Small Wars Journal

The Emergence of Irregular Warfare In Prehistory: Tactics Employed in the Trojan War and Lessons Learned

Tue, 01/09/2024 - 12:36pm

The Emergence of Irregular Warfare In Prehistory

Tactics Employed in the Trojan War and Lessons Learned

 

By Dave Campbell, Enas Jahangir, Rebekah Rodriguez

 

Disclaimer

 

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publisher, the editorial board, or any affiliated institutions. The information provided in this article is intended for general informational purposes only. While every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy and completeness of the content, the authors make no representations or warranties of any kind, express or implied, about the accuracy, reliability, suitability, or availability of the information contained herein.

 

Readers are advised to use their discretion and judgment when applying the information from this article to their specific situations. The authors and the publisher shall not be held responsible for any errors, omissions, or inaccuracies in the content or for any consequences arising from the use of the information presented in this article.

 

Background

 

Prehistory spans a vast period before the advent of written records, making it difficult to pinpoint specific conflicts with great precision. However, we can identify some significant disputes and developments in human history from the time of Troy (often associated with the late Bronze Age) up to World War I. These conflicts and events are characterized by the transition from prehistoric to historic times.

The Trojan War (circa 12th century BCE), as described in Homer's epics, the "Iliad" and the "Odyssey," involved a Greek coalition led by Agamemnon besieging the city of Troy. Though the historical accuracy is debated, it symbolizes the transition from the prehistoric to the historic period.

 

What we know about the Trojan War comes primarily from the Greek Historian Herodotus, Eratosthenes, and the Poet, Homer. While the exact timeline of the Trojan War varies by source, this war was likely fought between 1250-1184 BCE.[1] At that time, the Mycenaean Greeks were in the midst of the Bronze Age, and rapidly expanding.[2] The Mycenaean Greeks had arguably one of the most advanced militaries of the age, and it was led by King Agamemnon, the King of Kings.[3]

 

The Trojan city of Troy was located just across the Aegean Sea in what is now the city of Hisarlik in the northwest corner of Turkey.[4] Founded around 3000 BCE, the city of Troy was highly prosperous, had tremendous influence in the region, and was the home of one of the most powerful militaries on the eastern side of the Aegean Sea.[5]  King Priam ruled over Troy with his two sons Hector and Paris by his side. King Priam and the Trojans were not at odds with the Mycenaen Greeks before the Trojan War. In fact, King Priam, Hector, and Paris were in good favor with the Greeks. All of that would change after Hector and Paris take one fateful trip to Sparta.

 

Key Events

 

1. While the tales of how the Trojan War began are tightly interwoven with Greek mythology, the catalyst for the conflict is ultimately Helen, the Queen Sparta fleeing to Troy with Paris. As the tale goes, Hector and Paris visit with King Menelaus of Sparta while traveling through Greece on a mission to retrieve their aunt and return her to Troy. Paris and Queen Helen quickly fall in love, and Helen stows away aboard Paris’ boat, fleeing to Troy with him.[6]

 

2. King Menelaus demands that King Priam return Helen immediately. When King Priam sides with Paris and refuses to bend to the will of King Menelaus, King Menelaus calls for his brother, King Agamemnon, the commander of the Greek army to retrieve Helen from Troy.[7]

 

3. The Greek army sets sail for Troy. They crossed the Aegean Sea, set up camp along the coastline, and initiated what would become known as the Battle of Troy or the Trojan War. By all accounts, this was a bloody and ruthless 10-year siege.[8] Over those 10 years, several battles are fought, but Troy’s defenses hold and prove to be impenetrable. King Menelaus challenges and bests Paris in combat, but Hector saves Paris and successfully defends Troy, killing Patroclus and invoking the rage of Achilles.[9] This would prove to be a significant turning point in the war.

 

4. Achilles leads the Myrmidons to avenge Patroclus. Achilles kills Hector and Drives the Trojans back into Troy. In a rage, Achilles drags the body of Hector around the walls of Troy, effectively breaking the will of the Trojans to keep fighting.[10] King Priam pleads with Achilles to return Hector’s body and put an end to the fighting.

 

5. With Hector dead and Paris believed to be mortally wounded, The Greeks declare the war over. They return Hector’s body, and as legend has it, they gift the Trojans a wooden horse as a peace offering.[11]

 

The Endstate

As night fell, a small group of Myrmidons emerged from the gifted horse. Finally, inside the impregnable defenses of Troy, the Greeks were able to take down and weaken the defenses. After 10 years of fighting, Troy fell in one night. The Greeks won the war and the Trojans that survived the final siege were forced to flee. Those that escaped from Troy, including Prince Aeneas, are believed to have made their way to Italy and played a significant role in the foundation of Rome.[12]

 

Irregular Warfare Activities Employed During the Conflict

 

The Greek military strategy during the Trojan War shows a progression from conventional warfare to irregular warfare, ultimately combining both of these in a form of compound warfare.

