The folks at Defense and the National Interest

(DNI) have been kind enough to offer a block of seats to members of the

Small Wars Journal /

Small Wars Council community

of interest.  Space is very limited -- so it's first come first serve -- and

the price is right -- free.

For those that wish to attend please contact Mr. Bob Howard at

ooda.loop@gmail.com.

The 2007 Boyd Conference

Friday, 13 July 2007

The Alfred M. Gray Research Center

Marine Corps Base

Quantico, Virginia

Agenda

0800 - 0830: Welcoming and Opening Remarks.

0830 - 0930: Session 1

Boyd 102: Salient Points of Colonel John Boyd and Operating Inside the Observe,

Orient, Decide and Act (OODA) Loop.

Dr. Chet Richards (Colonel USAF Ret.) and Colonel Frans Osinga (PhD, Royal Netherlands

Air Force)

• What it means
• What it does to the opposition
• The type of organizational climate / culture needed to make it work
• Latest research into why it works

0930 - 1030: Session 2

Warfare since Boyd: Summary of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW)

Colonel G. I. Wilson (USMC Ret.) and Panel

• "War on Terror"
• Iraq and Afghanistan
• Lebanon
• Can we ever operate inside their OODA loops?
• Through a glass darkly (trends & forecasts)

1045 - 1130: Session 3

War in our future?

William Lind

• Various interpretations: William Lind (crisis of legitimacy of the state),

  Col. TX Hammes (evolved insurgency), FM 3-24 (international insurgency)

• Can these approaches be reconciled? (e.g., FMFM 1-A)
• Other possibilities (e.g., van Creveld's "non-trinitarian warfare")
• Critiques: Is it just guerrilla warfare under another name? Is it the same

  as "terrorism"?

• Is it really war?

1130 - 1300: Lunch Break

1300 - 1415: Session 4

Breakout Sessions

Major Donald Vandergriff (USA Ret.): Adaptive leadership: training for adaptability

and 4GW.

Colonel TX Hammes (USMC Ret.) and William Lind: 4GW and the future of warfare.

• Concepts of 4GW
• Is there a 5th Generation?
• Next steps in the "war on terror"
• Fallout from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon from the standpoint of 4GW
• Implications for the military (including intelligence) and the Department

  of Defense

Dr. Chet Richards and Colonel Frans Osinga: OODA Loops into the future - areas

for further research on Boyd.

1430 - 1530: Session 5

Senior Leaders' Critiques (Panel TBD): What I would have done (and would do)

differently

1530 - 1600 (+/-): Session 6

Final Thoughts and Wrap-up (Speakers TBD)

1700 - ????: Further debate and deliberation at a watering hole to be

announced...

Speakers and Breakout Session Leaders Include:

Dr. Chet Richards, Colonel, USAF, Retired: Associate of Boyd's for roughly 20

years, and author of

Certain to Win, on applying Boyd's ideas to business. He will share some of

Colonel Boyd's ideas on the OODA loop that make it much more powerful than just

a simple cycle.

Colonel Gary I. Wilson USMC Retired: A primary co-author of "The

"Changing Face of War" in 1989 which

served as the genesis of debate and discussion on 4th Generation Warfare.

Colonel Frans Osinga, Ph.D., Royal Netherlands Air Force: Author of the new study

of the late Colonel John Boyd and his work

Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd.

Colonel T. X. Hammes, USMC Retired: Author of

The Sling and the Stone, the first full length study of 4GW.

Major Don Vandergriff, USA Retired: Author of the new book on adaptive leadership,

Raising the Bar: Creating and Nurturing Adaptability to Deal with the Changing Face

of War.

William S. Lind, author of the

Maneuver Warfare Handbook, "Strategic

Defense Initiative," and co-author, with Colonel Wilson, et al., of "The

Changing Face of War."

We have a number of special guests who have tentatively accepted, including senior

officers who were associated with Colonel Boyd.

In the linked paper I argue that, just as the new realities of warfare demanded the creation of the Special Forces in the 1960's, winning the Long War will require that the Army develop a standing Advisor Corps.  It has been informed by the experience of many advisors with service in Iraq and Afghanistan, and may prove of some interest to the Small Wars Journal / Small Wars Council community of interest.

"Institutionalizing Adaptation: It's Time for an Army Advisor Corps" was published by the Center for a New American Security.

The most important military component of the Long War will not be the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our allies to fight with us. After describing the many complicated, interrelated, and simultaneous tasks that must be conducted to defeat an insurgency, the new Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual notes “Key to all these tasks is developing an effective host-nation (HN) security force.” Indeed, it has been argued that foreign forces cannot defeat an insurgency; the best they can hope for is to create the conditions that will enable local forces to win for them…

I would like to thank Colonel (retired) Don Snider, Ph.D., whose seminal June 1998 “Army” article “Let the Debate Begin: It’s Time For An Army Constabulary Force” was the intellectual progenitor of this work; Don’s thoughtful mentorship of young Army officers at West Point is a lasting gift to the nation. Dr. Carter Malkasian at the Center for Naval Analysis sponsored the roundtable discussion that was the proximate cause of research leading to this report; thanks to all of those who drew me out at that session, especially those from the Program Analysis and Evaluation element of the Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense. The argument in this report was informed by the experience of hundreds of members of Transition Teams with experience in Iraq and Afghanistan and sharpened by dozens more officers and non-commissioned offi cers engaged in training their successors at Fort Riley, Kansas. Thanks to Major General Carter Ham for encouraging such debate and making the Big Red One a true learning organization. Finally, I would like to thank Vinca LaFleur and Christine Parthemore for their masterful editing and Billy Sountornsorn for his leadership and creativity in our production process.

