Welcome to the fourth generation of warfare.[1]  Although some commentators would argue that this term is misleading since “fourth generation war” is nothing new, its resurgence as a primary method of engaging in conflict with world powers is new.  Building upon the teachings of Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi Minh and Che Guevera, today’s insurgents have redefined their understanding of centers of gravity and have broadened the field of war.  Recognizing a complete inability to defeat the military might of the United States, and seeking to avoid massing their forces for inevitable defeat, non-state actors such as Al Qaeda have turned to a modern, asymmetric approach to war.  Through maneuver, an enlargement of the battlefield to include the whole of society, and decreased reliance on centralized logistics, today’s insurgent forces, although technologically inferior to U.S. military forces, provide a formidable opponent.  Fourth Generation War (4GW) insurgents seek to combine guerrilla tactics with a willingness to fight “across the political, economic, social, and military spectrums” to convey a message that will achieve the strategic goal of “changing the minds of the enemy’s policymakers.”[2] 

Proponents of 4GW suggest that we are embarking upon a new era in warfare that results in the breakdown of the nation-state’s monopoly of war and calls for the development of new methods to combat warfare that run the spectrum of society.  At least one commentator has argued that

[n]o matter how many search and destroy missions are initiated against ‘terrorist’ sites, no matter how many terrorist operatives are targeted for assassination, terrorist planners . . . ceaselessly emerge from the anonymity of the crowd, supported both overtly and surreptitiously by rogue regimes . . ., to reap their vengeance and havoc upon innocent civilians . . . and all symbols of established society.[3]

It has been said that technology and firepower alone cannot win this type of war wherein enemy combatants are composed of decentralized cells capable of blending into the population at will.  How, then, can it be done?  Despite arguments to the contrary, the United States has previously engaged in this type of warfare and the lessons learned from those conflicts stand ready to be incorporated into today’s strategy and tactics.  Given the on-going conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the likelihood of similar engagements in the future, an understanding of those past lessons is crucial.  The hard won lessons of past small wars teach us that 4GW cannot be won solely by second and third generation tactics.

It is generally agreed that a small war is one in which a traditional nation-state armed force is engaged in combat with an irregular armed force.[4]  From that starting point, the differing attributes of a particular small war are as varied as the locations in which small wars are fought.  Regardless of the specific nature of any particular small war, they bear a striking resemblance to 4GW.  Indeed, history provides numerous examples of small war scenarios that are directly analogous to military engagements we face in the 4GW era.  Is an article that discusses American troops hunting a warlord, speaking of “the [small war] pursuit of Pancho Villa in 1916 – or [the 4GW pursuit of] Muhammed Farah Aidid in 1993 or Osama bin Laden in 2001?”[5]  Is America’s invasion of a sovereign country to overthrow a dictatorial regime in favor of self-government by the people, a small war in Mexico in 1914 – or 4GW in Iraq and Afghanistan in the present day? 

The commonalities between small wars and 4GW, apart from similar objectives, owe much to the nature of the opponent and the location of the engagement.  Perhaps not coincidentally, it is these common attributes that serve as the enemy’s strength.  The combatant likely to be faced in a small war or 4GW relies upon mobility and superior intelligence regarding terrain and the troop movement of his opponent and is not encumbered with supply to the same degree as regular forces.[6]  This provides the insurgent with an ability to attack at his own choosing and then to disperse once he has drawn blood thereby avoiding singular defeat by a regular force.  The location of these engagements can be anywhere the nation-state has a perceived interest, be it military, economic, or purely social.  Throughout history, and even today, we see that these engagements often occur in the inhospitable terrain of unexpected places.  Thus, despite America’s technological advantage, we often face an opponent of unknown strength and quality in a place we know little about.  This initially puts U.S. forces at a disadvantage because the insurgent will often be able to develop an operational or tactical method to counter America’s technological advantages.  The insurgent does this by controlling the pace of war, refusing battle, and drawing the invader deep into hostile country were he becomes overextended and vulnerable.  To counter these insurgent advantages, U.S. forces must employ a strategy that combats the insurgent militarily, socially, and politically.

