to patronage/security and control of territory is how the political system works... period... whether we are talking tribes or political parties.

Thirdly, representational government exists in Iraq. It has always existed in the tribal house where all decisions are based on consensus. Majority rule does not govern in Iraq. If seven out of ten Sheikhs agree, no Sheiks agree for ten out of ten Sheikhs must agree hence the coordinating message "no stability without us". A group may seek to impose its solution without the required consensus building if it is —to accept the inevitable push-back from those that were not consulted or included in the decision. Never forget, fighting is a form of negotiation in this part of the word. Sheikh Sattar is not able to become an "independent" player for he and the Albu Risha are dependent upon the constellation of allies that Sheikh Sattar is able to "attract" to the Albu Risha and maintain through a patronage relationship. One of the greatest misconceptions we have is that Iraqi society shares our "cult of the individual" (one of our operating codes). It does not. The tribal ethos fosters a multiplicity of compact groups-ethnic, sectarian or economic-all vying with and suspicious of each other. The focus of each group is to survive and prosper and they can do so only if they preserve and reinforce the corporate pattern. Iraqis do not focus on the individual but rather on the tribe or the community of interest and let the tribe or the community progress as a whole. The Sahawa al Anbar is transitioning into a political party but not in accordance with American norms nor can it for Iraqis are not Americans. I am not sure whether you would agree that this constitutes evolutionary progress, whatever that means, but it is all Iraqi, the good, the bad and the ugly.

Thank you for this opportunity to discuss the model and its cultural operating codes and coordinating messages. It is not my intent to convince you that it is an appropriate tool to study and appreciate Iraq's cultural environment. I can tell you that we are applying the model in Anbar province and it helps us to appreciate the cultural operating environment better.

Respectfully,

MAC

-----

Also see:

COIN in a Tribal Society - SWJ Blog

Methodology for Tribal Structure Analysis - PowerPoint Brief

In other public statements and in several Small Wars Journal postings, Kilcullen entered very slowly, very prudently into the virtually verboten realm of attacking al Qaeda-style Terrorism in Islamic religious context, rather than in Western secular terms only -- referring to the AQ terrorists as "munafiquun" (hypocrites to authentic, Qur'anic Islam) and pointing out that "they call themselves mujahideen" but are doing barbaric things which are anything but holy.

To which this word warrior says: Spot on! Two small steps for a good man, two giant steps for truth-in-language and truth-in-Islam in the War on al Qaeda-style Terrorism -- a.k.a., Irhabi Murderdom and the AQ Apostasy, as this essay recommends as its most appropriate new names.

But even these two measured Kilcullen attacks on the terrorists' religious legitimacy were in conflict with the State Department's basic rule in such matters. As stated on page 25 of the US National Strategy For Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, the official advisory is, in part, as follows: Use caution when dealing with faith issues. Government officials should be extremely cautious and, if possible, avoid using religious language, because it can mean different things and can be easily misunderstood...

So broad brush is this avoidance of matters and words religious that the traditional "hearts, minds and souls" frame of reference no longer includes the word "souls."

In respectful contradiction to this "avoid using religious words" directive, this writer has been able to post three recent essays supportive of Dr. Kilcullen's specific acts of re-labeling and of his general call for a "New Lexicon" for expanding this line of counterinsurgency to its full potential.

The latest of these essays, Petraeus Aide's Call for a New Lexicon, offers over a dozen of the Arabic and Islamic words which are necessary frames of reference in any such anti-bin Ladenism Glossary, or Lexicon.

Enter Marine Corps Lieutenant General Jim Mattis

By fortunate circumstance, Lieutenant General Jim Mattis, Commanding General of US Marines Forces Central Command and I Marine Expeditionary Force, and the Marine Corps' premier counterinsurgency (COIN) expert -- has just inserted himself into the religious and/or the pseudo-religious aspects of the current war on al Qaeda's metastasizing cancer of so-called "Jihadi Martyrdom."