 

It is important to note, however, that modern concepts of irregular warfare activities and operations did not exist at the time. As such, Department of Defense (DOD) doctrine, which defines unconventional warfare (UW) as “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area,” does not fit neatly in this context.[13] Rather, it may be useful to understand the Trojan War through the lens of other Special Operations core activities, such as direct action, special reconnaissance, or military information support operations.

 

Nonetheless, this project aimed to explore how tactics and strategies employed in the Trojan War might map to UW specifically and what lessons learned this example could provide for our nation today. Thus, while the Greek campaign did not enable a resistance movement or insurgency per modern doctrine, this work will focus on applying the UW lens to understand similarities between UW and underground or guerrilla tactics used in the Trojan War.

 

Conventional Warfare: The Trojan War started off as conventional warfare, led by Agamemnon, wherein Greek forces attempted to siege the city of Troy. This could be considered a large-scale combat operation that included encampments, naval operations to blockade Troy and cut off its supplies, and frontal assaults attempting to breach the city’s walls.[14]

 

Transition to Irregular Warfare: The Greeks were unable to penetrate Troy despite a 10-year siege of the city, due to its strong defenses. This long stalemate forced the Greeks to change their strategy and they transitioned to irregular warfare, employing unconventional tactics.[15]

 

The most notable unconventional tactic they used was strategic deception. The Greeks used deception to deliberately mislead the adversary, causing them to take actions that contributed to the Greeks’ success. They did this by constructing the Trojan Horse, which they left outside the city gates as a supposed offering to the gods. Meanwhile, the Greek army pretended to sail away. The Trojans, believing the deception, brought the horse inside the city as a victory trophy. However, Greek soldiers hid inside the horse and emerged that night to open the city gates for the Greek army, which had returned under the cover of darkness.[16]

 

Compound Warfare: The Trojan Horse strategy combined elements of both regular and irregular warfare, with a small group of forces using unconventional tactics that ultimately enabled conventional forces to enter the city and attack.[17]

 

Other unconventional tactics used during the Trojan War included:

  • Psychological Operations— The Greeks used Achilles’ armor on the battlefield to convince the Trojans that Achilles had returned, creating panic and fear[18]
  • Guerrilla Tactics— The Greeks conducted hit and run attacks on Trojan outposts and disrupted supply lines to hinder the enemy’s operations[19]
  • Infiltration and Reconnaissance— Odysseus disguised himself as a beggar to enter Troy, gather intelligence, and assess Trojan vulnerabilities[20]
  • Sabotage— In some versions of the story, Odysseus and Diomedes also conducted night raids in Trojan camps, killing soldiers and Trojan allies, including the Thracian King Rhesus[21]

 

Prevailing Party

 

Ultimately, the Greeks won the war, with the use of the Trojan Horse being the critical turning point that allowed the Greeks to enter and attack the city in an undefended state.

 

Lessons Learned & How the Trojan War Can Benefit Our Nation Today

 

Drawing lessons from the Trojan War for modern warfare, particularly irregular warfare, can offer valuable insights for the United States and its military strategies. While the Trojan War was fought in a very different context, several principles and strategies can be applied in contemporary military thinking:

 

1. Deception and Misdirection: The Trojan War is famously associated with the use of deception—the Greeks used the Trojan Horse to infiltrate Troy. In irregular warfare, deception and misdirection can be powerful tools to confuse and outmaneuver adversaries. Strategic misinformation and covert operations can disrupt enemy plans and create opportunities for success[22].

 

2. Understanding Local Terrain and Culture: The Greeks in the Trojan War had to adapt to the local terrain and understand the Trojan culture to be successful. In irregular warfare, understanding the local environment, culture, and social dynamics is crucial for gaining the support of the local population and effectively countering insurgent or irregular forces.

 

3.  Guerrilla Warfare Tactics: The Trojan War involved elements of guerrilla warfare, with both sides using hit-and-run tactics and ambushes. Modern irregular warfare often features guerrilla tactics employed by non-state actors. Understanding and countering these tactics is essential for military success.

 

4.  Siege Warfare and Patience: The siege of Troy lasted for ten years, illustrating the importance of patience and perseverance in irregular warfare. Long-term commitment and the ability to maintain the initiative over extended periods are critical when dealing with insurgencies or irregular conflicts[23].

 

5.  Diplomacy and Alliances: Throughout the Trojan War, the Greeks relied on alliances with various city-states. In contemporary irregular warfare, building and maintaining coalitions and partnerships with local actors and international allies can enhance effectiveness and legitimacy[24].

 

6.  Intelligence and Reconnaissance: The Greeks relied on intelligence gathering to assess the Trojans' strengths and weaknesses. In irregular warfare, intelligence and reconnaissance are essential for identifying insurgent networks, understanding their capabilities, and targeting their leadership.