Any errors of omission or commission are my own. The views expressed in this report are my own and do not necessarily represent the views of the United States Army or the Department of Defense.

The Small Wars Council has begun a discussion of John Robb’s new book Brave New War at the Brave New War Roundtable thread.  The discussion is in the Members Only forum and can be accessed after a short, painless and free registration process.

Join in today and participate over the coming weeks in an in-depth discussion on Robb’s latest on the “next stage of terrorism and the end of globalization”.

A quick look at several recent news articles that mention or quote members of

the Small Wars Journal and Council community of interest and a boatload of thanks

to fellow bloggers, reporters and columnists who have helped us along in our quest

to facilitate and support the exchange of information among practitioners, thought

leaders, and students of Small Wars, in order to advance knowledge and capabilities

in the field.

Small Wars Journal and Council members 'in the news':

Filipino Terrorist

Informants Awarded $10M from U.S. -- FOXNews by Oliver North.

What has been altered is the approach being taken here by both the Philippine

and U.S. governments. Decisions in Washington and Manila — to wage this fight

not simply as a military campaign against terrorists, but primarily as a battle

for the hearts and minds of the people — are paying big dividends. As one Philippine

officer put it: "Today we are making a difference in the lives of the people.

It has taken time, but now they know they can trust us. That's why they cooperate

with us against the terrorists."

When I asked Maj. Gen. Ruben Rafael, the commander of Joint Task Force Comet,

and the senior military officer in this remote part of the Philippine archipelago

— for the secret to this success, he replied, "Patience, persistence and perseverance.

Last Christmas none of my soldiers, sailors, airmen or Marines took leave because

we needed to keep the pressure on the terrorists. It was hard on the troops,

but it proved to the people we were here to protect them and that we are here

to stay."

U.S. Army Col. David Maxwell, who commands Joint Special

Operations Task Force Philippines, fully supports that sentiment — for the Filipinos.

But of the Americans under his command, he says, "We're here on a temporary

basis to help them put us out of work." Then, the veteran Special Forces officer

quickly adds, "But none of us want to leave before the job is done."

Counter-Insurgency

and 'The Single Narrative' -- Syndicated Column by Austin Bay.

"Since counterinsurgency is a competition to mobilize popular support, it

pays to know how people are mobilized."

That candid declaration of common sense appeared last year in IOSPHERE, the

publication of the Joint Information Operations Center, in an article written

by Dr. David Kilcullen.

Kilcullen's article expanded on the sources of motivation. "In most societies,"

he wrote, "there are opinion makers: local leaders ... religious figures, media

personalities ... who set trends and influence public perceptions. This influence

-- including the pernicious influence of the insurgents -- often takes the form

of a 'single narrative.' This is a simple, unifying, easily expressed story

or explanation that organizes people's experience and provides a framework for

understanding events.

"Iraqi insurgents have one, as do al-Qaida and the Taliban. To undercut their

influence, you must exploit an alternative narrative: or better yet, tap into

an existing narrative that excludes the insurgents."

After

the Surge -- Commentary Magazine's Contentions by Max Boot.

What comes after the troop surge? Even though it isn't complete yet, it makes

sense to think about this issue now. The best proposal I've seen so far comes

from Bing West and Owen West—a father-and-son

pair of Marines and national security analysts with vast experience in Iraq.

They propose maintaining

about 80,000 troops for a decade or so, with 20,000 of them working as advisers

to the Iraqi security forces, 25,000 in a combat role, and another 35,000 providing

logistics. The only problem is how to get from here to there—how to send home

half of the American troops without causing a complete collapse of the Iraqi

government and its security forces. That's where the surge comes in: the plan

to downsize only works if the current surge manages to restore a semblance of

order in Baghdad and its environs.

It's Patriotic to Criticize -- Syndicated Column by Fred Kaplan.

Yet in the scheme of things, Gen. Mixon was merely filing a complaint. Two

weeks earlier, a lower-ranking officer, Lt. Col. Paul Yingling

-- deputy commander of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment -- issued a jeremiad.

In a blistering article in the May issue of Armed Forces Journal,

Col. Yingling likened the debacle in Iraq to the disaster in Vietnam and blamed

them both on "a crisis in an entire institution, America's general officer corps."

Tomorrow's generals are chosen by today's generals, and Col. Yingling charges

most of this generation's generals with lacking "professional character," "moral

courage," and "creative intelligence."

Col. Yingling's essay is the most stunning -- and maybe the most fiercely

intelligent and patriotic -- public statement I have ever read from an active-duty

officer.

