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Small Wars and Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Lessons from Iraq

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ABSTRACT

On 1 May 2003, President George W. Bush stood aboard USS Abraham Lincoln, in front of a banner stating ‘Mission Accomplished’, and declared that ‘major combat operations have ended. In the battle for Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed.’ The President’s declaration has proved to be a false dawn. Despite a breathtaking conventional military campaign that removed Saddam Hussein’s regime in 43 days, the US-led Coalition has since been embroiled in countering an increasingly violent, diverse and unpredictable insurgency.

This dissertation provides some historical perspective to the development of insurgency and counter-insurgency. It traces the background to the creation of the modern state of Iraq. It examines the post-conflict insurgency in Iraq. It considers those decisions made by the Coalition that most contributed to its emergence and growth. It analyses those lessons that should contribute to future British counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine.

The paper addresses four themes. First, the US military alone in Iraq is conducting a COIN campaign against an insurgency that is unprecedented in history. Secondly, key lessons for British COIN doctrine must be learnt from the American politico-military experience; the British Army must therefore be receptive and open-minded. Thirdly, Iraq has witnessed a continued failure by American and British policy-makers to learn the lessons from history. Lastly, COIN operations in Iraq have to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people as they have to do with the perceptions of the wider Muslim world and the American and British electorates. It is a battle of perceptions in a war over ideas.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Symbol Definition

1st CAV. 1st US Cavalry Division
3ID. 3rd Infantry Division
AO. Area of Operations
AOR. Area of Responsibility
BCT. Brigade Combat Team
BG. Battle Group
BW. Black Watch
CALL. Centre for (US) Army Lessons Learned
CAVNET. Cavalry Intranet
CENTCOM. Central Command (Army)
CERP. Commander's Emergency Response Program
CFLCC. Coalition Forces Land Component Command
CJTF. Combined and Joint Task Force
COIN. Counter-Insurgency
CPA. Coalition Provisional Authority
CPA(S). Coalition Provisional Authority (South)
CSIS. Centre for Strategic and International Studies
CT. Counter-Terrorism
DFID. Department of International Development
DoD. U.S. Department of Defense
FM. Field Manual
G-COIN. Global Counter-Insurgency against a Global Insurgency
FRL. Former Regime Loyalists
HCSC. Higher Command and Staff Course
HUMINT. Human Intelligence
IMEF. 1st Marine Expeditionary Force
IAEA. International Atomic Energy Agency
IDA. Institute of Defense Analyses
IO. Information Operations
JDAM. Joint Direct Attack Munition
MEF. Marine Expeditionary Force
MOD. Ministry of Defence
MP. Military Police
NGO. Non-Governmental Organization
OGA. Other Governmental Agency
OIF. Operation Iraqi Freedom
ORHA. Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
PJHQ. Permanent Joint Headquarters
PSO. Peace Support Operations
SASO. Stability and Support Operations
SF. Special Forces
TELIC. The British designation for Operation Iraqi Freedom: Operation Telic
TPFDD. Time-phased Force and Deployment Data
TTP. Tactics Techniques and Procedures
WMD. Weapons of Mass Destruction

CHAPTER ONE

COUNTER-INSURGENCY: A GENERATIONAL CHALLENGE

“The conduct of small wars is in fact in certain respects an art by itself, diverging widely from what is adapted to the conditions of regular warfare.”

Colonel Charles E. Callwell¹

IRAQ – 2 YEARS ON

On 1 May 2003, President George W. Bush stood aboard USS Abraham Lincoln and declared that ‘major combat operations have ended. In the battle for Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed.’² Despite a breathtaking conventional military campaign that removed Saddam Hussein’s regime within 43 days, the United States continues to lead a now much-reduced ‘Coalition of the Willing’³ that is engaged across the full spectrum of operations throughout the country – from high intensity war-fighting to Peace Support Operations (PSO). The casualty statistics are well documented. Since the President’s speech, 1395 US Marines, soldiers and airmen of the US military have been killed by *hostile* attacks⁴; the British Army has had 36 soldiers and airmen killed⁵ in similar fashion and the international community a further 490, including 254 private security consultants and employees from Non-Government Organisations.⁶ Whilst tens of thousands of insurgents have been killed, it is estimated that in the same time span at least 24,685 civilian Iraqis have lost their lives; US-led forces are deemed responsible for 37% of them and anti-occupation forces responsible for 27% of them.⁷ They include 270 politicians and government workers, and almost 1500 members of the Iraqi Security Forces.⁸ At least 34 ordinary Iraqis have been killed every day since 19 March 2003.⁹ The range of violence, from Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), assassinations and suicide attacks to hostage beheadings, broadcast on the Internet, has caused revulsion and alarm.

The nature of the ‘insurgency’ in Iraq remains unclear. What is certain is its significant growth. Since mid-2003, when US military commanders stated that it comprised “5,000 dead-enders”¹⁰, the insurgency is now estimated to number over 200,000 with 5,000 ‘hard-core’ fighters.¹¹ It is complex, multi-faceted, and

ideologically diverse, comprising more than 87 groupings and organisations.¹²

Historical analysis offers few useful comparisons.

The Coalition's counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy took up to one year to crystallise. Such belated emergence was due to political and military indecision throughout the Coalition on how to implement an embryonic plan for post-conflict Iraq (Phase IV) and reluctance even to accept that an 'insurgency' existed. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (Operation TELIC, the UK military term) demonstrates the Coalition's inability to overcome a 'collective amnesia'¹³ that blights the 'lessons learned' procedures from previous military campaigns, especially in the context of counter-insurgency warfare.

The COIN campaign in Iraq continues to debate the 'security = development' nexus. The US government has earmarked \$21 billion for Iraq's reconstruction but only \$7.5 billion has been spent. This is largely because of contractual difficulties; 16% of all contracts are for the provision of security guards.¹⁴ This has all been unfolding in the full glare of the highly politicised and increasingly hostile world's media. The Iraqi population, and the Muslim world at large, is strongly influenced by and engaged with this modern and all-pervading medium.¹⁵

Operations in Iraq have been unique for the British Army. Previously it had not conducted a counter-insurgency operation either in a coalition or as a junior partner. This new experience has resulted in a degree of 'friction' with the American military over its COIN strategy in Iraq. This is short-sighted and regrettable. Whilst respecting the historical perspective, authority and expertise of the British Army, some US commanders (and encouragingly some British officers too) have come to challenge and even resent our occasionally hubristic and patronising attitude to the prosecution of counter-insurgency campaigns. Indeed one senior British officer has stated 'the British Army after August [2004] has very little to offer [the US Army]'.¹⁶ For an institution that wears the tag of a 'counter-insurgency army'¹⁷ with justifiable self-belief, its 'fixation on [success in] Malaya'¹⁸ is being eroded by our current posture in Iraq. Simply put, the US and UK are pursuing two almost entirely different campaigns in Iraq – against different enemies in different terrain and with different national objectives.

UK AND US VIEWS OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY WARFARE

The position of counter-insurgency warfare within US and British military doctrines reflect their different exposures to insurgency throughout history and their responses to this form of conflict. The British Army's doctrine evolved from its experience in dealing with colonial insurrections throughout the last century. Its success in Malaya remains the cornerstone of its current doctrine. Crucially it has had a series of opportunities to test and re-adjust that doctrine throughout the second half of the 20th Century, most notably in Northern Ireland.

In contrast, the US military has traditionally been a conventional war fighting force. Its COIN doctrine developed as an adjunct to its main military business and was dominated by the secret world of American Special Forces (SF) and Other Government Departments, most notably the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The regular and conventional army balked at the prospect of becoming immersed in 'messy' wars where conventional rules did not apply. It was also deeply affected by a handful of episodes that reinforced its own "comfort zones" in which overwhelming firepower and technology dominate. Conventional US military COIN doctrine suffered.

COIN doctrine for the 21st Century is therefore at an important stage of evolution. Whilst there must always be a core capability of fighting high-intensity conventional wars, it is more likely that 'irregular wars' that are occasionally highly intense will dominate future conflict. Given the strong expectation that the US and her close allies will prosecute future military campaigns together, both national and international COIN doctrine must continue to develop. The only appropriate response to a 'global' insurgency is a 'global' policy forged by the US and the UK in particular. It is in this context that the lessons from Iraq must be studied and not ignored.

AIM

The aim of this paper is to evaluate the operational lessons identified by Coalition Forces in Iraq since May 2003 that are relevant for the development of 21st Century counter-insurgency doctrine.

ENABLING OBJECTIVES

To achieve this aim, the study has the following objectives:

1. Review the evolution of insurgencies and counter-insurgency doctrine.
2. Provide an historical and cultural overview of Iraq.
3. Conduct a short assessment of the present insurgency in Iraq.
4. Critically evaluate the operational lessons identified by the Coalition in Iraq.
5. Propose recommendations for 21st Century COIN doctrine.

STUDY VALUE


The paper presents an alternative (and perhaps controversial) perspective on the prosecution of operations in Iraq. It argues that the US military now has the monopoly in counter-insurgency warfare. By contrast, the British military and political hierarchy, through a degree of complacency engendered by its largely successful colonial history, is now distinctly uneasy with contributing to the American campaign in the Sunni Triangle. This has led to a growing divide between the two countries. From its side of the Atlantic, the US military is confronting the vanguard of this new and particularly menacing form of ‘global insurgent’; the British Army is simply “yelling advice from the touchline.”¹⁹

STUDY METHODOLOGY

Although ‘insurgencies’ have existed since the Roman Empire, doctrines to counter them have only really developed since the end of the 19th Century. As with any conflict, doctrine evolves according to the types of war that a nation is required to fight at a given point in time. Doctrine usually develops when military commanders find that current practice falls short in particular areas so highlighting ‘the fact that we have been fighting on this planet for 5,000 years and still can’t get it right’.²⁰ An examination of the lessons from Iraq since May 2003 requires the characteristics of insurgencies and the principles of COIN doctrine to be scrutinised first. The reader will judge the relevance of this study to the evolution of British COIN doctrine. Its importance lies in the perspective placed Coalition operations. This aspect has not

previously been accorded the significance it now merits. Figure 1.1 illustrates the challenge to policy-makers and military practitioners.

Figure 1.1 The 21st Century Challenge



Source: Author

The model shows that:

1. Future conventional wars involving the US and the UK will likely be short-term campaigns using few resources designed to achieve a ‘close’ effect. The toppling of Saddam’s regime took 43 days. The UK and US had 148 soldiers killed from 20 March to 9 April 2003.²¹ It required *relatively* few resources.
2. Counter-Terrorist are now short-term and precise operations, but can have a deep effect in removing Britain’s strategic threats.
3. Peace Support Operations, the like of which Britain is conducting in Iraq, bridge the gap between conventional war and COIN, are having a degree of effect, are medium term and require a modicum of resources.
4. The US COIN campaign in Iraq has become central to the much deeper, resource-heavy and longer-term Global Counter-Insurgency campaign. The US is shouldering the major commitment in this field.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research approach to this study is constructed on three pillars: an empirical survey, including interviews; secondary data and personal experience of British and American counter-insurgency doctrine. Over 30 interviews and discussions were conducted, both in the US and the UK, with senior military commanders, civil servants, think-tanks, military college academia, doctrine writers, historians, and five respected authors. The sensitivity surrounding much of the debate on Iraq prevents the publication of a full list of those interviewed; many of the comments made during those interviews and included in this paper are non-attributable.

The literary study encompassed a wide range of secondary source material that was provided by six prominent libraries in the US and UK, and by a number of individuals. The Internet provided much of the material (including statistics) pertinent to current operations and opinion on Iraq, although the majority of the literature is American. This reflects both the obsessive drive in the US to find the ‘silver bullet’ to defeat the Iraqi insurgency and the Transformation²² of its military.

STUDY STRUCTURE

Chapters Two and Three examine the history of insurgency and counter-insurgency doctrine. Chapter Four narrows the focus onto a review of Iraq’s history and culture since 1914 to the conclusion of the opening scene of the current war, on 1 May 2003. Chapter Five assesses the Coalition’s planning efforts for the war post-conflict Iraq and how operations were conducted in the first year. Chapter Six provides a detailed study of the Iraqi insurgency. Chapter Seven identifies the operational lessons that the Coalition should learn set against the six traditional British COIN principles. Finally Chapter Eight concludes with a series of recommendations for British COIN doctrine. The emphasis throughout the paper will move from broad illustration to narrow analysis.

NOTES ON ARABIC

The Arabic language only uses three vowels – *a*, *i*, and *u*; there is no *e* or *o*. Hence, to the average reader the spelling of some words may be unfamiliar. For example, *sheik* appears as *shaykh*; the surname Hussein appears as *Husayn* and so on. When writing these words myself I have used the Arab version. Quotations have been left untouched.

DISCLAIMER

Inevitably this paper cannot be fully comprehensive. For example, the development of COIN doctrine leads to issues of equipment, logistics and training. The transfer of operational responsibility and ‘ownership’ to national military forces is a major study in its own right. Secondly, this paper does not represent the official views of the British Army but those of the author and those interviewed. The basis premise of this paper is to present the evidence that Britain needs to change its COIN doctrine and future interventionist policy.

REFERENCES AND NOTES

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- ¹ Charles Callwell, *Small Wars: A Tactical Handbook for Imperial Soldiers*, London, 1906, p. 23 cited in Frank Hoffman, *Principles for the Savage Wars of Peace*, Centre for Emerging Threats and Opportunities (CETO), Quantico, VA, 2005
- ² www.cnn.com
- ³ At the time of the invasion in 2003, the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ comprised 25 nations. At the time of writing, the Coalition comprises 13 nations. This ‘shrinkage’ has been a deliberate policy objective of the insurgency and is one of their greatest strategic successes.
- ⁴ Correct as at time of writing. See www.icasualties.org
- ⁵ For the latest casualty figures, see www.icasualties.org.
- ⁶ *ibid*
- ⁷ John Sloboda, Oxford Research Group, 6 August 2005
- ⁸ The nature of Iraqi civilian statistics is always difficult to confirm because of the loose reporting and accounting methods. Civilian casualties numbers are always political statements. This statistic was garnered a range of Internet sites. See Harmit Dardagan, John Sloboda, Kay Williams & Peter Bagnall, “Iraq Body Count, A Dossier of Civilian Casualties 2003-2005,” *Oxford Research Group*, July 2005 See www.iraqbodycount.org, www.csmonitor.com/2003/0522/p01s02-woiq.html, www.antiwar.com/casualties/, <http://icasualties.org/oif/Civ.aspx>, and numerous news reports.
- ⁹ Oxford Research Group at www.iraqbodycount.org
- ¹⁰ General John Abizaid, the Commander of US Central Command (CENTCOM) and in charge of all Coalition operations in the Near East, Middle East and Central Asia was quoted as saying the insurgency in Iraq comprised 5,000 dead-enders. Donald Rumsfeld, the US Secretary of Defense... to follow.
- ¹¹ BG Ham, Pentagon, June 2005
- ¹² Lieutenant Colonel (Dr.) David Kilcullen (Australian Army), ‘Countering Global Insurgency’, published privately and given to author following discussions in the US. Lt Col Kilcullen works in the Office of the US Secretary of Defense.
- ¹³ Ian F.W. Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies, Guerrillas and their Opponents since 1750*, Routledge, 2001.
- ¹⁴ The Times, ‘*Rebuilding is bogged down and will be billions over budget, admit chief*’; 23 May 2005.
- ¹⁵ There are no reliable statistics to show the growth of satellite television in Iraq. However, statistics do exist for telephone and internet subscribers. It was estimated that approximately 833,000 and 11,000 people subscribed to a telephone company and Internet company respectively before the 2003 war. It is now estimated that those numbers have increased to 3,172,771 and 147,076 respectively as of May 2005. All statistics taken from ‘*The Iraq Index, Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq*’ at www.brookings.edu/iraqindex, 13 May 2005.
- ¹⁶ Lieutenant General Kizely MC in conversation with author, 18 May 2005. Lieutenant General Kizely was the senior British Army officer in Iraq and served as Deputy Commander of Multi-National Forces Iraq (MNF-I) from October 2004-April 2005.
- ¹⁷ Dr R Thornton, ‘*Historical Origins of the British Army’s Counter-Insurgency and Counter-Terrorist Techniques*’, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Conference Paper. 2004.
- ¹⁸ Ian F.W. Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies, Guerrillas and their Opponents since 1750*, Routledge, 2001, page 226.
- ¹⁹ Interview with Lieutenant General Sir John McColl, Wilton, 12 March 2005
- ²⁰ Lieutenant General James Mattis USMC during interview with author, 21 April 2005, Quantico. LTG Mattis, who commanded the 1st Marine Division (USMC) on two tours of Iraq is likely to have amended T.E. Lawrence’s sentence written to Basil Liddell-Hart: “With 2,000 years of examples behind us we have no excuse, when fighting, for not fighting well. (Garnett, David, ed. *The Letters of T.E. Lawrence*, London: Jonathon Cape, 1927, pages 768-769).
- ²¹ www.icasualties.org
- ²² Space prevents a full explanation about Transformation in this paper. Suffice to say that it is the most ambitious re-organisation of the US military, principally the Army, since WW2. Readers interested in Transformation should go to www.globalsecurity.org

CHAPTER TWO

A HUNDRED YEARS OF IRREGULAR WARFARE

“Wars might be won without fighting battles” T.E. Lawrence, 1917¹

‘TOOLKITS’

History is littered with irregular wars² in which the actions of guerrillas, insurgents and terrorists have defied the authority of stronger, more conventional forces. Since 1990, there has been an average of 25 internal conflicts every year.³ The preponderance of such warfare, and the measures that have developed to counter it, necessitates a careful examination of the definitions and causes of this specific style of warfare set against an historical backdrop.

Irregular Warfare comprises ‘military operations in which one or more sides include irregular forces or employ irregular methods’.⁴ The ‘rules and ethics’ governing regular warfare do not apply. *Irregular warfare* ‘tends to marry especially low conduct with characteristically high-minded motives.’⁵ In prescribing an irregular strategy, the protagonist is able to employ a range of tactical effects or ‘modes of conflict’⁶ that include insurgency, guerrilla action and terrorism.

Current British military doctrine⁷ defines insurgency as “an organised movement aimed at the overthrow of constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. It is an armed political struggle, the goals of which may be diverse. Generally, an insurgent group attempts to force political change by a mixture of subversion, propaganda, political and military pressure, aiming to persuade or intimidate the broad mass of the people to support or accept such change.”⁸ Current events in Iraq have forced the British Army to re-examine this definition: ‘Insurgency is *competition* involving at least one non-state movement using means that include violence against an established authority to achieve political change’.⁹ The verbosity of the definition tells the practitioner that insurgent movements will use *all* methods and tactics at its disposal to achieve a political aim. Bard O’Neill offers a less-

prescriptive synopsis: “Insurgency may be defined as a struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the non-ruling group consciously uses political resources (organisational expertise, propaganda and demonstration) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics.”¹⁰ In choosing violence, the insurgent can pick from his ‘toolkit’ of irregular warfare¹¹ the tactical instruments that he believes will deliver that objective.¹² In short, the insurgent demonstrates that he is capable of prosecuting a broad tactical battle as part of a politically strategic campaign. Examining the evolution of this capability over the 20th Century is best focused by looking at four issues: the conditions from which revolt appeared; the insurgent leader’s strategy and operational philosophy; the tactics that were employed; the outcome of the campaign and the way that it affected subsequent insurgencies.

FOUNDATIONS AND FACES OF INSURGENCY IN THE 20TH CENTURY

The history and evolution of insurgency in the 20th Century is dominated by a triage of ideological clashes, wars about nationalism or liberation or both, and uprisings based on the effects of industrialisation and globalisation.¹³ While the pendulum bounced haphazardly between all three, seven campaigns in particular had a disproportionate influence. These were the Arab Revolt and T.E. Lawrence (1916-1919); the People’s War in rural China and Mao Tse-tung (1930s); Latin America and Ernesto Che Guevara (1960s), the growth of urban insurgency in Palestine (1947), Cyprus (1956) and Brazil (1967) under Menachem Begin, George Grivas and Carlos Marighela respectively; and the current menace from radical Islamist militancy (since 1960) that is currently personified by Usama Bin Laden but is articulated by thousands and potentially millions of others.¹⁴

REVOLT IN ARABIA

The Arabs had been long suffering victims at the hands of Ottoman imperialists in a way that ‘cannot be imagined in sufficiently horrible terms’.¹⁵ Believing that Ottoman policies discriminated against them ‘on the grounds of race and nationality’ the Arabs wanted to be rid of the Turks and claim Arabia for themselves but did not know how to set about it. When the Ottoman Empire aligned itself with Germany during World

War One the Allied Powers, and Britain in particular, encouraged Hussein, the *sharif* of Mecca and his son Faisal, to lead the Arab peoples in revolt by promising [them] a future state of their own.¹⁶ Although Britain offered material support in terms of arms, it had no intention of committing British troops to the Turkish Front *en masse*. It did offer a small band of intelligence officers and Arab specialists, one of whom was T.E. Lawrence, ‘arguably one of the most influential theorists of the twentieth century in terms of revolutionary war’.¹⁷ Knowing that the Arabs ‘were unused to formal operations’, Lawrence calculated that they would only taste victory if he formulated a style of revolutionary warfare by painstakingly discarding the conventional military doctrine prevalent in the British Army at the time. In his belief, ‘armies were like plants, immobile as a whole, firm rooted through long stems to the head. We [the Arab tribes] might be like a vapour, blowing where we listed. Our kingdoms lay in each man’s mind, and as we wanted nothing material to live on, so perhaps we offered nothing to killing.’¹⁸

Lawrence’s strategy relied on three tactical elements – ‘one algebraic, one biological, a third psychological’.¹⁹ The algebraic examined the pure science of achieving victory, and to this Lawrence analysed the numerical strengths of the Turkish Army against which the Arabs were pitted. He reached the conclusion that ‘to hold Arabia the Turks would ‘have need of a fortified post every four square miles, and a post could not be less than 20 men, so the requirement would be 600,000 men for the area they were trying to control, whereas they only had 100,000 available.’²⁰ The biological factors would re-balance the superior numbers of men and materials that philosophers had traditionally calculated to achieve victory. The Arabs could not afford casualties for though ‘they may make only a brief hole, rings of sorrow widen out from them’; in material terms, the Turkish Army were in constant short supply so that ‘our cue should be to destroy not the Army but the materials’.²¹

The third element was psychological and would concern not only shaping Turkish minds to the war in which they were now engaged, but the Arabs who had to either fight it or be a part of it. In helping to achieve this, Lawrence regarded the printing press as ‘the greatest weapon in the armoury of the modern commander’²² in persuading Turkish soldiers and the Arabs that victory was inevitable. An acquiescent Arabian population was fundamental to achieving this objective; victory would be

theirs when ‘we had taught the civilians in it to die for our ideal of freedom: the presence or absence of the enemy was a secondary matter’.²³ Lawrence summed up his operational philosophy: ‘In fifty words: Granted mobility, security (in the form of denying targets to the enemy), time, and doctrine (the idea to convert every subject to friendliness), victory will rest with the insurgents, for the algebraical factors are in the end decisive, and against the perfections of means and spirit struggle quite in vain.’²⁴

The tribes of Arabia waged a very specific guerrilla campaign against an occupying Turkish Army. It avoided direct confrontation when and where possible, preferring the ‘hit and run tactics’ on Turkish outposts and supply lines. In short, the Arab Revolt witnessed the victory between 1916 and 1919 of 3,000 Arab tribesmen over a Turkish force of up to 50,000 soldiers.²⁵ Lawrence had been the first practitioner to articulate the nature of insurgent warfare. Mao Tse-tung would be the next.

MAO TSE-TUNG AND THE PEOPLE’S WAR

Following the dissolution of the Manchu Qing Dynasty in 1911, China had been shaped by the internecine politics of warlordism, a growing nationalist movement among the urban centres and a burgeoning communist sector in the ruling party. Mao, one of the founding fathers of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921, had fled persecution from the purges of the ruling nationalist party, and soon began to formulate revolutionary aspirations to seize power for the Communists. Mao had recognised that ‘a potentially revolutionary situation exists in any country where the government consistently fails in its obligations to ensure at least a minimally decent standard of life for the great majority of its citizens.’²⁶ This was the case in China. Millions of rural peasants lived in squalid conditions where the benefits of education, health and employment were denied in preference to the urban centres. The schism between urban and rural China would dictate the revolutionary movement that Mao intended to lead. China’s struggle would, according to Mao, be both ideological and nationalistic. Victory over the ruling urban classes for the predominantly *rural* masses depend on a strategy that involved an intangible ‘quartet’ of time, space, will, and substitution’.²⁷

Mao needed time to build the organisational strength of the party and the will and determination to win among both communists and the population at large 'upon whose support they were entirely dependent for ultimate victory'.²⁸ Space would be traded for time by avoiding battles with conventional forces and surrendering territory. Substitution forced the movement to find the 'means of drawing upon what strengths were possessed in order to offset weaknesses' such as propaganda for weapons, subversion for air power, and political mobilisation for industrial strength.²⁹

A campaign for national liberation based on three phases would follow. The first phase would be one of organisation, consolidation and preservation in which military operations would be sporadic and limited. This pre-revolutionary phase, the 'strategic defensive', would concentrate on building will and training and organising the peasants into subversive elements to enable the guerrillas to live among the population 'as little fishes in the ocean'.³⁰ The second phase would involve sporadic military attacks on enemy outposts and patrols coupled to a philosophy of eroding the faith of the people in the government while enhancing the *cause celebre* of the insurgents to defeat the government. This 'strategic stalemate' would concentrate on establishing bases, increasing the tempo of operations and training units for the decisive third phase. This would be the 'strategic offensive' in which the revolutionary movement would be organised into regular military units and inflict a defeat on the constitutional military in conventional battle. Every phase should occur simultaneously, so that the revolution is self-fulfilling and ever-lasting.³¹ It poured another foundation onto Lawrence's uncompromising belief in Clausewitz's most famous dictum that war is a continuation of politics by other means. Mao insisted that the political and military organisation run separately but in parallel with each other.³²

Mao's philosophy on guerrilla warfare, extensively published after the Communist victory in 1949, gained wide currency. However, the philosophy's success must be interpreted within a broader understanding of China in the late-1930s, particularly concerning the Japanese invasion in 1937. This had largely eradicated the China-based threats to Mao's movement, effectively clearing the way for his accession to power. However, the success of a communist-inspired revolution in a period of great instability in the world after the Second World War precipitated a number of revolutionaries to copy his philosophy in their reach for power in their own countries.

Between 1950 and 1970 there were at least ten insurrections across the globe in which Mao's model, or the Marxist ideology from which it was inspired, was the chosen vehicle.³³ Not all of these were successful; revolutionary models tend to work only in the country in which it was born and, on more occasions than not, are entirely terrain dependent. The relevance is in the fact that his philosophies *were* studied and adapted and did inspire other revolutionary movements, regardless of their eventual outcome. Latin America in the 1960s was a particularly fertile continent for revolutionary aspirations.

GUEVARA, 'FOCO' AND LATIN AMERICA

Ernesto 'Che' Guevara was born in Argentina in 1928 and had trained as a doctor before travelling through South America. He was in Guatemala in 1954 when the CIA manufactured the overthrow of a left-wing government; the uprising convinced Guevara in the strength of revolution. He fought alongside Fidel Castro in Cuba between 1956 and 1959.³⁴ He then travelled throughout Latin America during the 1960s and attempted to export his revolutionary ideas.

Whereas most theories of revolution seem to agree that certain preconditions must be met if a revolutionary situation is to arise, Guevara's theory was built on the basis that only a 'minimum level of discontent with a government' would be sufficient to create objective conditions favourable to revolution and to 'kindle the first spark'.³⁵ The revolutionaries *themselves* would create the conditions from which the people would want to revolt.³⁶ Once this level had been reached, military forces would provide the *foco* for revolution by exposing the corruption in government and the sufferings that it inflicted on the people. The *foco* would be the 'small motor of revolutionary dissolution'.³⁷ It would strike from its base in the countryside because 'the guerrilla fighter is above all an agrarian revolutionary'.³⁸

Guevara's attempts to export his model throughout Latin America in the 1960s failed because *foco* was built on the false premise of revolutionary success in Cuba in which the conditions for revolution certainly did exist.³⁹ Castro's victory in Cuba where the conditions *either* the 'minimum levels of discontent' did not exist or the intrusion by revolutionary, 'multi-national' armies bent on a form of 'regime change' was not

welcomed.⁴⁰ Also, Guevara's deliberate engineering of a rural insurgency movement ultimately ignored the rural to urban migration that had seen urban centres at an alarming rate. Guevara's greatest failure was in Bolivia, where his efforts at implanting *foco* was intended to subsequently start a chain reaction of *foquismo* through Argentina, Brazil and Peru. Bolivia's land reform programme and its nationalisation of the tin mines had enriched great swathes of the rural and urban populations, depriving Guevara of anything like the seeds of disenfranchisement that were vital for his movement to mature. The tin mining community 'regarded his [Guevara's] small band of assorted followers – Cubans, Peruvians, a few Bolivians and one East German woman – as aliens...the Bolivian army was more of a 'people's army' than the *foco*.⁴¹ Guevara was killed in Bolivia in October 1967, his *foco* theories largely discredited and abandoned.