As Mattis has charged in a recent North County Times interview, the al Qaeda narrative in this respect is nothing but tyranny in false religious garb. Although he does not list the specific Islamic terms which constitute that pseudo-religious scam, the most likely ingredients of this patently false but highly seductive, self-sanctifying narrative would be bin Ladenism's six-word mantra of so-called

(1) Jihad (holy war) by supposed

(2) mujahideen (holy warriors) and UBL-anointed

(3) shuhada (martyrs) destined for a promised 72-virgins

(4) Jennah (Paradise) as reward for killing us alleged

(5) kuffr (infidels) and, in time, the alleged

(6) Shaitan al-Kabir (the Great Satan, America), as well

Notice, please, that the widespread parroting of this AQ-supportive narrative is much akin to the "useful idiocy" of those in the Cold War who parroted (and who demonized those few who would not join them in parroting) the Soviets' and Fascist Fidel Castro's deceitful narrative of so-called

(1) Wars of National Liberation by alleged

(2) Progressive Movements and supposed

(3) Patriotic Fronts on their way to heaven-on-earth

(4) People's Democracy as a reward for killing all of us

(5) Fascists and for defeating the evils of

(6) American Imperialism

The two situations and the patently false labeling sustaining each are virtually identical. They are both highly representative of the problem which the late, great Senator Pat Moynihan and Dr. Fred Charles Ikle -- Ronald Reagan's Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and now with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) - described in the early 1980s as "semantic infiltration."

As Moynihan defined the term, Simply put, semantic infiltration is the process whereby we come to adopt the language of our adversaries in describing political reality. The most totalitarian regimes in the world would call themselves 'liberation movements.'... [substitute 'Jihadi Martyrs'] ... It is perfectly predictable that they should misuse words to conceal their real nature. But must we aid them in that effort by repeating those words? Worse, do we begin to influence our own perceptions by using them?"

Back then, it was a case of Leninist and Castroite "tyranny in false Liberationist garb." Today, it is the neo-Leninist and fascist-Left equivalent which General Mattis so correctly condemns as being wrapped in "false [Islamic] religious garb." Indeed, both of these monumental scams are deceitful echoes of the militant atheist Vladimir Lenin's cynical postulation that

"We will find our greatest success to the extent that we inculcate Marxism as a kind of religion. Religious men and women are easy to convert and win, and will easily accept our thinking if we wrap it up in a kind of religious terminology."

The question now is what should be done about it -- namely, what is the optimum counter narrative that will begin applying the necessary antidote to the AQ cancer which has spread across the planet? Like any cancer, it is deadly. But like any cancer, it can and must be defeated -- both by destroying individual cells and by a death-to-the-source chemotherapy of worldwide "delegitimization."

As a means of delegitimizing and even demonizing the AQ-style enemy and its Salafi-Wahhabi sponsors, this longtime admirer of General Mattis suggests to him that this ultimate counter-narrative will be one which paints a certifiably apostate and satanic picture of the Terrorists and their impending trip to Eternal Hellfire in Islamic religious words -- both Arabic and English -- along the following lines:

(1) Hirabah (unholy war, "war against society'") and/or Irhab (Terrorism) by ruthless

(2) mufsiduun (evildoers, mortal sinners, corrupters) destined for

(3) Jahannam (Eternal Hellfire) as a proper punishment for their

(4) khawarij (outside the religion) violations of the Qur'an which are so serious, so

(5) shaitaniyah (satanic) and so willfully unrepented as to constitute

(6) al-Irtidad al Qaeda (the AQ Apostasy) against Qur'anic (not "Shari'a") Islam

At this point, these terms are known by all too few of us. But just as we have learned not only the deceitful "Jihadi" words of the AQ narrative but several other Arabic and Islamic terms, as well -- words such as fatwa (religious edict), intifada (insurrection), Allahu Akbar (Allah is Great), fitna (discord), Shari'a (Islamic Law) and Umma (Muslim World), surely we can learn a few more -- especially those which will at long last allow us to begin demonizing rather than continuing to canonize these genocidal killers.

A prudent way to begin such truth-in-labeling in Iraq and elsewhere is to condemn AQ-style atrocities -- i.e., the slaughter of innocents coming from a prayer meeting, or while shopping in the markets or while celebrating a soccer team victory -- not only in such secular terms as "criminal" and "horrendous" and "barbaric" but as being clearly satanic (shaitaniyah), as well.

After all, who delights in these bloody and often genocidal attacks by Muslims on fellow Muslims? Is it the peaceful, compassionate, merciful and just Allah of the Qur'an? Of course not. Or is it, instead, what any truly faithful Muslim knows to be the cruel, the hating, the murderous and the ever-deceitful Satan himself?

But if we never bother to call it satanic, this makes it all the easier for the AQ-style and the al Sadr-style terrorists to mislabel such sinful criminality forever as "in the will of Allah" -- which it is obviously not.