At 41, a veteran of both Iraq wars and a graduate of the School for Advanced

Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, the Army's elite postgraduate strategy

center, Col. Yingling is widely thought to be one of the brightest, most dedicated

up-and-coming officers.

Col. Yingling's argument is tightly reasoned. Policymakers go to war to accomplish

political objectives. Generals must provide the policymakers with an estimate

of the war's likely success.

Multiple Enemies Complicate Iraq -- Stars and Stripes by Drew Brown.

Frank Hoffman, an analyst with the Center for Emerging Threats

and Opportunities, an internal Marine Corps think tank in Quantico, Va., said

there are least 20 major armed groups in Iraq.

In an essay to be published this summer in the Army War College's "Parameters,"

Hoffman argues that the dizzying array of actors, fueled by competing strains

of religious inspiration, linked by the Internet and operating mostly in large

urban areas, make Iraq difficult to comprehend.

"I think this is a unique conflict that we are having trouble with conceptualizing,"

said Hoffman, who is also a retired Marine officer and senior fellow at Philadelphia's

Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Sunni insurgents, however, including former Saddam loyalists and al-Qaida

in Iraq, an extremist group that emerged after the 2003 invasion, "are the biggies"

as far as threats to U.S. forces.

Former regime supporters want to regain power, U.S. officials believe. But

al-Qaida in Iraq's goal is "to foment a crisis between Shia and Sunni, not take

over, and they want as much chaos, disruption as possible," Hoffman said.

Terror Gangs -- Investor's Business Daily editorial.

At a recent UCLA forum on terrorism, Los Angeles officials said the city's

estimated 40,000 gang members are an attractive target for terrorists like al-Qaida.

"There are many, many more people who consider themselves jihadists now," said

L.A. Police Deputy Chief Mark Leap. "And criminal enterprises are being used

to support terrorist activities."

L.A. County Sheriff's Lt. John Sullivan said officials are

worried al-Qaida could tap into smuggling networks that move migrants and contraband

across Mexico's porous border and into the U.S.

Chief among them is the notorious MS-13 gang, which has infiltrated L.A.

and other U.S. cities from Central America.

"MS-13 has a lot of characteristics that could facilitate terrorist activities,"

Sullivan said, noting that al-Qaida has stated its intent to smuggle black-market

nuclear devices into the U.S. and kill at least 4 million Americans.

Checking In On The 'Surge' -- The National Journal's The Gate by Irene

Tsikitas.

The Christian Science Monitor

reported

this morning that one of those commanders, Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno, acknowledged

the struggles beefed-up U.S. forces are encountering as they pursue a more aggressive

strategy, causing a natural spike in casualties. May was the year's

deadliest month for U.S. forces in Iraq, and third-worst month for U.S.

casualties since the start of the war.

"Right now if you asked me, I would tell you I'd probably need a little bit

more time to do a true assessment," Odierno

said yesterday in reference to the September deadline. In the Christian

Science Monitor report, counterinsurgency expert Col. T.X. Hammes

concurred, saying: "People shouldn't be looking for an answer by September."

U.S. Military

Changes Needed -- The News Tribune by Michael Gilbert.

In recent years there haven't been any upsets when military forces clash

on conventional terms; the big power wins. Think Operation Desert Storm and

the Falklands.

But time after time -- in Vietnam, in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,

in Somalia, in Lebanon -- seemingly outgunned guerrillas fighting unconventionally

have prevailed against superpowers.

And they think they're winning again in Iraq and Afghanistan, author and

military strategist T.X. Hammes said Wednesday in Tacoma.

The United States' military and national security strategy relies too much

on high technology and concepts like "network-centric warfare." That makes us

vulnerable to insurgencies that fight on low-tech terms and might have a greater

long-term political will to win, said the author of "The

Sling and The Stone: On War in the 21st Century."

Hammes and a series of other national military and intelligence strategists

spoke Wednesday at the Pacific Northwest National Security Forum at the Sheraton

Tacoma Hotel.

Seminar:

Media, Technology Change Battlefield -- Marine Corps Times by Kimberly

Johnson.

About 150 people from the services, U.S. Joint Forces Command and U.S. Strategic

Command, along with military and civilian organizations representing 21 countries,

met in Potomac, Md., May 19-24 for Joint Urban Warrior 07. The war-game seminar

was co-sponsored by the Marine Corps and Joint Forces Command.

The brainstorming sessions focused on how best to create a unified message

from the battlefield that works in tandem with ongoing information and public

relations campaigns.

"The concern they had was there were a lot of nontraditional actors — people

or information — that they couldn't quite control but were affecting how they

conducted operations," said Dave Dilegge, Joint Urban Warrior

project officer at Quantico, Va. "That's the purpose of this, to really get

a handle on this."

While based on fictitious scenarios, the war game is rooted in reality, participants

said.

"Modern technology, where you have satellite channels covering every conceivable

subject — you have the media on the scene at major battles, you have the media

in all military activities in a way that they never have been before," said

David Passage, former ambassador to Botswana. "Strategic compression, more or

less, obliges those from the military or from the diplomatic world to be more

agile, to be more nimble, to be more responsive in the more compressed time

frame than they've ever been before."