A PASSAGE OF RITE: URBAN INSURGENCY AND TERRORISM

The over-emphasis on insurgencies seizing power from a rural base had generated a swathe of counter-arguments from theorists and practitioners who extolled the virtues of revolution with an urban insurgency core. This frequently spilled over into urban terrorism, a trend demonstrated by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) resistance to British rule.⁴² Indeed just as urban insurgency developed as a vehicle for revolution in conjunction with growing urbanisation, so too did the frequency of attacks on innocent civilians, deliberate or otherwise. The bond between urban insurgency and terrorism is now indivisible. A number of protagonists emerged to demonstrate the growing attraction of this relationship. Principal among these were Menachem Begin in Palestine (1944-48), George Grivas in Cyprus (1956) and Carlos Marighela in Brazil (1967).

BEGIN'S PALESTINIAN WAR

By 1943, British administrative control of Palestine had generated a sense of extreme resentment among the local population. Frustrated by the British refusal to lift its immigration laws to allow more Jews into the country, and contemptuous that the British had seemingly reneged on its commitment to give independence to Palestine, a number of Jewish resistance movements appeared. One of those was Irgun, a right

wing organisation that was led by Menachem Begin. For Irgun and Begin, the time had come to fight and to ‘break through the gates from within’.⁴³ Begin announced that ‘all the hopes that beat in our hearts have evaporated without a trace. We have not been accorded international status, no Jewish army has been set up, the gates of the country have not been opened. Our people are at war with this regime – war to the end...’⁴⁴

Begin’s fight was to be a political struggle pursued by military means, in which Britain would be targeted directly through a precise bombing campaign that would ‘deliberately, tirelessly, [and] unceasingly’ destroy its prestige in the eyes of the international community.⁴⁵ Palestine would be turned into a ‘glass house’ into which the world’s attention would be focused. He would achieve this by welding terrorist tactics to an extremely sophisticated propaganda machine that encouraged each of the insurgent organisations to ‘run its own illegal radio station and an underground paper’⁴⁶ so that the ‘propaganda of the deed [of violence]’⁴⁷ would achieve the aim.

Between September 1946 and July 1947, there were over 600 British military casualties, the majority resulting from road mines, a particularly lethal form of attack which injured the vehicle driver and the occupants. British counter-tactics typically failed and the insurgents who planted the mines ‘usually escaped undetected’.⁴⁸ There were a select number of attacks on the intelligence and security apparatus, and more than 90 attacks on economic targets involving over 20 train derailments and 12 attacks on the oil pipeline.⁴⁹ The selection of economic targets had the dual purpose of increasing both the financial burden of the Palestinian government by raising the direct and indirect security costs (and thus taxes), and the number of troops that were assigned to protect those targets, thus reducing the number of troops that could be involved in counter-insurgency operations. Begin’s campaign was also exported to Italy, Germany and Austria where the British Embassies were all bombed.⁵⁰ The terrorist campaign cost 338 British lives and led to the handover of the territory to the United Nations in 1948. Israel was granted independence a year later. Attention would now turn to the further evolution of urban insurgency in Cyprus.

GRIVAS, EOKA AND CYPRUS

Urban insurgency was given another shot in the arm by George Grivas's EOKA (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters)-led campaign in Cyprus between 1953 and 1956. His campaign against British colonial rule began in 1953 with the political objective of achieving *enosis* (union) between Cyprus and Greece. This would be fought by directing a guerrilla war as 'the sole instrument of the political aim pursued'.⁵¹ Conditions for revolution were ripe, with British taxes incurring the wrath of virtually all Greek Cypriots.⁵²

Grivas's strategy was built around the belief that national liberation movements must have the 'complete and unreserved support of the majority of the country's inhabitants.'⁵³ The purpose was to 'win a moral victory through a process of attrition, by harassing, confusing and finally exasperating the enemy forces, with the object of achieving our main aim.' He also believed in spending a great deal of time in the preparatory phase, building the will of the people and organising the insurgency movement. He attached great significance to the secrecy behind the insurgency's movement, but discarded Mao's 3rd phase believing that the insurgency could deliver the objective by itself.

EOKA's terrorist campaign bombed British government offices in Cyprus, murdered British subjects and displayed a wanton disregard for Cypriot life by inflicting terrorist atrocities in broad daylight, killing women, children and members of the clergy.⁵⁴ Other than bombing, his chosen methods of attack included arson, sabotage, raids on police armouries, street murder and mining.⁵⁵ The campaign swung between rural and urban theatres. During November 1956, there were 416 terrorist incidents in which more than 35 people died; in April 1957 EOKA exploded 50 bombs and assassinated two British soldiers.⁵⁶ As the struggle increasingly took on the spectacle of a civil war a political solution became progressively more attractive. Eventually, EOKA halted its demands for *enosis* and a Republic of Cyprus was declared in 1959.

The significance of Grivas's campaign is found in his own admission that he 'applied certain principles and methods which were applicable to the special case of Cyprus. In my opinion that was one of the principal reasons for our military success.'⁵⁷ He not

only fused his military campaign to a political objective but studied the historical offerings at hand, in particular Mao and Guevara. He adapted both models to create an urban and rural insurgency movement which successfully employed terrorism and guerrilla warfare. As Grivas's campaign was interpreted by others as achieving political success, so the evolution of urban insurgency continued. The struggle would now move back to Latin America.

MARIGHELA'S BRAZILIAN DREAM

The evolution of urban insurgency received fresh impetus with the publication in the late 1960s of the revolutionary theories of Brazil's Carlos Marighela. Considered by many as 'possibly the most widely read, known and imitated theoretician and practitioner of urban guerrilla warfare'⁵⁸, Marighela had been a communist activist for over 40 years until he formed the Action for National Liberation (ALN), a revolutionary movement that intended to 'destroy the present Brazilian economic, political and social system...'⁵⁹ Achieving success would be dependent on adapting the revolutionary models of Che Guevara and Fidel Castro to suit conditions in Brazil at the time. Rapid urbanisation had exposed several deep-running sores within Brazilian society, not least the burgeoning shanty towns with their high unemployment and feeble prospects. Marighela rightly identified that the city would be 'the primary battleground' for his revolutionary concepts to take hold.⁶⁰

Marighela's revolutionary philosophy revolved around inflicting specific acts of terrorism in order to generate a government response. That response would be either conciliatory or brutally repressive; either way it would serve to further alienate the population. The city offered both soft targets and the perfect landscape on which the population could effectively judge that response. Alistair Horne, who analysed the impact of Marighela's work on the Algerian Independence movement in the 1950s, summed up his strategy: "Marighela's essential philosophy was that a resort to blind terrorism would inevitably provoke the forces of law and order into an equally blind repression, which in turn would lead to a backlash by the hitherto uncommitted, polarise the situation into two extreme camps and make impossible any dialogue of compromise by eradicating the "soft centre."⁶¹ The ALN would also follow a strict propaganda code tied to the careful use of mass communications and the media. His

Minimanual confirms this approach: “The coordination of urban guerrilla⁶² action, including each armed section, is the principal way of making armed propaganda. These actions, carried out with specific and determined objectives, inevitably become propaganda material for the mass communications system. Bank assaults, ambushes, desertions and diverting of arms, the rescue of prisoners, executions, kidnappings, sabotage, terrorism, and the war of nerves, are all cases in point. The war of nerves or psychological war is an aggressive technique, based on the direct or indirect use of mass means of communication and news transmitted orally in order to demoralise the government.”⁶³

Tactically, Marighela initiated a series of actions that ‘would be designed to be spectacular, targeting Brazilian authorities as well as multi-national companies’ in order to weaken the economy by driving foreign capital out.⁶⁴ His principal techniques were letter bombs, assassinations and politically motivated kidnappings. These included kidnapping the US Ambassador to Brazil and demanding the release of 15 prisoners; both the Ambassador and the prisoners were released.⁶⁵

Ultimately Marighela’s theories failed because the government’s response, though brutally repressive, did not have the desired effect of alienating the population. It seemed ‘impervious’ to the claims of the insurgents and increasingly rejected their violent tactics.⁶⁶ A survey carried out in Rio de Janeiro in 1969 showed that 79% of the city’s inhabitants rejected terrorism.⁶⁷ Ultimately, the insurgents ‘failed to develop a rural component to complement their urban strategy’ and their attacks did not themselves threaten the government.⁶⁸ Marighela’s fate dovetailed with that of his theories and he was eventually killed in a police ambush in 1969, an operation which government forces labelled as ‘the biggest success of the 1969 counter-guerrilla operations.’⁶⁹ Up until this moment, insurgencies were regional and based loosely around the communist ideology. That would face competition in the 1970s as a highly politicised strain of Islam emerged from the Middle East. It dominates insurgency and terrorism to this day.

RUMBLINGS OF POLITICAL ISLAM

By the 1970s insurgency had evolved into a revolutionary ‘competition’ between ruling governments and those forces that used a variety of means to challenge their legitimacy. It had progressed from a solely rural affair into one that swayed between the city and the countryside depending on what the conditions gave the insurgents the best chance of success. It had discarded the concept of violent struggle for pure violence’s sake and replaced it with a formula whereby violent struggle could *only* be successful if there was a political goal in sight. That political goal had alternated between the twin ideological pillars of Marxism and Capitalism which, for much of the 20th Century, elevated insurgency to Cold War objectives. And as the Cold War thawed after 1991, so the new ideological pillar, representative of radical Islam, was erected. Sayyid Qutb, one of the small handful of theorists behind Islam’s resurgence, is clear: ‘The communists failed. The nationalist leaders failed. The secularists totally failed. Now the field is empty of all ideologies – except Islam...Now at this most critical time when turmoil and confusion reign, it is the turn of Islam, of the *umma* to play its role. Islam’s time has come.’⁷⁰ As the century drew to its violent close, global insurgency would be added to the repertoire of irregular war strategy. Radical Islam’s cause was given a powerful boost courtesy of the last of the superpower proxy wars which took place in Afghanistan in 1979, in the last of the superpower proxy wars.

In 1979, several massive events shook the Muslim world. A peace deal was signed between Israel and Egypt,⁷¹ Ayatollah Khomeini seized power in Iran under the banner of the Iranian Revolution, 49 American citizens were hostages in the US Embassy in Tehran,⁷² a radical Islamist group seized control of the Grand Mosque at Mecca, and the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.⁷³ Each of these events would now be played out in the Afghan theatre where a new strain of *jihadist* insurgency would emerge.

JIHAD!

Afghan communists had seized power during a coup in 1978. The Soviet Union, ever mindful of the threat to its interests from Pakistan and Iran, both of whom were American allies, had signed a treaty of friendship with the Afghan leaders that bound

the two countries firmly together. The ruling parties⁷⁴ subsequently initiated a series of policies of ‘radical agrarian reform, compulsory literacy, and the imposition of socialism, through thousands of arrests and summary execution’⁷⁵ that alienated large swathes of a traditional and tribal-based population. Following this, the Khalq faction disposed of the Parcham in a vicious purge. In April 1979 there was a general uprising after which the government lost control of the countryside. The Soviet Union intervened on 26 December 1979 to halt the government’s slide and the cracking of the Soviet socialist edifice.⁷⁶

The invasion sparked great consternation throughout the West, particularly in America and Britain. Occurring during the closing week of a tumultuous year, the US Congress almost immediately granted millions in foreign aid to a resistance movement and promised to support a resistance movement. The ‘resistance’ that emerged was initiated by Islamic religious networks across the Muslim world; it would take the form of *jihad*, or Holy War. Those that would inflict would fight under the banner of Islam as *Mujahidin*, or Warriors of God.

The call for *jihad*, positively encouraged by America, galvanised seven Sunni Muslim resistance movements from across the Muslim world to repel the ‘impious invader’ and liberate a land of Islam (*dar el-Islam*) under the banner of an ‘Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahidin (IUAM).’⁷⁷ Saudi Arabia, custodian of the Two Holy Places of Islam (Medina and Mecca) and therefore defacto leader of Islam, viewed its involvement in Afghanistan as part of its struggle for that leadership. That struggle had been given fresh impetus after Khomeini’s Revolution had swept him to power earlier in the year. A resurgent Shi`i Iran could threaten Sunni hegemony. Saudi leadership of Islam, already threatened by revolt earlier in the year at the Grand Mosque, could not suffer another reversal. Therefore, the Saudi government decided that it would not only financially support the Sunni-based Mujahidin but that it would export, on ‘an industrial scale’⁷⁸, its Wahhabist and Salafist⁷⁹ interpretation of Islam to Pakistan.⁸⁰ The exporting of ‘petro-Islam’ to the scores of *medrassahs* (religious schools) in Peshawar after 1979 reinforced Saudi Arabia’s intent for the war in Afghanistan to be fought under the banner of Islam and *jihad*.

Thousands of Wahhabist Sunnis from across the Muslim world travelled to the North West Frontier, and from there into Afghanistan, to join forces with the Afghan resistance movement. This force was perceived by the West as freedom fighters and by Saudi Arabia as the vanguard of the *Umma* and the *jihad*.⁸¹ The seven resistance groups, the Peshawar Seven, had diverse political, ideological, and religious views which were patchily united by the CIA under the common objective of establishing an Islamic government in Afghanistan under the Shari`a code of law.⁸²

On arrival in the region, the volunteers met with Afghani soldiers, Pakistani military and CIA operatives in training camps and centres along the border regions of Pakistan and Iran.⁸³ There they learned the necessities of guerrilla warfare - ambushes, sabotage, small-arms weapon training, use of terrain, concealment and demolitions. Particular attention was paid to teaching mine warfare.⁸⁴ From those centres, small detachments of mujahidin, totalling between 90,000 to 250,000 guerrilla fighters,⁸⁵ were funnelled into Afghanistan. Armed with a wide selection of light weapons, mortars, DShK machine guns and, increasingly after 1986, hand-held Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, the detachments carried out widespread sabotage of bridges, pipelines and electricity pylons, extensive road mining, attacks on small Soviet garrisons, and occasionally participating in combat as part of a larger, more powerful regimental formation.⁸⁶

At their peak, the Soviets had over 120,000 men in Afghanistan supported by over 30,000 men operating in Soviet territory. 'In all, some 642,000 men were rotated through Afghanistan over the whole campaign. In addition to the 13,000 dead or missing, Soviet forces lost over 300 helicopters and over 1,300 armoured personnel carriers.'⁸⁷ In 1989, President Gorbachev ordered the Red Army to withdraw from Afghanistan, providing confirmation that the war had "destroyed the myth of a (superpower) in the minds of Muslim mujahidin young men".⁸⁸ Among them were three individuals who would come to articulate the struggle in a much broader, and for the West more menacing, sense. Those individuals were Abdallah Azzam, Ayman Muhammed al-Zawahiri, and Usama bin-Laden.

ABDALLAH AZZAM AND THE SIX PILLARS OF ISLAM

Abdallah Azzam, a professor of Islamic Law from Palestine and Jordan and founder of the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas, had travelled to Pakistan during the 1980s to support the Afghan resistance movement. In Peshawar, where he was ‘the best known Arab Islamist’⁸⁹ he founded the Council of Islamic Coordination, an Arab-based charity under the aegis of the Red Crescent of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. From there, he founded the Bureau of Services to the Mujahidin to ‘receive, supervise, and organise all these people.’⁹⁰ Azzam’s priorities lay in demonstrating that jihad in Afghanistan was the moral and financial obligation of every Muslim. He proclaimed, and published articles in a series of *jihadist* newspapers to support his assertions that “if the enemy has entered Muslim lands, the jihad becomes an individual obligation according to all doctors of the law, all commentators of the Sacred Texts, and all scholars of tradition (those who assembled the words of the Prophet).”⁹¹ Afghanistan was merely the first land usurped by infidels and it was the individual duty of every Muslim to reclaim that land. The struggle would not lapse there, but “will remain an individual obligation until all other lands which formerly were Muslim come back to us and Islam reigns within them once again. Before us lie Palestine, Bukhara, Lebanon, Chad, Eritrea, Somalia...”⁹² In doing so, Azzam told his followers that jihad had to become the 6th pillar of Islam, to which every Muslim must subscribe.⁹³

Although other clerics called for jihad, Azzam’s proclamations were given extra kudos ‘because what he called for [in Afghanistan] actually came about.’⁹⁴ He became the ideologue of the ‘Arab Afghans’ delivering hugely charismatic and knowledgeable sermons about Islamic law, jihad and the persuasive allure of martyrdom. ‘It was Azzam’s epic, mythic, fantastical language that was to become the standard mode of expression for ‘jihadi’ radicals over the next decade’.⁹⁵ In 1984, Azzam founded a movement to provide logistics and religious instruction to the mujahidin; it was known as Al-Qai’da al-Sulbah (or ‘the solid base’).⁹⁶ This base would enable jihad to be exported throughout the world as part of a ‘cosmic struggle’⁹⁷ in pursuit of an Islamic caliphate. A few months later, Azzam and his two sons were murdered by a car bomb. The yawning gap that his death created was quickly filled by Ayman Muhammed al-Zawihiri, a medical student of his from Egypt.

KNIGHTS UNDER THE BANNER OF THE PROPHET⁹⁸

Al-Zawahiri, born in Egypt in 1951, had become radicalised at an early age through the teachings of Azzam and the writings of spiritual leaders of radical Islamist groups. One of these was Sayyid Qutb, who urged his Islamist followers to ‘launch something wider’.⁹⁹ For Qutb division in the world was stark, “In the world there is only one party, the party of Allah; all of the others are parties of Satan and rebellion. Those who believe fight in the cause of Allah, and those who disbelieve fight in the cause of rebellion.”¹⁰⁰ Al-Zawahiri became further radicalised when he was imprisoned, along with thousands of others, for the assassination of Egyptian President Sadat in 1981. On his release three years later, he was asked to go to Afghanistan to take part in a relief project. He found the request ‘a golden opportunity to get to know closely the field of Jihad, which could be a base for Jihad in Egypt and the Arab world, the heart of the Islamic world where real battle for Islam exists.’¹⁰¹ Previous attempts at inciting jihad in Egypt had failed because ‘the Nile Valley falls between two deserts without vegetation or water which renders the area unsuitable for guerrilla warfare...’¹⁰²

Following a second prison term ended in 1984, he returned to the ‘incubator’ of Afghanistan where jihad could ‘acquire practical experience in combat, politics and organisational matters’.¹⁰³ This had not been the case elsewhere because wars were ‘fought under nationalist banners mingled with Islam and sometimes even with...communist banners’.¹⁰⁴ It was during this second period in 1987 that al-Zawahiri met the third individual in the pack, Usama bin Laden. Their partnership, founded in Afghanistan, would flourish into a multinational organisation. Its spiritual leader was al-Zawahiri.

USAMA AND THE CULT OF PERSONALITY

Usama bin Laden’s history and current involvement in transnational terrorism is now infamous. Born in 1957 as one of 57 children to a Saudi construction magnate, it is estimated that bin Laden inherited roughly \$300 million when his father died in 1967.¹⁰⁵ As the only child to not volunteer for an overseas university education, bin Laden enrolled into the Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah, which was then a centre for

Islamic dissidents from all over the world. It was here that the bin Laden was exposed, and seemingly hypnotised, by the fiery sermons of Abdallah Azzam and Mohammed Qutb.¹⁰⁶ The massive events that had shaken the Muslim world in 1979 occurred in the same year that bin Laden left university, and they left a deep impression on him.¹⁰⁷

Bin Laden first travelled to Peshawar in 1980, and by 1984 was firmly ensconced there. He set up various charitable organisations for the mujahidin and worked at Azzam's *al-Jihad* newspaper, the standout paper in the region at the time.¹⁰⁸ Azzam was a huge influence on bin Laden through his ability to fuse Islamist scholarship with contemporary issues affecting the Muslim world. By adhering to the Azzam line of the sixth pillar, bin Laden became known in Afghanistan chiefly as a person who generously helped fund the jihad.¹⁰⁹ Working alongside Azzam in the Bureau of Services, bin Laden realised that jihad in Afghanistan would increasingly depend on a complex network of charities, sympathisers and financiers. Though he did fight, his principal contribution was in the financial support he donated and the contacts he made with the mujahidin commanders. These contacts formed the foundation for al-Qai`da, which literally translated means 'the [Data] base'.¹¹⁰ Although Al-Qai`da's and Usama bin Laden's greatest impact was still to come, by 1988 he began to extol the virtues of a worldwide jihad and his attention increasingly turned to Palestine.

The Red Army withdrew in early 1989 leaving a puppet regime whose time in power would be immediately challenged. Pakistan, wishing to see an Islamic government in Afghanistan, continued to support the mujahidin in their unfulfilled quest for power. In one of the last major tactical battles of the war, the mujahidin attacked Jalalabad with the intention of seizing it as the new administrative capital of the country. The attack failed and only served to expose the serious infighting among the myriad of mujahidin factions. For Bin Laden and other fanatical Islamists, the in-fighting represented *fitna* (strife or division within Islam), a state of affairs which was expressly forbidden in the Qur`an.¹¹¹

The *jihadist* war in Afghanistan had both short and long-term effects. In the short term, Soviet forces were defeated by a guerrilla army who had adapted the tactics and strategies of Mao, Guevara, Begin, Grivas and Marighela to achieve their political

objectives of installing an Islamic government, though it would take another few years for the Taliban to seize power. The longer-term effects were more far-reaching. The Arab leaders viewed this Afghan war as a “training course of the utmost importance to prepare Muslim mujahidin to wage their awaited battle against the superpower that now has sole dominance over the globe, namely, the United States.”¹¹² Fuelled by Azzam’s ‘exhortations to violence’¹¹³, in which anything but armed struggle is rejected, the Afghan war had re-asserted the Arab belief in their ‘cosmic struggle’ for a pure and just Islamic state, something that had not occurred since the Prophet’s death 1,300 years ago. That was the new political objective to which this ‘global insurgency’ would fight to achieve.

INSURGENCY IN A NEW CENTURY

Two events in this new century have forced the world into what Dr Stephen Metz has labelled another ‘age of insurgency analogous to the period from the 1950s to the 1980s’.¹¹⁴ The first event was 9/11 and the potential threat from a resurgent militant Islam; the second event is the ongoing counter-insurgency campaign in Iraq. After nearly four accumulated years of highly charged debate a new category that Dr John Mackinlay has labelled a ‘global insurgency’ has emerged.¹¹⁵

Both these events have forced Western Governments and the United States in particular, to push the study of insurgency and irregular warfare to the forefront of military and political debate. There are now a growing number of politicians, military academics, strategists, historians and investigative journalists who are examining the subjects and professing another theory (and often a prescriptive solution) to subjects that remain ‘fraught with perils’.¹¹⁶

The study of insurgency has revealed a number of core themes or principles. Support of the people is critical enabling the insurgent to blend in. Insurgencies will inflict hit and run tactics and avoid pitched battle until the insurgent forces are ready. Throughout the 20th Century, insurgents used propaganda and the media as a weapon. All insurgencies have been fused by a political ideology, a drive for an alternative political structure to replace the current power base. Above all, insurgents have *competed* for power with the government and have used every means at their disposal

in order to win. By contrast, counter-insurgency forces have not been given the same freedom of manoeuvre than conventional forces, as the next chapter will illustrate.

REFERENCES AND NOTES

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- ¹ T.E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*; Penguin Books, London, 1935; p.202.
- ² There is great debate as to a definition of 'irregular warfare'. Many practitioners in the US military view irregular warfare as every category of war that is *regular*. For the purposes of this paper, I have deliberately cited 'irregular warfare' to mean unconventional warfare, small wars, complex emergencies, peace enforcement operations, insurrection, asymmetric warfare, insurgency, terrorism and guerrilla warfare. Equally, regular warfare is just that, regular, and should be categorised with conventional warfare.
- ³ Uppsala Conflict Data Project, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
- ⁴ US DOD, '*Irregular Warfare Study*', Quadrennial Defence Review; Version 4, 25 May 05. The definition is a hybrid version adapted from C.E. Callwell, '*Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*'.
- ⁵ Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy*, Oxford University Press, 1999; p.286.
- ⁶ Gray argues convincingly in Chapter 10 of *Modern Strategy*, 'Small Wars and Other Savage Violence', that insurgency, terrorism and guerrilla warfare all 'modes of conflict' within war itself but that regular forces *can* fight irregularly i.e. irregular warfare can be countered by regular forces.
- ⁷ British Army COIN doctrine was last published in 2001, to which this definition emanates.
- ⁸ ADC Draft, *Land Operations*, p1-18. The definition was provided by the War Studies Department at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (RMAS). The full definition continues "...:some insurgencies aim for seizure of power through revolution; others attempt to break away from state control and establish an autonomous state on ethnic or religious bounds; in some cases an insurgency has more limited aims to achieve political concessions unattainable without violence".
- ⁹ Definition provided by Dr Daniel Marston of the War Studies Department at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (RMAS) in correspondence with author, 6 June 2005. Marston is keen to stress that the key points of this definition is that insurgencies are not movements or people; they are competition, struggle or conflict. 'It is a manifestation of war'. It must include at least one non-state movement to differentiate it from wars between states. Insurgency is an extension of war as defined by Clausewitz, as the trinity of rationality, chance and violence. Violence is therefore a pre-requisite. Marston is especially keen to stress that the political nature of insurgency is so important. The change sought could be government change, typically an objective of 1950-60s communist insurgencies, or a lesser objective such as self-determination or for the release of political prisoners.
- ¹⁰ Bard O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*; Brassey's, 1990.
- ¹¹ Gray, *Modern Strategy*, pp.273-296.
- ¹² Those two instruments are guerrilla warfare and terrorism. Guerrilla warfare is defined as 'highly mobile hit-and-run attacks by moderately armed groups that seek to harass the enemy and gradually erode his will and capability'. Terrorism is defined as the 'indiscriminate use of force to achieve political aims' *International Encyclopaedia of Terrorism*, Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 2004. Other definitions of terrorism include: 'politically motivated violence against civilians, conducted with the intention to coerce through fear' (Kilcullen, 2005), 'the sustained use, or threat of use, of violence by a small group for political purposes such as inspiring fear, drawing widespread attention to a political grievance and/or provoking a draconian or unsustainable response' in James D. Kiras, *Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies*, edited by Bayliss, Wirtz, Cohen, Gray; Oxford University Press, 2002; pp.208-232.
- ¹³ Peter Paret, *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*; Oxford University Press, 1986.
- ¹⁴ The interpretation is mine. While other campaigns also shaped the characteristics of insurgent movements, such as the Irish War of Independence (terrorism), the Bolshevik Revolution (revolutionary ideological uprising and Vietnam (rural insurgency), the campaigns listed above had a disproportionate effect on modern day insurgency. A different set of campaigns shaped counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine which will be discussed later.
- ¹⁵ Arnold Hottinger, *The Arabs: Their History, Culture and Place in the Modern World*; Thames and Hudson, London, 1963.
- ¹⁶ Ian F.W. Beckett, *Encyclopaedia of Guerrilla Warfare*, ABC-CLIO, 1999, p.15. This was always going to be a false promise, based on the Balfour Treaty that promised to carve out a Jewish State in Palestine. A united Arabia was therefore never on the cards.
- ¹⁷ Ian F.W. Beckett, '*Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and their Opponents since 1750*'; Routledge, 2001, p19. T.E. Lawrence became infamous as Lawrence of Arabia and is described by Hottinger as 'an archaeologist Arabist and romantic genius with self-destructive tendencies, but wonderfully gifted in dealing with the Arabs'; p. 215-216. In dealing with Arabs, and

indeed all tribes and local nationals, commanders would be well advised to read Lawrence's *Twenty-Seven Articles* in Appendix B.

¹⁸ *ibid* p.20.

¹⁹ B.H. Hart, *T.E. Lawrence: In Arabia and After*; Jonathon Cape, London, 1934; p.172.

²⁰ B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy: The Indirect Approach*, Faber and Faber, 1967. p.379.

²¹ Liddell Hart, *T.E. Lawrence: In Arabia and After*, p.174.

²² T.E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, Penguin Books, London, 1935; p. 203.

²³ *ibid*, p.176.

²⁴ T.E. Lawrence, *Guerrilla Warfare*.

²⁵ Beckett, 'Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and their Opponents since 1750'; p.19.

²⁶ Mao Tse-tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*; trans. Samuel Griffith; Cassell, London, 1965, p.14.

²⁷ Robert Taber, *The War of the Flea: A Study of Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practice*; Paladin, 1970. p.47.

²⁸ Beckett, *Encyclopaedia of Guerrilla Warfare*, pp.70-78.

²⁹ *ibid*.

³⁰ Mao Tse-tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*.

³¹ *ibid*. See also John A. Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*; Praeger, 2002. p.23.

³² Beckett, *Modern Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency*, p.170.

³³ Mao's model inspired, among others, the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960), the insurrection in the Philippines the Hukbalahap (1946-1954), Cuba and a series of revolutions in Latin America (1960s), Portuguese Guinea (1961-73), Rhodesia (1974-79), Vietnam (1970s), Thailand (1980s) and the Shining Path in Peru (1980s).

³⁴ Guevara led one of the guerrilla columns in Castro's final advance on Havana and entered the capital six days before Castro. See Ian F.W. Beckett, *Encyclopaedia of Guerrilla Warfare*, p.92.

³⁵ J. Moreno, *Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare: Doctrine, Practice, and Evaluation*; ed. by Sam C. Sarkesian; Precedent Publishing, Chicago, 1975; pp.395-419.