Beginnings of the Proposed New Lexicon

The urgent need for a long-overdue glossary of such terms is twofold. It will be a unique semantic roadmap by which all of us might better understand and to act upon:

First, the deadly implications of the powerful "Jihad by mujahideen destined for Paradise" narrative which has been invented by the Wahhabi-Salafi-UBL conspiracy and which is carelessly parroted and given legitimacy by all too many of us and,

Second, the much needed antitoxin of the "Hirabah by mufsiduun destined for Hellfire" counter narrative set forth above -- with these three terms and few more serving as a startup -- and with perhaps a dozen more to be added. Again, see David Kilcullen's Call for a "New Lexicon"for the current list of words and for those proofs of the Al Qaeda Apostasy which will fully justify their use.

In reviewing these Arabic and Islamic terms, we should not imagine ourselves using them quickly, expertly, loudly or in a fashion of lecturing or pontificating to any audience. But we should at least understand them well enough -- one word at a time if necessary -- to know which ones will serve our purposes and which ones are to be avoided because they are polishing the haloes of the Irhabi Murderdom likes of bin Laden, al-Sadr and Ahmadinejad. [See also TrueSpeak Essays]

Only then can we begin designing strategies, operations and tactics which will, at long last, begin to define these hyena-like suicide mass murderers, rather than America and the West, as the real and everlasting enemies of authentic, Qur'anic Islam.

In that context, as Ronald Reagan said about the Evil Empire, "We (and the God of Abraham) win. They (and their Satan of Eternal Hellfire) lose."

A DC-area attorney, writer, lecturer and anti-Terrorism strategist, Jim Guirard was longtime Chief of Staff to US Senators Allen Ellender and Russell Long. His TrueSpeak Institute and TrueSpeak.org website are devoted to truth-in-language and truth-in-history in public discourse. Phone: 703-768-0957 - E-mail: Justcauses@aol.com

-----

Discuss at Small Wars Council

General Peck's article is a balanced, even restrained, articulation of what airpower can and has brought to today's ongoing irregular campaigns, and I highly recommend it. Gen Peck is the Commander of the Air Force Doctrine Center and Vice Commander of Air University. He brings impressive operational and academic credentials to bear on the subject, including his 300 combat hours in the F-15.

Airpower's Crucial Role in Irregular Warfare

Air & Space Power Journal - Summer 2007

Maj Gen Allen G. Peck, USAF

Because the dominance of America's airpower in traditional wars has not been lost on those who threaten our national interests, we can logically expect them to turn increasingly to irregular warfare (IW). The ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan reflect the ways that US military power has had to adapt and transform to meet new challenges presented by enemies who have respect for our conventional dominance and the determination to find exploitable seams in our capabilities.

Although the capabilities and effects that America's airpower brings to the fight are not as visible to the casual observer as the maneuvers of ground forces, airpower (including operations in the air, space, and cyberspace domains) remains an invaluable enabler for those forces. Airpower can also serve as a powerful IW capability in its own right, as it did early in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. No one should dismiss IW as falling strictly within the purview of ground or special operations forces. Understanding the IW environment and, in particular, airpower's immense contributions is critical for America's future Air Force leaders, who will prove instrumental in ensuring that the service continues adapting to an ever-changing enemy and bringing relevant capabilities to bear in an ever-changing fight.

The Irregular Warfare Environment

Doctrine defines IW as "a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations." (1) IW includes counterinsurgency operations and foreign internal defense (FID) (providing support to/for a regime, typically against internal foes) as well as support for insurgency operations. For example, al-Qaeda and associated movements, in their quest for power and territory, will likely resort to IW methods, attacking perceived vulnerabilities in order to influence relevant audiences while avoiding direct confrontation with US, allied, or partner-nation forces. This type of warfare often takes a markedly different form from traditional, conventional warfare, requiring the addition of IW capabilities to the "tool kit" from which US forces can pull. At the same time, however, the Air Force cannot afford to lose its acknowledged edge in traditional warfare, which has enabled past military successes and will prove necessary in the future to maintain America's position as the world's superpower.

The long-war aspect of IW poses challenges to America's center of gravity—its willingness to bring considerable resources to bear and remain engaged in an extended fight. Historically, democracies tend to grow weary of fighting relatively quickly, as reflected in this country's experiences in the Civil War, Vietnam, and the present conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed, the network of radical Islamic extremists has produced a plan for a 100-year struggle, and democratic nations under their attack are showing signs of fatigue just a few years into the battle. (2) This long-war aspect has implications for today's Air Force; for instance, junior officers, operating today at the tactical level, may well be responsible for the strategic aspects of tomorrow's war. Not only must our Airmen have knowledge of airpower capabilities in IW, but also they must articulate airpower concepts as well as educate the joint and coalition communities on the weapons and skills that airpower brings to the fight.