The days are gone when military and diplomatic leaders could take time to

mull over how best to respond to tactical events on the ground, Passage said.

-----

A special thanks to old and new friends -- bloggers all -- who have helped us along

in our quest to facilitate and support the exchange of information among practitioners,

thought leaders, and students of Small Wars, in order to advance knowledge and capabilities

in the field.

And yes...  We are getting around to updating our blog roll --

soonest...

In alphabetical order:

Abu Muqawama at Abu Muqawama

The Gang at Argghhh!

Carl at Because We're Here

Boy, No One Else; Just Us

Wretchard at The Belmont Club

The Gang at BlackFive

Herschel Smith at The Captain's Journal

Charles Sheehan-Miles at Charles Sheehan-Miles

Max Boot at Contentions

John and Allen at Cox and Forkum

Noah Shachtman at Wired's Danger

Room

The Gang at A Fistful of Euros

Jules Crittenden at Forward Movement

Bill Roggio at The Fourth Rail

Sonny at FX-Based

The Gang at The Glittering Eye

John Robb at Global

Guerrillas

Michael Tanji at

Haft of the Spear

Vimothy at House of War

Glenn Reynolds at Instapundit

Phillip Carter at Intel Dump

Kent's Imperative at Kent's Imperative

Michelle Malkin at Michelle Malkin

The Gang at MilBlogs / Mudville

Gazette

MountainRunner at MountainRunner

David Danelo at On Point

The Gang at OPFOR

Phil and Luke at Pacific Empire

Duke at Pennypack Post

Merv Benson at PrairiePundit

The Gang at Red State

ShrinkWrapped at ShrinkWrapped

Michael Tanji, at The Washington Examiner's

The Spot Report

Dan at tdaxp

Tom and Sean at Thomas P. M.

Barnett

The Gang at Threats Watch (Special Thanks

to Marvin!)

WestHawk at WestHawk

Michael Goldfarb at

WorldWideStandard

Mark at ZenPundit

-----

And last, but not least, several thanks to a few 'mainstream' friends...

Tom Ricks at

The Washington Post

Stan Correy at

Australian

Broadcasting Corporation

The North County Times

Diana West's holier-than-thou attack on Dr. David Kilcullen of Gen. David Petraeus' senior staff in Baghdad must be a delight to al Qaeda and Hizballah propagandists and anti-American brainwashers worldwide.

In a June 1, 2007 Washington Times essay entitled “Pay attention to jihad,” she slams the Australian-born anti-Terrorism strategist for an assertion several months ago that so-called "jihad" (holy war in the name of Allah, etc.) has assumed the stature of heroic "adventure" in the minds, hearts and souls of many young Muslims.

She distorts Kilcullen's words into the preposterous speculation that  he approves of this development and asks whether if he had grown up in Hitler's Germany he “might have become a Nazi” -- when, in fact, the man and his fellow counterinsurgency (COIN) experts are attempting to discover an effective antidote for a highly seductive “Jihadi martyrdom” factor which is providing al Qaeda-style Terrorism with an endless supply of enthusiastic young suicide mass murderers.

Recall, please, the Cold War situation in which Communism's so-called "wars of national liberation" became the heroic cause celebre of young "progressives" and "patriotic fronts" -- and how outraged their Western apologists, sympathizers and "useful idiots" became when Ronald Reagan dared to call their Soviet sponsors "The Evil Empire."

And recall, also, that during the Reagan years almost everyone was referring routinely to Soviet “adventurism” in Central America, Africa and worldwide. This was simply because we opted not to call their rampant imperialism and colonialism by those truthful words -- just as Ms.West is now mindlessly opting to call al Qaeda killers “holy” rather than satanic.

But when David Kilcullen attempts to strip the so-called "Jihadists" of their holy and godly standing in the Muslim World, she objects loudly and insists that we stick with the "holy guys" imagery which this much-debated term so falsely implies. (By this perverse standard, she may well have wasted her time insisting that we condemn the Soviets as damnable "liberationists.")

Addiction to the “Jihad” Label

This addiction to the "Jihad" label is so powerful as to exclude from her own lexicon virtually all of the Arabic and Islamic labels which would serve to draw a bright-line distinction -- a "disaggregation" Dr. Kilcullen calls it -- between these suicide mass murdering terrorists (genocidal irhabis in Arabic) and those "moderate Muslims" who most experts say constitute the great majority, albeit a frustratingly passive majority, of the Muslim World.

Perhaps she has not noticed that a very similar distinction is made by the now famous PBS-funded -- and PBS-suppressed -- film produced by former Reagan Assistant Secretary of Defense Frank Gaffney makes between quietly worshipful Muslims and the bloodthirsty "Islamists." Clearly, this film affirms that the latter, while professing to act “in the way of Allah,” are actually the deadly enemies of the "peaceful, compassionate, merciful and just" Allah who is worshiped by the moderates.

Strangely enough, Ms West strongly supports the Gaffney film and its "good guy" versus "bad guy" distinctions while at the same time lambasting Kilcullen for his efforts in this same strategic direction, though by slightly different and more specifically religious tactics -- in words which challenge Osama bin Laden's patently false claims of holiness and godliness. But all the while, Ms West is inadvertently  polishing al Qaeda's halo, instead. For example,

• UBL calls what he and his killers are doing "Jihad." Diana West enthusiastically agrees and even seems to insist that no other word will do.