³⁶ Beckett, *Modern Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency*, p.170.

³⁷ Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare*, *op cit*, Beckett, *Modern Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency*, p.170.

³⁸ *ibid* p.16.

³⁹ The Cuban Government at the time of Castro's takeover of power was 'corrupt and inefficient, and it had alienated virtually all sections of Cuban society; the Cuban Army was badly led and poorly motivated; Batista [the President] had lost the support of the United States as a result of his lamentable human rights record'. See Beckett, *Encyclopaedia*, p.93.

⁴⁰ The 'minimum conditions' had existed in Cuba. Batista's government was corrupt and estranged from the rural and urban masses. Fidel Castro swept to power because his revolutionary movement, which Guevara adapted, had a cause to fight for. Guevara was also attempting to export *foco* as the USA increased its financial and military commitment to stem the tide of communism in 'its own backyard'.

⁴¹ Beckett, *Modern Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency*, p.172.

⁴² Brief synopsis of IRA and Collins to follow.

⁴³ Eric Silver, *Begin: A Biography*; Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1984; p.43.

⁴⁴ Menachem Begin, *The Revolt*, W.H. Allen, London; pp.42-43.

⁴⁵ *ibid*, p.52

⁴⁶ *ibid*, p.66.

⁴⁷ Wilkinson, *Terrorism and the Liberal State*; Macmillan, London, 1977. pp.111-12.

⁴⁸ David A. Charters, *The British Army and Jewish Insurgency in Palestine, 1945-47*; Macmillan Press, London, 1989. p.62.

⁴⁹ *ibid*, p.63.

⁵⁰ *ibid*, p.88.

⁵¹ General George Grivas-Dighenis, *Guerrilla Warfare and EOKA's Struggle*, trans.by A.A. Pallis; Longmans, 1964; p.77.

⁵² The Charter for British to levy taxes in Cyprus was perhaps the one condition from which the Greek population were fused into taking up arms. The taxes, levied on top of the ordinary taxes incurred, were viewed as serving to replenish British war chests from its colonial rule and World War 2. They served no purpose for the Cypriot population. The 'tax' issue had led to demonstrations and violent struggle since the British assumed control of the island in 1923.

⁵³ Grivas, pp.11-12.

⁵⁴ EOKA initiated 1782 bombs during the campaign. The bombing attacks varied in sophistication from an attempt on the British governor's life in which explosives were stuffed into a drinks bottle in a cinema, to the timebomb aboard a Hermes aircraft that destroyed the plane before the 68 passengers had boarded. See the *International Encyclopaedia of Terrorism*, p.168-170.

⁵⁵ Beckett, *Modern Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency*, pp.151-156.

⁵⁶ Beckett, *Encyclopaedia*, p.170.

⁵⁷ Grivas, p.4.

⁵⁸ Charles A. Russell and Bowman H. Miller, "Profiles of a Terrorist" in *Perspectives on Terrorism*, eds. Lawrence Z. Freedman and Yonah Alexander, Scholarly Resources, Wilmington, 1983; p.48.

⁵⁹ Carlos Marighela, *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*, p.xxx.

⁶⁰ John W. Williams, "Carlos Marighela: The Father of Urban Guerrilla Warfare", in *Terrorism*, Vol.12, No.1; pp.1-20.

⁶¹ Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962*; Penguin Books, London, 1986; pp.118-123.

⁶² "The term 'urban guerrilla' in short, is a public relations term for terrorism; terrorists usually dislike being called terrorists, preferring the more romantic guerrilla image." Lacquer, *Terrorism: A Study*, p.217.

⁶³ Marighela, p.103.

⁶⁴ Beckett, *Encyclopaedia*, p.150.

⁶⁵ *ibid.*

⁶⁶ Marighela 'may be the 'only' terrorist to have used the word terrorism when referring to his own activities: "By terrorism I mean the use of bomb attacks," he wrote in *For the Liberation of Brazil*; "At no point [did] he advocate acts of indiscriminate terror against the population." (Lacquer, *Terrorism: A Study*, p.183). Jennifer Morrison Taw and Bruce Hoffman, "The Urbanisation of Insurgency: The Potential Challenge to US Army Operations", *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 6, No.1, Spring 1995, pp.68-88.

⁶⁷ Georges-Andre Fiechter, *Brazil Since 196: Modernisation under a Military Regime: A Study of the Interactions of Politics and Economics in a Contemporary Military Regime*, Macmillan Press, London; p.147.

⁶⁸ *ibid.*, p.72.

⁶⁹ Quartim, *Dictatorship and Armed Struggle in Brazil*; Monthly Review Press, New York; p.214-215.

⁷⁰ Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones*, American Trust Publications, 1990. Found at www.youngmuslims.ca Qutb continues: 'Mankind today is on the brink of a precipice, not because of the danger of complete annihilation which is hanging over its head because humanity is devoid of the vital values which are necessary not only for its healthy development but for its real progress. Even the Western World realises that Western civilisation is unable to present any healthy values for the guidance of mankind'. See Introduction to *Milestones*.

⁷¹ Egypt had been at the epicentre of the radical Islam's growth during the 1960s. The growth had been carefully monitored and stoked by the Muslim Brotherhood, a sect of extremists that had been implicated in the assassination of President Sadat in 1967. One of its founding fathers, Sayyid Qutb was hanged in Egypt in 1966. Qutb's writings rejected the values of the nationalist and reactivated Islam as the sole cultural, social, and political standard for behaviour among Muslims. His two principal works, *In the Shadow of the Koran* and *Signposts on the Road* became bestsellers all over the Muslim world. In simple language, Qutb's writings appealed to the youth born after the majority of independence movements had been completed. He made the criteria of difference between Islam and non-Islam, Good and Evil, Just and Unjust. 'Within Islam alone, Allah alone has sovereignty, being uniquely worthy of adoration by man. The only just ruler is one who governs according to the revelations of Allah. When sovereignty is wrested in an 'idol', whether a nation, party, army, or people, and when this idol become an object of mass adoration, as happens so often under the orchestration of authoritarian nationalist regimes, then evil, iniquity, and falsehood reign. The result is anti-Islam, *jahiliyya*'. See Gilles Kepel, *Jihad, The Trail of Political Islam*, Taurus, 2002, pp.23-42.

⁷² The Embassy had been occupied by radical Islamists and Iranian Revolutionary militia who announced a plan to murder the hostages by suicide explosions if any attempt was made to rescue them. The students also called for a global Islamic revolution against the superpowers.

⁷³ Jason Burke, *Al Qaeda: The True Story of Political Islam*; Penguin Books, 2004. page to follow. For a detailed account of these events, see Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*; Penguin Press, New York, p.22-30.

⁷⁴ The People's Party (Khalq) and the Party of the Flag (Parcham).

- ⁷⁵ Kepel, p.139.
- ⁷⁶ Kepel, 139.
- ⁷⁷ Beckett, *Modern Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency*, p.209.
- ⁷⁸ Burke, p.45.
- ⁷⁹ The Islamic revivalist movement centred on the idea of a return to the teachings and examples of the pious ancestors. The Salafism movement in particular preaches a reformation of Islam on the basis of a return to a strict adherence to scripture and thus a purification of the faith of all blameworthy innovations and an apostate leadership. Wahhabism was founded by Muhammed Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in the 18th Century, and has been seen by Western commentators as the ultra-conservative branch of Islam which purports *jihad*.
- ⁸⁰ Kepel gives an illuminating account of the exporting of Salafist-Wahhabist Islamist doctrine to Pakistan after 1979. Under Pakistani orchestration arms, ammunition, and funds from foreign governments was siphoned off to seven resistance groups (the “Peshawar Seven” of four Islamist groups and three traditional groups). Under General Zia’s leadership (who had declared a fatwa in 1979 and installed an Islamic government in Islamabad), See pp. 142-150.
- ⁸¹ The war in Afghanistan would be a “defensive” jihad that required every Muslim to either participate, or contribute, to the ejection of the impious force.
- ⁸² The Russian General Staff, *The Soviet-Afghan War*, trans. Lester Grau, XXX. p.56.
- ⁸³ 78 of these centres were in Pakistan, 11 were in Iran, 7 in Egypt and up to 6 in China. There were some 15,000 instructors in these centres which could handle up to 50,000 trainees every month. Every month, approximately 2,500 to 3,000 fighters graduated. See Grau, *The Soviet-Afghan War*, p.60.
- ⁸⁴ Grau, p.69. Grau continues on p.69 to explain the tactics of mine warfare. The Mujahidin devoted particular attention to mining the main roads, using a variety of mines and demolition explosives. They placed their mines ahead of time on the road or in close proximity to the approaching forces and vehicles. They laid pattern minefields (with mines laid equally along the entire route) as well as small irregular groups of three to five mines. The majority were anti-tank mines surrounded by 4-5 anti-personnel mines; all were well hidden. Local inhabitants and children were often used to lay them as they knew the local conditions.
- ⁸⁵ Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies*, p.209. The higher figures are provided by Burke. p.61.
- ⁸⁶ Grau, pp.53-60.
- ⁸⁷ Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies*, pp.210-211.
- ⁸⁸ Ayman Mohammed Rabi` Al-Zawahiri, ‘*Knights Under the Banner of the Prophet*’, XXX.
- ⁸⁹ Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*, Penguin Press, 2004; p.155.
- ⁹⁰ Kepel, p.146.
- ⁹¹ Abdallah Azzam, ‘*Join the [Jihad] Caravan*’; Beirut, 1992, p.44. op.cit Kepel, p.146.
- ⁹² Abdallah Azzam, *Jihad sha`b muslim*, p.26-59. op.cit., Kepel p.147.
- ⁹³ The Five Pillars of Islam are confession of faith, prayer, fasting, almsgiving, and pilgrimage.
- ⁹⁴ Kepel, p.147.
- ⁹⁵ Burke, p.75.
- ⁹⁶ *Christian Science Monitor*, 1 Oct 2001; op.cit. Nimrod Raphaeli, ‘The Making of an Arch-Terrorist’ in *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.14, No.4 (Winter 2002), p.9.
- ⁹⁷ Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones*, p.7.
- ⁹⁸ This is the title of Al-Zawahiri’s book smuggled out of Afghanistan and published by the Arab newspaper *Al-Sharq al-Awsat* in London, 2002. Extracts of it can be read at www.msb.edu/faculty The title makes reference to the Knights in what is meant to be a deliberate mocking of the Western Knights of the Crusades who invaded the Muslim world in the Middle Ages.
- ⁹⁹ Nimrod Raphaeli, pp.1-22.
- ¹⁰⁰ Qutb, *Milestones*, Introduction.
- ¹⁰¹ Ayman Muhammed al-Zawahiri, *Knights*.
- ¹⁰² *ibid*.
- ¹⁰³ *ibid*.
- ¹⁰⁴ *ibid*.
- ¹⁰⁵ Jason Burke disputes this and says that it was far less than this sum. p.46.
- ¹⁰⁶ Mohammed Qutb was the brother of the pre-eminent Islamist radical Sayyid Qutb, the Egyptian cleric who had articulated many of the perceived grievances among Muslim youth in the 1960s.
- ¹⁰⁷ According to Burke, bin Laden was particularly impressed with the seizure of the Grand Mosque at Mecca by the Wahhabist-inspired Saudi National Guardsman, Juhaiman ibn Saïd al-Utaiba and 400 of

his radical followers. The house of Saud, according to bin Laden and other Wahhabists, had deviated from the true and pure form of Islam. It had therefore lost its legitimacy as the ruler of Sunni Islam. bin Laden believed that the men who seized Mecca were true Muslims. *Al Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam*, p.57-59.

¹⁰⁸ Burke, p. 58.

¹⁰⁹ Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, Columbia University Press, 2002, p.16-23.

¹¹⁰ This is the most accurate translation of both the meaning and interpretation of AQ. Burke compares it to a 'wealthy university disbursing research grants and assisting with facilities such as libraries or with teaching that can allow the ambitions of its pupils to be realised, particularly those pupils who have attracted the attention of the Chancellor. This is the Holy War Foundation'.

¹¹¹ Burke, p.81.

¹¹² *ibid*, p.11.

¹¹³ *ibid*, p. 83.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid*.

¹¹⁵ See Dr Mackinlay, "Globalisation and Insurgency," Adelphi Paper for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002

¹¹⁶ Bard O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*, Brassey's, USA, 1990, p.13.

CHAPTER THREE

COUNTERING INSURGENCIES: THE HUNDRED YEAR CHALLENGE

“Fools say they learn from experience; I prefer to learn from the experience of others” Otto von Bismark¹


MIXED MESSAGES

In contrast to the steady and almost systematic evolution of insurgencies over the last century, the history of countering them has been plagued by distraction and indecision. Much of this has to do with understanding what counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine is and, more importantly, what it is not. The same indecision and confusion which dogged the ‘definitional debate’ for irregular warfare and insurgency has hampered the smooth emergence of a corresponding definition for COIN.² Furthermore, the urgency behind formulating COIN doctrine³ has been entirely dependent on the frequency that nations prosecute such operations, how comfortable it is with being distracted from its principal *raison d’etre* of fighting conventional wars and how quickly it has adjusted its doctrine based on gainful experience.⁴ There is certainly a trend within Western militaries that COIN warfare sits at a solitary table away from the main feast of preparing for and taking part in regular warfare. On occasion it is given precedence, particularly when casualties are incurred, but otherwise it retreats back to the shadows, re-assuming its place as the ‘orphaned child of strategy’.⁵

The problem with this trend concerns the sheer *regularity* of irregular warfare over the last century and the seemingly constant demand for COIN forces to combat it. Since 1945, there have been 11 wars that can be termed conventional. In contrast the British Army has been asked to conduct a number of stabilisation operations. While the justification in perfecting conventional war doctrine is reasonably sound and has stood the test of time, it must now be equally reasonable to suggest that the likelihood of Western forces being asked to fight such wars again in the next decade is slim. In contrast, and as the last chapter has proved, Western forces *are* more likely to fight insurgents now than any other time in their history. This argument necessitates an

examination of COIN's place in British military doctrine and its place within the teaching syllabi of Western military academic institutions. This is best illustrated by looking at the British Army's Continuum of Operations and its Spectrum of Conflict.⁶


Figure 3.1: The Spectrum of Conflict



Source: Army Doctrine Publication, *Land Operations*, May 2005, p.11

As a subject taught at Western military staff colleges, the study of COIN has been given less emphasis than conventional operations. The British Government's Defence White Paper in 2003 did not even mention counterinsurgency as a likely threat.⁷ The reasons behind this placement are entirely justified by the British Army's operational track record in recent years and the inherent belief that the successful prosecution of COIN operations derives from being able to successfully wage High Intensity Conflict. This is illustrated by the British Army's Continuum of Operations.

Figure 3.2: Continuum of Operations



Source: ADP, *Land Operations*, May 2005, p.12

Like its insurgent sibling, providing a definition of counter-insurgency is difficult. British COIN doctrine does not bother and concentrates its efforts instead on recommending certain approaches to military commanders based on historical analysis. The reluctance to provide ‘a general antidote to the problem of insurgency’⁸ has meant that the COIN doctrine that has emerged has been wholly ‘conflict specific’.⁹ The subsequent responsibility for passing the information on was up to ‘seasoned veterans [who moved] from one campaign to the next’.¹⁰ This approach has tended to work. The British Army’s regimental structure, in which the battalion forms the nucleus, and the exposure of it to the regularity of such warfare, made it wholly suitable for suppressing local uprisings against its colonial policies. By being isolated from the rest of the Army, the British generated an almost instinctive understanding of the ‘legitimate grievances, political, social or economic’ that caused rebellion and which needed to be addressed.¹¹ Other colonial powers adopted similar approaches but similarly did not offer definitions for COIN.

The US military, built around the more cumbersome division as its nucleus, has had a much more formulaic but fitful approach to COIN. It does define COIN though, stating that it comprises ‘those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency; it is an offensive approach involving all elements of national power [and] it can take place across the range of operations and spectrum of conflict’.¹² Indeed it has found the distraction of COIN operations difficult to balance against a perception that it must perfect conventional warfare first, an ironic situation given its success at COIN during the Philippines campaign between 1899 and 1902.

In examining the development of COIN doctrine it is necessary to look at five distinctive periods. The first period was at the turn of the centuries and was dominated by British and French colonial warfare. The second period, during the inter-war years, witnessed the Amritsar massacre and the recognition that insurgencies had adopted political objectives after which contemporary British COIN was written. American, British and French COIN doctrines were all refined during the Cold War period following a series of anti-imperialist, ideological and nationalistic wars across the globe; for the Americans and the British Vietnam and Malaya were critical passage of rites. The fourth period witnessed Western militaries being fully engaged in

preventative interventions after the end of the Cold War. The final period, in which the West remains, has been dominated by transnational terrorism. For each of the main protagonists, the effect that each period has had on the development of their brand of counter-insurgency warfare has been unique. Before one reaches this conclusion it is important to return to the turn of the century.

A 19TH CENTURY HANGOVER

According to the British 21st century strategist Colin Gray, warfare at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries was clear cut. On the one extreme there was ‘civilised warfare among similar states, societies and armed forces’ and on the other there was ‘uncivilised or savage warfare conducted to spread civilisation, advance the Christian religion, make money, provide adventure, and all the other motives that help make for military action’.¹³ The British Army had followed this approach during the latter years of the 19th Century and the opening years of its successor. Between 1872 and 1899, it had fought 35 major campaigns and many more minor ones.¹⁴ As with all wars, certain tactics worked and others failed.

For the British, American and Spanish militaries, three campaigns highlighted a common tactical approach that each had adopted and which was subsequently encased in British COIN doctrine during the Malayan Emergency in the 1950s. During the British campaign against the Boers during the latter stages of the Boer War, the Spanish campaign in Cuba between 1895 and 1898, and the US campaign in the Philippines between 1899 and 1902, the tactic of separating the insurgent from the population had developed. All three armies had adopted ‘reconcentration’ – the gathering of the civilian population in guarded locations in order to ‘deny guerrillas in the field ready access to food or other material support from civilians’.¹⁵

The policy of reconcentration was shored up by the prescribed use of violence counterinsurgency forces to suppress rebellion. For the British operating along the North West Frontier of India, counter-insurgency operations were frequently called ‘butcher and bolt’ under the assumption that the extreme use of force was an appropriate psychological response to insurgency.¹⁶ In terms of firepower, and under the shared assumption that ‘whatever happens we have got, the Maxim Gun which

they have not', colonial forces began to use machine guns to great effect in a series of campaigns in Africa in the second half of the 19th century.¹⁷ This approach was exemplified at the Battle of Omdurmann in the Sudan in 1898 where British and Egyptian forces killed 11,000 tribesmen as part of its defeat of the 52,000-strong Mahdi Army.¹⁸

The other approach that gained increasing currency was the recruitment and use of native troops to share both the military and financial burden of imperialism. As divide and rule conquered the land, so locally raised troops were used to control it. These proved more especially useful in terms of terrain knowledge, cultural assimilation, and robustness in the face of local diseases such as malaria. The use of the British Indian Army in Abyssinia in 1867, and maintained at the expense of the Indian taxpayer, exemplified the British approach that 'the key to maintaining an empire lay in making the yoke of foreign rule as light as possible'.¹⁹

The British Army had prosecuted its colonial policies and the warfare with which it often entailed without a doctrinal manual which it could refer to; its soldiers had long been left to the time honoured tradition of 'making it up as they went along'.²⁰ The difficulty in providing such a manual was compounded by the fact that 'the kind of enemies encountered and usually, but not always, defeated by European armies were widely divergent in characteristics and methods'.²¹ In 1906, having taken part in a number of the British wars, and drawing on the experiences of several imperial powers, Colonel Charles E. Callwell published *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*, a book about 'asymmetrical, uncivilised, even savage warfare'.²² Callwell's manual was driven by his vision of what fighting guerrilla warfare entailed: "...the guerrilla mode of war must in fact be met by an abnormal system of strategy and tactics".²³ Callwell divided 'colonial campaigns' into three broad categories. The first were campaigns of conquest and annexation; secondly campaigns of pacification to suppress insurrection or restore order and the thirdly were punitive campaigns intended as retaliation for particular outrages.²⁴ Callwell cautioned military forces getting involved in fighting guerrilla warfare, recognising that 'the crushing of a populace in arms, the stamping out of widespread disaffection by military methods, is a harassing form of warfare even in a civilised country with a settled social system. In remote regions peopled by half-civilised races or wholly savage tribes such

campaigns are most difficult to bring to a satisfactory conclusion”.²⁵ By the turn of the century, and in the brief lull before 1914, British doctrine for dealing with insurgents had evolved almost in parallel to the development of insurgencies. Neither adopted much of a political theme, preferring to operate along purely violent lines. Only the French Army’s approach in Algeria, Morocco and West and Central Africa resembled a dual strategy combining psychological and military effect.

In Algeria in particular, the French adopted a policy whereby local rulers would be encouraged to participate in the indoctrination of that country in French values. This was later refined by Louis-Hubert-Gonslave-Lyautey, one of the great French exponents of what became known as *tache d’huile* (oil slick)²⁶, a sort of ‘imperialist infiltration that was intended to undermine the solidarity and authority of rebel chieftains’.²⁷ In advising his officers, Lyautey stated: “...don’t disturb any tradition, don’t change any custom. In every society there exists a ruling class, born to rule, without which nothing can be done. Enlist that class in our interests”.²⁸ Attached to this philosophy would be a combined military and political system that would extend French control more effectively by installing French soldier-administrators as soon as the military columns arrived in a particular area. Lyautey emphasised that French conquest would take place ‘not by mighty blows, but as a patch of oil spreads, through a step by step progression, playing alternately on all the local elements, utilising the divisions between tribes and between their chiefs’.²⁹ In fusing political incentives and civic action to military conquest, France adopted a model that it would retain for another 60 years.

It was a fleeting glimpse of how COIN doctrine had evolved. Whereas the French model had been successful because its opponents had been largely tribal and not overly nationalistic, Britain understood that a healthy and intact Empire depended on suppressing native unrest. Further development of COIN doctrine would be put on hold by events in Europe in 1914 when European armies turned to more pressing matters. It wasn’t until 1919 that Britain’s policies of imperial policing were dusted off and used again.

AMRITSAR, IMPERIAL POLICING AND THE INTERWAR YEARS

While T.E. Lawrence was fermenting revolt in Arabia between 1916 and 1919, British forces continued to implement traditional colonial policy in India. In 1919, as Lawrence was leading his Arab forces on a victory march into Damascus, British and Indian forces opened fire on Sikh protesters at Amritsar in north-west India.³⁰ This single incident is one that Mockaitis describes as being of such significance that it left a ‘lasting impression on soldiers’.³¹ British imperial policy, and COIN doctrine within it, suddenly became an extremely important issue for both the British Army and the British population as a whole. The message was abundantly clear – if force was to be used to control the Empire, it should be used carefully and in minimum quantities. The notion of ‘minimum force’ was adopted as a principle for all internal conflict within British COIN doctrine, where it remains.³²

The lessons from Amritsar concerning the use of minimum force and riot control were published in *The Manual of Military Law and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power*. Despite the recognition, both of these manuals continued the trend of ‘conflict-specific’ observations and recommendations which were un-applicable to other theatres. There was little sense of urgency in recognising that many rebellions had a hardened political shell under which grievances to specific imperial policies had festered. British officialdom largely ignored the politically-motivated insurgency in Ireland between 1919 and 1921 and it wasn’t until the Burmese uprisings in 1932 that the British decided to appoint a Special Commissioner to ‘coordinate the overall police, civil and military response’.³³

The lessons from Amritsar, the Moplah Rebellion two years later and the first revolt in Cyprus in 1931 were formally published in Major General Sir Charles Gwynn’s *Notes on Imperial Policing* in 1934 in which he stated that ‘excessive severity may antagonise the neutral or loyal element, add to the number of rebels, and leave a lasting feeling of resentment and bitterness. On the other hand, the power and resolution of the government forces must be displayed.’³⁴ Gwynn laid down four principles by which British forces should operate. The first reasserted the primacy of the civil power and the acceptance that ‘since insurgents operated clandestinely within a general population, they had much more in common with criminals and so could be better dealt with by the police with the army in support.’³⁵ Secondly, minimum force

must be used. Thirdly, there was a need for firm and timely action. Fourthly, there was a need for cooperation between the civil and military authorities.³⁶ Despite these, *Notes* reasserted the uncomplicated message from past campaigns – rebellions could be extinguished by battalion-sized sweeps and other tactical improvements that reinforced the belief in ‘collective punishment’ without having to address the underlying causes.³⁷

The purely military approach slowly became unfeasible. The Cyprus revolt had been countered by a joint police and army headquarters, the model of which was transplanted to Palestine to deal with the rise of Arab nationalism in the 1930s. Despite labelling the Arab insurgents as ‘ideological innocents’, the British offered them political hope through a series of conferences in parallel to a ‘village occupation’ policy that gradually separated the guerrilla from the population and improve intelligence. Large-scale sweeps were abandoned in favour of small unit actions and ‘thousands of hours of patrolling’ in the application of constant military pressure.³⁸ As the Second World War approached British COIN doctrine, though still in its infancy, had taken several important strides. US military doctrine had followed suit but in another direction.

In 1935, the US Marine Corps published its *Small Wars Manual* based on experiences gained in Nicaragua. Splitting COIN operations into five phases, the manual professed ‘an obsession with firepower’ as a substitution for manpower. ‘Reconnaissance by fire’ would place bullets where the British had small covert teams. The ‘heavy’ approach was reinforced by the select use of bombing runs and reconcentration, although the latter was to be avoided where possible. This novel formula for winning ‘hearts and minds’ would be encouraged by local gendarmeries and the offer of free elections as part of a total package of ‘American values’.³⁹ However, just as it had done 20 years previously, military attention in 1939 was diverted back to more pressing, and conventional, matters. COIN doctrine would be dusted off again in 1948 with the outbreak of the Malayan Emergency.

EMERGENCY IN MALAYA

The Malayan Emergency occupies hallowed turf within British military history. The campaign exposed a number of weaknesses in the British approach to colonial policing which had to be resolved. This took time. When the tide did eventually turn in British favour, junior commanders insisted that the lessons were not lost for future generations. Thus the tactics and procedures learned so painfully in Malaya stuck and formed the backbone of current British COIN doctrine from which other nations have copied.

In 1948, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) intended to exploit the political and socio-economic grievances felt by the Chinese Malay population and weld them to Mao Tse-tung's model of guerrilla warfare to defeat the will of the British in the maintenance of their colony. The strategy would call for protracted insurgent warfare from a rural, jungle-dominated base.⁴⁰ The immediate British response was overly conventional in style, a natural and forgivable reaction to six years of conventional warfare. The initial batch of British commanders in Malaya reasserted the impression that 'the predilection of some army officers for major operations seems incurable...new brigade commanders would arrive from England nostalgic for World War 2, or fresh from large scale manoeuvres in Germany'.⁴¹ The resultant battalion sweeps and drives met with little success. Not only did they not find the insurgents, but too often they further isolated themselves from any local sympathy.

The tide began to turn for the British with the appointment of Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs as Director of Operations in early-1950. In what became known as 'The Briggs Plan', operations would now focus on separating the insurgent from the support of the population, both in terms of recruits and material supply.⁴² A political solution designed to address the population's grievances, and thus stunt the growth of the insurgency, would take precedence over the military solution. The British plan revolved around making the Chinese Malay and the wider population believe in and work for the future of Malaya, not a greater China. The newly appointed Colonial Secretary Oliver Lyttelton articulated the political primacy: "You cannot win the war without the help of the population, and you cannot get the support of the population without at least beginning to win the war".⁴³

A second part of the Briggs Plan led to the creation of an elaborate system of committees with the Federal War Council at the top down to district, local and village committees. Their role was to bring together representatives from the police, army, civil agencies and from 1955, representatives from the ethnic communities. This ensured a co-ordinated response right across the government. The third and final plan re-emphasised the need to separate the insurgent from the majority of the rural population. This was achieved by the mass relocation of jungle villages into new villages. The resettlement policies stuttered to life, with the authorities preferring to move people into villages that were secure instead of villages that had an abundance of fertile land. 509 villages were eventually built at great cost, but over the long term the policy tended to work. Finally, there was a glaring need for timely and actionable intelligence, summarised succinctly by the Commander in Chief of Far East Forces:

“Our greatest weakness now is the lack of early and accurate information of the enemy’s strengths, dispositions and intentions. Information services must depend almost entirely on the police who in turn must depend on the confidence of the people, especially the Chinese, and the civil administration generally and its power to protect them”.⁴⁴

When a despondent General Montgomery visited Malaya in 1950, he told Lyttelton that “we must have a plan. Secondly, we must have a man. When we have a man and a plan, we shall succeed: not otherwise”.⁴⁵ Three months later, the British Government appointed Lieutenant General Sir Gerald Templer as both the High Commissioner and the Director of Operations in order to ‘control all aspects of the response to the insurgency’.⁴⁶ By sheer personality, Templer initiated a ‘hearts and minds’ approach underpinned by a belief that “the shooting side of the business is only 25% of the trouble and the other 75% lies in getting the people of this country behind us.”⁴⁷ Behind this approach lay a number of alterations to the current policy. Principle amongst these was the need for intelligence.⁴⁸

Templer initiated a series of operational and tactical alterations to the Malay plan.⁴⁹ Committees were strengthened with the addition of intelligence officers.⁵⁰ He appointed a Director General of Information Services in 1952 to improve the delivery of propaganda and established a Psychological Warfare Section in 1954.⁵¹ When

intelligence flowed, Templer rewarded the villages with running water, medical supplies and electric lights. When it was not forthcoming, he had no hesitation in dishing out a range of punishments including fines, rationing and village re-location.