Airpower's Asymmetric Advantages

In an IW environment, the traditionally recognized ability of airpower to strike at the adversary's "strategic center of gravity" will likely have less relevance due to the decentralized and diffuse nature of the enemy. (3) The amorphous mass of ideological movements opposing Western influence and values generally lacks a defined command structure that airpower can attack with predictable effects. Still, airpower holds a number of asymmetric trump cards (capabilities the enemy can neither meet with parity nor counter in kind). For instance, airpower's ability to conduct precision strikes across the globe can play an important role in counterinsurgency operations. Numerous other advantages (including information and cyber operations; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance [ISR]; and global mobility) have already proven just as important. These capabilities provide our fighting forces with highly asymmetric advantages in the IW environment.

Innovation and adaptation are hallmarks of airpower. Cold War--era bombers, designed to carry nuclear weapons, can loiter for hours over the battlefield and deliver individual conventional weapons to within a few feet of specified coordinates. Fighter aircraft, designed to deliver precision weapons against hardened targets, can disseminate targeting-pod video directly to an Air Force joint terminal attack controller who can then direct a strike guided by either laser or the global positioning system (GPS). Unmanned systems such as the Predator, once solely a surveillance platform, now have effective laser designation and the capacity for precision, kinetic strike. Airborne platforms offer electronic protection to ground forces, including attacking insurgent communications and the electronics associated with triggering improvised explosive devices (IED). Exploiting altitude, speed, and range, airborne platforms can create these effects, unconstrained by terrain or artificial boundaries between units. Forward-thinking Airmen developed these innovations by using adaptive tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment to counter a thinking, adaptive enemy.

To be sure, our IW adversaries have their own asymmetric capabilities such as suicide bombers, IEDs, and the appropriation of civilian residences, mosques, and hospitals as staging areas for their combat operations. However, they lack and cannot effectively offset unfettered access to the high ground that superiority in air, space, and cyberspace provides.

Airpower's Contributions - Today and Tomorrow

US airpower, in its myriad forms, is currently operating simultaneously in multiple theaters, producing invaluable combat and enabling effects across the board. For instance, the Air Force has engaged in a wide spectrum of combat operations in Southwest Asia for more than 15 years, and over 25,000 Airmen are currently deployed to US Central Command's area of responsibility. Airpower's capabilities have been—and will continue to be—integral to the success of US military power in this theater and in the global war on terror writ large, a fact often overlooked in accounts that focus on the more readily visible aspects of war. Nevertheless, when properly integrated with other military and civil efforts under the rubric of IW, airpower consistently delivers effects critical to winning the overall joint fight and meeting the campaign's overarching military and political objectives.

A number of the fundamental tenets of airpower have proven particularly valuable in enabling the Air Force to bring its most potent asymmetric strengths to bear in ongoing operations. Perhaps first and foremost amongst these is the application of airpower via centralized control and decentralized execution. This imperative for centralizing planning and direction while decentralizing tactical-employment decisions has as much applicability to IW as to traditional warfare operations. The rationale for this fundamental belief should roll off a professional Airman's tongue as easily as, say, a Marine officer would justify the inviolability of the Marine air-ground task force. By incorporating all assets under a single commander, Air Force forces and joint force air component commander (JFACC), the air component can both effectively and efficiently allocate limited airpower resources to cover competing requirements from multiple war-fighting commanders across the theater while maintaining a vigilant focus on broader goals. The fire hose of effects available from airpower operations can be focused where and when needed, according to the priorities established by the joint force commander. Decisions regarding particular employment methods and tactics will reside at a lower level, closer to the fight and to the knowledge of what is needed.

Today, air-component forces provide the following: kinetic effects from fighters, bombers, and unmanned systems; ISR that uses a variety of air-breathing, space, and nontraditional sensors; electronic-warfare platforms; and airlift/airdrop capabilities, which can range practically anywhere across Iraq and Afghanistan, provided they have not been "penny-packeted" to individual units. Most of airpower's contributions in Iraq focus on support for ground forces, but unique abilities allow it to conduct both interdependent and independent operations.