• UBL wants his genocidal evildoers to be called "Jihadis." Again, she agrees. (She used to berate President Bush for calling them "evildoers" (mufsiduun in Arabic) rather than holy war "Jihadists.")

• UBL calls their suicide bombing "Martyrdom Operations." And so does Diana West -- but never has she uttered the "irhabi murderdom" condemnation which reveals the true nature of such atrocities.

• UBL promises his "young lions of Islam” a clear path to Paradise -- with 72 virgins in the receiving line. The lady has never denied or ridiculed that false postulation but, instead, ridicules Kilcullen for worrying that this vivid image of an Allah-approved sex-orgy Paradise must sound like one hell of an "adventure" to thousands of young Muslim men.

• UBL justifies all of these holy, heroic and Paradise-bound activities as a proper reward for killing all of us "infidels." Here again, Ms. West fails to point out (as she most certainly knows) that the Quran itself quite clearly states that Christianity and Judaism are not infidel religions -- but are brotherly Abrahamic religions, instead.

So, while Dr. Kilcullen is searching prudently for labels in both English and Arabic which will not inadvertently enhance al Qaeda's legitimacy but will make it an apostate enemy of Quranic Islam, Diana West strenuously objects. Remarkably, she insists that bin Laden's carefully concocted lexicon of self-justification and self-canonization is fine and dandy -- and that those who refuse to parrot these pro-UBL labels are somehow "indifferent" toward the terrorists.

Believes That Islam Is The Enemy

The problem here is that Ms. West has apparently decided that Islam itself is the enemy and that the "Irhabi Murderdom" terrorists are, in fact, a true and faithful embodiment of that religion. She seems to believe that to call these ruthless killers munafiquun (hypocrites) mufsiduun (evildoers) and murtaduun (apostates) and khawarij (outside the religion deviants) and to condemn them for waging Hirabah (Unholy War) is to draw an improper distinction between them and Quranic Islam.

This is, of course, exactly the picture which the Irhabi masterminds (bin Laden, al Zawahiri, al Sadr, Ahmadinejad, Nasrallah, Mullah Omar and their satanic ilk) want her to paint -- namely, a persecuted but unified Islam representing an all-approving Allah, which is under ruthless attack by an "occupying" and "humiliating" and “arrogant” America representing an all-evil "Great Satan."

While General Petraeus, Dr. Kilcullen and their COIN colleagues are prudently attempting to convey the message that it is the AQ-style, hyena-like Terrorists who are the real enemies of "moderate" Islam, both Generals Nancy Pelosi and Diana West are busy chopping these good men to bits -- one from the "Progressive" (i.e., communoid) Left and the other from the Well-Intended but Thoroughly Confused (WITC) Right.

As for David Kilcullen, he should simply continue his search for the truthful words and frames of reference which will finally begin to demonize the Terrorists in their language, their culture and their religion – hopefully, in ways which are as least as effective as the deceitful ways in which they have long been demonizing us.

In due course, it will become quite obvious that it is not Dr. Kilcullen but Diana West herself whose remarks convey a deep “non-comprehension” and an “indifference” to the satanic nature of so-called “jihad” – and to the bloody consequences of calling it “holy” and its ungodly perpetrators “martyrs.”

Jim Guirard – TrueSpeak Institute  703-768-0957  Justcauses@aol.com   (and TrueSpeak.org).  A Washington DC-area attorney, writer, lecturer and anti-Terrorism strategist, Jim Guirard was longtime Chief of Staff to former US Senators Allen Ellender and Russell Long. His TrueSpeak Institute is devoted to truth-in-language and truth-in-history in public discourse.

Counterinsurgency Expert Advises Soldiers in Iraq

Spc. Chris McCann, Army News Service

2007-06-05

CAMP STRIKER, Iraq (Army News Service, June 5, 2007) - Recruit more Iraqi Soldiers and increase their divisions from 11 to 20 is what one counterinsurgency expert said he would do if he was in the shoes of the Multinational Forces - Iraq commander.

Dr. David Kilcullen, an authority on counterinsurgency, was appointed to advise the MNF-Iraq commander, Gen. David Petraeus. Dr. Kilcullen visited Soldiers with the 10th Mountain Division's 2nd Brigade out of Fort Drum, N.Y., to take stock of the "Commando" brigade's progress June 2 and 3.

Dr. Kilcullen served 21 years in the Australian army and has led Timorese troops, was a special advisor for irregular warfare during the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review, and remains a reserve lieutenant colonel in the Australian army.

Col. Michael Kershaw, 2nd BCT commander, escorted Dr. Kilcullen around Patrol Base Dragon, the Yusufiyah Joint Security Station and the Mahmudiyah Iraqi Army Compound.

"They've done a great job just setting it up," said Dr. Kilcullen of the JSS. "They've got the Iraqi army and Iraqi police working together, which is a great start, it's a good setup with the IPs doing municipal law and order, and the Iraqi army doing rural security. The next step is to set up a joint-operations room where they can plan operations together."