Templer's main focus was the native Malay Regiment: "I am convinced that an essential pre-requisite to the granting of independence to Malaysia is the formation of an adequate Malayan Army to support the civil authority...it must be a balanced force and it must be composed of men of all races who have made Malaya their home".⁵² A home guard service had been established in a number of villages and tin mines whose sole responsibility was village defence under a systematic policy of attacking the insurgents where their support was weakest before rolling up the more intransigent areas. These decisions were reinforced by the mobilisation of political parties into associations and unified movements.

Templer also adjusted British military tactics. Small unit patrols and ambushes replaced battalion and brigade jungle sweeps. In particular, the introduction of the Special Air Service Regiment (SAS) and helicopters had an immediate impact. Operating as four-man teams, the SAS was inserted by air deep inside enemy territory from where it was able to conduct offensive action and cut the insurgent's material supply lines.⁵³ The patrols spread Templer's philosophy by delivering medical aid and food supplies to remote villages. The rest of the Army soon caught on, revamping its organisation to mirror that of the SAS. The insurgency, its numbers severely depleted, was gradually pushed back to the border with Thailand. British and Malay forces had successfully 'turned' over a number of captured insurgents to collect information for them in exchange for an offer of freedom and life. Neither was the requirement to inflict casualties on an insurgency lost on British commanders as the campaign resulted in over 13,000 insurgents being killed and 2,900 insurgents surrendering.

Alongside Templer were a cohort of senior military officers and civil servants whose collective ideas would rejuvenate British efforts in Malaya. Principal among these was Sir Robert Thompson, the newly appointed Colonial Secretary.⁵⁴ Thompson re-emphasised Briggs' dictum that the achievement of goals must be tied inexorably to the creation of a government that earns the support of the people. He issued five principles which would dictate the British approach; these became known as the

Thompson Principles. Firstly, the government must have the clear political aim of a ‘free, independent and united country which is politically and economically stable’; secondly, that the government must function within the law; thirdly, that the government must have an overall strategy; fourthly, that the government must give priority to defeating political subversion, not the insurgents; and lastly, in the guerrilla phase of an insurgency, a government must secure its own base areas first.⁵⁵

The Emergency spawned a number of important pamphlets and manuals. Indeed the ‘counter-insurgency’ as a doctrinal term was first seen in print in *Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power*, published in 1949.⁵⁶ In addition, *The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya* was a first-class rendition of tactical approaches to jungle operations and how to form a village committee. Sir Robert Thompson subsequently published his account, and his principles, in *Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam*, a book that high on staff college reading lists. British experiences of Malaya were central in the development of British COIN doctrine. American experiences in Vietnam would have the opposite effect.

‘YOU HAVE TO DESTROY THE VILLAGE IN ORDER TO SAVE IT’⁵⁷

The US military’s campaign in Vietnam between 1965 and 1978 demanded a strategy built solely around COIN but instead it stuck to a deeply flawed concept that rested almost entirely on a conventional military approach.⁵⁸ British success against jungle-based insurgents preaching Maoist principles in Malaya was all but ignored by a US military leadership fighting an almost identical enemy in Vietnam.⁵⁹ In Malaya, political solutions and winning the hearts and minds of a wavering population had reigned; outside of the pernicious Washington DC beltway, politics in Vietnam simply did not matter. The widely-held view among the political and military senior leadership was that what had worked in World War II and Korea would work in Vietnam; as General Westmoreland, the commander of military forces in Vietnam, famously said that ‘firepower’ alone could defeat the insurgency. It was a strategy that over the course of the eight-year war exposed deep-seated sores in the military and a chasm between the Department of Defense and the Department of State.

The strategy of attrition involved large-scale battalion and brigade sweeps supported by air and artillery fire in search of Viet Cong in the vain hope that pitched conventional battle would ensue. As one commander stated: “Wars are won by Offensive Action. Therefore, you must...`bring the VC to battle’ at a time, place, and in a manner of our choosing – [this is] the primary objective of every commander”.⁶⁰ The success of the Ia Drang and Tet Offensives between 1965 and 1968, in which conventional Viet Cong forces were defeated by American units, confirmed the belief that the strategy “gives the best assurance of military victory in South Vietnam”.⁶¹ Troop levels spiked to 584,000 in 1968, although it should be noted that only 80,000 of those were combat troops the rest being support staff and logisticians.⁶² The number of manoeuvre battalions increased from 35 to 79.⁶³ US Air Force bombers increased the frequency with which their payloads were disgorged, dropping over 8,000,000 tonnes of ordnance onto villages and towns throughout the entire country.⁶⁴

However, underneath the euphoria a groundswell of deep scepticism was growing among junior and middle-ranking officers. Conventional tactics were simply *not* working. US intelligence was poor and the VC kept on escaping. The heavy armoured and mechanised forces trampled through the jungle with little effect. Bombing and artillery fire were largely ineffective. The Defence Secretary noted the pessimism: “Allowing for possible exaggeration in report, the enemy must be taking losses – death in and after battle – at the rate of more than 60,000 a year. *Yet there is no sign of an impending break in enemy morale and it appears that he can replace his losses by infiltration from North Vietnam and recruitment in South Vietnam.*”⁶⁵ The darkening mood was shared by the American-sponsored South Vietnamese forces: “Since we did not know where the enemy was, ten times we launched a military operation, nine times we missed the Viet Cong, and the tenth time we struck right on the head of the population.”⁶⁶ The only hope of winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of that population lay in the pacification efforts offered by the Special Forces, the US Marine Corps and the Civil Affairs groups.⁶⁷ Under the weight of military pressure these programmes eventually collapsed.

In 1973, President Nixon ordered the withdrawal of all American forces in South Vietnam. The eight-year war left deep scars in both the psyche of the American military and of the wider American public.⁶⁸ There was bitterness towards the

American public for its lack of support and appreciation and anger at the country's political leadership for committing the Army to Vietnam and then seemingly abandoned it. 'Counter-insurgency' was changed to 'Foreign Internal Defense'⁶⁹ and Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) was cast off as 'unbearably problematic from which no good will come'.⁷⁰ The Vietnam debacle was not to be repeated and "No more Vietnams" became the adopted mantra. Colin Powell, then a young major having served in Vietnam, promised that 'when our turn came to call the shots, we would not quietly acquiesce in half-hearted warfare for half-baked reasons that the American people could not understand or support'.⁷¹ It was a philosophy that would guide American foreign and military policy for the rest of the century.

The US Army's transformation from the Vietnam debacle would be shaped by a number of events and key policy decisions stretching over nearly 20 years. Each event served to remind American of its failures in Vietnam and why it had to ensure that its military would never fail again. Unfortunately, each event served two purposes. They shattered the illusion of invincibility that the Army in particular had been projecting since 1975. In parallel it gave heart to America's enemies who were increasingly resorting to highly irregular tactics to counter America's conventional superiority. The combined result of the failed hostage rescue attempt in 1979⁷², the bombing of the Marine Corps barracks by Hezbollah terrorists in 1983⁷³, and the killing of 18 US soldiers in Somalia⁷⁴ pushed America further back into its conventional mindset. Memories of these events became 'code words used to evoke the risks of daring exploits without maximum preparation, overwhelming force, and a well-defined mission'.⁷⁵ This approach was demonstrated in overwhelmingly fashion in the 1991 Gulf War, victory in which the US had finally 'licked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all'.⁷⁶

PROVINCIAL QUAGMIRE AND BRITISH COUNTER-TERRORISM

At the same time as the US military was learning tough lessons in Vietnam about how not to prosecute a counter-insurgency campaign, the British Army was able to continually refine the Malayan model in a score of uprisings and insurrections throughout the Middle East. Operations in Aden and Oman, though simple compared to Vietnam, were built on the sound principles of political primacy, local support and

‘hearts and minds’. Although each operation was different than the last, there was a growing self-belief, even arrogance, that the Malayan model built on Thompson’s principles and Templer’s leadership would suffice in any COIN environment. Britain genuinely believed that it possessed a ‘counter-insurgency Army’.⁷⁷ This was always going to be a dangerous route to take; ‘fixation on Malaya had become obsessive and the Emergency was growing larger with each telling’.⁷⁸ It wasn’t until the British military began to operate in Northern Ireland in 1969 that the more traditional custom of ‘historical amnesia’ pertinent to past campaigns was re-adopted and the institutional memories of Malaya began to fade.⁷⁹

The British Army, as is common in most COIN operations, started slowly and for a variety of reasons at the time made some fundamental mistakes. Foremost among these was the lack of a political objective that was satisfactory and achievable to both the Catholic and Protestant communities. The Army’s initial efforts to keep those communities apart amid continued sectarian violence did not constitute a long-term political objective. Secondly, the introduction of internment in 1971 targeted the Catholic minority adding weight to the belief within that community that British strategy in the Province was entirely Protestant-related. The third and perhaps the most controversial episode were the events of Bloody Sunday.

Gradually, the British government massaged its approach to one that typified both a traditional COIN campaign and an emerging counter-terrorist policy. British soldiers were continually exposed to the complicated dynamics of police and civil primacy, minimum force, armed propaganda and media intrusion. It fused the political ‘carrot and stick’ approach to precise military action based on increasingly reliable intelligence.⁸⁰ Economic policies that were generated in Dublin and Whitehall were implemented in towns and cities across the Province. A Northern Ireland Minister and General Officer Commanding (GOC) were appointed to unify the political and military approaches. It also lured the British public and certain segments of the wider international community into the unforgiving world of terrorism and political concessionary negotiation.

As with previous campaigns, a gamut of doctrinal manuals was published. Foremost among these were the writings of Brigadier Frank Kitson throughout the 1970s.

Kitson's arguments revolved around the observation that while the British Army trained mostly for conventional war, it was more likely to fight counter-insurgency operations in the future. A balance should therefore be struck and the Army's junior officers should receive as much training and education in irregular warfare as regular.⁸¹ The core of Kitson's arguments was that while he agreed with five of Thompson's Malayan principles he disputed the sixth which gave the police primacy over intelligence operations. Kitson argued that the police was often a key target for insurgent attacks which usually meant that the army had to rebuild the intelligence structures anyway and was the principle user of intelligence. In the long term, Kitson's work forced the Army to loosen its fixation on Malaya and generate broader, less conflict-specific doctrine.

Despite its COIN overtones, Operation BANNER tended to be labelled as a Counter-Terrorist campaign. Certainly the British public's bloody exposure to the IRA demanded a highly sophisticated approach. Indeed CT doctrine developed rapidly as a result of a series of high profile bombings in England and on the European mainland during the 1980s and early 1990s. It was easier to classify the IRA as terrorists and not the multi-faceted and highly adaptive insurgents that they were. As the peace process evolved and the Armalite was shelved, though never permanently, the British learned that insurgencies are always protracted affairs – over the course of the 30-year campaign 'victory or defeat in an insurgency is very largely a matter of endurance – of who gets tired first.'⁸² It was a philosophy that it would re-emerge in 2001.

'THERE'S A PLANE!'

When aircraft hit the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on 11th September 2001, the impact was profound in a variety of ways. Just as insurgencies had evolved into complex organisms that changed their appearance according to ideological tendencies, so counter-insurgency had been forced to adapt its approach that had always been one reactive step behind. 9/11, while initially shocking, has heralded in an era whereby counter-insurgency doctrine *must* be proactive. The resultant approach, driven fervently by the United States, is wholly international in outlook. Unfortunately it took an event such as 9/11 to galvanise the international community into action. Of course, it wasn't always like that. The World Trade Centre had been targeted in 1993.

US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were blown up in 1995. The American warship USS Cole was attacked by suicide bombers while it berthed off Yemen. Los Angeles International Airport was targeted by Islamic extremists at the turn of the century. Throughout the 90s, the studies of insurgency and the studies of terrorism remained divided, perhaps reflecting reluctance on behalf of the American defence community that terrorism *was* in the toolkit of irregular warfare and insurgency.

After 9/11 the US undertook the greatest transformation in its international posture. Encapsulated in President Bush's 'Axis of Evil' speech, America would pursue an interventionist policy that would seek to prevent terrorists from striking Western interests again. Those states who provided safe havens to terrorists or those who 'weren't with America' could be targeted as if they were terrorists themselves. Irregular warfare was the prescription, and America sought to dedicate overwhelming energy and financial commitment to waging it. Whereas counter-insurgency doctrine throughout the 20th century had always been a national affair, the 21st century would herald demand for international doctrine that those nations contributing to defeating transnational terrorism. No such effort had ever been made before.

SUMMARY

The counter-insurgency campaigns of the 20th century reflected in clear terms the American and British approaches to the subject. British doctrine has evolved on the foundation of Malaya and the principles of Thompson. American doctrine, unwilling for decades to accept a need for COIN, has borrowed many of those principles, but it needed the Vietnam War to puncture its hubris. The need for political primacy and coordinated government machinery was aligned to military action to neutralising the insurgent while separating him from his base of support. Above all the doctrine espoused the belief in longer-term post insurgency planning and the creation of a better future. Insurgency and counter-insurgency was a competition for the hearts and minds of the people in the region and the national electorates. Winning could only be achieved by unifying *every* asset of national power. Yet despite the historical facts, both countries crossed into Iraq with little expectation that it would be facing a violent and multi-faceted insurgency. And while US forces has amended its COIN doctrine to reflect its experiences in Iraq, British COIN doctrine remains firmly rooted in its 2001

edition. The reasons for that are simple enough. The British Army is not prosecuting a COIN operation in Iraq. Therefore, two campaigns exist in international politics today. One is the global counterinsurgency effort in which Britain is intricately involved. The other is taking place today in Iraq and it is proceeding with minimal British military involvement. The reasons for that are discussed in the next chapter.

REFERENCES AND NOTES

- ¹ Cited in Samuel B. Griffith II, "Guerrilla, Part 1", *Marine Corps Gazette*, July 1950, p.43 and op cit. Robert M. Cassidy, "Back to the Street without Joy: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam and Other Small Wars", *Parameters*, Summer 2004, pp.73-83
- ² Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations*, Faber and Faber, London, 1971, p.2
- ³ Military doctrine is defined as the 'fundamental principles by which military forces guide their action in support of objective. It is authoritative, but requires judgement in application. It should not constitute a set of rules to be applied without thought; its purpose is to guide, explain and educate, and to provide the basis for study, training and informed discussion'. Taken from Britain's Army Doctrine Publication, p.1-1.
- ⁴ Brigadier Gareth Bulloch, "The Development of Doctrine for Counter-Insurgency Warfare: the British experience" in *British Army Review*, December 1995, pp.21-24.
- ⁵ MLR Smith, "Guerrillas in the Mist: Reassessing Strategy and Low-Intensity Conflict," *Review of International Studies*, Vol.29, 2003
- ⁶ *Land Operations*, 1-11. "The Continuum of Operations provides a framework for understanding the complexity of the operational environment. It has four major elements: the spectrum of conflict provides the context for predominant campaign themes of major combat operations, counter-insurgency, peace support operations, and peacetime military engagement. Campaigns consist of a variety of types of tactical operations grouped as offensive, defensive, stabilising operations which may occur simultaneously, and can be depicted to show how a campaign may change over time. Together with enabling activities, they comprise the range of land tactical activities conducted by land forces on operations. The Spectrum of Conflict reflects the environment in which operations take place. The principal discriminator is the level of violence, which ranges from absolute war to absolute peace: neither exists in pure form – levels of conflict range between these theoretical issues".
- ⁷ Defence White Paper on internet at www.mod.uk/publications/whitepaper/2003/
- ⁸ Army Field Manual, *Counter Insurgency Operations (Strategic and Operational Guidelines)*, Volume 1, Part 10, July 2001, p. B-2-1
- ⁹ Thomas R. Mockaitis, *British COIN in the post-imperial era*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1995, p.134
- ¹⁰ *ibid*, p.134.
- ¹¹ *ibid*, p.1
- ¹² US Army's Field Manual 3-07.22, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, HQ Department of the Army, October 2004 (expires 2006), p.vii.
- ¹³ Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy*, Oxford University Press, 1999, p.275
- ¹⁴ Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-insurgencies: Guerrillas and their Opponents since 1750*, Routledge, London, 2001, p.31. Between 1849 and 1914 there were 52 large-scale expeditions on the North West Frontier of India alone. This pattern was replicated by the French in North and West Africa, Madagascar and Indo-China; the Russians in the Caucasus and Central Asia; the Germans in German South West and German East Africa; the Dutch in the East Indies; the Italians in Libya and Abyssinia and the Spanish in Cuba and the Philippines. Between 1867 and 1900, US marines went ashore eight times on Haiti and had intervened in Nicaragua nine times by 1912.
- ¹⁵ *ibid*, pp.24-55
- ¹⁶ Beckett, p.33
- ¹⁷ *ibid*, p. 33
- ¹⁸ The Battle of Omdurmann (1898) , between British and Egyptian forces and the Islamic Mahdi tribes, resulted in the destruction of its 52,000 army and the killing of over 11,000 tribesmen. See Beckett, p.33.
- ¹⁹ Thomas R. Mockaitis, 1990, p.64 op cit. Dr Rod Thornton, *Historical Origins of the British Army's counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist techniques*, DCAF Conference Paper, downloaded from ...
- ²⁰ Thomas Mockaitis, *British counter-insurgency in the post-imperial order*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1995, p.133.
- ²¹ Beckett, p.32.
- ²² Gray, p.275
- ²³ Callwell, p.
- ²⁴ Callwell
- ²⁵ *ibid*.
- ²⁶ Beckett, p.40
- ²⁷ Robert B. Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Classic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Persia to the Present*, Little, Brown and Company, 1994, p.141

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- ²⁸ Peter Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare*, p.49. In dealing with Morocco, the following advice was offered: "This country ought not to be handled with force alone. The rational method – the only one, the proper one, and also the one for which I myself was chosen rather than anyone else – is the constant interplay of force with politics. I should be very careful about attacking regions which are 'asleep', which are lying still, which are waiting and questioning, which would burst into flames if I entered them, at the cost of many men and much trouble, whereas, once all the neighbouring regions are dealt with, these others will find themselves isolated and will fall into our hands by themselves..." (Maurois, p.141).
- ²⁹ *ibid.*
- ³⁰ General Reginald Dyer, the British officer in charge of colonial policy in India, ordered his native troops to open fire on a crowd of Sikh protestors killing between 200 and 379. The Hunter Committee that investigated the incident castigated Dyer for his use of excessive force.
- ³¹ Thomas R. Mockaitis, *British Counter-Insurgency, 1919-1960*, Macmillan Press, London, 1990, p.23
- ³² Mockaitis, *British counterinsurgency*, p.143
- ³³ Beckett, p.178
- ³⁴ Charles Gwynn, *Imperial Policing*, War Office, London, 1934, p.5
- ³⁵ Mockaitis, p.1
- ³⁶ Beckett, p.39. See also Gwynn.
- ³⁷ Beckett, p.44
- ³⁸ Mockaitis, p.76
- ³⁹ Beckett, p.49
- ⁴⁰ John A. Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam – Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, Praeger, 2002.
- ⁴¹ Clutterbuck, R.L. *The Long, long War: The Emergency in Malaya 1948-1960*, Cassell, London, 1966
- ⁴² Nagl, p.134
- ⁴³ Malaya: Cabinet memorandum by Mr Lyttelton in Stockwell, *Documents*, Vol II, pp.318-353; *op cit*, John A. Nagl, p.
- ⁴⁴ Short, A. *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, Frederick Mueller, New York, 1975.
- ⁴⁵ Nagl, p.145
- ⁴⁶ Beckett, p.100
- ⁴⁷ John Cloake, *Templer, Tiger of Malaya: The Life of Field Marshall Sir Gerald Templer*, Harrap, London, 1985, p.264
- ⁴⁸ See Wing Commander Charles O'Reilly's Sound Records
- ⁴⁹ The effect of Templer's personality and policies on the entire chain of command should not be underestimated. For anecdotal evidence about Templer read General Sir John Akehurst's "*Generally Speaking*", Michael Russell Publishing, Norwich, 1999
- ⁵⁰ The majority of these came from an intelligence school that he had set up in Malaya.
- ⁵¹ Both of these departments were responsible for dropping over 100 million leaflets over the jungle by aircraft in 1956. There were 2,200 broadcast flights and 90 mobile information vans in operation by 1958. Film was an especially popular medium of passing information. Films were shown in Malaya, Britain and in America where support for British policies was important. In May 1952, British propaganda changed the characterization of insurgents from bandits to communist terrorists in a deliberate attempt to underline to outside audiences, especially in America, the gravity of the threat posed. (Information found in Beckett, p.101).
- ⁵² Cloake, p. 34
- ⁵³ The insurgency was gradually pushed back to the border with Thailand...p.103.
- ⁵⁴ Oliver Lyttelton had been appointed as the Governor of Malaya in late 1951.
- ⁵⁵ Robert F. Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam*, Chatto and Windus, London, 1972, pp.50-60.
- ⁵⁶ The title indicates the change in policy away from military primacy towards support for the civil power.
- ⁵⁷ Quote from unidentified US Army officer during Tet Offensive, Vietnam, 1968.
- ⁵⁸ Thomas R. Mockaitis, "Unconventional Conflicts" in *America's Armed Forces: A Handbook of Current and Future Capabilities*, edited by Sam C. Sarkesian and Robert E. Connor, Jr; Greenwood Press, London, 1996, pp.387-416. This mood existed despite the Kennedy reforms and the creation of the Special Forces group and Green Berets to form a counter-insurgency army.
- ⁵⁹ The British dispatched an Advisory Team to Vietnam in 1961 under the leadership of Robert Thompson, the Colonial Secretary from the Malaya Emergency. Thompson argued that the focus should be, not on the destruction of VC forces but on the political stability and security of the populated rural areas. He emphasized many traditional elements of COIN, particularly the use of

stringent security measures by the police. The plan revolved around the well-learned concept of winning control of the population rather than killing insurgents. This contrasted completely with the American approach and was ultimately rejected.

⁶⁰ Lt Gen McGarr, commander of MAAG in 1962; op cit, *The Army and Vietnam*, p.57-58

⁶¹ General Earle Wheeler, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in p.166

⁶² *ibid*, p.176

⁶³ *ibid*, p.179

⁶⁴ Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr, *The Army and Vietnam*, Johns Hopkins University Press, London, 1988.

⁶⁵ OSD, DPM, McNamara to the President, "Trip Report, Actions Recommended for Vietnam", 14 October 1966; quoted in *The Army and Vietnam*, p.184. Italics in original

⁶⁶ David Halberstam, *Making of a Quagmire*, Random House, New York, 1964, p.86. The Strategic Hamlets Program was an attempt to copy the British Malay model of separating the insurgent from the population by building new villages, re-locating the population, arming them and, through a combination of civic programmes and police action, the area would gradually be cleared of VC by the villagers and the police. It was said to follow the *tache d'huile* concept envisioned by French COIN doctrine. The programme failed. In two years 8,000 hamlets had been 'created', but their purpose was really just to satisfy Washington. Some hamlets were never occupied (no water) and in others the population moved back to their original villages immediately the Americans left.

⁶⁷ 5th Special Forces (SF) Group were tasked to organise Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) comprising ethnic minority tribes and groups from Vietnam's mountain and border regions. Raised to deny Viet Cong access to key terrain, the CIDG also conducted long-range reconnaissance patrols, guerrilla hit-and-run attacks and intelligence gathering operations. Over 50,000 CIDG tribal fighters were raised and led by 5th SF Group alone. Secondly, the US Marine Corps (USMC) initiated the Combined Action Programme (CAP) that inserted squads of marines into villages to live alongside a platoon of locally-raised fighters. The marines helped train the local forces by living alongside them, eating with them, helping to secure their villages, collecting intelligence and conducting offensive patrols, all of which prevented the Viet Cong from securing more terrain. The CAP units accounted for 7.6% of the enemy killed while representing only 1.5% of the Marines killed in Vietnam. More than anything, it offered a fresh hope for waging protracted counter-insurgency campaigns. Lastly, the Civil Operations and Revolutionary (later Rural) Development and Support (CORDS) pacification effort under Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV). This programme allowed USAID personnel to work with their Vietnamese counterparts at the province and village level to improve security and local infrastructure. Out of CORDS came the Phoenix programme which used former Viet Cong and indigenous Provincial Reconnaissance Units to root out the Viet Cong's infrastructure. Though it attracted a great deal of negative press, it was also very effective.

⁶⁸ The statistics of the Vietnam War line up in not dissimilar fashion to the waves of US bombers that crossed the 17th parallel into North Vietnam. The remainder were support staff and logisticians. 47,378 members of the US military were killed and another 304,704 were wounded, of which 153,329 were hospitalised. The economic cost of the war amounted over \$140 billion. Other than the success of the Tet Offensive in 1968, US forces suffered countless defeats at the hands of a lightly-armed but highly adaptive and sophisticated guerrilla army built on Maoist principles.

⁶⁹ Robert M. Cassidy, *Back to the Streets*, p.74

⁷⁰ M.L.R. Smith, p.28

⁷¹ Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, *A Soldier's Way*, Hutchinson, London, 1995, p.149

⁷² The failed mission to rescue 53 American hostages held in the American Embassy in Tehran in 1979. The plan was flawed from the outset and resulted in the deaths of eight US servicemen in the desert 200 miles to the south east of Tehran.

⁷³ The terrorist group Hezbollah detonated a suicide bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983, killing 241. President Reagan withdrew all American troops soon afterwards. Following a detailed investigation, new procedures would become customary for forces deployed abroad. These involved a number of 'force protection measures' that 'became a significant claim on the time and resources of the Department of Defense'.

⁷⁴ The final event, and one that evoked memories of the previous two, took place in Somalia in October 1993 and became known as 'Black Hawk down'. In seeking to capture the Somali warlord Mohammed Farrah Aideed, a special forces unit launched a raid on Mogadishu during which two Black Hawk aircraft were shot down by RPGs, and 18 US soldiers were killed and dragged through the street by a baying crowd. The television images were broadcast throughout the world.

⁷⁵ *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*, Norton and Company, London, 2004 p.97

⁷⁶ President George H. Bush declares the end to the Vietnam syndrome after the Gulf War in 1991.

⁷⁷ Dr Rod Thornton, *Historical Origins of the British Army's counter-insurgent and counter-terrorist techniques*, DCAF Paper, 2004; found at www.dcaf.ch/news/PfP_7thConf_Bucharest/Baxter.pdf

⁷⁸ Mockaitis, p.137

⁷⁹ *ibid*

⁸⁰ This countered the IRA approach of ejecting the British from Ireland by a process of the 'bomb and the ballot box.'

⁸¹ Kitson was able to amend the training syllabi for junior officers while he was the Commandant at the Infantry School in Warminster.

⁸² Desmond Hamill, *Pig in the Middle: The British Army in Northern Ireland, 1969-1984*, Methuen, London, 1985, p.63

CHAPTER FOUR

IRAQ'S TROUBLED HISTORY

“There is still – and I say this with a heart full of sorrow – no Iraqi people but unimaginable masses of human beings, devoid of any patriotic idea, imbued with religious traditions and absurdities, connected by no common tie, giving ear to evil, prone to anarchy, and perpetually ready to rise against any government whatsoever.”

King Faisal 1, Iraq, 1933¹

The modern state of Iraq has been in existence for 85 years. In that short space of time it has played a part in one world war, suffered the consequences of another, and been involved in at least four regional conflicts, two of which it initiated. It has been at the epicentre of at least seven *coup d'états* and hosted a dozen rebellions, uprisings or insurrections. It has suffered the indignation of being occupied and administered by two empires and has had its internal affairs massaged by at least four Middle Eastern countries. That so many seemingly destabilising events have occurred in such a young country is representative of the foundations upon it was built. “As any student of contemporary Iraqi history will discover...that the primary factor for the persistence of tension and violence [is] the brittleness of Iraqi national identity.”² Indeed the beams that support this curiously solid edifice were put in place by Muslims and Turks long before 1920. It is therefore clear that an understanding of contemporary Iraq necessitates an examination of ancient Mesopotamia from as much an historical as an anthropological viewpoint. Consequently, that history has been shaped in particular by the Arab-Islamic conquest in the 7th Century, the policies of the Ottoman and British Empires and, at its very heart, the anthropological influence of the Arab tribe.

TRIBES, ISLAM AND THE OTTOMANS

Tribes form the bedrock of Iraqi society. Some three-quarters of the population belong to one of the over 150 tribes in Iraq.³ They have remained unfazed by Iraq's and Mesopotamia's history. The majority of tribes practised were Islamic, though more of the conservative strain. *Sunni* and *shi'a* often existed within the same tribe.