In this regard, airpower offers a wide spectrum of asymmetric capabilities that we can focus and direct as necessary, creating effects such as kinetic destruction, persistent ISR collection/dissemination (including air-breathing and space-based as well as manned and unmanned), infiltrating/exfiltrating forces and supplies, and attacks on computer networks and support infrastructures. All of this is available on an as-needed basis, almost without regard for geography or artificial surface boundaries.

Since the beginning of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, Central Command's air component has flown over a half million combat and combat-support sorties. Though impressive, that number does not tell the whole story. First, many of these sorties are of long duration, supplying unprecedented persistence and presence overhead, ultimately enabled through a combination of air refueling and forward basing. One cannot under¬estimate the criticality of being able to choose from among a variety of weapons and tools and respond rapidly, particularly in an IW environment in which the enemy very often dictates the time, place, and nature of attacks. Second, and more importantly, sortie counts or similar metrics cannot readily depict many of the effects that the Air Force brings to the fight. Although impressive, statistics represent only one part of the Air Force's contribution in today's war. We must not overlook either the robust intelligence analysis and dissemination capabilities that leverage the unprecedented collection afforded by today's Air Force systems or the communications-enabling functions that make global warfare as seamless as if it were in our own backyard.

Employing Airpower's Capabilities

Space-based assets rank among the least understood and recognized of the Air Force's war-fighting contributions. Vital intelligence, communications, weather, and navigation capabilities all rely heavily on assured access to space. Space-based force multipliers are proving immensely valuable at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. Take for example the GPS—it is not only critical to providing guidance for precision munitions but also vital to reporting the geolocation of friendly troops, insurgents, and civilians. Precision location allows more rapid responses for close air support, combat search and rescue, casualty evacuation, and prosecution of time-sensitive targets. Yet, a determined, capable adversary could challenge access to space, as the Chinese reminded the rest of the world with their recent antisatellite demonstration.

Intelligence made available by air and space forces serves as a critical enabler in IW. In traditional warfare, larger yields and/or quantities of weapons can compensate for targeting uncertainties, but this is generally not the case in counterinsurgency operations, in which unintended collateral damage can undermine support for the government and become a recruiting tool for the insurgency. Currently, over both Afghanistan and Iraq, space-based and air-breathing assets alike continuously monitor the situation on the ground, helping identify insurgents as well as their organizational networks, supporters, and lines of communication and supply. These platforms collect and disseminate a variety of intelligence (signals, communications, imagery, moving-target, full-motion-video, etc.), all integral to the fight. Overhead assets also contribute significantly to the emerging field of forensic analysis, which involves backtracking from ongoing events to determine the sources from which they emanated (e.g., tracing back from explosions of IEDs to locate the bomb-making organizations and facilities that support them). In both Iraq and Afghanistan, airborne assets have developed the capacity to respond quickly to determine the launch points of mortar or rocket attacks, identify suspicious individuals/vehicles and mark them with laser designators for apprehension by ground forces, or, in many cases, destroy them outright. As with other airpower applications, centralized control of intelligence platforms (which minimizes duplication of effort and ensures support for the joint force commander's highest-priority requirements) enables effective and efficient use of limited ISR assets—key elements of the coalition's asymmetric advantage in IW. For example, effective ISR enables the air component to bring airpower to bear in support of small coalition or indigenous ground-force units, magnifying their organic capabilities.

Precision strike, another highly effective tool of counterinsurgency, permits us to eliminate insurgents in close proximity to civilians or friendly ground forces, thus giving coalition forces a significant firepower advantage. Highly accurate guidance systems, cockpit-¬selectable fuzes, and munitions of various explosive yields allow Airmen to deliver intended effects precisely while limiting unintended effects. Of course, in certain situations we may need to attack large areas with less discriminate use of firepower—a task for which airpower is also well suited.

Air mobility offers another edge in counter¬insurgent operations. Our forces exercise this advantage over surface-bound IW adversaries by transporting personnel and cargo while bypassing contested lines of communications, air-dropping supplies, and quickly evacuating the wounded. In Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom last year, the air component flew over 50,000 airlift sorties, transporting over 1,000,000 personnel and 90,000 pallets of cargo that otherwise would have moved via slower, more vulnerable ground-based means of transportation. The mobility advantage also enables the infiltration, resupply, and exfiltration of relatively small ground units. By providing humanitarian assistance, medical support, and transportation for government officials to remote areas, airpower can promote the government's credibility and improve the quality of life for its population. These types of operations, which directly affect and are immediately visible to the population in question, can have significant effects in the overall campaign against the insurgents.