He observed that U.S. forces' performance is improving, although the situation has - at least temporarily - taken a turn for the worse.

"Your progress since the beginning of the year is substantial," Dr. Kilcullen said. "The trick now is putting the Iraqi structures into place. It's about sustainment and expectation management.

"The 10th Mountain Division is the most-deployed division in the Army today," said Dr. Kilcullen. "That experience really shows in your approach to the area of operations. This is a tough, unforgiving AO which punishes the slightest tactical mistake. I am extremely impressed with the way the brigade has approached the mission, and with the progress in this district, which is the best I have ever seen it."

Dr. Kilcullen also discussed ways to improve combined U.S. and Iraqi operations with Brig. Gen. Ali Jassim Al-Frejee, commander of the 4th Brigade, 6th Iraqi Army Division.

"What makes a local sheikh respect coalition forces more than terrorists?" Dr. Kilcullen asked. "Is it a case - like the Indonesians say - 'either silver or lead'?"

"Either way is difficult," said Brig. Gen. Ali. "People are getting tired of Al-Qaeda in Iraq - they're tired of the ideology and killing. In Anbar, many tribes are fighting terrorism. We just need time to re-culture the people."

"I'm very impressed with your progress here," Dr. Kilcullen told him. "The last time I came to this area, we couldn't even drive here. It's very impressive."

Dr. Kilcullen asked Brig. Gen. Ali what he would do if he were in Gen. Petraeus' shoes.

"More Iraqi army soldiers," Brig. Gen. Ali said without hesitation. "Right now we have 200,000 troops. The first reason is that we need more soldiers watching and protecting the people. The second thing is that it would improve the economy and reduce the unemployment rate - and when people are poor, it's easy to recruit them for terror. In my view, Iraq needs 20 divisions instead of the 11 (they) have now."

Capt. Blake Keil, commander of Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 15th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd BCT, spoke with Dr. Kilcullen about company-level operations.

"It's great to listen to him speak," said Capt. Keil. "And it's cool to see him here as an adviser to Gen. Petraeus."

"Everybody knows that July and August are going to be bad months," said Dr. Kilcullen, reminding several company commanders and other officers that Petraeus' plus up report, expected in September, will be a target for insurgents. "You should expect a spike in enemy activity. Civilian and U.S. Soldier deaths will look bad - I think we'll have a hot summer. But if we break (terrorists') backs, it might drop right after. You guys are an important reality check for what's going on, and you know things before division or corps-level people."

He encouraged lower-level leaders to trust their gut feelings and their Iraqi army counterparts.

"Even with Iraqi intelligence - if one of your Iraqi counterparts writes a one or two paragraph summary of what's going on, even if he can't justify what he expects, he knows his area."

He also reminded the leaders to keep notes for handing over to the next unit.

"I encourage you to write stories about your missions - everything from big issues to just personal recollections. Share them with the incoming guys, because they're valuable."

Dr. Kilcullen seemed genuinely impressed by the Commando leaders' accomplishments.

"You guys are doing one of the toughest jobs in this country, and I think you're doing it right. This brigade definitely 'gets it,'" he added. "They're doing it right. In this form of warfare, though, there are no shortcuts or gimmicks - it's all about keeping up constant, unremitting pressure over time. At the same time, you need to be alert to how the enemy and the environment is adapting, and constantly come up with new, entrepreneurial ways to work the area.

"At this stage of your tour, it's all about consolidation, improvement and getting to steady state so that you can hand over a well-controlled district to your successor unit."

Spc. Chris McCann writes for the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division Public Affairs.

Originally aired on 1 June on The News Hour w/ Jim Lehrer.  

Iraq's Anbar Province Faces Political, Military Changes

Iraq's western Anbar Province is undergoing shifts in military and political power as Sunni Arab militants continue to battle with al-Qaida insurgents. A journalist and a former military official discuss the region's struggles.

Ray Suarez - "For an on-the-ground assessment of the situation in Iraq's largest province, we're joined by two men who visited there last month. David Wood is the national security correspondent for the Baltimore Sun, and former Marine Captain Bing West, he's now a correspondent for the Atlantic magazine and has written two books about the war."

Full transcript and audio available here at The News Hour's site. 

Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces, Central Command Reading List

LtGen James N. Mattis

Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Central Command

Section II is recommended reading separated into specific regions within the AOR.  Applicable ranks are assigned and each item is marked by the estimate amount of time that the item can be completed prior to deployment.  The time allotted permits prioritization of the reading requirements should a Marine receive late notification for deployment.