 

7.  Adaptability and Innovation: The Trojan War demonstrated the need for adaptability in the face of changing circumstances. Military forces engaged in irregular warfare must be agile and able to adjust their strategies and tactics based on evolving threats and conditions[25].

 

8.  Human Intelligence (HUMINT): Gathering human intelligence, or HUMINT, played a role in the Trojan War. In irregular warfare, developing sources within local communities and understanding the motivations of individuals can provide critical information for decision-making.

 

9.  Balancing Force and Diplomacy: The Trojan War illustrates the balance between military force and diplomacy. In irregular warfare, there is often a need to employ both military and diplomatic means to achieve desired outcomes[26].

 

10.  Cultural Sensitivity and Information Operations: Trojans and Greeks had distinct cultural identities, and understanding cultural nuances was important. In modern irregular warfare, cultural sensitivity and information operations that address local beliefs and perceptions can influence the narrative and public support.

 

While the Trojan War is an ancient conflict, its strategies and lessons can be adapted and applied to contemporary irregular warfare scenarios. By studying historical conflicts and extracting relevant principles, the United States can better prepare for future irregular warfare challenges, where adaptability, intelligence, and understanding of local dynamics are crucial for success.

 

 

Bibliography

 

Allan, William. "Arms and the man: Euphorbus, Hector, and the death of Patroclus." The Classical Quarterly 55, no. 1 (2005): 1-16.

 

Allen, Susan Heuck. Finding the Walls of Troy: Frank Calvert and Heinrich Schliemann at Hisarlik. Univ of California Press, 2023: 255-256.

 

Baillergeon, Rick and Sutherland, John. "Integrating Special and Conventional Forces." Armchair General. January 9, 2014. http://armchairgeneral.com/tactics-101-092-integrating-special-and-conventional-forces.htm.

 

Bassett, Samuel Eliot. "Achilles' treatment of Hector's body." In Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, pp. 41-65. American Philological Association, 1933.

 

Beatty, John. "A Different Horse: Alternate Interpretations of the Trojan War." The Ohio State University eHistory. Accessed September 24, 2023. https://ehistory.osu.edu/articles/different-horse-alternate-interpretations-trojan-war.

 

Braw, Elisabeth. "The Defender's Dilemma: Identifying and Deterring Gray-Zone Aggression." American Enterprise Institute. Accessed September 24, 2023. https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Braw_Defenders_Dilemma_Chapter_1.pdf?x91208.

 

Bulfinch, Thomas. 2002. Bulfinch’s Mythology: The Age of Fable. https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/3327/pg3327.html.

 

Burgess, Jonathan S. The tradition of the Trojan War in Homer and the epic cycle. JHU Press, 2003: 2-4.

 

Farrow, James G. "Aeneas and Rome: pseudepigrapha and politics." The Classical Journal 87, no. 4 (1992): 339-359.

 

Flores, Juan César, and Mauro Bologna. "Troy: A simple nonlinear mathematical perspective." Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 392, no. 19 (2013): 4683-4687.

 

Gere, Cathy. The tomb of Agamemnon. Harvard University Press, 2012: 2-10.

 

Homer. 1919. The Iliad: with an English Translation by A.T. Murray. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Hom.%20Il.%2010.435&lang=original.

 

Homer. 1919. The Odyssey: with an English Translation by A.T. Murray. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0012.tlg002.perseus-eng1:4.219-4.264.

 

“Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations.” United States Special Operations Command, April 18, 2011. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA543873.pdf.

 

Ishtiaq, Muhammad. "HOMER’S CONCEPTION OF HONOUR AND GLORY IN THE ILIAD." International Journal of Research-GRANTHAALAYAH 7, no. 8 (2019): 104-10.

 

Lynch, Justin. 2015. “The Strategy Bridge.” The Strategy Bridge. May 2015. https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2015/12/5/achilles-and-odysseus-in-modern-warfare.

Page, Denys. "The Historical Sack of Troy." Antiquity 33, no. 129 (1959): 25-31.

Page, Denys. "Stesichorus: The ‘Sack of Troy’and ‘The Wooden Horse’(P. OXY. 2619 and 2803)." The Cambridge Classical Journal 19 (1973): 47-65.

SOFREP. 2023. “The Siege of Troy: Ancient Warfare and Timeless Lessons in Military Strategy.” SOFREP. July 17, 2023. https://sofrep.com/news/the-siege-of-troy-ancient-warfare-and-timeless-lessons-in-military-strategy/.

 

Strauss, Barry. 2006. The Trojan War: A New History. New York: Simon and Schuster.

 

Thompson, Diane P. The Trojan war: literature and legends from the Bronze Age to the present. McFarland, 2013: 3-6.