Coupled with relatively small numbers of coalition and indigenous forces, airpower can bring a full spectrum of effects to bear, from humanitarian to electronic to kinetic. In some cases, the mere visible or audible presence of airpower can demonstrate commitment to a population and support to a government as well as shape the behavior of insurgents by reducing their freedom of movement and denying them sanctuaries.

Assisting Partner Nations' Air Forces

The Air Force's FID, which includes military programs that support partner nations' strategy for internal defense and development, primarily seeks to develop and sustain the airpower capabilities of those nations. By building partnerships in this way, the United States helps shape the strategic environment and impede potential terrorists from gaining a foothold in these countries. Ultimately, increasing partner nations' ability to counter irregular threats allows them to fight more effectively, enhance their legitimacy, and reduce their dependence on US forces.

Currently the Air Force provides education and training essential to resurrecting the air forces of Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite getting off to a slow start, the nascent Iraqi air force is conducting rudimentary ISR and mobility missions. Operating Al Muthana Air Base (a section of Baghdad International Airport), it plans to take over activities at several other bases. US forces continue to train Iraqis in support functions needed to maintain and protect their aircraft and bases. Furthermore, they are helping develop an indigenous ability to provide air surveillance and air traffic control over sovereign airspace—an essential part of any coalition exit strategy since partner nations will need support from coalition air forces until they can independently conduct their own operations and defend their airspace. In this age of increasing emphasis on IW, the Air Force's FID capabilities will likely receive greater emphasis and resources.

Planning, tasking, executing, and assessing combat operations are the JFACC's forte. Clearly, planning and executing phase four (stabilize) and phase five (enable civil authority) operations pose unique challenges for the air component. (4)

An understanding of how to help rebuild a partner nation's airpower (including complexities of legislation and funding for foreign military assistance, aspirations of partner nations, and opportunities for coalition contributions) constitutes one potential IW emphasis area for educating and training Airmen. The Air Force's FID force structure may also need a relook with an eye towards improving the capacity to rebuild partner nations' air forces; for example, it is no coincidence that the most successful asset of the Iraqi air force, the C-130, is the only aircraft type it has in common with the US Air Force.

Developing Airmen for Irregular Warfare

Force development is a function of education, training, and experience, with an objective of producing adaptive, creative, and knowledge-enabled Airmen. Our Airmen not only must know and articulate what their service brings to the IW fight today, but also must think "outside the box"—an ability that will enable them to lead and direct the Air Force of the future. Our service must continue to adapt and leverage its asymmetric capabilities against those adversaries engaged in IW against the United States and its allies. Fortunately, adaptability and an inherent capacity for thinking above the fray are ingrained in the genetic code of Airmen. Likewise, flexibility is built into the platforms with which they wage war. Developing bright, innovative, highly capable leaders who will continue this tradition of flexibility is essential to ensure that airpower maintains a place at the fore of IW conflicts.

Our Airmen must receive training and education in the capabilities and limitations of airpower; moreover, they must unapologetically articulate airpower concepts and doctrine to the joint community, members of other services, and personnel assigned to other government agencies. Numerous ongoing initiatives focus on educating our Airmen on aspects of IW in which US airpower plays a direct role and makes a direct contribution, such as the effort initiated by the Air Force chief of staff to identify and/or train Airmen who have a solid understanding of foreign cultures and languages. In addition, expanded training programs for new recruits, increased emphasis on predeployment training for combat-support personnel, and enhanced flying training for aviators and Battlefield Airmen based on war-fighting lessons learned all reflect the new realities of IW. Just as Airmen can survive and kill the enemy at great distances from the air, so must they have the training and motivation to survive and kill at close range on the ground.

Air Force doctrine will also play a significant role in educating Airmen. Consisting of the fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of national objectives, doctrine shapes the manner in which the Air Force organizes, trains, equips, and sustains its forces, preparing war fighters for future uncertainties and giving them a common set of understandings on which to base their decisions. Currently the Air Force is revising the existing version of AFDD 2-3.1, Foreign Internal Defense, 10 May 2004, and developing a new doctrinal keystone publication: AFDD 2-3, Irregular Warfare, which will codify how the Air Force approaches IW, including its capabilities and contributions to counter¬insurgency operations. This document will also form the basis of our service's position as the joint community tackles the important business of writing doctrine on counterinsurgency. All of the aforementioned initiatives are designed to create a core of IW leaders and experts upon which the Air Force can rely.