I.  Require reading list for all Marines and Sailors deploying to USCENTCOM AOR.

All Ranks

Small Units Leaders’ Guide to Counterinsurgency – MCCDC (MCIP 3-33.01) (Ed. note, pardon the alternate online source, it is no longer available via FAS)

Closing Ranks – Leslie Susser, Jerusalem Post, 8 January 2007

Israel’s Lebanese War, A Preliminary Assessment – Dr. Martin van Creveld, The RUSI Journal, October 2006

Gates of Fire: Epic Novel of the Battle of Thermopylae – Setphen Pressfield

The Village – Bing West

Ethics and Combat: Thoughts for Small Unit Leaders – Steven Silver, Marine Corps Gazette, November 2006

Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency – Dr. David Kilcullen

Blood Stripes – David Danelo

Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned Website – (PKI / CAC Card Login Required)

Staff NCOs, CPOs, Company Grade Offices and Above

Winning the Peace, The Requirement for Full Spectrum Operations – MG Peter Chiarelli, Military Review, October 2006 (COIN Reader)

Tentative Manual for Countering Irregular Threats: An Updated Approach to Counterinsurgency Operations – MCWL (MCIP 3-33.02)

Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq – LTG David Petraeus, Military Review, October 2006 (COIN Reader)

Seven Months in Ar Ramadi: Observations from 2nd Battalion 4th Marines - Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned Website – (PKI / CAC Card Login Required)

A Bell for Adano – John Hersey

Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned Website – (PKI / CAC Card Login Required)

One Bullet Away: The Making of a Marine Officer – Nathaniel Fick

Marine Corps Operating Concepts for a Changed Security Environment – MCCDC Pamphlet dated March 2006

Tentative Manual for Countering Irregular Threats: An Updated Approach to Counterinsurgency Operations – MCWL (MCIP 3-33.02)

Winning the Peace, The Requirement for Full Spectrum Operations – MG Peter Chiarelli, Military Review, October 2006 (COIN Reader)

Counterinsurgency – US Army Field Manual 3-24 / Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 33.3.5

Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare – MCCDC / USSOCOM Pamphlet dated 2006

The Army in Vietnam – Andrew Krepenivich

Achilles in Vietnam – Jonathan Shay

The Crusades Through Arab Eyes – Amin Maalouf

The Small Wars Manual – FMFRP 12-15

Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice – David Galula

Combat Stress – Marine Corps Reference Publication 6-11C

Colonels and General Officers

Thoughts on Operational Art – Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, October 2006

The Utility of Force – General Rupert Smith

The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror – Bernard Lewis

Tentative Manual for Countering Irregular Threats: An Updated Approach to Counterinsurgency Operations – MCWL (MCIP 3-33.02)

Counterinsurgency – US Army Field Manual 3-24 / Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 33.3.5

Knowing the Enemy: Can Social Scientists Redefine the "War on Terror" – George Packer, The New Yorker Magazine dated 18 December 2006

Advising Foreign Forces: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures - Center for Army Lessons Learned Special Edition No. 06-01 dated January 2006 (requires AKO account)

II. Recommended Reading for Marines and Sailors Deploying to Specific Regions of USCENTCOM’s AOR

Corporals and Below

Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia – Ahmed Rashid

Taliban – Ahmed Rashid

Imperial Grunts – Robert Kaplan

Sergeants and Above and Company Grade Officers

Reaping the Whirlwind: Afghanistan, Al Qa'ida and the Holy War – Michael Griffin

Afghan Guerilla Warfare: In the Words of the Mujahideen Fighters – Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester Grau

Imperial Grunts – Robert Kaplan

Tactics of the Crescent Moon – H. John Poole and Ray Smith

Afghanistan’s Cave Complexes 1979 – 2004 – Mir Bahmanyar

Soldier Sahibs – Charles Alan  

The Village – Bing West

What Went Wrong?: The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East – Bernard Lewis

From Beirut to Jerusalem – Thomas Friedman

Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan – Lester Grau

The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War – Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester Grau

The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power – Max Boot

Soldiers of God: With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan – Robert Kaplan

Staff NCOs and Field Grade Officers

Afghanistan – Stephan Taylor (ed. note - unable to locate online)

The Osama Bin Laden I Know: An Oral History – Peter Bergen

Charlie Wilson’s War – George Crile  

Afghanistan: A Military History – Stephen Tanner

Culture and Customs of Afghanistan – Hafizullah Emadi

War at the Top of the World: The Struggle for Afghanistan, Kashmir and Tibet – Eric Margolis

The Soviet Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost – Russian General Staff

Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia – Ahmed Rashid

The Punishment of Virtue – Sarah Chayes

Afghan Guerrilla Warfare – Ali Ahmad Jalali

The Battle for Peace: A Frontline Vision of America’s Power and Purpose – General Anthony Zinni

Djibouti / Horn of Africa

Sergeants and Company Grade Officers

What Everyone Needs to Know About Islam – John Esposito

The Battle for God – Karen Armstrong

Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa – Alex De Waal

Staff NCOs and Field Grade Officers

A Modern History of the Somali – I. M. Lewis

Layers of Time: A History of Ethiopia – Paul Henze

Famine Crimes – Alex De Waal

The Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations – Peter Woodward

The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror – Bernard Lewis

Iraq

Sergeants and Company Grade Officers

No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle of Fallujah – Bing West

Imperial Grunts – Robert Kaplan

The Revolt on the Tigris – Mark Etherington

Greater Middle East

Corporals and Below

Hatred’s Kingdom – Dore Gold

The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam’s War Against America – Daniel Benjamin