Writing in 1896, C.E. Callwell laid out the blueprint for a strategic approach to combating insurgents.  Recognizing that the insurgent, owing to his mobility, is at a strategic advantage over the regular force, Callwell argued that the object in a small war is to force the insurgent to fight so the regular force’s tactical advantages of firepower and discipline could prevail.[7]  Once the battle is forced, “mere victory is not enough.  The enemy must not only be beaten.  He must be beaten thoroughly.”[8]  This is the essence of what Callwell teaches, for the “mere expulsion of the opponent from the ground [he occupies] is of small account; what is wanted is a big casualty list in the hostile ranks.”[9]

Although Callwell’s reliance upon attrition to win the day is grounded in second generation warfare (2GW),[10] he steals a page from the insurgent and combines this approach with third generation warfare (3GW) maneuver and mobility.  First, the theater of operations is divided into sections that are fortified with defensive posts and supply depots to support mobile columns of troops that will patrol the area.[11]  Once this is done, the commander in each area can focus upon defeat of the insurgents within his area.  This is accomplished by maintaining mobile columns of lightly-equipped troops ever-ready to close with and destroy an insurgent force before it has time to disperse into the populous.[12] 

In addition to tactics calculated to inflict a high casualty rate among the insurgents, Callwell also addresses the need to strike them where they live.  This becomes necessary when there is no identifiable objective such as a capital city, stronghold, or organized army for the regular force to focus on capturing or destroying.  It is then that the regular force must “hunt [the enemy] from their homes and . . . destroy or carry off their belongings.”[13]  Thus, a method for driving the insurgency to failure is through the destruction of its means of existence.  This can be done through the burning of crops and stores of grain and other foodstuff, through the capture of livestock, and the burning of villages.[14]  To be effective, however, this strategy must be conducted methodically; a ring of fortified posts must be established around the area sought to be pacified and vigorous patrols conducted so that an insurgent force is unable to escape.[15]  The objective in this method is, as it is throughout Callwell’s approach, to force the insurgent to fight whereby the regular force can annihilate him.

Throughout its campaigns between the world wars in every clime and place, the United States Marine Corps borrowed heavily upon the teachings of Callwell and recorded its practical experiences in a manual designed to pass on lessons learned from one generation to another.  Agreeing with Callwell to a point, the Marines understood that the enemy must be sought out, attacked vigorously, and pursued doggedly to ensure complete victory.[16]  However, recognizing that the small wars of its generation lacked the imperial quality of that in Callwell’s generation and were “usually a phase of, or an operation taking place concurrently with, diplomatic effort,”[17] the Marines eschewed the heavy-handed, attrition-based strategy favored by Callwell for a more tactful approach.

Since diplomatic efforts were not yet exhausted, the Marines’ approach to small wars reflected the limits that the diplomatic corps often places on military actions of this nature.  Indeed, those limits often dictate that Marines are limited to a show of force or other tactics short of actual combat.[18]  Thus, the restoration of peace and orderly government may involve more than purely military measures and, to the extent military measures are applied, they may be of secondary importance,[19] for “the goal is to gain decisive results with the least application of force and the consequent minimum loss of life.”[20]  It is for this reason that the Marines place great emphasis on the psychology of small wars and establish a key difference between their approach to small wars and Callwell’s approach.

Understanding the psychology involved in small wars has an appreciable impact on the methods employed to accomplish the mission involved.[21]  The major difference in psychology in regular warfare vice small wars concerns the impact upon the individual members of the regular force.  While in regular warfare, a hatred of the enemy is often developed among the regular troops to instill courage and a willingness to fight;[22] this is counter-productive in small wars.  Since the goal in the Marine approach to small wars is to accomplish an objective without resorting to force when possible, the local population must be convinced of the altruistic nature of the regular force.[23]  This is achieved by a thorough study of the people of the theater of operations culminating with an indoctrination of all ranks with a proper respect and attitude toward that population.[24]  By exercising proper deportment and courtesy, the individual troops within the regular force may act as suitable ambassadors for the United States to convey a message of benevolence.  This common sense approach will inevitably result in immeasurable benefits with the local population as they realize that the regular force is not an invader but a humanitarian force intent on restoring peace and order.