Conclusion

America and its military are at war; the current threat posed by global terrorists, potentially armed with weapons of mass destruction, is as great as previous threats to our way of life posed by Nazism, fascism, and communism. Coalition and partner-nation forces join the United States in this effort. The US Air Force provides air, space, and cyber power as part of the joint and coalition war-fighting team, dedicated to winning the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan while simultaneously protecting the vital interests of our nation and the coalition in which it operates. Airpower, in all its forms, brings a vast array of direct-effect weapons and joint-force enablers to the fray, a fact not always clearly recognized or portrayed in the press. Although it is not so important that audiences properly attribute progress in the global war on terror to particular components or services, it is important that Air Force Airmen know and articulate our resident asymmetric capabilities and that they use their knowledge and expertise to ensure that our service remains as relevant to tomorrow's fight as it is to today's.

Notes

1. "Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept," draft version 1.0, January 2007, 4.

2. Rear Adm William D. Sullivan, vice-director, Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Fighting the Long War—Military Strategy for the War on Terrorism, briefing slide 9, February 2006, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/jcs/jcslongwar_12jan06_j5.pdf (accessed 15 January 2007).

3. The strategic center of gravity is a source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act.

4. Joint Publication 3.0, Joint Operations, 17 September 2006, IV-25 through IV-29, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf.

Maj Gen Allen G. Peck (USAFA; MS, Air Force Institute of Technology; MA, Salve Regina College) is commander, Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center, and vice-commander, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He has served as an F-15 aircraft commander, instructor pilot, and standardization and evaluation flight examiner. General Peck has completed two tours on the Air Staff at the Pentagon and a joint assignment as chief, Current Operations, US Central Command (USCENTCOM), MacDill AFB, Florida. The general has commanded an air operations group in Germany, an air expeditionary wing in Saudi Arabia, and the Air and Space Expeditionary Force Center, Langley AFB, Virginia. A key planner for the air war over Serbia, General Peck served as chief, Combat Plans, combined air operations center (CAOC), Vincenza, Italy, during the subsequent campaign. He also served with the commander, Air Force forces at USCENTCOM's CAOC during Operation Iraqi Freedom's major combat operations. As deputy combined force air component commander, he oversaw planning, tasking, execution, and assessment of coalition air operations for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. A command pilot with more than 2,700 hours in the F-15, including more than 300 combat hours, General Peck is a distinguished graduate of the US Air Force Academy, Squadron Officer School, the Air Force Institute of Technology, and the College of Naval Command and Staff; he also attended Harvard University as a National Security Fellow.

The Brookings Institution Iraq Index for July 30, 2007 contains an update of the indicators measured since 2003. The overall summary, based on an examination of the trends is "On balance, Iraq at the end of July is showing significant signs of battlefield momentum in favor of U.S./coalition military forces, but there is nonetheless little good to report on the political front and only modest progress on the economic side of things." However the report itself is much more informative than its summary. The statistics collected by the Brookings Institution describe the shape of combat and politics in Iraq and give us a greater insight into why the the political front is struggling and what the connection is between combat operations and the political arena...

Richard also comments on an earlier Belmont Club post (Half a Loaf) about the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq.

I was just on the blogger round table with Philip Reeker, US Embassy Baghdad, on the subject of PRTs. And it was clear that they were trying to building things from the bottom up in a society where the tradition of local government (as opposed to tribal government) was nonexistent. But it was also clear that the assets necessary to accomplish this are pretty thin. They're still building the doctrine. And there's no enabling bureaucratic structure. One of the things, for example, that Ambassador Crocker had to do was waive the State Department security regs to get people out. To provide any security at all, the PRTs either have to be embedded or escorted, except in places like Kurdistan where they can mostly operate unescorted.

Interestingly, the PRTs found the military's reserve system very useful because it provided a pool of specialists for which State had no analogue. There was some reference to the need for the equivalent of a Goldwater-Nichols for the civilian arms of government to provide an institutional cure. But that's still prospective. The sense you got was that State is trying to field people and is succeeding somewhat, but that many hurdles remain.

To summarize, from what I understand there's a clear recognition now -- and there may have been a former reluctance -- to create the capacity to conduct political work at the grassroots. But there remain questions about whether a) it is still possible, given the time elapsed; b) US Government agencies can mobilze effectively to accomplish this task.

My own sense, without any pejorative reflection on State, is that they are struggling to match the political work with the security gains. And this is due, I think, almost wholly to the circumstance that we are now asking diplomats to do something they never in their wildest dreams thought they would be doing. As Mr. Reeker ran down the list of this or that person voluntarily leaving a post in such and such European capital for duty in some provincial Iraqi dustbowl you got the sense that the State guys were individually making one heck of an effort but that the institutional capacity still isn't there.