When the Ottomans conquered Iraq in the early part of the last millennium, they were faced with a population of roughly 14 million in which the Arabs dominated, making up about 75-80% of the population. Kurds made up the remainder.⁴ The remaining fraction was made up of a mixture of religions and ethnicities, including Turkmen, Assyrians, Christians, Jews and Yazidis. The majority of the Arab population was split into the two religious camps, of which the *Shi`a* represented approximately 60% of the population. Therefore Iraq was, and still is, split predominantly into three groups – Arab *shi`a*, Arab *sunni*, and Kurd. Each religious sect is further identified by tribal politics which have, in their own right, played ‘a profound role in Iraq’s modern history’.⁵ At the time of the British Mandate in 1920, the tribes were nomadic, seminomadic, or settled [and] they surrounded the handful of cities and larger towns, controlled the country’s communications systems, and held 9/10ths of the land.

The Arab-Islamic conquest has been described as the ‘decisive event in shaping current Iraqi identity.’⁶ Following the death of the Prophet Muhammed in 632 AD, factions from Mecca and Medina invaded Mesopotamia in a relentless drive to spread Islam east and then west through to North Africa and Spain.⁷ As this juggernaut ploughed its furrow eastwards, it initiated a series of battles between Arabs and Persians on the one hand and Arabs and Arabs on the other.⁸ Along its axle ran the struggle for the leadership of Islam, a dispute that split the religion into its current *sunni* and *shi`a* constituencies.⁹ With Islam established as both the central religion and the definitive guide to life, so subsequent invaders fought to control it. Foremost among those were the Ottoman Turks who governed Mesopotamia for four centuries. The repercussions of this struggle would be used by the architects of Iraq’s second most influential period. The rulers of the Ottoman Empire would play a role in shaping modern Iraq ‘second only to that of the Arab tribe and family’.¹⁰

The Ottomans administered Iraq from the early years of the 16th Century until World War One.¹¹ Although at first the *sunni* Ottomans tolerated a *shi`i* presence in Iraq¹², conflict with Persia for leadership of the Islamic world was inevitable and once blood had been spilt wars were endemic.¹³ As *sunni* Arab hands grabbed more power, suspicion, resentment and hostility swept through the *shi`i* majority. Even when the Empire began to crumble in the middle of its tenure, the bedrock of ‘authoritative paternalism’ that the Ottomans had laid remained firmly embedded within the *sunni*

ruling class.¹⁴ When the British ousted the Turks in 1917, they saw no reason to dabble in what they believed was a perfectly workable formula.

BRITISH MANDATE AND THE FIRST INSURRECTION

The British Army invaded the Faw Peninsula on 6 November 1914 with a number of strategic intentions. Foremost among these was the protection of its trade routes to India, access to its oil fields in the northern Persian Gulf, and protection of its communications systems across Arabia. Both Ottoman and Russian ambitions towards the Gulf threatened British interests, made all the more urgent when Turkey sided with the Central Powers at the start of World War One. The occupation of the country was subsequently fused to a League of Nations Mandate that stated that Iraq ‘would be ready for independence and self government after a very brief period of rehabilitation and administrative training’.¹⁵ Iraqis of all persuasions were exalted at the prospect of independence.

Other than preparing Iraq for that moment, British intentions in the country were not ambitious and her attention was focused elsewhere. ‘Harassed by the more urgent problems of Germany, Russia, Austria and Turkey, the British government shelved the question of Iraq, leaving [it] under an improvised military administration’.¹⁶ The policies that it did initiate tended to reinforce the Turkish predilection for appointing *sunnis* into the political and military leadership. Nonetheless, the British decided to alter the balance of power between the urban classes and the rural tribes, and undertook a series of measures that empowered the tribal *shaykhs*¹⁷ by redistributing age-old land titles; the majority of these shaykhs were *sunni*. However, the general mood of excitement slowly began to dissolve as British administrators prevaricated over the withdrawal of its colonial forces and the shape of post-British Iraq. The reasons for this are complex but their consequences could have long-running effects on Iraq’s history and Western interference in it.

Dismay over the continued British presence fuelled the belief that Britain had no intentions of awarding independence within the near future. Urban centres became progressively more pan-Arab and pan-Islamic, citing that Britain was not only anti-Iraqi but even ‘a threat to Islam.’¹⁸ Alongside the urban masses were the *shi`i*

religious communities and the increasingly boisterous Iraqi expatriate community living in Syria, many of whom returned to Iraq.¹⁹ But it was the tribes that ‘put teeth into it [the revolt] and thus transformed it into a sort of war’,²⁰ as much for independence as against *any* form of centralised government control over them.²¹ Demanding freedom both from the British and any form of Iraqi control, the tribal leaders south and west of Baghdad refused to listen to British remonstrations about a political settlement. Vocal opposition was rife: “Since you took Baghdad, you have been talking about an Arab Government, but three years or more have elapsed and nothing has materialised.”²² As a leader from the al-Dulaimi tribe uttered, ‘He who takes the sword will not yield to words!’²³ Religious leaders fanned the incendiary words with calls for *jihad*.²⁴ The subsequent revolt lasted only four months and pitted 7,500 British and 53,000 colonial Indian troops against roughly 131,020 insurgents, the majority armed with old rifles.²⁵ Although it was swiftly quashed, the four month long insurrection cost the British over 400 British lives and up to £40 million in cost.²⁶ The uprising had a number of effects.

Of utmost importance, the insurrection forced Britain to set the conditions whereby Iraqi political institutions could mature. The British dispatched Sir Percy Cox to seek a political solution. Sensing the possibilities that Iraq offered the British,²⁷ he implemented a series of political concessions that gave birth to a provincial government with an Arab president and council of state; this was received with the complete blessing of the local population.²⁸ At the Cairo Conference in 1921, the British introduced three mechanisms through which eventual independence would be granted. It installed Faisal of Mecca and the leader of the Arab Revolt as Iraq’s first king. It published the treaty which dictated the extent of British rule, and it wrote the constitution which was designed to integrate ‘all elements of the population under a democratic formula.’²⁹ It also led to the eventual creation of a regular Iraqi army and its subsequent presence in Iraqi politics.³⁰ While the first buds of a future Iraqi state had blossomed under particularly trying conditions, it would take a further decade before the tangible fruits of independence could be enjoyed.

GUNS OF INDEPENDENCE

Iraq was awarded League of Nations status and independence in October 1932. The years that followed were dominated by two groups whose political ambitions would shape the country for the remainder of the century. On the one hand were the mostly *sunni* Arab nationalists and on the other were the mostly *shi`a* social reformers who appealed to the minorities. The period was also marked by conscription into the army, which affected tribal manpower and a series of agrarian laws which spurred 'intense competition for land' by urban investors and tribal *shaykhs*.³¹ In sum, the years up to 1936 and the first of Iraq's many coups were dominated by 'greed, tangled land claims, religious sentiment, and the weakening of tribal authority, especially by conscription.'³² The army had not only doubled in size from 1933³³ but had assumed a greater political role by extinguishing the 1936 coup and a series of other revolts throughout the country. The period was also marked by the second invasion by the British in similar circumstances *vis a vis* World War political allegiances to 1914. The actual effects of World War 2 on Iraq were negligible and it would take the discovery of oil in the 1950s to add another player to the Iraqi game.

But underneath these goals, living standards were falling while the expectation of greater riches from oil rose. In 1950, only 23% of the children were in school; illiteracy measured at 90%.³⁴ This lopsided trend had a particular effect on the volatile urban population, specifically those in higher education.³⁵ And it was to this disenchanted group in Iraqi society that those opposed to the ruling elites turned.

A REVOLUTIONARY DECADE

Between 1958 and 1968 there were four changes to regimes in Iraq, a number of failed coups³⁶ and a series of revolts in Kurdistan between *pesh merga* forces and the Iraqi army. Iraq also became the focus of Cold War political interest in relation to its oil, and its growing allegiance to the Soviet Union as a tonic to American and British interest in Israel.³⁷ It was in this environment dominated by political intrigue and loyalty to family and kin above all else that allowed the Ba`ath Party to assume control of Iraqi society, first in 1963 and then again in 1968. Having learned from its

past mistakes, the Ba`ath of 1968 seized power on the basis of its understanding of the rudimentary nature of Iraqi society, namely the tribe, family and clan.

The Arab Ba`ath Socialist Party, as it was officially known, descended from a provincial, semi-Bedouin lifestyle dominated by small villages and tribal politics. Preaching a doctrine of secular pan-Arabism and radical social change, the party had adopted the cell structure synonymous with Communist-inspired Middle Eastern conspiratorial parties.³⁸ Despite its meagre party base, which in 1968 was said to number between 150 to 300 party members,³⁹ the Ba`ath proceeded to expand its support by mass mobilisation and party control. It did this by integrating all aspects of the tribe, clan and family into the military and the security services, the two instruments that it used to control society.⁴⁰ Coupled to these was the Committee of Tribes that touted Ba`athist policies among tribal groups, particularly in the ‘*sunni* triangle’ to the west and north of Baghdad.⁴¹ By sucking tribal solidarities into its own body, it inculcated a patrimonial-totalitarian form of control across the societal spectrum that rapidly ‘hegemonised, destroyed and absorbed all nascent civil society structures and institutions, such as unions, professional associations, an independent press, chambers of commerce and industrial leagues. Where a deep vacuum existed, cultural tribalism filled the gap.’⁴² The principle architect of all Ba`athist policies was Vice President Saddam Husayn.

Born in 1937 to a poor and illiterate peasant family in a small village south of Takrit, Saddam was raised in an environment in which the values of clan and kin were paramount. Takrit, defined by the 18th Century English historian Edward Gibbons as the ancient and ‘impregnable fortress of independent Arabs’,⁴³ was built on the Bedouin codes of honour, courage and revenge.⁴⁴ Saddam, a member of the *sunni* Albu Nasir⁴⁵ tribe, spent a great deal of time on the revolutionary fringes of Iraq’s political stream where he built a formidable reputation for toughness and political skill. Furthermore, ‘his secretiveness, his suspiciousness, and his distrust of outsiders spring from years of being hunted – and hunting others – and from his own considerable talents in organising conspiracy.’⁴⁶ During the 11 years that Saddam was Vice President, he not only eliminated virtually every political and military threat to Ba`athist rule, but reinforced the numbers the *sunni* stranglehold on the key levers of political power. The discovery of oil provided the much needed lubricant.

BLACK GOLD AND BA`ATHISM

By the early 1950s, oil production began to be a major feature in Iraq's economy. The discovery of black gold in the Rumallah fields (see map), and in the north-east of the country suddenly placed enormous sums into Iraqi financial reserves. By 1959, oil accounted for 60% of the budget.⁴⁷ Much of the revenue was set aside for long-term development, particularly in agriculture, transportation and communications. Iraq's nationalisation of its oil industry in 1973 coincided with the Saudi-led oil embargo which led to an unprecedented price rise. Prices had quadrupled within a year and continued to rise throughout the remainder of the decade. The effect on Iraq's oil revenues was startling.⁴⁸ Oil production now displaced virtually all of Iraq's production industry as the chief source of national income. The effects of increased mobility and rapid urbanisation altered the demographics of the country and in 1977 64% of the population lived in the cities. Society's tolerance for the regime could now be measured by the price of oil and it was a barometer that Saddam did not ignore.

A ground swell of national pride and pan-Arabism was fed with rapid public works projects, social development programmes and lifestyle improvements that Saudi Arabia had initiated after its oil boom in 1973. Six lane highways were built, pay increases were distributed, and households were encouraged to take out interest-free loans to pay for new electronic consumer goods. The military received an injection of Soviet manufactured aircraft, tanks and small arms. With the party base now permeating through the entire country, the Ba`ath now strived for Iraqi leadership of the Arab world, proclaiming that "the glory of Arabs stems from the glory of Iraq...this is why we are striving to make Iraq mighty, formidable, able and developed, and why we shall spare nothing to improve its welfare and to brighten the glory of all Iraqis."⁴⁹ When he seized power and became President in 1979, Iraqi political life was transformed from a one-party state to a personal and autocratic regime that revolved around the twin cylinders of security, controlled by his kin, and the cult of personality. Relatively free from the constraints of domestic politics, Saddam now turned his attention to the east to confront the personal, religious and national challenge of Ayatollah Khomeini and a resurgent *shih* Iran.⁵⁰

GULF WAR I

When Iraqi air and ground forces invaded Iranian territory in September 1980, they did so under a confusing array of potential strategic objectives. Foremost among those was the long-held suspicion of Iran within *sunni* Iraqi political circles and the desire to reclaim not only areas of geographical dispute but more importantly prestige that had been lost to Iran since the 1920s. While the Shah remained in power, it was always unlikely that the two countries would go to war, but the threat that the Iranian Revolution posed to Iraqi's hegemonic interests in the region and wider Arab world spurred Iraq into a pre-emptive incursion into Iran. Saddam, always mindful of the threat that the Iranian Revolution posed to his revolutionary credentials, seized on the change of regime in Tehran to solidify both his domestic image and international Arabist standing. Despite the hyperbole surrounding a clash of Islam, 'in the end, opportunity and a growing sense of confidence, rather than defense against a *shi`i* rebellion, appeared to dominate.'⁵¹

The course of the war soon began to resemble the stalemate of the Western Front. Tactical successes for both sides would be followed by tragic defeat. Grabbing of land would be followed by ignominious withdrawal. But then the conflict was never just about conquest; it came to symbolise the hubris of its leaders who refused to buckle under the almighty strains of waging attritional warfare. For Saddam, those pressures would be brought to bear along the seams of Iraqi society that he had been so precise in stitching. In southern Iraq, the regime executed the prominent *shi`i* cleric Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr for organising anti-Ba`ath demonstrations.⁵² In Kurdistan, where Masoud Barzani's *pesh merga* had joined Iranian forces to form a northern front against the Iraqi Army, Saddam appointed Ali Hasan al-Majid, later known as 'Chemical Ali', as governor of the northern provinces with 'full powers' to take *whatever* measures were necessary to quash the insurgency.⁵³ These ethnic and religious fissures would be widened by the dramatic human and economic costs of the campaign as both leaders simply poured men and money into the front line. Iraqi casualties amounted to over 380,000 killed or wounded. Between 50,000 and 80,000 soldiers became Prisoners of War (POW), many of whom did not return for years.⁵⁴ In total, and with up to 100,000 being killed by 'Chemical Ali', the war accounted for 2.7% of the population.⁵⁵ Significant labour shortages inevitably followed, with

certain sectors of the industry forced to send as much as 45% of their manpower to the front.⁵⁶

The economic repercussions were no less severe. Iran targeted its oil infrastructure forcing production to slow and its exports from the Persian Gulf field to close. 'By 1983, only those projects capable of aiding the war effort or expanding its oil infrastructure were receiving funds.'⁵⁷ Furthermore, Saddam kept on importing foreign goods in a staged 'guns and butter' campaign of persuading the population that he could 'wage war and maintain a business-as-usual atmosphere at the same time.'⁵⁸ Over the course of eight years, Iraq wracked up an insurmountable debt of over \$80 billion, at least half of which was owed to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, France, Russia and the United States.⁵⁹ But instead of repaying those debts, it kept on borrowing with a promise once the war was won its oil fields would quickly repay.⁶⁰

Proclaiming all of this was the President, preaching to the world the necessity of the struggle against the tide of *shi`ism*. Throughout Iraq, the image of Saddam as the champion of *sunni* pan-Arabists became ubiquitous, 'as much a symbol of the people as well as Head of State.'⁶¹ Statues of Saddam were erected and a multitude of murals were painted in a multitude of guises – Arab warrior, educated official and religious leader. The Ba`ath now moved to mobilise the entire population into a mass-based force representing not only the channel of mobility and Iraqi patriotic fervour but a tightly controlled police state; 'with one in seven Iraqis a Party member of one rank or another, the common definition of Iraq as a state of informers can hardly be considered an exaggeration.'⁶² But despite the propaganda and the flourishing party base, in reality the war had set in motion Iraq's ultimate demise. By the end of the decade Iraqi forces had not only retreated but had been repositioned for action elsewhere in the region. Kuwait now fell into Saddam's sights.

GULF WAR II AND ITS AFTERMATH

The reasons behind Iraq's invasion and temporary occupation of Kuwait are multifarious and largely inconsequential for gaining an understanding of contemporary history; the simple fact that Saddam was desperate for funds to pay for the war with Iran should suffice.⁶³ The sizeable coalition of US-led international

forces⁶⁴ that ousted Saddam's demoralised forces from Kuwait is rightly praised with executing a near-faultless campaign but as always it is in the political realm that the significance of the second Gulf War is interpreted. Specific Coalition decisions and subsequent Iraqi ones would have serious ramifications for all concerned for a considerable period of time.

The Allied bombing of Iraqi infrastructure included not only a range of precise military targets but a host of related industrial components vital to Iraq's national economy badly deflated after the first Gulf War. Power stations, refineries, bridges, hydro-electric plants, roads, bridges and storage facilities were all targeted and mostly destroyed. Iraq's communications infrastructure was 'completely decimated' and its electricity supply was reduced by 75%.⁶⁵ The resultant chaos within hospitals, schools and businesses was plain to see. Furthermore, ordinary Iraqis had to pay for it through the reduced capacity of nearly all forms of work. Just as the 'Guns and Butter' policy had immunised Iraqis from the consequences of the first war, so the air campaign visibly in the second displayed the extent damage in a very real and quantifiable manner. A report to the UN Secretary General was clear:

“The recent conflict has wrought near apocalyptic results upon the economic infrastructure of what had been, until January 1991, a rather highly urbanised and mechanised society. Now most means of modern life support have been destroyed or rendered tenuous. Iraq has, for some time to come, been relegated to a pre-industrial age, but with all the disabilities of post-industrial dependency on an intensive use of energy and technology.”⁶⁶

The international community now drove a heavy roller over the rubble. UN Security Council Resolution 687, unanimously passed on 3 April 1991, 'called for an Iraq that would accept peace with its neighbours, and which would be subject to powerful international controls.'⁶⁷ However, no sooner had the ink dried that a violent insurrection flared up in the south and the north of the country, the two areas of the country which Saddam had never completely controlled.⁶⁸ The *intifada* not only demonstrated the fragile nature of the Iraqi state but, in his violent repression of the *intifada*, Saddam's determination to challenge every clause of the Resolution in a

flagrant and provocative manner. In surviving national and international attempts to remove him from power, Saddam once again demonstrated his Darwinesque skills at political survivability.

The international decision to not remove Saddam from power, whether through the leverage of a coherent military strategy or by support to the *intifada*, has been the focus of continued debate. It is clear that there was neither a legal case through the UN Resolution nor the sheer will that supported an international attempt to topple his regime as a concluding act of the Gulf War. As then Defence Secretary Dick Cheney remarked, “If we’d gone to Baghdad and got rid of Saddam Hussein – assuming we could have found him – we’d have had to put a lot of forces in and run him to ground some place. He would not have been easy to capture. Then you’ve got to put a new government in his place and then you’re faced with the question of what kind of government are you going to establish in Iraq? Is it going to be a Kurdish government or a Shiite government or a Sunni government? How many forces are you going to have to leave there to keep it propped up, how many casualties are you going to take through the course of this operation?”⁶⁹

Saddam emerged from the confrontations with Iran, the international community and his own countrymen as a deeply suspicious and insecure leader. In order to shore up his crumbling domestic support he turned to the very people that had propelled him to power 15 years previously. His promotional policies for members of the Albu Nasir tribe, his family and his clan were accompanied by the re-lighting of Muslim consciousness and Iraqi nationalism. Once again, Saddam had demonstrated his skills at political survival by adjusting the constituent parts of the pillars that supported his power base.

TRIBALISM, ISLAMIC CONSCIOUSNESS AND ARAB NATIONALISM

On 29 March 1991 and for the first time in Iraq’s modern history, a major delegation of tribal chieftains from the *sunni* triangle⁷⁰ was received at Saddam’s Presidential Palace in Baghdad. All came to either vow a total Islamic loyalty to Saddam as the chief of all chieftains (*shaykh al-mashayikh*). ‘Tribal banners were lowered and thrown at the feet of the President of the Republic. These bore the symbols of each

tribe and were an expression of their autonomy as if they were a mini-state. But giving away the banner was akin to presenting the diplomatic credentials to another, although higher, state.⁷¹ The *shaykh* and his tribesmen now controlled the levers of power within the military and security apparatus and means of mass mobilisation and *control* that were up to then solely Ba`ath positions. Within a year, tribes were working alongside the military to suppress the rebellion in the south, prompting Saddam to label them the ‘Swords of the State’ to which they vowed that they would ‘give battle until the last drop of blood’ and would ‘remain his men in times of crisis.’⁷²

Over the subsequent years, stringent measures were taken to cement the state-tribe relationship into Iraq’s societal fabric. In 1996 a High Council of Tribal Chiefs was created that gave *shaykhs* judicial powers to settle disputes, levy taxes and quash disputes. In return, the tribes received light arms and ammunition, electronic communication devices, vehicles and other logistics, tracts of land, special government rations, diplomatic passports and exemption from military service.⁷³ In return, the tribes gave complete and unwavering loyalty to the President. In 1998, tribal armed units dressed in civilian clothes and tribal headwear patrolled the streets of Baghdad next to special security forces as part of Saddam’s contingency plans to counter the military threat from the US and UK.⁷⁴ Tribes were incorporated into three layers of Saddam’s inner circle – the Ministry of Interior, the Presidential Palace Guard, and the National Security Bureau. At ‘the pinnacle was the Himaya (Protection) Force, a small group of thirty to forty men recruited wholly from tribal groups loyal to Saddam.’⁷⁵

Tensions between tribes and the state were, given their history, inevitable. In May 1995 after a string of attempted and suspected coups against Saddam, security forces executed a senior member of the Al-Dulaimi tribe in Ramadi, prompting a tribal rebellion and the subsequent execution of up to 130 military officers from the tribe.⁷⁶ Other rebellions flared up throughout the centre of Iraq that forced Saddam to retreat further into his Takrit-based *Beiji* family and clan. Punitive international sanctions simply heightened the tension. In 2000, only 40% of installed electrical power was available. Oil pipelines and refineries were in urgent need of repair. The UN programme that permitted the bi-annual sale of \$2 billion of Iraqi oil for imported

food, medicine and other humanitarian supplies was corrupt and rarely helped the average citizen. As the economic crisis gripped the nation, and the US and UK's air campaign continued to erode his military capability and morale, military loyalty started to fade and Ba`ath Party membership plummeted.⁷⁷

Saddam thereafter played almost his final card in a desperate bid to retain power. Sensing a worldwide resurgence in Islamic militancy and as a result of the Palestinian *intifada*, the regime 'began to tilt heavily towards Islam' and the waging of *jihad* against the US and the UK.⁷⁸ Hundreds of mosques were commissioned as part of a national 'faith campaign' and murals of Saddam praying sprang up throughout the country.⁷⁹ Over 100m Iraqi dinar was allocated by the government to expand Qu`ranic teaching in Iraqi schools.⁸⁰ By 2003, 'Islam was firmly embedded in the regime's ideology and symbolism.'⁸¹ Saddam had ensured that any struggle that the international community had with Iraq would now be a struggle with Islam. It was a potent mix.

EMBERS OF ETERNAL CONFLICT

At the turn of the millennium, Iraq's society had changed little from its heady days of 1920. The country's tribes, family, kin and clan systems had cemented their position throughout the 1990s as the keystone around Iraq prepared itself for the onset of yet more conflict. Saddam had carefully mixed a revival of Islam with traditional Arab values that offered his countrymen a renewed sense of pride in Iraq and allegiance to Saddam. He had perfected the art of political survival on so many occasions that the majority of *sunni* Arab Iraqis tended to adopt his belligerent stance towards the West. Surely a nation that had always resisted Western imperialism could do so again. For people who had been immersed in internecine or regional conflict for decades, the prospect of another major war in 2003 set off the now familiar rings of panic, alarm and foreboding. For Saddam, who had skilfully defied the west for over 12 years, his ability to understand the politics of war would now be played out over the next two years.

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³ Dr Patrick Sookhdeo, *Iraq Briefing, A Political, Ethnic and Religious Analysis of Iraq in the Post-Saddam Era*, Institute for the Study of Islam and Christianity, February 2005

⁴ There are approximately 4 million Kurds in Iraq, about 13 million in south-west Turkey (23% of the Turkish population), 5-6 million in Iran and less than 1 million in Syria. See Marr, p.12

⁵ Marr, p.18

⁶ Phebe Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 2nd Edition, Westview Press, Colorado, 2004, p.4. Prior to Islam, Mesopotamia was ruled by tribalism from which no religion stood out.

⁷ William L. Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 3rd Edition, Westview Press, 2004, p.13. Spain was conquered in the first half of the eighth century when Arab forces crossed from Algeria and Morocco. Except Spain, all of the areas have remained Islamic.

⁸ The Arabs defeated the Persians at a series of battle in the middle of seventh century. Three of those battles took place in Mesopotamia, the most significant of which was the defeat of the Persians at the battle of Qadisiyya in June 637. Indeed Iraq often formed the front line against Persia, with Arab forces occupying garrisons at Kufa (north of An Najef) and Basrah. Notes taken from Lieutenant General Sir John Glubb, *A Short History of the Arab Peoples*, Hodder and Stoughton, 1969, pp.55-77

⁹ *Shi'ites* believe that... The first event took place at Karbala, south of Baghdad, in 680 when Hussein Ali, the son of the 3rd caliph after Mohammed, was killed by a *sunni*-led army.⁹ His death and decapitation became symbolic of the different interpretations of Islam by both communities and 'became the founding myth of the Shi'a.

¹⁰ Marr, p.5

¹¹ Glubb, p.233. 'Incorporation into a mighty empire might well have brought peace and recovery to unhappy Iraq, which had suffered three centuries of ruin, chaos, plunder and devastation at the hands of the Turks, Mongols and her own lawless tribes. Her fate was to be sadly different. Her situation, almost infinitely remote from Istanbul, made supervision from the capital impossible. The governors sent to rule her were anxious only to amass fortunes and recoup themselves for the bribes which they had paid in order to secure their appointments'.

¹² a situation not eased by the presence of large *shi'a* communities south of Baghdad

¹³ The first battle between the *sunnis* and *shi'ites* occurred in 1537 south of Baghdad, with subsequent wars in 1604 and 1605, during which Bagdad was blockaded. The most serious incursion into Iraqi *shi'a* communities took place in the early 19th Century when Wahhabi warriors from Saudi Arabia invaded southern Iraq, 'massacring many Shi'a, sacking Karbala, and desecrating the shrine of Iman Husayn.' Tension between the two strands continues to exist. Patrick Sookhdeo, *Iraq Briefing: A Political, Ethnic and Religious Analysis of Iraq in the Post-Saddam Era*, Institute for the Study of Islam and Christianity, February 2005

¹⁴ Marr, p.5

¹⁵ For a fuller discussion see Collier's Encyclopedia, Macmillan Educational Company, New York, 1989, pp.248-249

¹⁶ Glubb, p.279

¹⁷ The British deliberately empowered tribal shaykhs to collect taxes from their tribesmen and made them responsible for law and order within their fiefdoms. This ultimately reduced the need for British colonial officers in the countryside, but gave the tribal shaykhs almost total control over the countryside.

¹⁸ Ghassan R. Atiyah, *Iraq: 1908-1921, A Socio-Political Study*, Arab Institute for Research and Publishing, Beirut, 1973, p.307

¹⁹ Many of these officers had served in the Turkish Army during the Arab Revolt and, having witnessed the French seizure of Damascus, believed that Britain had reneged on her commitment to give independence to Iraq. The arrival of these officers in Baghdad caused an outburst of resentment in Baghdad. See Glubb, p.279

²⁰ *ibid*

²¹ Glubb states that the tribes were not inspired by nationalist ambitions, but by opposition to government control in any form. Their argument was with British attempts at controlling the entire country and their fight continued the tradition that they had started against the Ottomans. Furthermore,

it was almost unprecedented for a tribesman to think of himself in terms of membership of a state. Equally, the words of statesmen, and British ones at that, meant very little to the tribal leaders. Glubb, p.237-8

²² H.V.F. Winstone, *Gertrude Bell*, Jonathon Cape, London, 1978, p.222, cited in Con Coughlin, *Saddam: The Secret Life*, Macmillan, London, 2002, p.12

²³ Foreign Office telegram 371/5076/E8330 from 51st Brigade to 17th Division repeated to General Headquarters and Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 13 May 1920, cited in *ibid*, p.346

²⁴ It is interesting to note that the calls for *jihad* were accompanied by the strict orders not to loot any property that belonged to the Iraqi nation.

²⁵ Lieutenant General Sir Alymer L. Haldane, *The Insurrection in Mesopotamia, 1920*, William Blackwood and Sons, London, 1922, Appendix VI.

²⁶ Marr, p.24

²⁷ In a telegram to the Foreign Office, Sir Percy wrote: "From an economic point of view, I think it is common knowledge that the possibilities of Mesopotamia in oil, cotton, and wheat make it a country of great promise. Oil is, of course, an uncertain quantity, but the prospect is at any rate sufficient to attract to Mesopotamia the interest and capital of very large accounts". Sir Percy Cox, *Appreciation of Mesopotamia-Persia Situation*, 24 July 1920, cited in Atiyah, p.360

²⁸ Marr, p.24-33

²⁹ Marr, p.24-33

³⁰ The urban 'stokers' of the insurrection realised that the military defeat of the tribes by regular British and Indian forces necessitated the creation of an equally professional Iraqi army. There was thus the gradual build up of an army 'as a medium through which nationalism was to be siphoned'. Marr, p.33

³¹ The Land Settlement Law (1932) apportioned legal title to land and was used by urban investors and tribal sheikhs to increase their ownership. It also reduced many tribesmen to the status of sharecropping tenants and increased the flow of rural to urban migration. See Marr, p.43

³² Marr, p.43

³³ The Army had doubled in size from 1933 to 1936 to reach 23,000; see Marr, p.43

³⁴ Marr, p.70

³⁵ By 1958, Iraqi universities were producing only 1000 graduates.