No God but God: The Origins, Evolution and Future of Islam – Reza Aslan

The Idea of Pakistan – Stephen Cohen

Understanding Arabs: A Guide for Modern Times – Margaret Nydell

The Arab Mind – Raphael Patai

The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future – Vali Nasr

Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution – Nikki Keddie

Failure of Political Islam – Oliver Roy

Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism – Robert Pope

Sergeants and Company Grade Officers

Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al Qaeda – Gary Bernsten and Ralph Pezzullo

Global Responses to Terrorism: 9/11, Afghanistan and Beyond – Mary Buckley

Staff NCOs and Field Grade Officers

All the Shah’s Men – Stephen Kinzer

Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napolean to Al-Qaeda – John Keegan

The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power – Max Boot

Battle Ready – Tom Clancy

The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future – Vali Nasr

Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution – Nikki Keddie

Failure of Political Islam – Oliver Roy

Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism – Robert Pope

A Peace to End All Peace – David Fromkin

The Arab Israeli Wars – Chaim Herzog

What Went Wrong?: The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East – Bernard Lewis

The Easter Offensive – Colonel G. H. Turley

The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror – Bernard Lewis

MARCENT Coordination Elements

MCWP 0-1.1 Componency (Required Reading for all MCE Assigned Personnel – MCWP 3-40.8

USMARCENT Theater Campaign Plan – MARCENT G-5 (not on NIPRNET)

The U.S. military and national security community lost interest in insurgency after the end of the Cold War when other defense issues such as multinational peacekeeping and transformation seemed more pressing. With the onset of the Global War on Terror in 2001 and the ensuing involvement of the U.S. military in counterinsurgency support in Iraq and Afghanistan, insurgency experienced renewed concern in both the defense and intelligence communities. The author argues that while exceptionally important, this relearning process focused on Cold War era nationalistic insurgencies rather than the complex conflicts which characterized the post-Cold War security environment. To be successful at counterinsurgency, he contends, the U.S. military and defense community must rethink insurgency, which has profound implications for American strategy and military doctrine.

Dr. Metz is Chairman of the Regional Strategy and Planning Department and Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute. He has been with SSI since 1993, previously serving as Henry L. Stimson Professor of Military Studies and SSI's Director of Research. Dr. Metz has also been on the faculty of the Air War College, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and several universities. He has been an advisor to political campaigns and elements of the intelligence community; served on many national security policy task forces; testified in both houses of Congress; and spoken on military and security issues around the world. He is the author of more than 100 publications including articles in journals such as Washington Quarterly, Joint Force Quarterly, The National Interest, and Current History. Dr. Metz's research has taken him to 30 countries, including Iraq immediately after the collapse of the Hussein regime. He is currently at work on two books: Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy and Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century. Dr. Metz holds a B.A. in Philosophy and a M.A. in International Studies from the University of South Carolina, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Johns Hopkins University. Other recent SSI monographs by Dr. Metz include:

Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy

In Iraq the U.S. Army has undertaken counterinsurgency, a type of activity it thought it had left behind with the end of the Cold War. In the long war against terror, counterinsurgency will remain a central element of American national security policy so it is important to assess the strategic implications of the Iraq campaign.

Modern insurgency warfare presents fresh challenges for the United States, which must re-conceptualize its approach to fighting such conflicts. Because the dominant characteristics of insurgency--protractedness and ambiguity--effectively stymie the American military's approach to war, the United States needs to reorient its strategic thinking.

The trends in the strategic environment in the development of the Future War/Future Battlespace suggest that traditional warfighting has changed in the post 9-11 era. The strategic environment can be classified into four strategic battlespaces, within which future adversaries will operate to thwart U.S. strategic initiatives.

We just experienced a good chunk of down time. Partly because of my fog, but honestly c/o some legitimate friction too. Clausewitz survives the information age! Anyway, we're 99% up and running now, just have a glitch in the blog comments that is temporarily preventing you from commenting. Working on it.

In the interim, feel free to bash us over in this thread in the Small Wars Council. And please use that forum as a place to report any problems you may be having. Proactive suggestions are welcome, too.

Updated, about 1:15 US Eastern... OK. It looks like comments are working now, and that should be it for restoring the status quo. Thanks (really) to all those who contacted us in the past 12 hours to let us know we were screwed up. Although this time we knew we were in with the alligators, we don't always. FYI, blog comments now require an e-mail address. TypeKey provides a utility for you to pass that through them without typing it in. You should trip over that next time you try to comment, and once you have authorized that it shouldn't bug you again.

Our Privacy Policy will be updated to reflect soon, but in short, this e-mail address is only required and used if needed for comment moderation; we will safeguard it and will NEVER sell or rent your personal information. Unfortunately, some of our comments do need moderation. And, FYI, without TypeKey we were getting a 10:1 spam to legit comment ratio. Sorry, but TypeKey or something like it seems to be necessary.

We know our current set up isn't perfect, and it does impair some of our deployed users in particular. Again, the Small Wars Council / Journal forum is a good place for your general site comments. And this thread asks for TypeKey problem info. Also let us know if there's another site that is working better for you, so we can try to poach their good methods. We just can't strip off all the automated trash and go wandering off naked in the e-world, there's too much white noise out there.