RADM Mark Fox, MNF-Iraq, BG Gen Robert Allardice, Commander, Coalition Air Force Transition Team, and Iraqi Air Force Commander LTG Kamal Barzanjy speak with reporters 5 August 2007.

This latest effort, Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win explores the nature and components of victories by the weak over stronger states. Professor Record examines a total of eleven insurgencies/small wars from the American Revolution to Iraq. His opening chapter explores three major previous works that have attempted to ascertain the most important variables in David's success in the proverbial David vs. Goliath context. Andrew Mack's notable "Why Big Nations Lost Small War" attributed defeat to the asymmetric levels of political will and interest involved. David usually plays for higher stakes—survival—against a major power. Another key contributor, Dr. Ivan Arrequin-Toft argued that the interaction of opposing strategies was the key. In How the Weak Win Wars, he contended that "strong actors will lose asymmetric conflicts when they use the wrong strategy vis-í -vis their opponent's." This important work sought to explain how major powers employing an inappropriate direct approach would generally lose against a weaker side taking a more Fabian or indirect approach. Finally, Record finds Gil Merom's How Democracies Lose Small Wars persuasive. Merom examined three cases studies of democratic states and found that democracies lose because they "find it extremely difficult to escalate the level of violence and brutality to that which can secure victory." Merom's work is controversial and Record deftly points out the weaknesses of the methodology and conclusions, which focuses excessively on the security component of insurgency and overrates "barbarism" for discriminate applications of force.

In the second chapter Dr. Record explores the key variable that he believes the literature to date has not focused—external assistance. He finds that external assistance is material (no pun intended) to David's success and consistently correlates with insurgent victory. Apparently, slingshots and round stones are not enough. I found this to be a detailed and insightful chapter, but wished that the author had explored the importance of modern forms of external support in the form of Diasporas and the internet.

Having identified the most significant component of David's victory, Record next examines the ongoing contest in Iraq and America's prospects. He uses a comparative assessment of Iraq and the Vietnam War to conduct and frame his analysis. While he is pessimistic about Goliath's chances, he does note that the Iraqi insurgents have no lock on success. Neither their size, appeal nor external support is nearly as impressive as the NVA or Viet Cong. His overall evaluation bears quoting:

The military dimensions of the Iraq War bear little comparison to those of the Vietnam War, which was a much large conflict against a much more powerful enemy. That said, the United States faces in Iraq the same two daunting political challenges it failed to surmount in Vietnam: fostering the creation and survival of a legitimate, indigenous government and sustaining American domestic political support for the war.

He also identifies and assesses the influence of distinctive features of the American way of war on the U.S. forces' performance against the Iraqi insurgency. This section of the book relied extensively upon Colin Gray's recent Strategic Studies Institute monograph, and I suspect that effort was influenced by Professor Gray's strategic realism and emphasis on looming threats in Asia. These two chapters also build upon the perceptive critiques of the distinguished military scholars Tony Echevarria and Fred Kagan. The former is a critic of the American "Way of Battles" with its Jominian linearity and its confusing winning battles with the attainment of strategic and political objectives. Professor Kagan's superb Finding the Target is likewise cited in support Record's devastating critique of American Way of War that too often sees the enemy as a target set that can be destroyed and that equates hitting targets with victory.

Professor Record finishes with six conclusions--all but the last are sound.

• The stronger side usually wins: the best strategy, there is to be strong.

• Weaker side victories are exceptional and almost always rest on some combination of stronger political will, superior strategy, and foreign help.

• External assistance is a common enable of victorious insurgent wars, though certainly no guarantee of success.

• Modern democracies have limited political tolerance for protracted overseas wars against irregular enemies.

• For the United States, the impact of anticipated and incurred casualties on political will is a function primarily of military action's perceived costs, benefits, and chances o success.

• America's political system and Jominian approach to war greatly impede U.S. success in counterinsurgent warfare; accordingly, the United States should avoid direct military involvement in foreign internal wars.

Record's grasp of American strategic culture is sound, and while I agree that strategic culture is important, I also believe it evolves (to quote Dr. Gray) and America has won irregular contests in the past in the Philippines and I believe that it can again as long as initiatives like the new counterinsurgency manual take root. To paraphrase Sir Michael Howard, America's armed forces better get used to this form of war, it's the only war and only form of peace we shall see for a generation.