³⁶ Marr, p.81

³⁷ The Soviet Union became particularly generous benefactors. An extensive economic agreement was signed in 1959 that provided Iraq, in return for oil, with a substantial loan for industrial development in steel, electricity, glass and textile industries. The USSR also provided arms.

³⁸ Marr, p.71-78

³⁹ Faleh Jabar, 'The State, Society, Clan, Party, and Army in Iraq: A Totalitarian State in the Twilight of Totalitarianism,' *From Storm to Thunder, Unfinished Showdown Between Iraq and the US*, Institute of Developing Studies, Tokyo, 1998, pp.8-9

⁴⁰ Faleh Abdul-Jabar and Hosham Dawod, *Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East*, Saqi, London, 2003, p.81

⁴¹ Established in the early 1970s, the Committee was originally set up to mobilise the tribes to protect the porous Iraq-Syria border at a time of fierce inter-fighting between Syrian and Iraqi Ba'ath wings. The western desert was also the route which the trafficking of militants, weapons, and print hardware necessary for clandestine operations, took place. Notes taken from Faleh Abdul-Jabar and Hosham Dawod, *Tribes and Power*.

⁴² *ibid*, p.90-93

⁴³ S. Lloyd, *Twin Rivers: A Brief History of Iraq from the Earliest Times to the Present Day*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1943, p.126

⁴⁴ Marr, p.138-145

⁴⁵ See Appendix C to fully explore Saddam Husayn's lineage.

⁴⁶ Marr, p.145

⁴⁷ Charles Issawi and Muhammed Yeganeh, *The Economies of Middle Eastern Oil*, Praeger, New York, 1962, pp.143-147, cited in Marr, p.68

⁴⁸ Oil revenues increased from \$575 million in 1972 to \$26 billion in 1980. By 1979, oil production constituted almost 63% of Iraq's GDP. See World Bank, *World Tables*, 3rd edition, vol.1, Economic Data, Johns Hopkins University Press, Washington D.C., 1983, pp.90-91

⁴⁹ Karsh, *Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography*, p.100

⁵⁰ Ayatollah Khomeini had lived in An Najef for 13 years until Saddam expelled him in 1978. He had no respect for the Ba'ath Party and its secular, pan-Arab, and anti-*shi'a* policies. Saddam thought that Khomeini was a radical militant whom he regarded as a moral threat to his own revolutionary

credentials. The religious struggle was between the two branches of Islam and leadership of the Arab world, a mantle that Saddam was pursuing at the time. At the national level, and as always in the Middle East, fused to the religious level, was the tension between the interpretation of Islam. The Iranian Revolution *was* a threat to Saddam because of the large *shi'i* population living in southern Iraq. The suspicion that had dominated *sunni* politics in Iraq since the Ottoman Empire was particularly sharp in Baghdad where there had long been a desire to reclaim territory that had been lost to Iran since the 1920s. While the Shah remained in power, it was always unlikely that the two countries would go to war, but the threat that the Iranian Revolution posed to Iraqi's hegemonic interests in the region and wider Arab world spurred Iraq into a pre-emptive defensive phase. When the US military operation DESERT ONE failed, Saddam realised that America would probably support Iraq if it went to war with Iran. As Marr says in her first-class book, 'in the end, opportunity and a growing sense of confidence, rather than defense against a *shi'i* rebellion, appeared to dominate.' See Marr, pp.183-194

⁵¹ Marr, pp.183-194

⁵² His son, Moqtadr al-Sadr, would rise to prominence in 2004.

⁵³ The measures that Ali Hasan took in Kurdistan resembled a scorched earth policy and became known as the Anfal campaign (meaning 'spoils'). For a full description of the campaign see Marr, pp.200-202

⁵⁴ Marr, p.207

⁵⁵ Marr, p.208

⁵⁶ Some analysts state that up to 15% of government employees, totalling some 200,000 men, were killed in the war. See Aburish, *Saddam Hussein, The Politics of Revenge*, p.100

⁵⁷ Marr, p.203

⁵⁸ Efraim Karsh & Inari Rautsi, *Saddam Hussein, A Political Biography*, Brassey's, London, 1991, p.153. Public spending rose from \$21 billion in 1980 to \$29.5 billion in 1982.

⁵⁹ Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991*, Princeton University Press, 1993, p.39

⁶⁰ These 'contributions' were given to Iraq as part of the religious and ideological struggle between *sunni* and *shi'a*, and for Kuwait, for the threat that Iran posed to its national security. Up to \$40 billion was given to Iraq, but the precise terms for the agreement were never agreed. Saddam thought they were gifts or contributions to the total Gulf effort in suppressing Iran, in which Iraq was at the tip of the spear. Therefore he felt that he didn't have to repay the money. That was very much in contrast to the contributing states, particularly Kuwait, who wanted the money repaid. In the end, Saudi Arabia cancelled the debt but Kuwait never did.

⁶¹ Marr, p.211

⁶² Karsh and Rautsi, p.178.

⁶³ The reasons behind the invasion revolve around:

⁶⁴ The Coalition in 1991 numbered over 50 nations.

⁶⁵ Marr, p.236. In Baghdad the lights went out at the beginning of the war and weren't turned on again until the end (17 Jan – 28 Feb 91).

⁶⁶ Report to the Secretary General on humanitarian needs in Kuwait and Iraq in the immediate post-crisis environment by a mission to the area led by Mr Martii Ahtisaari, Under-Secretary General for Administration and Management, dated 20 March 1991, p.5, para 8, cited in Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, *The Gulf War Conflict 1990-1991*, Faber and Faber, 1993, p.416

⁶⁷ Anthony Cordesman and Ahmed Hashim, *Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond*, CSIS, 1997, p.8. The resolution required Iraq to recognise the adjusted Kuwaiti-Iraqi border, accept a UN guarantee of the border, allow the UN to establish a peace observer force in a zone along the border 10 kms in Iraq and 5 kms in Kuwait, allow the UN to inspect the destruction of all biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, long-range ballistic missiles, and related facilities, equipment and supplies, accept liability for Kuwait's losses, accept liability for all pre-war debts, return or account for all Kuwaiti prisoners and renounce terrorism.

⁶⁸ The *intifada* did not affect the five central provinces of Baghdad, Anbar, Salah al-Din, Ninawa and Diyala.

⁶⁹ Dick Cheney interviewed on BBC Radio 4, "*The Desert War – A Kind of Victory*," 16 February 1992

⁷⁰ In particular the al Anbar province containing the Dulaimi tribe

⁷¹ Faleh Abdul Jabar and Hosham Dawod, *Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East*; Saqi, London, 2003; interview with tribal leaders, Jordan, 1996, p.92. 'The actual process is interesting. When the tribal chief's headwear is forcibly removed, one's honour is tainted, and blood has to be shed to remove shame. But if the *iqal* is removed voluntarily, the actor is signifying that he accepts the challenge to defy humiliation. Again, blood should be spilled to cleanse honour. At the

Presidential Palace, the sheikhs and their entourages willingly and without any challenges to their honour, lowered their *'iqals*. By this act, they signified their readiness to shed their honour before the president and for his sake, and by their performance they gain honour and not lose it. It is their word of honour to give total allegiance,' p.93

⁷² Adeed Dawisha, "Identity and Political Survival in Saddam's Iraq," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol 53, No 4, Autumn 1999, p.565. Following this were a series of laws that closed all of Baghdad's 40 night clubs and banned the sale and consumption of alcohol except in the home and at private parties.

⁷³ Abdul-Jabar and Hosham Dawod, p.95-97

⁷⁴ Abdul-Jabar and Hosham Dawod, p.95-97

⁷⁵ Marr, p.264. S's Special Protection Force, now several thousand strong, were almost wholly from the Albu Nasir Tribe. No less than half of RG division commanders were from the ANT or affiliated tribes. Leadership structure in 1998 provides a good snapshot of these imbalances: 61% Sunni, 28 % Arab Shia and 6% each Kurd and Christian.

⁷⁶ The al-Dulaim tribe has always been a strong and traditional supporter of Saddam. Based in the al-Anbar province in the heart of the sunni triangle, and spreading west into Syria, the Dulaim tribe controlled the commercial activity of sanctioned Iraq including all trade with Jordan. When Saddam discovered that Major General Mohammed al-Dulaim was plotting a coup against him, he ordered his security forces to execute him and deliver his body to his family in Ramadi. Blood ties being thicker than water led to an uprising in the Ramadi area which spread to the Abu Ghraib military and prison complex. After the uprising was quashed, Saddam ordered the execution of between 120-130 military officers related to the tribe. See Cordesman and Hashim, p.20

⁷⁷ Marr, p.294-195. By 2003, the party 'might have lost about 70% of its membership.'

⁷⁸ Marr, p.297

⁷⁹ Adeed Dawisha, p.565

⁸⁰ *ibid*

⁸¹ Marr, p.297

CHAPTER FIVE

INVASION AND OCCUPATION

POINTING THE FINGER AND RACING TO WAR

On 21 November 2001, just 72 days after the most calamitous event in American history, President Bush asked his Secretary of State for Defence “what kind of plan do you have for Iraq? How do you feel about a war plan for Iraq?”¹ In asking the question, the President initiated a course of events that would, within 16 months, lead to a US-led Coalition invading and subsequently occupying Iraq. He would begin the justification for this war during his first State of the Union address given to Congress on 29 January 2002.

Bush’s speech, the first that he had given to Congress since 9/11 and the first of his Presidency, outlined his Administration’s strategy for dealing pre-emptively with the threat from international terrorism. In corralling those threats, the President spoke of an ‘Axis of Evil’ in which North Korea, Iran and Iraq formed a triumvirate of rogue states that sponsored terrorism and threatened world peace. Bush stated that “...by seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States.”² Over the coming months, the US continued to narrow its focus on Iraq and developed a twin-tracked policy of coercive diplomacy and military deployment that would “deal with Saddam Hussein once and for all, peacefully if possible; by war if necessary.”³

The diplomatic approach was tackled principally by the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the US Department of State. Both Prime Minister Blair and President Bush pursued it reasonably aggressively. This culminated in the unanimous passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 on 8 November 2002. The Resolution accused Iraq of being “in material breach of its obligations” and that it would “face serious consequences” if it failed to agree access to UN and IAEA weapons inspectors.⁴ When Iraq submitted a 12,000-page “mishmash of a document

[which was] effectively an insult to the Security Council and its resolutions,” the transfer of weight from a diplomatic to a military solution was complete. “For Bush, military invasion was now inevitable and the UN route would only be useful insofar as it nailed Saddam’s perfidy before the world community.”⁵

CENTCOM had planned a four-phase operation to remove Saddam’s regime and find and destroy his WMD. Phase I (Preparation) would conclude with the establishment of an ‘air-bridge’ that would transport forces into the region to secure regional and international support for the operation. Phase II (Shape the Battlespace) would involve air operations that would shape the conduct of ground operations. That would lead into Phase III (Decisive Operations) that would see “regime forces defeated or capitulated” and “regime leaders dead, apprehended or marginalised.” Phase IV (Post-Hostility Operations) would be the longest phase and arguably the greatest challenge.⁶

While America’s position was hardening, Great Britain’s approach to Iraq had remained equally apportioned between diplomacy and military action; the Prime Minister remained ‘committed to go with the Americans if there was a conflict [but] he was not committed to conflict.’⁷ The deterioration in diplomacy over the summer had allowed British military planners to join their American counterparts in June 2002 on a strictly “no commitments” basis.⁸ By the autumn the US “wanted the Brits to share the political and military risk”⁹ of an occupation. The evolving and occasionally hesitant nature of Britain’s commitment to a US-led military operation raised a number of concerns. How much did the US Administration want or need British military capability? When would the British efforts at a diplomatic solution be abandoned? One senior British officer in Washington DC summed up the frustrations,

“How late could we leave the decision [to commit]? Although we were coordinating quite well we didn’t have the integrated planning staff officers in place. There was never a discussion about where we have got to or what are the options? Britain never got its act together. We weren’t welcome and we were not prepared to be in there nor were we able to really insist that we should be and make a song and dance about it because diplomatically we were still pursuing a peaceful solution.”¹⁰

WASHINGTON POLITICS AND POST-CONFLICT IRAQ

From 9/11 the Pentagon rather than the State Department had emerged as the leading foreign policy advisor to the President. The military-induced collapse of the Taliban had ushered in a period in which the US military was considered capable of collapsing *any* regime. That position did not change despite the contextual framework shifting to Iraq. However the bipartisan domestic and international support afforded to the Pentagon and the President during the Afghanistan campaign was not replicated in the run up to conflict in Iraq. Decision-making over Iraq now lifted the seal on the ‘internecine and deeply dysfunctional’ politics that existed inside Washington DC’s Beltway.

The struggle for political supremacy, and for the mind of the President, was fought principally by supporters of the US Department of State on one side of the river and the Department of Defence on the other. Vice President Cheney was firmly in the Pentagon’s camp. He used his position to protect Rumsfeld as one senior British civil servant explained,

“The VP had stolen more power from the Oval Office than any living Vice President in living memory...and he used it to protect Rumsfeld’s area. He wanted to make sure that the neo-cons¹¹ had room to command and control the operation without interference from other parts of the US government.”¹²

In threatening unilateral pre-emptive action against another sovereign nation based on strong suspicion but little fact, the debate also exposed Washington’s adoption of a generally indifferent opinion concerning political and military advice offered by its international allies, other foreign governments, and the United Nations.¹³ Simply put, international allies would not jeopardise the neo-conservatives agenda for Iraq.¹⁴ Military action alone would defeat Saddam and thereafter herald a new era of democracy in the Middle East. The problem was that, compared to Phase III, very little thought was given to that new era.

The US and the remainder of the Coalition, “seduced by the idea of quick victory and decapitation [of Saddam’s regime],”¹⁵ did not plan for a post-conflict Iraq to the same magnitude or with the same resolve that it had committed to winning Phase III. As the British military staff in Washington remarked, “Lots of people were thinking Phase IV and there was planning for worst-case but it focused mainly on the humanitarian side and major infrastructure catastrophe.”¹⁶ The Pentagon ultimately chose to ignore the US State Department’s ‘Future of Iraq’ project published in late 2002.

The ‘Future of Iraq’ paper brought together 17 working groups with a remit ‘to systematically cover what would be needed to rebuild the political and economic infrastructure of the country.’¹⁷ Ultimately a source of ideas emanating from experts drawn from a number of fields, including a large Iraqi expatriate community¹⁸, the project numbered 13 volumes, much of it in Arabic, at a cost of \$5 million. It made a number of recommendations of which three were critical. The immediate requirement and “key to coalition and community relations” concerned the urgency to provide electricity and water to the population as soon as military hostilities had ended.”¹⁹ Secondly, the working groups emphasised that Iraq, once the regime had been removed, was likely to sit in a dangerous power vacuum during which criminals would have “the opportunity to engage in acts of killing, plunder and looting.”²⁰ Thirdly, central to Iraq’s future would be an apolitical and re-structured military that would be built after a comprehensive Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme.

Stapled to the project’s recommendations were a series of CIA assessments that urged caution in removing the regime. One report stated that “rivalries in Iraq were so deep, and the political culture so shallow, that a similarly quick transfer of sovereignty would only invite chaos.”²¹ Despite these highly qualified assessments, it was the collective voice of the neo-conservatives that dominated the networks, talk-shows and political discussion in Washington. Ironically, given the Administration’s disinclination to listen either to domestic or foreign advice, it was the influence of a group of Iraqi exiles that would set the course for American foreign and military policy in Iraq.

The 'London Seven', a group of Iraq exiles led by Ahmed Chalibi promised a swift re-emergence of Iraqi government institutions and security forces. It was an enticing message and one that the neo-conservatives firmly trumpeted. Coalition forces would be welcomed as liberators in similar fashion as Allied soldiers had been at the end of the Second World War. Asked on NBC's Meet the Press "...if your analysis is not correct and we're not treated as liberators but as conquerors, and the Iraqis begin to resist, particularly in Baghdad, do you think the American people are prepared for a long, costly, bloody battle with significant American casualties?" Dick Cheney replied,

"Well, I don't think it's likely to unfold that way because I really do believe that we will be greeted as liberators. Various groups and individuals, people who have devoted their lives from the outside to trying to change things inside Iraq... The read we get on the people of Iraq is there is no question but that they want to get rid of Saddam Hussein and they will welcome as liberators the United States when we come to do that."²²

In what has now become a famous parable, Rumsfeld's personal and very precise involvement in building the TPFDD to match Cheney's outlook ran at odds with a number of senior US General Officers. Foremost among those was General Shinseki, the US Army's Chief of Staff. In November 2002, when asked about the size of force required for Iraq, General Shinseki told Congress that "something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers are probably...required; we're talking about post-hostilities control over a piece of geography that's fairly significant, with the kinds of ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems."²³ The Administration subsequently ridiculed him. Paul Wolfowitz told a House Budget Committee that the "higher-end predictions that we have been hearing recently, such as the notion that it will take several hundred thousand US troops to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq, are wildly off the mark."²⁴

The Defence Secretary, who had never really respected his Army Chief of Staff²⁵, now believed that he had ample reason to get personally involved in crafting the invasion force. By interfering in the TPFDD, Rumsfeld scaled back the size of the

invasion force to its leanest and lightest level similar in scope to the Afghanistan and RMA-centric model. In General Franks, CENTCOM commander, he had a loyal servant who believed that “the days of half-million-strong mobilisations were over.”²⁶ Throughout 2002, American force levels were reduced from 500,000 down to 160,000 and beyond to meet the requirement of a rapid deployment followed by a swift victory against a dilapidated Iraqi Army. General Franks articulated the American approach to war, “this is not 1990. The Iraqi military today is not the one we faced in 1991. And our own forces are much different. We see that in Afghanistan.”²⁷ It was with this confidence that Secretary Rumsfeld persuaded President Bush to sign his National Security Presidential Directive 24 on 20 February 2003, approximately one month before the Coalition would invade Iraq.

RECONSTRUCTION AND REINTEGRATION

Throughout the latter half of 2002 and early January 2003 the US Administration had begun talking about creating a non-deployable office for post-war planning. NSPD 24 formerly authorised the creation of an Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) under DOD leadership. Rumsfeld was now responsible for not post-conflict operations in Iraq²⁸ and American foreign and strategic policy “which it is not equipped to do.”²⁹ On Rumsfeld’s advice, the President appointed retired US general Jay Garner to lead it. Garner immediately began the task of pulling together a widely experienced team from across the US government. British interests were represented by Major General Tim Cross and a small contingent of British military staff officers.³⁰

Garner immediately convened a Rock-Drill at Fort McNair to which virtually every US government department attended. General Tim Cross recalled that,

“It was a very good rock-drill [including] a variety of presentations ranging from people in the education plan, the de-nazification programme, the Treasury...the entire spectrum of where people had got to; it was during this drill that the idea emerged of deploying ORHA.”³¹

One of those who had been invited by General Garner was Thomas Warrick, the State department official who had been the principal author of the 'Future of Iraq' project. Garner had great confidence in Warrick and was delighted to have him on the ORHA team. Despite this, Rumsfeld summoned Garner to his office a day before ORHA was due to leave for Kuwait and ordered him to release Warrick and 15 other State Department officials.³² He was concerned that they would paint a pessimistic picture of what was required after Phase III thereby derailing the war plans he almost keenly wanted to implement. General Cross bluntly assesses the 'neo-cons' grip on the Administration, "...the neo-cons had their own paradigm of what Iraq was going to look like and if your plan didn't conform then you were out."³³ But their plan for post-conflict Iraq was not clear. One American commander summed up the concerns within the Coalition,

"When you remove a regime by military power, you [usually] have some government institution to step in and take control. It's either inside the country already or outside the country. At the national level, I think that there were some questionable assumptions over what would happen after Saddam Hussein was removed. There was somewhat a naïve sense that somehow the Iraqi population would be very happy that Saddam was not in power, and all of a sudden that they would come out and rejoice and control their own destiny, get back to work, but unfortunately we took some advice from some ex-patriots that probably had no relationship to modern Iraq."³⁴

Although Franks's believed that Phase IV "might prove more challenging than major combat operations,"³⁵ the heavy weight on emphasis remained with the Decisive Operations of Phase III. One British senior officer noted the level of CENTCOM planning, "Military planning for the military phase had been going on in huge depth. CENTCOM had been planning this for some time. They had been together since 9/11 and they wanted to execute the Iraq Plan before they broke up."³⁶

Nonetheless, comprehensive discussions were held in Tampa, the Headquarters of CENTCOM, about the challenges that Phase IV posed. Massive funding would be needed to address the immediate needs of the Iraqi people and thousands of ex-

soldiers would need jobs. Political leadership would need to be identified, although a de-Ba'athification programme would take place first. Above all, it was vital to adjust "American expectations that the process would be fast and painless."³⁷ But in reality the discussions failed to provide the answers that ORHA needed: "We asked about the health system, the electrical grid and the sewage treatment plants. The intelligence community could tell us very little. We just didn't know how decrepit the system was and how easily it could be disrupted."³⁸

Despite Franks's concerns and the efforts of Jay Garner, General Cross and others, the reality of ORHA's late entrance meant that it was not particularly welcome either in DC or in Tampa. The war planners at CENTCOM resented the late arrival of bustling civil servants and retired military officers who were not contributing anything to the main effort of Phase III. Planning meetings now became closed door sessions where the presence of ORHA representatives was rejected: "At one stage there was a one-star US engineer who was introduced to the planning team as being the man who was going to run a task force and the bottom line is that he was cut out [as] not a war-fighter. So he was told to go somewhere else."³⁹

ORHA's exclusion from the important discussions being held in Tampa was due to the blurred command relationship between ORHA, CENTCOM and CFLCC that would exist in Iraq. Garner was clear that he was working for General Franks but the NSPD had clearly stated that ORHA was to be the "senior entity" on the ground, usurping both CFLCC and CENTCOM and working directly to Rumsfeld. Was Garner going to be the Viceroy of Iraq? If so, when would the transfer of command between CFLCC and ORHA take place? What exactly was meant by regime change? No-one could provide the answers. When ORHA deployed to Kuwait on 16 March 2003, three days before the war began, its presence resembled that of an unwanted guest.

In short, post-war assumptions rested entirely on the views of the 'London Seven', the majority of whom had not been in Iraq for nearly 25 years. From a purely military standpoint, there was widespread belief that ORHA was not organised adequately across all of the lines of operation to deal with the problems that Iraq would pose

regardless of what the exiles said.⁴⁰ General Franks recognised the difficulties that ORHA faced:

“...it was understaffed...under-funded and their mission was not clear to everyone on the team. Jay Garner is going into this situation badly handicapped. Before the war had begun, Garner had spent weeks walking the corridors of power in Washington, hat in hand. He needed people and money. But he could only suggest a hypothetical situation: *If the United States went to war, could your department provide...? No experienced bureaucrat would refuse a hypothetical request. They would meet it – with hypothetical resources, vague promises that cost their department nothing in terms of funds or personnel...Penny wise will surely be pound foolish. We will spend dollars today...or blood tomorrow.*”⁴¹

It was a thought that in time became a reality.

WAR-FIGHTING

On 17 March 2003, President Bush publically issued the order that “Saddam Hussein and his two sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their failure to do will result in military action, commenced at a time of our choosing.”⁴² When the ultimatum expired, Bush informed the world that the Coalition had launched military operations to ‘disarm Iraq, to free its people and defend the world from grave danger.’⁴³ For the next three weeks, all eyes were firmly fixed on Phase III.

The plan that Lieutenant General McKiernan and the staff at CENTCOM and CFLCC had devised was militarily spectacular. Along a western boundary, American forces spearheaded by the 3rd Infantry Division raced alongside the west edge of Euphrates River towards the Karbala Gap and into Baghdad. Along a parallel eastern boundary between the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force manoeuvred through the heart of Iraq and attacked Baghdad from the east.⁴⁴ SOF operated throughout the country to destroy strategic threats and secure Iraq’s oil fields. Basrah was occupied by Britain’s 1st Armoured Division while Mosul, Iraq’s

3rd largest city, was occupied by the 10th Special Forces Group and 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit. Ground forces were accompanied by numerous fighter aircraft and strategic bombers as well as a fleet of naval vessels in the Persian Gulf.⁴⁵ Unprecedented Information and Deception Operations were conducted.

Despite the audacity of the plan to occupy Baghdad, Coalition forces did not manoeuvre through, or engage any Iraqi forces, in the towns and villages in the western corridor running from Baghdad to the Jordanian border. They were not considered a threat. Among them were the towns of Fallujah and Ramadi. It was an oversight not lost on some in the US chain of command, "...historically they were Ba`athist strongholds and probably the location of bad guys and we had bypassed those places."⁴⁶

Other than the occasional logistics truck driving to Baghdad from Jordan, the Dulaimi and Shammur tribal populations along the corridor never saw frontline US forces. Instead they listened to the BBC World Service as the towns and cities south of Baghdad fell in quick succession. As Coalition forces pulled down Saddam's statue in central Baghdad on 9 April 2003, the tribes of the western desert realised that not only was a distant war coming to a close but that Coalition forces had not, and perhaps would not, conquer *their* towns, cities and tribal areas. Their local councils remained in place and their buildings and infrastructure were still standing; tribal life could continue as it had done for centuries before. However when the hunt for Saddam and his associates spread from Baghdad into the western desert, that perception was shattered. On 11 April 2003, the US Air Force launched six JDAM missiles at a house 11 miles outside of Ramadi in the heart of al Anbar province. The effects were not only destructive to the house, but to American aspirations in what soon became euphemistically known as the 'Sunni Triangle.'

WINDOW OF NECESSITY

The missile warheads were seeking Saddam's half-brother⁴⁷ who was meant to be holding a meeting at the house but had left some time beforehand. The only people in the house were the tribal chief shaykh Malik Al-Kharbit and 21 members of his family. The Kharbit are a major force in the Dulaimi tribal federation, whose

stronghold includes the main urban centres in the Triangle - Fallujah, Ramadi, Qaim and Rutbah.⁴⁸ After the attack, in which the shaykh and his family were all killed, the tribes along the western corridor were “no longer willing to help US forces.”⁴⁹ Tribal solidarity, and antagonism towards American forces, now spread throughout the Dulaimi federation. On 17 April 2003, more tribal blood was spilt in Fallujah. The effects were as similarly destructive.

When the first units of the 82nd Airborne Division occupied Fallujah in mid-April 2003 their presence in local government buildings and schools led to a series of demonstrations. On 28 April, protests at a local school became violent when troops opened fire on the crowd, killing up to 17 civilians and wounding a further 75.⁵⁰ The shootings enraged the city’s population. Nearly all of whom were members of the Dulaimi tribal federation and the incidents galvanised them into a coherent resistance movement. Some accused American forces of “stealing our oil and slaughtering our people” while others urged its forces to not only leave Fallujah but “leave our country completely. We are a Muslim country.”⁵¹ Other, more sinister pleas were issued, “Now, all preachers of Fallujah mosques [Fallujah is known as the City of Mosques due to it having over 80] and all youths...are organising martyr operations against all American occupiers.”⁵²

Despite the underlying threat that these incidents had for long-term American security in Iraq, the Coalition’s military gaze remained transfixed on Baghdad. The demolition of the statue was meant to not only symbolise the end of Saddam’s rule but also the end of Phase III. On 1 May 2003, a triumphant President Bush bestrode USS Abraham Lincoln and declared that “major combat operations have ended. In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed...our coalition is now engaged in securing and reconstructing that country.”⁵³ However, in place of the predicted Humanitarian and Infrastructure disaster was a rapidly escalating internal security crisis which prevented the transfer of command from taking place. It was into this environment which ORHA arrived and for which it was totally unprepared.

ORHA'S ROLE IN POST-WAR IRAQ

ORHA had spent a considerable amount of time and effort in Kuwait shoring up its capability to implement its plans for the humanitarian and infrastructural crisis that CENTCOM predicted. It had successfully encouraged most US government departments to commit an Advisory Team consisting of three to four specialists. Additionally, it had surreptitiously flown in specialists from across the Coalition in an attempt to 'internationalise' the organisation, though this caused much consternation in Washington which was deeply suspicious of its intentions.⁵⁴ There were a number of absentees, the most notable being any officials from the Pentagon forcing ORHA's retired military officers to form their own Defence Advisory Team.

