Iraq's Hard-Won Lessons for Future Transitions in the Middle East
by Peter J. Munson
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Eight years after the American-led invasion of Iraq, the Middle East sits at a crossroads. The pressure, building for nearly a century in the contrived states drawn up after western models after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, has finally begun to burst the dam. The oppression and inhumanity were so intolerable that Mohamed Bouazizi, a roadside fruit seller unable to cough up a bribe to keep his roadside turf, immolated himself after Tunisian authorities beat him. This tipping point led to weeks of rage, felling the Tunisian and Egyptian dictators, setting Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria on razor's edge, and forcing at least token reforms in Oman, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. The depths of the frustration felt across the region, however, indicate not the promise of rapid transitions to democratic rule, but rather the extent of the damage to society, economy, and politics that will have to be overcome. While it is a unique case, the Iraqi experience holds hard-won lessons for what lies ahead. Rather than prescriptions on how to "do it better next time," the lessons should be that transition is an unpredictable and protracted process that cannot be predictably managed. This process can only find legitimacy in solutions that stem from the host society.
Download the Full Article: Iraq's Hard-Won Lessons for Future Transitions in the Middle East
Peter J. Munson is a Marine officer, aviator, and Middle East Foreign Area Officer. His first book, Iraq in Transition: The Legacy of Dictatorship and the Prospects for Democracy (Potomac, 2009), details the social, political, and economic legacies of the Saddam era and their intersection with the American-led invasion and its aftermath. He is currently working on a new project, tentatively titled War, Welfare, and Democracy: Rethinking America's Quest for the End of Democracy. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position of the United States Marine Corps or the Department of Defense.
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Comments
Gian,
The essay does downplay the surge and speaks to the oversimplifications. While I don't attempt to put the adventure into strategic context here, the point is that we shouldn't derive "won football game" lessons from Iraq, but rather that the mess there should be a cautionary that transition, no matter how it comes, is not easy. I will grant to Eugnid that the sentence he quotes does seem to underplay the on-going and currently stirred up mess in Iraq, but others would quibble that I should have painted a rosier picture. Again, I'm saying that the relative calm right now in Iraq shouldn't be a sign that we "got it right" and could do it better next time. Nor should it be seen as a lesson that we can help anyone else to get quickly through their transition. Places like Egypt and the next regime to topple will not make it all better with an election.
Building on Eugnid's post, I might add with a question: what strategic gain have we gotten from this nine year effort of spent blood and treasure in Iraq?
I was re-reading Peter Feaver's "International Security" essay on the Surge that just came out a few weeks ago and was struck by how he spent 30 plus pages in it huffing and puffing of how important and perhaps even decisive the Surge was, and of course his personal role in it, yet i kept asking myself so what? What did it all get us?
It was like he was writing about a football game that was still in the third quarter, but arguing that it had already been mostly won--albeit by an inconsequential play that happened in the second quarter. But until the game ends and the clarity of the relative, strategic inconsequence of the Surge emerges, folks like Feaver will continue to huff and puff about something that in the end will be seen as really not of much consequence at all.
gian
You wrote:
"In Iraq, a semblance of normalcy
has returned. Lights are on and per capita gross domestic product is three times that in
2002. Even so, Iraqs latest government, nine months in forming, has yet to address some of the
countrys thorniest issues."
Your generosity in evaluating the current state of affairs is NOT shared by the next generation of Iraqi who were kids terrorized by our "democratization." Right now, I ask, what is the proportion of skilled, technically and intellectually competent Iraqis serving the "new" Iraq relative to the number that served the "old" Iraq from which we saved them with "shock & awe"?
Steve,
Thanks for the comment. The lack of footnotes is largely because this is a very, very boiled down version of a lot of research (a book's worth). The points in this op-ed type of essay are so broad that I didn't feel footnotes would really be appropriate. For the few stats in the 4th paragraph, Brooking's Iraq Index is still the easiest source. Google "Iraq Index" to find it. As for the rest of my assertions, they stem from the research I did for my book, so you'll find copious notes there if you are interested. I do read/write/speak Arabic and there are a number of Arabic sources noted, as well as English and a few French. This wasn't meant to be a teaser for the book, but if you want sources, you'll find 'em there.
Peter,
The write-up was good, however, the lack of footnotes was a bummer.
Don't know if you are an Arabic speaker/writer/reader (I am not, ana mohandis just about covers my skills in that arena ) but sources are always appreciated (and they would, of course, help to back up some of your assertions ;) )
Steve