Although the use of this approach may bring about a prompt end to the small war, the Marines caution against allowing the populous to fall into a cycle of self-submission.  In countries that have a history of brutality and repression, the population may instinctively submit to the external influence of the regular force.  While this is initially welcomed because it results in a quicker return to order, the difficulty arises when the regular force seeks to return power to local authorities.[25]  Given their inclination toward submission, local authorities may be unwilling to shoulder their responsibilities.  Therefore, the regular force must assume only as much responsibility as is necessary to accomplish its objective while encouraging the local government to carry its full capacity of responsibility.[26]  To do otherwise “weakens the sovereign state, complicating the relationship with the [regular] forces and prolong[s] the occupation.”[27]

In addition to the continuing use of diplomacy and psychology in its approach to small wars, the Marine Corps also makes use of another tool that was unavailable to Callwell:  aviation.  Recognizing that insurgent forces are not likely to present targets of strategic military value for combat aviation, the Marines concluded that the best use of aviation in small wars is close support of infantry units.[28]  This support takes many forms.  Foremost in importance is reconnaissance aircraft.[29]  From a strategic perspective, reconnaissance aircraft permit the regular force to gain knowledge of the terrain, enemy location and disposition, enemy methods of supply, possible routes of attack, and locations of potential airfields and bivouac sites.[30]  This provides the theater commander with invaluable information to craft an appropriate battle plan.  Tactical reconnaissance provides the infantry commander with more detailed information as to enemy location and disposition in conjunction with an attack.[31]  When providing support to a mobile column, tactical reconnaissance can also supplement normal ground force security by identifying potential ambush sites and, occasionally, disrupting those sites through employment of whatever armament they might possess.[32] 

Combat aviation is generally employed in a close air support role.  This direct support of ground forces typically consists of interdiction of enemy supply routes and close-in support of attacking infantry.[33]  A third method of infantry support is the transport of troops and supplies.  As discussed above, the regular force will typically establish bases in various sectors of the theater of operations.  Given the inhospitable terrain that is often found in these places, and the possibility of insurgent raids upon road convoys, air transport of men and materiel becomes of increasing importance.[34]  Air transport greatly increases a regular force’s ability to match insurgent mobility thereby increasing the likelihood that the enemy can be forced into combat.

The advent of air power has changed the dynamics of war, particularly small wars.  The increased mobility and transport that air power affords closes the strategic advantage that the insurgent usually enjoys over the regular force.  Callwell concluded that the “all-important question of supply is in fact at the root of most of the difficulties, and has been the cause of some of the disasters, to which regular troops engaged in small wars seem ever to be prone.”[35]  In Callwell’s time, supply trains decreased the mobility of regular forces and reduced the number of troops available for attack since provisions had to be made for guarding the supply train.  Air transport significantly diminishes the difficulties faced by Callwell.  While air transport gave the Marines of the early twentieth century a decided advantage over the regular forces of Callwell’s time, the advantage enjoyed today is even greater.  Transport by helicopter obviates the need for airfields and allows for nearly pinpoint drops of supplies to beleaguered patrols.  Thus, while air power alone does not ensure victory,[36] it does provide significant strategic and tactical advantages and enhances the regular force’s ability to conclude operations swiftly.

The warriors of our past have reached out to teach a lesson in combating today’s insurgents.  They have set forth battle-tested theories that can be enhanced by today’s technology.  We would do well to listen and remember Callwell’s advice that technology is never a substitute for strategy since the insurgent will always develop effective counter-measures.  It is the “ability to adapt to terrain and climate, to match the enemy in mobility and inventiveness, [and] to collect intelligence” that will determine success in 4GW just as it did in previous small wars.[37]  4GW takes place across the spectrum of modern society; the enemy seeks to engage our thought process to effectuate a change in our policies.  We cannot combat this form of warfare by using the attrition-based method of 2GW.  We must combine the mobility, inventiveness, and vigor advocated by Callwell with the diplomacy and psychology promoted by the Marines’ Small Wars Manual to meet today’s insurgents throughout the spectrum of combat.  By meeting the enemy at every level, be it on the battlefield, in the media, or otherwise, his message can be countered and he can be forced to fight.  Yesterday’s small war soldiers are calling out to us; the only question is:  are we listening?

Captain John W. Bellflower, Jr. is presently the Chief of Claims, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, 49th FW, Holloman AFB, New Mexico.  He has served in private practice and as a criminal prosecutor.  He was prior enlisted as a Marine, reaching the rank of Sergeant.  He is currently pursuing a Master of Arts in National Security Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University. 

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