While building up its force structure and cross-area capabilities, ORHA's staff had been developing its contingency plans to cope with the range of scenarios that CENTCOM had predicted. As one staff officer recalled,

“The consensus was that there were going to be major issues – NBC, lack of water, starvation, [and] doomsday. [All of it was] clearly an exaggeration but it was just difficult to know how much. In trying to get a reality check there was no direction from anyone.”⁵⁵

Despite a lack of strategic direction, Garner's concept would see ORHA initially help each Ministry to start operating again by giving small cash payments of between \$20 and \$25 and promising to help where it could. By August, Garner wanted an Interim Iraqi Authority stood up. The London Seven would then arrive and use the Iraqi military and police forces to establish power. At no stage would Garner assume 'Viceroy' status, relying instead on the London Seven set up an administration in which people who have been in Iraq for the last 25 years would have critical roles. The new government would then be able to write a constitution before staging elections. In proposing such an ambitious plan “no-one told him any differently and certainly no-one in the UK told me how to stand up a government.”⁵⁶

When ORHA arrived in Baghdad on 21 April most of the infrastructure needed to run the country was still in place. Its headquarters comprised 270 staff officers⁵⁷, limited

communications facilities, no offices to move into, no personal security officers and a security situation on the ground which nobody had either predicted or prepared them for. Its late arrival ensured that it was never able to wrest command and control from CFLCC because it was not equipped to deal with the security crisis. However, Garner insisted that ORHA push forward with its agenda. He chaired two meetings with Iraqi political representatives and the London Seven in Nasiriyah and in Baghdad. These were intended as “initial moves towards the establishment of a national conference, which could set up the interim Iraqi authority and make progress towards constitutional change and the election of a new government.”⁵⁸ In addition, ORHA’s 18 Advisory Teams began the onerous task of getting hold of the Iraqi staff at each of the government’s ministries.

On reaching a particular ministerial building, the Advisory Teams often found members of its staff waiting outside and eager to work. Many had computer disks containing databases of names and addresses for all of the ministerial staff. Subsequent meetings were arranged at ORHA’s makeshift headquarters in the heart of the former Ba`athist sector and now known as the Green Zone. In choosing the Iraq Convention Centre, ORHA had a central location but one which the majority of Iraqis citizens did not know how to get to the area as it had been cordoned off from the rest of the city since 1968. As Paul Hughes later recounted,

“I was talking to an employee of one particular Ministry outside of the Green Zone one night and told him to come and see me the next day to discuss how his Ministry could be stood up. When I told him where to come he had no idea where I was talking about. When I told him that it was next to the Al Rashid Hotel he became very nervous; he had never been to that part of [Ba`athist-controlled] Baghdad before. We paid in spades for that mistake.”⁵⁹

Despite the sense of optimism that these meetings generated, CFLCC only had enough troops to guard four of the Baghdad’s 21 ministries.

SECURITY VACUUM

The security situation rapidly deteriorated after 9 April. Buoyed by the presence of tens of thousands of prisoners that Saddam had released before the war had started, widespread looting and destruction of the visible elements of Saddam's regime now took place. Organised criminal groups and gangs of men armed with assault rifles swept through Baghdad's commercial and government districts, ransacking buildings and pillaging the residences of the Regime's officials.⁶⁰ Thieves 'jumpstarted' tractors and bulldozers and drove them away. Mobs ransacked factories and warehouses, returning home in a parade of cars, trucks, and wheelbarrows piled with stolen goods. Government ministries were stripped of all plumbing, wires and furniture before being burned to the ground.⁶¹ Every unguarded ministry was looted and burned to the ground.

The four ministries that remained standing included the Oil Ministry. To many Iraqis, the sight of American troops guarding its Oil Ministry while its Ministry of Culture and central museum smouldered nearby reasserted the Iraqi perception that the US was only interested in Iraq for its oil. As one bystander remarked, "it's that they protected nothing else. The Oil Ministry is not off by itself. It's surrounded by other ministries, all of which the Americans allowed to be looted. So what else do you want us to think except that you want our oil?"⁶² Anarchy threatened as one senior Coalition commander recalls,

"There we are, in a fairly chaotic situation in May timeframe where there are no institutions in operation, from fire departments, police departments, to national political leadership, to regional political and national political leadership. There are no ministries, no prisoners in prisons [because] they've all been released, no judicial system, no economic system, there's nothing. And you have fairly small military footprint at that time for a country the size of California with a population of 26 million people and so you try and deal with it without having martial law authority and without having a government apparatus ready to take control."⁶³

In order to protect its own forces, CFLCC ramped up its own security posture and issued the order for all Coalition vehicle convoys leaving the Green Zone to have a Military Police (MP) escort. The relative scarcity of MP trucks and the pressure on them to accompany military patrols that were attempting to stem the growing violence, meant that ORHA missions dropped down the priority queues. This was highlighted on one morning when every ORHA team assembled in the forecourt of the Convention Centre and waited for MP trucks to escort them to the ministerial meetings. When the escorts didn't arrive, those meetings were cancelled. "One ORHA staffer arranged to meet 1,000 employees of the Ministry of Planning to give each an emergency \$20 payment – a standard subsidy for government workers until a new salary scale can be devised. The military, which didn't deem his mission a priority, cancelled the convoy at the last minute, leading to hours of arguments and finally an appeal to a general to secure the vehicles."⁶⁴

ORHA never could pick up the pace again, a situation made worse by those ministerial staff being unaware of where ORHA's HQ was. Stranded behind the Palace's walls, pleading with Washington to give it more authority and with CFLCC to take it more seriously, ORHA disintegrated as rapidly as the security situation around them. Back in Washington, "...Administration officials watched the chaotic images on TV and blamed General Garner. White House officials muttered about 'Occupation Light' and decided that Garner, who was strolling around in shirt sleeves and genially chatting with the locals, was a little too chummy with the vanquished."⁶⁵

PREPARED TO FAIL

ORHA failed for a number of reasons. Despite the assertions of NSPD 24, Garner was never given the authority as the pro-consul in Iraq over the military commanders. His organisation was understaffed and under-resourced and drip fed a series of erroneous predictions upon which they hatched equally unrealistic plans. Though Garner's political ambitions for an Iraqi constitution were perfectly reasonable, a mass of detail needed to have been worked out in Washington beforehand for them to work. All of these factors were not insurmountable if the security situation in Baghdad had been benign. ORHA's plans were ultimately blown away by a dangerously contagious

security situation for which CFLCC had neither the resources nor the energy with which to deal. As one senior Coalition official criticised,

“At some point in the campaign [you have] to control the population and dominate terrain, and let me define what I mean by that. Control population – at some point for some transitional period of time you are the defacto authority. In Bosnia it almost was martial law. In Iraq the military is going to be the authority for this transition period. By dominating terrain you are going protect the sovereignty of that nation, control the borders, public buildings, oil [and] electricity that is going to require a presence on the ground which is going to be larger than perhaps the ground presence that you had for the kinetic part of the operation. The numbers needed to control a population is the dilemma. The logic for military leaders with our experience would tell you that it was a no-brainer: it would take you more people after you break something to control it for a while so that you can turn it over to a stable and secure arrangement.”⁶⁶

The final nail in Garner’s coffin concerned his freedom to re-invigorate Iraq’s economy by handing out cash. But there wasn’t much available. The money was held back in DC and if it was used a complex auditing process was attached to it. Similarly the economic contracts that would have brought the large reconstruction corporations to Iraq were buried in a political quagmire in DC. If they could get to Iraq they had to have security. Therefore the failure of ORHA was as much as failure of the military plan that was meant to allow it to prosper but in reality never did. The end result was that the Coalition “went in with the minimum force to accomplish the military objectives, which was a straightforward task, never really in question. And then we immediately found ourselves shorthanded in the aftermath. We sat there and watched people dismantle and run off with the country.”⁶⁷

On 6 May 2003, President Bush appointed Jerry Bremer as his Presidential Envoy to Iraq and “senior leader of the Coalition.”⁶⁸ On 8 May 2003 the USA and the UK informed the Security Council that they had created the Coalition Provincial Authority (CPA), to include ORHA, “to exercise powers of government temporarily

and, as necessary, especially to provide security, to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid, and to eliminate weapons of mass destruction.”⁶⁹ General Garner, although he was asked to remain in Baghdad, returned to Washington but was cast a “complete and utter failure by the Administration.”⁷⁰

BREMER AND THE DISMANTLING OF IRAQ

Ambassador Bremer flew into Baghdad’s Saddam International Airport on 12 April 2003 aboard a US Air Force C-17.⁷¹ The initial impressions were encouraging. Standing next to Jay Garner, Bremer told reporters that “We are not here as a colonial power. We are here to turn over to the Iraqi people...as quickly as possible.”⁷² Although Bremer was a State Department official, “he will report to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and will advise the President, through the Secretary, on policies designed to achieve American and Coalition goals for Iraq.”⁷³ As General Cross recalls,

“Bremer flew into Baghdad with the style that Jay should have come in. Inside the C17 was a containerised office. On the first day he told the military to move your headquarters and you will do what I am telling you to do. He became the CPA, it was embodied in him and it was accompanied by a letter from the President. Soon afterwards there were a lot more people.”⁷⁴

Within a week of arriving, Bremer enacted three orders that “fundamentally flawed [despite being] told by an awful lot of people that they were fundamentally flawed. It was the only time that I saw Jay Garner lose his temper.”⁷⁵

On 16 May Bremer announced the “disestablishment of the Ba`ath Party of Iraq.”⁷⁶ It was the first of an eventual total of 100 CPA orders. The Order set up an Iraqi De-Ba`athification Council (IDC) and charged it with the authority of investigating and “removing roughly the top six layers of bureaucracy.”⁷⁷ The promptness in which Bremer announced the order strongly implies that the decision had been made by the Administration before Bremer departed for Iraq. In issuing it, the CPA hoped that a

“representative government in Iraq is not threatened by Ba`athist elements returning to power and that those in positions of authority in the future are acceptable to the people of Iraq.”⁷⁸ Although the Order was necessary to purge Iraq of the senior political and military leadership of the country, the immediacy of its implementation created not only a groundswell of sympathy for those that had been purged, but left a gaping hole in the ability of a future Iraqi government to lead the country. The decision to de-Ba`athify Iraq was greeted broadly in America although there was immediate concern in Iraq over what would replace it. As for the military decision, Bremer later described it as “the single most popular thing I’ve done since I’ve been in Iraq.”⁷⁹

Bremer’s second decision, announced on 23 May 2003⁸⁰, dissolved the Iraqi security services, its army and Republican Guard, the defence and information ministries and all military courts without payment or access to pensions.⁸¹ Although it had disintegrated during the war, the Army’s formal dissolution was a staggering reversal of the publically proclaimed pre-war plan to employ the military as the leading institution to rebuild the country during Phase IV. 400,000 people suddenly lost their only source of income without *any* consideration for the effect. Overnight, the political and military landscape that had been in existence in Iraq for 30 years was changed. Humiliated, angry and armed, scores of former soldiers and officers decided *at that moment* to form a resistance movement. Flash demonstrations broke out across the country. US forces, many of whom were still in a ‘war-fighting’ mode, were deployed to break them up. Although they were successful on a number of occasions there were occasional but costly errors.⁸² On 18 June in Baghdad, two former soldiers were shot and killed and several were injured when US troops fired into their demonstration.⁸³

Given the hubristic perception within the Pentagon that both decisions would be welcomed the prospects for ordinary Iraqis were ominous. The point is not that these institutions should have been allowed to carry on ‘business as usual’; the blunder lay in the timing. CPA officials seem to have forgotten to ask themselves what it might mean to turn tens of thousands of military officers loose on the street without at first even the promise of monetary compensation.⁸⁴ Combined with the final decision that Bremer enacted, these decisions were fatal.

Within a week of arriving, and advertising Washington's deep sense of unease with the 'London Seven' and the aspirations of Ahmed Chalibi's in particular. Bremer cancelled the plans for a provisional government. On 13 July he appointed an interim Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) that would assist the CPA in drafting a constitution and planning future elections.⁸⁵ It attracted immediate criticism. Whereas Garner's conferences in Nasiriyah and Baghdad had given Iraqis real encouragement to shape their own future, the perception was that the exile-heavy 25 member IGC⁸⁶ had a different and more threatening agenda. As General Cross recounts,

“ [Garner] slowed down the whole political process. In other words all the meetings that Jay had had, all the work that Jay had put into practice, ‘stop it...now. And stop it now because we want to ensure that the right people emerge to run this government.’⁸⁷

Furthermore, it struggled to find *sunni* Arabs to join the council thus eroding the meagre legitimacy that it already had.⁸⁸

The magnitude of Bremer's three decisions would be played out almost immediately but they would have long-term consequences. First, they dismantled the structure of society that the majority of Iraqis had grown over the course of their lives and built nothing in its place. Secondly, the Coalition's military onslaught had not only terrified millions of ordinary Iraqis but its subsequent inability to secure the country and provide for its people in accordance with all that Bush had promised on 19 March robbed it of legitimacy and trust. Thirdly, an already wary *sunni* population immediately became disenfranchised when Bremer re-negotiated the political programme and, seemingly, their role in a future Iraq. When the UN announced Resolution 1483 on 22 May, it confirmed to many Iraqis what they had long been suspecting; their liberators had now become their occupiers. Anyone who had studied Iraq's history would realise that the Coalition had set an ominous precedent.

SIX MONTHS AND COUNTING...

As with all previous counter-insurgency campaigns, the opening moves of the campaign are fundamentally important. The three months that sit either side of 19 March 2003 represent that critical period. In the three months before the campaign, the amount of effort that the US military spent on planning for Phase III completely overwhelmed the effort apportioned to Phase IV. In the three months after G Day, the decisions that the Coalition made, and the situation that was unravelling on the ground, ultimately sealed its fate. Perfecting counter-insurgency is now the clarion call within Iraq. Several moments over the last two years have exposed the fault lines that run across the Coalition campaign in Iraq – UN Resolution 1483 bestowing occupational powers to America and Britain; the killing of the UN Special Representative to Iraq on 19 August 2003; the capture of Saddam Husayn; the Abu Ghraib prison scandal; the Shi`a-led uprising in April and August 2004; the murder of four private security contractors and subsequent military assaults on Fallujah in April and November 2004; the deployment of the Black Watch battle group to North Babil; the countless kidnappings, executions, beheadings and suicide bombings; the training of Iraqi Security Forces and the entire Security Sector Governance (SSG) process; and the elections at the beginning of 2005 and the political stalemate that followed.

Each has its own series of consequences which have dogged the campaign. In analysing the broad lessons that have been identified from the campaign it is necessary to look at the nature of the insurgency that exists in Iraq today. By understanding this, one can put into context the scale of the mistakes that the Coalition has made in the last two years. Western political and military doctrine must now be re-cast.

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- ¹ Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, Simon & Schuster, 2004, p.13
- ² President Bush's State of the Union address, his first. Cited in James Fallows, *Blind into Baghdad*, The Atlantic Monthly, January 2004.
- ³ Michael Clarke, "The Diplomacy that Led to War in Iraq," in *The Conflict in Iraq, 2003*, edited by Paul Cornish, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, pp.27-59
- ⁴ UN Resolution 1441 (2002), S/RES/1441 (2002), dated 8 November 2002
- ⁵ "The Diplomacy that Led to War in Iraq", p.43
- ⁶ All information in this chapter from General Tommy Franks, *American Soldier*, Regan Books, 2004
- ⁷ Interview with senior British diplomat, June 2005
- ⁸ Hans Blix, *Disarming Iraq*, pp.12-13, cited in Michael Clarke, p.38
- ⁹ Interview with senior British Foreign Office official, June 2005
- ¹⁰ Interview with senior British civil servant, June 2005
- ¹¹ This is a somewhat controversial term referring to the political goals and ideology of the "new conservatives" in the US. The 'newness' refers to the term's origination as either describing converts new to American conservatism (sometimes coming from a liberal or big-government New Deal background) or to being part of a 'new wave' of conservative political thought and political organisation. Definition taken from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neoconservatism_\(United_States\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neoconservatism_(United_States))
- ¹² Interview with senior British civil servant, UK, 9 June 2005
- ¹³ The caveat to this is that the US *did* listen to certain key individuals from the UN, Great Britain and Australia. Unfortunately these somewhat lone voices had sympathetic ears in DC but were unable to influence the overall direction in which the US was headed.
- ¹⁴ It was at this time that all non-Americans began to realise the effects that 9/11 had had on the American psyche. Simply put, the Americans were at war.
- ¹⁵ Interview with Defence Attaché, 19 April 2005
- ¹⁶ *ibid*
- ¹⁷ These ranged from a working group to consider 'Democratic Principles and Procedures' and a 'Transitional Justice' group to 'Public Finance' and 'Oil and Energy'.
- ¹⁸ The majority of the exiles belonged to Ahmed Chalibi's Iraqi National Congress (INC) and several Kurdish groups and Assyrian and Turkomen organisations. It also included the Iraqi Constitutional Monarchy.
- ¹⁹ Future of Iraq Project, cited in Fallows.
- ²⁰ Fallows. Further predictions were given by Rend Rahim Francke, an Iraqi exile serving in Washington, who told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "the system of public security will break down, because there will be no functioning police force, no civil service, and no justice system [immediately after the fighting]...there will be a vacuum of political authority and administrative authority. The infrastructure of vital sectors will have to be restored. An adequate police force must be trained and equipped as quickly as possible. And the economy will have to be jump-started from not only stagnation but devastation."
- ²¹ Fallows. These views were shared with the author with senior representatives of the US Council of Foreign Relations, Washington, April 2005
- ²² E.J. Dionne, "Behind the Failure," *The Washington Post*, 22 August 2003, p.A22, cited in Carlos L. Yordan, "Failing to Meet Expectations in Iraq: A Review of the Original US Post-War Strategy," *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 8, No.1, March 2004, p.55
- ²³ Senate Armed Services Committee report, 25 February 2003.
- ²⁴ Paul Wolfowitz testifies to the House Budget Committee on 27 February 2003. He went on to say, "It's hard to conceive that it would take more forces to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself and to secure the surrender of Saddam's security forces and his army. Hard to imagine." Rumsfeld announced the successor to General Shinseki 14 months ahead of time.
- ²⁵ Rumsfeld thought that Shinseki was a army general of the old-school – ponderous, overly cautious and built from the same mould as General Colin Powell. He subsequently announced Shinseki's successor 14 months ahead of time by calling out of retirement General Peter Schoomaker. The final snub came when the Secretary did not attend Shinseki's Farewell Ceremony.
- ²⁶ General Tommy Franks, *American Soldier*, Harper Collins, 2004, p.394
- ²⁷ *ibid*, p.333
- ²⁸ NSPD 24 has not been made available to the public. A news article stated that ORHA was tied to the Pentagon and that, while USAID would handle much of the humanitarian and reconstruction work,

ORHA would be in charge of the funding. ORHA's goals were to assist with Humanitarian Relief, defeating and exploiting terrorist networks, dismantle Iraq's WMD, facilitate the protection and reconstruction of Iraq's infrastructure and organise the transition to an Iraqi-led authority

²⁹ Interview with Major General Cross, May 2005

³⁰ The mechanics of the early days of ORHA and the appointments of Generals Garner and Cross reveal the chaos that US and UK political and military planners were involved with. General Garner was a respected retired General who had led the successful US mission to assist the Kurds (Op XXX) from Saddam's purges after the 2nd Gulf War. Rumsfeld had met him at a conference on the military in space and was impressed enough to ask him to set up the office of post-war reconstruction. Within days he had called a number of retired former military colleagues to join him. They all did, leaving behind well-paid civilian jobs 'at the drop of a hat.' General Cross, who had originally been appointed as the 2-star commander of British forces in Turkey (for an expected assault into Iraq from the north) before returning to the UK and then two days later being asked to be the UK representative in ORHA. On accepting the appointment, General Cross similarly telephoned former colleagues to join him. A number of these officers had worked with General Garner in northern Iraq and a mutual professional and personal respect existed between both parties.

³¹ Interview with Major General Tim Cross, Netheravon, May 2005

³² The chronicle of events behind Warrick's sacking runs like a true Washington conspiracy. On 23 Feb, a day before he was due to leave for Kuwait, Rumsfeld asked Garner to remove 16 of the 20 State officials "Jay, have you got a guy named Warrick on your team?" "I said, 'Yes, I do,' He said, 'Well, I've got to ask you to remove him.' I said, 'I don't want to remove him; he's too valuable,' But he said, 'This came to me from such a high level that I can't overturn it, and I've got to ask you to remove Mr. Warrick.'" Warrick was allegedly suspicious of the Iraqi exiles. Newsweek's conclusion was that the man giving the instructions was Dick Cheney. John Barry and Evan Thomas, *The Unbuilding of Iraq*, Newsweek, 10 June 2003, Vol.142, Issue 14

³³ Major General Cross, interview, May 2005

³⁴ Interview with senior American general, April 2005, USA.

³⁵ Franks, p.352

³⁶ Cross, May 05.

³⁷ Franks, p.424. It is interesting to note that Franks admits that CENTCOM's plans included de-Ba'athification and de-mobilisation, decisions that were severely criticized when Ambassador Bremer made them in May 03.

³⁸ Interview with Paul Hughes, senior ORHA official, May 2005

³⁹ General Cross, interview May 05. This runs against what Franks says in his book: "Jay and his team spent countless hours with the CENTCOM staff and the key planners on the Joint Staff and in OSD, hammering out processes and procedures that would place US army civil affairs specialists in every province in Iraq." It is easy to criticize CENTCOM but as General Cross highlights General Franks and his team had been on working since 9/11

⁴⁰ The US military uses the acronym DIME to explain the lines of operation that are required in post-conflict scenarios. Standing for Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic, it is clear from my interviews that the senior military leadership did believe that only part of the DIME equation had been synchronised before the war started and that once it did start it was extremely difficult to pull together because the situation on the ground is so fluid.

⁴¹ Franks, pp.525-526. His emphasis.

⁴² www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases

⁴³ ibid

⁴⁴ Williamson Murray and Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr., *The Iraq War*, Harvard University Press, 2003, pp.59-70. Britain's 1st Armoured Division was attached to 1 MEF and attacked Basrah.

⁴⁵ ibid

⁴⁶ Interview, April 2005

⁴⁷ Tahir Jahir Habbush was, according to Newsweek, working for the CIA and was at the house trying to organise a meeting with a CIA station chief before the missiles were launched. He escaped. See "Unmasking the Insurgents," *Newsweek*, February 2005, downloaded from www.msnbc.msn.com on 18 May 2005

⁴⁸ Carl Conetta, "Vicious Circle: The Dynamics of Occupation and Resistance in Iraq," *Al Jazeera*, 17 May 2005 and "Unmasking the Insurgents," *Newsweek*, February 2005

⁴⁹ Baram, p.13

⁵⁰ www.washingtonpost.com

⁵¹ Edmund Blair, "Anger Mounts After U.S. Troops Kill 13 Iraqi Protesters," *Reuters*, 29 April 2003, downloaded from www.commondreams.org/cgi-bin/print/cgi?file=headlines03/0429-01.html on 6 July 2005

⁵² *ibid*

⁵³ "Bush Speech Aboard USS Abraham Lincoln, 1 May 2003," seen on 6 Jul 05 at www.home.earthlink.net/~platter/speeches/030501-bush-lincoln.html

⁵⁴ Furthermore, each government department in DC had contributed 3-4 of its staff to ORHA. Thus there were representatives from the US Department of Agriculture, Commerce, the Treasury and so on. The Pentagon did not send anyone and so ORHA operated without a Defence Advisory Team.

⁵⁵ Major General Tim Cross, interview, May 05

⁵⁶ *ibid*

⁵⁷ General Garner asked that General Cross be his Deputy to work alongside an Operational Deputy, an International Deputy and a Long-Term Reconstruction Deputy. General Cross filled the International Deputy role but nobody turned up to fill the other two vacant positions.

⁵⁸ HC Deb, 28 April 2003, c.22 cited in UK House of Commons Research Paper 03/51, "Iraq: law of occupation," 2 June 2003, written by Paul Bowers

⁵⁹ Interview with Paul Hughes, Washington DC, 19 April 2005

⁶⁰ Robert M. Perito, *The Coalition's Provincial Authority's Experience with Public Security in Iraq, Lessons Identified*, Special Report 137, United States Institute of Peace, April 2005. Downloaded from www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr137.html

⁶¹ *ibid*

⁶² Unidentified Iraqi interviewed in David Rieff's "Blueprint for a Mess," *New York Magazine*, 2 Nov 2003

⁶³ Interview with senior Coalition commander, April 2005

⁶⁴ Joshua Hammer, Colin Soloway, John Barry, Tamara Lipper, "Who's in Charge Here?" *Newsweek*, Vol. 141, Issue 21, 26 May 2003

⁶⁵ "The Unbuilding of Iraq," *Newsweek*, Vol.142, Issue 14, 10 June 2003

⁶⁶ Interview with senior Coalition commander

⁶⁷ Thomas White, interviewed in Fallows

⁶⁸ White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "President Names Envoy to Iraq," May 6, 2003, available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030506-5.html

⁶⁹ Letter to the Security Council from USA and US, S/2003/538, 8 May 2003. There is widespread dispute over the exact origins of the CPA. "Available information about the authority found in materials produced by the Administration alternatively (1) denies that it was a federal agency; (2) states that it was a US government entity or instrumentality; (3) suggests that it was enacted under the UNSCR 1483; (4) refers to it, and ORHA, as "civilian groups...reporting to the Secretary of Defence"; asserts that it was created by General Franks. Without a clear, unambiguous statement that declares the CPA's organisational status; clarifies what its relationship was to DOD and other federal agencies, and addresses the competing explanations for how it was created, various questions are left unanswered, including whether, and to what extent, CPA might be held accountable for its programmes, activities, decisions, and expenditures." CRS Report for Congress, "The Coalition Provincial Authority (CPA): Origin, Characteristics, and Institutional Authorities," 6 June 2005

⁷⁰ Interview Major General Cross

⁷¹ Clare Short, the UK's Cabinet Minister for DFID, resigned on the same day, citing that "...mistakes that were made in the period leading up to the conflict are being repeated in the post-conflict situation."

⁷² "New U.S. Administrator Arrives in Baghdad to Stabilize Country," PBS Online NewsHour, 12 May 2003. Seen at www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/bremer_05-12-03.html

⁷³ White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "President Names Envoy to Iraq," May 6, 2003, available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030506-5.html

⁷⁴ Interview with General Cross, May 2005

⁷⁵ *ibid*

⁷⁶ Coalition Provincial Authority Order Number 1, *De-Ba'athification of Iraqi Society*, 16 May 2003; downloaded from www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations

⁷⁷ J. Barry & E. Thomas, "The Unbuilding of Iraq," *Newsweek*, 1 October 2003

⁷⁸ CPA Order No.1 dated 16 May 2003

⁷⁹ *ibid*

⁸⁰ The decision was actually made some two weeks beforehand when Bremer was in DC.

⁸¹ The order included war widows and disabled veterans who were senior party members, defined as any officers at the rank of colonel or above.

⁸² In what many commanders viewed as an impressive start, the CPA reversed its decision and handed out cash payments to 370,000 conscripts and more than 250,000 officers. In conjunction it initiated a country-wide recruitment drive for Iraqi security forces in the form of Facility Protection Security Forces (FPSF) and a new Iraqi Police Force. In the face of growing violence, military commanders were ordered to hire and arm as many officers as they could find.⁸² Thousands of former Ba`athists re-joined.

⁸³ *ibid*

⁸⁴ Adeed Dawisha, "*Iraq: Setbacks, Advances, Prospects*," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.15, No.1, January 2004, p.8

⁸⁵ Celeste J. Ward, "The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Governance in Iraq," *United States Institute of Peace*, Special Report 139, May 2005, downloaded from www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr139.html

⁸⁶ The majority Shi`a received 13 of the 25 seats; Sunni Arabs – 5; Sunni Kurds – 5; one Turkmen and one Assyrian Christian representative.

⁸⁷ Interview with Major General Cross, Netheravon, May 2005

⁸⁸ The IGC's role was set out in a 7-point plan. One of its key tasks was to develop a process for drafting an Iraqi constitution by December 2003. According to this plan, after the document was written, it would be ratified in a referendum, and then a sovereign Iraqi government would be elected. The whole process would take several years.

CHAPTER SIX

INSURGENCY IN IRAQ'S SUNNI TRIANGLE

“The extremists are out for independence, without a mandate. At least they say they are, knowing full well in their hearts that they couldn't work it. They play for all they are worth on the passions of the mob and what with the Unity of Islam and the Rights of the Arab Race they make a fine figure. They have created a reign of terror; if anyone says boo in a bazaar it shuts like an oyster...They send bagfuls of letters daily to all the tribes urging them to throw off the infidel yoke. The tribes haven't responded except with windy talk.” Gertrude Bell, 1920¹

PLANNING TO RESIST

There is growing evidence to suggest that Saddam Husayn's Security and Intelligence organisations secretly planned an insurgency well before the Coalition invaded the country on 19 March 2003. In a letter published in the Arabic newspaper *al-hayat*, Saddam initiated a plan of action that included the establishment of nationwide supplies of weapons and money, the preparation of guerrilla forces with special training and a link up with extremist Islamist organisations; resistance was to be a blend of Ba`athist, nationalist and Islamist ingredients.² Evidence suggests that many foreign fighters, including Palestinians that had been recruited in 2002, infiltrated into Iraq before the start of the war.³

Furthermore, Saddam liquidated large portions of his financial assets stored abroad and hid them throughout Iraq for use in a protracted guerrilla campaign.⁴ He also wrote a series of letters to Iraq's tribal leaders while in hiding during the first six months of the Coalition's occupation. In them Saddam urged them to launch a *jihad* against the “hated invaders and those who cooperated with them”⁵ under the proclamation that “...this is no victory as long as there is resistance in your hearts.”⁶ He ordered regional governors to continue fighting even if Baghdad fell to Coalition forces. All of these letters were written to those who would prosecute the insurgency campaign.