Yamagata, Naoko. "The fall of Troy." In Homeric Morality, Brill, 1994: 22-27.

 

 

[1] Thompson, Diane P. The Trojan war: literature and legends from the Bronze Age to the present. McFarland, 2013: 3-6.

[2] Burgess, Jonathan S. The tradition of the Trojan War in Homer and the epic cycle. JHU Press, 2003: 2-4.

[3] Gere, Cathy. The tomb of Agamemnon. Harvard University Press, 2012: 2-10.

[4] Allen, Susan Heuck. Finding the Walls of Troy: Frank Calvert and Heinrich Schliemann at Hisarlik. Univ of California Press, 2023: 255-256.

[5] Page, Denys. "The Historical Sack of Troy." Antiquity 33, no. 129 (1959): 25-31.

[6] Yamagata, Naoko. "The fall of Troy." In Homeric Morality, Brill, 1994: 22-27.

[7] Ishtiaq, Muhammad. "HOMER’S CONCEPTION OF HONOUR AND GLORY IN THE ILIAD." International Journal of Research-GRANTHAALAYAH 7, no. 8 (2019): 104-10.

[8] Flores, Juan César, and Mauro Bologna. "Troy: A simple nonlinear mathematical perspective." Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 392, no. 19 (2013): 4683-4687.

[9] Allan, William. "Arms and the man: Euphorbus, Hector, and the death of Patroclus." The Classical Quarterly 55, no. 1 (2005): 1-16.

[10] Bassett, Samuel Eliot. "Achilles' treatment of Hector's body." In Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, pp. 41-65. American Philological Association, 1933.

[11] Page, Denys. "Stesichorus: The ‘Sack of Troy’and ‘The Wooden Horse’(P. OXY. 2619 and 2803)." The Cambridge Classical Journal 19 (1973): 47-65.

[12] Farrow, James G. "Aeneas and Rome: pseudepigrapha and politics." The Classical Journal 87, no. 4 (1992): 339-359.

[13] “Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations.” United States Special Operations Command, April 18, 2011. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA543873.pdf.

[14] Barry Strauss, “Assault on the Walls,” in The Trojan War: A New History. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), 69-99.

[15] John Beatty, “A Different Horse: Alternate Interpretations of the Trojan War,” The Ohio State University eHistory, https://ehistory.osu.edu/articles/different-horse-alternate-interpretations-trojan-war.

[16] Thomas Bulfinch, Bulfinch’s Mythology: The Age of Fable. (2002), 201-202, https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/3327/pg3327.html.

[17] Rick Baillergeon and John Sutherland, “Integrating Special and Conventional Forces,” Armchair General, January 9, 2014, http://armchairgeneral.com/tactics-101-092-integrating-special-and-conventional-forces.htm.

[18] Thomas Bulfinch, Bulfinch’s Mythology: The Age of Fable. (2002), 191-193, https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/3327/pg3327.html.

[19] Barry Strauss, “An Army in Trouble,” in The Trojan War: A New History. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), 101-116.

[20] Homer. The Odyssey: with an English Translation by A.T. Murray. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1919), 4.245-260, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0012.tlg002.perseus-eng1:4.219-4.264.

[21] Homer. The Iliad: with an English Translation by A.T. Murray. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1919), 10.455-565, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Hom.%20Il.%2010.435&lang=original.

[22] SOFREP. 2023. “The Siege of Troy: Ancient Warfare and Timeless Lessons in Military Strategy.” SOFREP. July 17, 2023. https://sofrep.com/news/the-siege-of-troy-ancient-warfare-and-timeless-lessons-in-military-strategy/.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Lynch, Justin. 2015. “The Strategy Bridge.” The Strategy Bridge. May 2015. https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2015/12/5/achilles-and-odysseus-in-modern-warfare.

[25] Ibid

[26] Ibid

About the Author(s)

Dave Campbell is an active-duty U.S. Army Officer pursuing his master’s degree in security policy studies at George Washington University. After receiving his bachelor’s degree in international Affairs from the University of Georgia in 2012, he commissioned and served nine years as an Intelligence Officer. He currently serves as a Functional Area Officer in the Nuclear and Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) field. The opinions expressed are his own and do not represent those of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Enas Jahangir is a people and mission-oriented professional pursuing her master’s degree in security policy from George Washington University. After receiving her bachelor’s degree in religion and Middle East Studies from Smith College, she went on to receive multiple U.S. government fellowships. She currently works in the public sector focusing on national security.

Rebekah Rodriguez is a dedicated professional with a master’s degree in security policy from George Washington University and is currently pursuing an MBA from the same institution. With a Bachelor's in Global Sciences from American Public University and an associate degree in Persian Farsi from the Defense Language Institute, Rebekah possesses a diverse educational background which reflects her unwavering dedication to both professional excellence and global betterment.