According to the New York Times, Pentagon intelligence reports conclude that “many bombings against Americans and their allies in Iraq and the more sophisticated of guerrilla attacks in Fallujah are organised and often carried out by members of Saddam’s secret service, the so-called M-I4, who planned the insurgency even before the fall of Baghdad.”⁷ Although many commentators dispute the reliability of all these reports, it is clear that a degree of resistance had been organised before 19 March 2003. Once Saddam’s statue had been pulled down on 9 April 2003 and his home town of Tikrit captured five days later, those resistance fighters implemented a plan that had been devised some time before hand. Its initial success had as much to do with that planning as it had with the decisions of the CPA and the competence of CJTF-7.

EVOLUTION OF THE INSURGENCY

The insurgency in Iraq’s Sunni Triangle has evolved throughout the course of the occupation. As the ‘window of opportunity’ closed after the war in the wake of burning ministries, widespread looting and Bremer’s decisions, American forces began to target four elements that it held responsible for the deteriorating security situation. These comprised ordinary criminals, Former Regime Elements (FREs) and disaffected Ba`athists, ex-soldiers from the disbanded Iraqi Army, and a small number of foreign fighters principally from Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iran.⁸ In June 2003, the National Council of Iraqi Resistance was formed under the leadership of Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri⁹; it comprised every Iraqi-based grouping and any Arab nationalists that came into Iraq after the war.¹⁰ A second grouping formed up around the radical Islamist cells. Both were built on cell structures learned from the Palestinian *intifada* and from Menachem Begin’s urban uprising against the British in 1948.¹¹

The majority of military commanders in Iraq categorised the initial Iraqi attackers as resistance fighters¹² whose political goals encompassed the removal of the Coalition and the return of Saddam Husayn and restoration of the Ba`ath Party. By November 2003, CENTCOM commander General Abizaid¹³ estimated that the Coalition faced “a loosely organised operation” by no more than 5000 fighters.¹⁴ Other commentators

within the Coalition estimated that its strength was as high as 16,000.¹⁵ Over the following months, CJTF-7 and the CPA increasingly referred to the attackers as terrorists, claiming that they were a mixture of Former Regime Loyalists (FRLs) and foreign fighters. The confusion over labels in the first year revealed their uncertainty. Indeed throughout much of the year there was a dismissive arrogance with US intelligence efforts tied to the continued hunt for the Top 55. It was widely believed that capturing or killing these people would have a soothing effect on the hopes of the insurgents. Although the immediate effects of Coalition actions against this group were pleasing, in the longer-term those effects were negative, often acting as an incentive.¹⁶

By contrast, after Saddam was captured this political objective was abandoned and the insurgency adopted an Iraqi and Arab nationalist fervour with a common goal of removing the Coalition. As one insurgent leader put it, “We first want to expel the infidel invaders *before anything else*.”¹⁷ The humiliation of living under foreign occupation was coupled to a perception that the Sunni community felt threatened by the rising tide of *shi'i* hegemonic supremacy. It was their responsibility to defend it.¹⁸

Not all attacks launched by Iraqis had such weighty aspirations. Many had lost their jobs and livelihoods as a result of Bremer’s decisions and simply took up arms for money. According to the commander of the US Army’s 1st Armoured Division, firing an RPG at a Coalition patrol could fetch up to \$3000.¹⁹ Many of the disenfranchised and poor felt aggrieved and let down by the perceived breaking of the Coalition’s promises to improve their lives. As one *sunni* civilian put it, “After the war ended we expected things to improve, but everything became worse: electricity, water, sewage, draining. So mosque speakers openly spoke of jihad and encourage those praying to join it after a month of occupation.”²⁰

The number of radical Muslim extremists flowing into Iraq, although present in Iraq before the war, accelerated during the summer of 2003. Iraq became the front not only in their prosecution of *lesser jihad* but in their pursuit of an Islamic caliphate that could only be achieved by the expulsion of infidels from Muslim lands. These *jihadists* operated at the extreme end of the spectrum of violence – larger and more sophisticated IEDs, complex ambushes and of course, martyrdom operations in either

human or Vehicle Borne form. Their attacks were less frequent but were always more spectacular and violent. By the end of the first year of occupation, there were approximately 70-80 daily attacks across the spectrum of violence.²¹ For targeting purposes, US forces had gained enough understanding of the now-recognised insurgency that it could apportion attacks to a particular grouping. At the one end of the spectrum were Iraqis disgruntled with Coalition efforts at improving the economy. Many had lost their jobs and were likely to attack Coalition forces for cash payment.

TWO YEARS ON...

There are now at least 87 groups waging an insurgent campaign against Coalition forces in Iraq.²² Each of these can be classified into six broad categories – tribes, secular ideologists, hardened criminals, Islamists (moderate, ultraradical Salafists and Wahhabists), and ex-Ba`athists who have either committed crimes against humanity or are otherwise convinced that there is no place for them in the new system.²³ Each of these six groups have been placed into two broader categories for the purposes of counter-insurgency campaigning – those who can be drawn into the political process, and those that will never be. The Islamists and ex-Ba`athists with no future sit in the second grouping.²⁴ Open source estimates indicate that there are as many as 4,000 foreign fighters in Iraq, representing as much as 10% of the hard core element of the insurgency²⁵ although more realistic assessments state that there are no more than 1,000.²⁶ Regardless of their numbers, the capabilities that they bring to the struggle give them “force multiplier” qualities.²⁷ If one includes those Iraqis who provide shelter, finance and intelligence, it is estimated that the insurgency numbers roughly 200,000 people. In its entirety, the insurgency is a heterogonous network of clans, families, tribes and other affiliations; each grouping has its own ideology and political goals, and each employs a range of tactics in the expectation of achieving them.

As Chapter 4 indicated, the tribe is the one common denominator that links the vast majority of Iraqis together regardless of political or religious persuasion.²⁸ Many tribes include *sunni* and *shi`a* members. The tribal insurgents are no different from their forefathers who initiated the insurrection against the British in 1920, or who took up arms to quell the *intifada* of 1991 in the south and north of the country. Saddam’s tribal policies have already been discussed but the means by which he empowered and

armed the tribes of central and northern Iraq during the 1990s has been overlooked by the Coalition for the last two years. Simply stated, “Attacks on Coalition troops should be viewed through the prism of tribal warfare. This is a world defined in large measure by avenging the blood of a relative (*al-tha`r*), demonstrating one’s manly courage in battle (*al-muruwwah*), and generally upholding one’s manly honour (*al-sharaf*).”²⁹ There are several distinct motivations for the tribal insurgents. Some are culturally intangible, such as the tribal reluctance to submit to any kind of authority, which in turn is matched by the conservative Islamist and nationalist reluctance to submit to foreign infidels.

Iraq’s secular Arab ideologists are drawn from a series of tribes throughout the four central provinces. Bred from a foundation of former members drawn from the Ba`ath Party, Saddam’s intelligence and security services, the army, and his political police, they mostly abandoned the hope of restoring Saddam to power when he was captured and replaced with fervent nationalism and a desire to rid Iraq of the ‘occupiers’.³⁰ The passion for nationalism should not be under-estimated by Western forces operating in the Middle East or Central Asia; upwards of 66% of Iraqis³¹ believe that “rule by non-Muslims is an abomination, a blasphemous inversion of God’s dispensation.”³² Their political aspirations do not differ sharply with what those of their predecessors in the years following the creation of Iraq in 1920. They have long defined themselves as encompassing pan-Arab nationalism and Iraqi patriotism which in turn unlocks foreign financial donations as part of the wider religious ideological struggle against the rise of *shi`ism*. Many Iraqi Islamist organisations, having received preferential treatment after 1991, remain loyal to Saddam and fight the occupation because it “confiscates sovereignty and independence, hurts our dignity, humiliates the people, dissipates our wealth, and dismembers the homeland.” It intends to inflict defeat on the US military because “power, no matter how great, cannot make history if faced with the will...of the people.”³³ However, despite advocating the expulsion of the Coalition, the group has no positive offer of providing a better political alternative.³⁴

The criminals who have been hardened by two years of evading the US military and the increasingly confident Iraq Security Forces (ISF) have changed little since the war. They include former soldiers and Ba`ath Party officials who quickly discovered that the salary of an insurgent exceeded that of a law-abiding citizen. It is estimated

that between 75% and 85% of insurgent activity appears to be motivated by purely economic factors without political motivation.³⁵ The financial incentive is certainly lucrative; al Jazeera recently broadcast a statement from one group offering a bounty of \$15 million for anyone who kills a top American commander.³⁶

The final but most sinister and menacing insurgent grouping that is operating principally in the four central provinces is made up of ultra-radical Salafi and Wahhabi Islamists. The vast majority of their numbers arrived after the war begun.³⁷ Drawing from the works of Sayid Qutb, Abdullah Azzam and the Iraqi Muslim Brother Muhammed Ahmad al-Rashid³⁸, and led by among others Abu Musayib al-Zarqawi, the radical groups viewed the invasion as an affront to Islam and encouraged all Muslims to expel the Coalition by the legitimate waging of a *lesser* or 'defensive jihad'.³⁹ Groups such as *al-Qaida*, the Muslim Brotherhood, *Jama`at-i-Islami*, the Deobandis in Pakistan and the clerics in Cairo's al-Azhar University adopted the struggle in Iraq as *their* struggle; hundreds of their followers duly flocked to Iraq with the clear acceptance that, for many, "we are going to die, we know we will not come back."⁴⁰ It is estimated that up to 1,000 radical Muslims are presently fighting in Iraq. In political terms, there is no way that either the Salafists or Wahhabis are going to be dissuaded from continuing their terrorist activities. Victory for them would encompass the expulsion of the Coalition and a Taliban-style government replacing it.⁴¹

TACTICAL STRUCTURE AND EFFECTS

The insurgency is using a highly effective and almost impenetrable cell structure of 4-6 men based mostly on family, clan, tribal or ideological loyalties. Given that the majority of the population actively supports the insurgency, the cells comprising Arab Iraqis are able to blend seamlessly into a population whose culture and recent history has been one of neighbourly protection and secrecy. In contrast, the cells containing foreign fighters are easier to distinguish and they have subsequently been forced to move into secure base areas such as Fallujah, Samarra and Ramadi. Indeed they had turned Fallujah into somewhat of an "Islamic Republic" with a strict dress code very similar to that ordered by the Taliban, a ban on cigarettes and the consumption of alcohol. Any contravention of these rules resulted in a public flogging. Western films,

makeup and hairstyles were also forbidden.⁴² Although there is a degree of mutual suspicion between *sunni* Islamists and Former Regime Loyalists, secular-minded nationalists and tribal elements actively opposing the Coalition, it does not mean that the latter groups are averse to providing logistical support to the former. Attempts by foreign fighters to operate in Iraq depend on the resources, protection and concealment provided to their fighters in Iraq. Nonetheless, there exists a tangible level of tension between Iraqis and these foreigners.⁴³

The scale of attacks in recent months has demonstrated that the insurgents had paid close attention to US intelligence-gathering techniques and counter-IED operations and had changed their own behaviour accordingly. In tactical terms, they have adapted their own *modus operandi* over the last two years and increasingly relied on three primary methods of attack - direct fire in the form of ambushes, drive-by shootings and assassinations, indirect fire from mortars and rockets, and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) to include Vehicle Borne and Human Borne devices.⁴⁴ Direct fire ambushes are proving to be the least effective tactic with superior Coalition forces often inflicting much greater damage by anti-ambush drills. IEDs are becoming the favoured weapons, and their size and capability had reached “dangerous proportions”⁴⁵ according to one senior US commander.

The scale and complexity of the attacks has also evolved. In contrast to the type of attack that were being launched in the first few months of the campaign, attacks today are likely to involve a series of ambushes, suicide bombings and follow-on attacks as signified in this report on an attack on a US Marine outpost in the Anbar province,

“The insurgents distracted Marine guards with well-aimed mortars and rocket-propelled grenades, then launched three successive suicide bombing strikes in an attempt to blow up the base and overrun it. The fire engine had a driver, a spotter, and a bulletproof windshield, and was packed with dozens of propane tanks filled with explosives. The blast rained jagged red shrapnel for more than a minute, and unhinged doors and cracked the foundation of buildings well inside the Marine base.”⁴⁶

In addition, elements of the insurgency have displayed traits and tactics that have been drawn directly from the theories not only of Guevara's 'focoism' but also of Mao's People's War in which the insurgency has created bases⁴⁷ and then formed into viable military units that have confronted Coalition forces in almost open battle. In April 2005, Abu Musayib al Zarqawi's organisation claimed responsibility for a major military assault on the Abu Ghraib prison complex that lasted for 40 minutes, involved up to 60 insurgent employing mortars, rockets, ground assaults and a car bomb and resulting in 44 Americans being wounded.⁴⁸

In transmitting the effect of these increasingly audacious attacks, the insurgents have become highly adept at exploiting the international media for a number of strategic purposes. Firstly, the insurgents aim to influence American public opinion, an area that they perceive to be the strategic Centre of Gravity. Secondly, the airing of the attacks throughout the Muslim world acts a vital recruitment tactic. Thirdly, in line with the radical interpretation of the Qu`ran, martyrdom operations seek not only to kill as many people as possible but to do so under the premise that the greater the publicity, the greater the sacrifice.⁴⁹

SUMMARY

The *sunni* Arab insurgency that American and Iraqi Security Forces are fighting in the four provinces of central and northern Iraq is complex, multi-dimensional, networked and violent. The majority of it remains Iraqi-born and against the occupation. These elements differ little from historical comparison. A significant but small minority are foreign fighters, some of whom are being given state-level support by Iran and Syria. It is this group that is capturing the headlines by the audacity and lethality of their attacks. And the insurgency is not losing the campaign. However, what they possess in variety they lack in a coherent political message other than the ejection of Coalition Forces. What happens after that moment is unclear and it is precisely in this area that the insurgents' weakness is exposed. Unfortunately the Coalition's counter-insurgency efforts have been unable to exploit it as the next chapter will indicate.

REFERENCES AND NOTES

- ¹ Gertrude Bell, *Letters from Arabia*, 1920, downloaded from www.gerty.ncl.ac.uk
- ² “New Iraq – the Main Players: Overview Guerrilla Movements,” *RUSI Resources*, 12 Jan 2004, cited in Dr Patrick Sookhdeo, *A Political and Religious Analysis of Iraq in the Post-Saddam Era*, February 2005, p.48. The full text of the letter reads, “In the event of a downfall of the Iraqi leadership in the hands of the American, British and Zionist forces, God Forbid, it is incumbent on all the members of the agencies listed above to act in accordance with the instructions below: looting and burning of all state agencies connected with our directorates and other [government agencies]; changing residence from time to time; destroying power generating stations, destroying water installations; mobilising of dependable elements and bringing them into mosques; joining the religious centres in Najaf; joining the nationalist and Islamic parties and groupings; cutting off internal and external communications; purchasing stolen weapons from citizens; establishing close ties with those who are returning from outside the country; assassination of imams and preachers of mosques.” It is signed on 23 Jan 2003 by the Director General of Iraqi Intelligence Agency and was subsequently circulated around all of its members.
- ³ Ahmed Hashim, “Foreign Involvement in the Iraqi Insurgency,” *The Jamestown Foundation: Terrorism Monitor*, Vol.II, Issue 16, 12 August 2004
- ⁴ Sunday Times, “Saddam set up his resistance five years ago,” 21 September 2003, cited in Dr Patrick Sookhdeo’s Iraq report.
- ⁵ Amatzia Baram, “Who are the Insurgents: Sunni Arab Rebels in Iraq?” *United States Institute of Peace*, April 2005. See www.usip.org
- ⁶ “A Letter from Saddam Husayn to the Iraqi people and the Arab Nation,” *al Quds-al Arabi*, London-based Arabic newspaper, 30 April 2003, cited in MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis: *The Iraq Crisis (1): Iraq prepares for war*, No. 467, 11 February 2004
- ⁷ Thom Shanker, “Hussein’s agents are Behind Attacks in Iraq, Pentagon Finds,” *New York Times*, 29 April 2004. The report continues, “...says suicide bombers have worn explosive-laden vests made before war under direction of M-14 officers, and one suicide attack last Apr, which killed three Americans, was carried out by pregnant woman who was an M-14 colonel; roadway explosive devices and car bombs have killed Iraqis as well as Americans, and have sown chaos and fear across Iraq; Pentagon report’s findings are based on interrogations with high-ranking M-14 members now in American custody, as well as documents discovered and translated by Iraq Survey Group; report provides more detailed portrait of Iraqi insurgency, which American officials have been describing as rudderless guerrilla movement of foreign fighters, Islamic jihadists, former Baathists, and common criminals; report does not address question of how broad-based support for insurgency is.” In discussions between the author and Sean Naylor, an Army Times reporter working in Washington DC and the author of *Not a Good Day to Die*, there is also evidence to suggest that Saddam had ordered insurgent cells to move to Syria before the war began and then return once Baghdad had been captured by the Coalition.
- ⁸ Multiple sources agree to this categorisation, including the author’s own experience.
- ⁹ Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri is the No.6 on the Coalition’s Top 55 list. At the time of writing he is still at large.
- ¹⁰ Dr Patrick Sookhdeo, *Iraq Briefing: A Political, Ethnic and Religious Analysis of Iraq in the Post-Saddam Era*, Institute for the Study of Islam and Christianity, February 2005
- ¹¹ Lt Col D.J. Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” Private Paper, 30 November 2004
- ¹² Interview with Major General Stewart, May 2005
- ¹³ General Abizaid had succeeded General Franks on Franks’ retirement during the summer of 2003
- ¹⁴ “Iraqi Insurgency Groups.” See www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_insurgency.htm
- ¹⁵ Anthony H. Cordesman, “*The Developing Iraqi Insurgency: Status at End of 2004*,” CSIS Working Paper, 22 December 2004. The variance in estimations reflect military versus CPA interpretation.
- ¹⁶ The brigade of the 101st Airborne Division that the author served in was responsible for the deaths of Uday and Qu’say Husayn on 22 July 2003. Many of Mosul’s residents welcomed the Brigade’s action but the next morning an IED killed another of its soldiers.
- ¹⁷ Ahmed Hashim, “The Insurgents’ Aim,” *Terrorism Monitor*, The Jamestown Foundation, Vol II, Issue 16, 12 August 2004
- ¹⁸ Amatzia Baram, “Who are the Insurgents: Sunni Arab Rebels in Iraq?,” *United States Institute for Peace (USIP)*, April 2005
- ¹⁹ General Odierno, Commander of 1st Armoured Division, Baghdad, 2003-04

- ²⁰ Nir Rosen, "Fallujah – Inside the Iraqi Resistance," *Asia Times Online*, Parts 1-7, 15-23 July 2004. Seen at www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FG17Ak01.html
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- ²⁴ *ibid*
- ²⁵ www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_insurgency.htm
- ²⁶ Institute for International Strategic Studies, Jan 2005, quoted in *ibid*...
- ²⁷ Comments made to author by Peter Bergan author of *Holy War, Inc. The Secret World of Osama bin Laden*, London, 2003
- ²⁸ It is estimated that 75% of the Iraqi population belong to a tribe.
- ²⁹ Amatzia Baram, "Victory in Iraq, One Tribe at a Time," *New York Times*, 28 October 2003
- ³⁰ Dr Patrick Sookhdeo of the Institute for the Study of Islam and Christianity, in his Iraq Report, states that the former Ba'athists comprise at least six groupings. **(1)** The United Council of the Iraqi Resistance. Formed in June 2003, comprising Ba'ath activists, remnants of the Iraqi Army and the RG, and operatives of the former national security apparatus. **(2)** Jaish Muhammed (Muhammed's Army): military arm of the national resistance Council. Est by S. shortly before the invasion. Recruits from a pool of unemployed security and intelligence officers. Allied to Arab Islamist fighters who infiltrated into Iraq. Islamists in the group are said to be supported by wealthy Saudi Arabians. It is believed to be responsible for the increasingly sophisticated attacks on US forces and it might be the most dangerous element of the resistance. From April to July 2003 the group smuggled hundreds of Arab fighters, millions of dollars and a plethora of weapons into Iraq across the Saudi border. **(3)** Al-Awda: Former members of the intelligence services, security services, soldiers, political police and Ba'ath party members have organised this loose network of fighters to perpetuate hit and run actions against American forces. This network is the most highly trained, best armed and best funded movement. Awda means "the Return". Claimed that they are offering \$500 in cash to any one willing to join their operation. **(4)** Fedayeen: meaning those who sacrifice themselves, founded in 1995 by Udayy. Force later trained to fight against the invading forces. In their training bases they had contact with Islamist extremists from around the world. A special elite corps of 1200 suicide attackers, *Al-Qari'a (the Strikers)* was later created, drawn from families and clans deep within the Ba'athist regime. **(5)** Other groups: Al-Ansar (the Supporters); Al-Muhajiroun (the Migrants), al-Mujahidin (combined Iraqis with Islamist fighters with experience of Afghanistan and Chechnya) – nos about 6000.
- ³¹ Poll taken by the Iraq Centre for Research and Strategic Studies, June 2004
- ³² Daniel Pipes, "Why Iraq Rebels," *Jerusalem Post*, 14 April 2004 cited in Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, *Insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, Change and Continuity*, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), 2004, p.22
- ³³ Amatzia Baram, ...Quotes taken from a letter written by Al Mujahidin – the Holy War Fighters to their supporters
- ³⁴ Metz and Millen, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq*, SSI, US Army War College, 2004
- ³⁵ Kilcullen.
- ³⁶ "Still a Cauldron, Not a Quagmire," *The Economist*, 1 May 2004 cited in Metz and Millen, p.10
- ³⁷ In the summer of 2003 there were some reports that Syrians were often outnumbering locals in carrying out attacks in various locations throughout the four provinces. In addition, dozens of Arab fighters have come from France and hundreds from Europe. Intelligence reports state that Hamas and Islamic Jihad each sent units of 300 fighters, with Islamic Jihad's mujahidin coming through Lebanon. In addition, Hezbollah sent approximately 800 mujahidin. Many of the AQ operatives have come in through Iran. For further information see www.jihadunspun.com/articles/18122003-Iraqi-Resistance/ir/ailatir01.html
- ³⁸ al Rashid in his book *Al Masar: Ihya' Fiqh al-D'awa (The Fifth Book, Cairo: Dar al Bashir lil-Thaqafa wal-Ulum)*, 1999, pp.67-68. Cited in Amatzia Baram...
- ³⁹ 'Defensive jihad' is the term used that permits Muslims to wage war against foreign occupiers. The Salafist radical groups have always interpreted Iraq as representative of *jahiliyya*, the pre-Islamic era of barbarism and paganism. Building on this, the Wahhabis have a fundamental hatred of *shi'as* who they see as idol worshippers. Violence must be used to remove the Coalition from power and replace it with a Taliban-style government. For them, "the only options are victory, death, prison and the continuation of the armed struggle."³⁹
- ⁴⁰ "A bus ride to martyrdom: They'll die for Iraq, but not for Saddam," *The Economist*, 3 April 2003, Cairo edition

⁴¹ Amatzia Baram, "Who are the Insurgents: Sunni Arab Rebels in Iraq?" USIP, April 2005

⁴² *ibid*

⁴³ Ahmed Hashim, "Foreign Involvement in the Iraqi Insurgency," *The Jamestown Foundation: Terrorism Monitor*, Vol.II, Issue 16, 12 August 2004

⁴⁴ Anthony H. Cordesman, "*Iraq's Evolving Insurgency*," Working Draft, CSIS, 16 May 2005. The US Army's Vice Chief of Staff stated in September 2005 that some 500-600 IEDs were going off each month, and roughly half either harmed US personnel or damaged US vehicles. In addition, LTG Conway, the Army's Director of Operations, stated that a total of 70% of all Coalition casualties since the fall of Saddam were caused by IEDs. At the time of writing, a total of 336 Americans have been killed by IEDs, and an additional 90 by suicide bombers. Exploding vehicles account for approximately 60% of Iraqi police and recruit fatalities. For a full analysis of the insurgency see Cordesman's report.

⁴⁵ Interview with senior US officer, July 2005

⁴⁶ For this and other similar stories see www.washingtonpost.com

⁴⁷ Bases are important (eg Fallujah): "you need places where you have combat-support functions for the guerrillas. They have to be fed. They have to get medical attention. They have to have places to rest and refit. They have to have places to go for their ideological training, whatever it might be. All of this stuff was certainly operative with Mao. Mao would say, you can't fight using my kind of strategy without substantial bases. Guerrilla forces need bases."

⁴⁸ Ellen Knickmeyer, "Zarqawi Said to Behind Iraq Raid," *The Washington Post*, 5 April 2005, p.A01

⁴⁹ 9/11 Commission, Malise Ruthven, Jason Burke and others

CHAPTER SEVEN

COUNTER-INSURGENCY LESSONS FROM IRAQ

“The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish...the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, not trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.”

Clausewitz¹

ASSUMPTIONS AND RISKS

At the time of writing, Britain’s conventional Armed Forces are not conducting a counter-insurgency campaign in the south-east of the country. Indeed since 1 May 2003, conventional British units in the southern four provinces have only fought insurgents in April and August of 2004. This was further emphasised by Major General Bill Rollo, the General Officer Commanding MND (SE) stating that throughout much of 2004,

“I did not feel I was conducting a counter-insurgency in the South East. There was not an insurgency – there was in August, but the rest of the time there was not. I had a counter-terrorist campaign going on, against a very small number of people, and quite a lot of what I did was designed to make sure I did not have to do a counter-insurgency.”²

Even after General Rollo had returned to the UK, there was a broad understanding that “from September [2004] no insurgency existed [in the south-east].”³

Instead, British forces in the south-east have been fed an almost daily diet of Counter-Terrorism, Peace Support Operations (PSO), Security Sector Reform (SSR) and ordinary crime. This paper has no intention to denigrate or belittle the importance of British military operations in southern Iraq. Its purpose is to clarify and improve our

perception of the critical counter-insurgency struggle being waged in Iraq. In a revealing declaration, a leading British commander noted that,

“...in my six months, the US has garnered the greatest experience and the most to learn from those experiences. In a sense we have been overtaken as the repository of experience in modern counter-insurgency operations. The sooner we understand that the better because otherwise we are making puffed-up claims on questionable evidence.”⁴

In startling contrast to the British experience, the US military has been fighting “a most virulent insurgency”⁵ in central and northern Iraq which has accounted for almost 1,500 deaths from hostile fire. As the previous chapter indicated, the US military is fighting across the entire spectrum of conflict against an insurgency that employs *all* tactical means to achieve a strategic effect. In September 2004, the US Army’s Vice Chief of Staff stated that between 500 and 600 IEDs were going off each month with roughly half harming US personnel or damaging its vehicles.⁶ At the time of writing, 356 Americans have been killed by IEDs, and an additional 90 by suicide bombers eclipsing *total* British casualties incurred from hostile fire since 19 March 2005.⁷ Indeed when the British Army’s Black Watch Battle Group (BG) was exposed to this type of insurgency in November 2004, it reported that “attacks against the battle group reflected an opponent more accomplished, more ruthless and more dedicated than previously experienced by British troops in Iraq.”⁸

Future British counter-insurgency doctrine is at a junction. In order to understand the significance of the choice facing the British Army, and the policy-makers that give it strategic direction, persuasive arguments have to be presented. First, that the British Army no longer has the monopoly on the prosecution of counter-insurgency warfare. If it accepts that its contribution to fighting insurgents in Iraq is limited to three short periods of time, and even less so against *sunni* insurgents, then it must take into account the US military experience in Iraq, both from the mistakes that it has made but also from the great strides that it has taken. Secondly, that it now has little understanding of a modern insurgency movement inspired by Arab nationalist and *jihadist*-fundamentalism. Thirdly, that despite every historical summation of previous counter-insurgency campaigns concluding that there has to be Unity of Effort across

the Lines of Operation, operations in Iraq have once again demonstrated the West's collective amnesia when it comes to applying those lessons. All too frequently military commanders have found themselves in charge of political negotiations, economic projects, or communications strategy because of the absence of core specialists more suited to unifying the effort and therefore winning the campaign. Coalition casualties are a direct consequence. As one US divisional commander mused: "I was the principal negotiator for Fallujah for 65 days, with absolutely no qualifications I might add."⁹ The message should not be lost on British policy-makers who, if they seriously wish to reverse the growing tide of transnational insurgency they must remove the politico-military caution and hesitancy that has prevented a greater involvement in Iraq. Simply put, policy-makers must focus a greater extent of British national power at the core of the 'close' fight in Iraq.

This will help achieve worthwhile objectives. It will demonstrate a unified commitment to what is predominantly an American struggle. It will improve its ability to influence American foreign policy. If one accepts that a link exists between the *jihadist* elements of the Iraq insurgency and radical Islamist attacks in the UK, then allowing British forces to demonstrate the full extent of their skills will have a positive effect on the defeat of a global insurgency.

POLITICAL PRIMACY AND POLITICAL AIM

Bremer's three 'fundamentally flawed decisions' exposed the ignorance with which the Coalition approached Iraq's political apparatus. Ambassador Bremer's decision to 'de-Ba'athify' the country meant that the military line of operation dominated the first year of the campaign. As Adeed Dawisha points out, this was a fatal error, "...to proscribe all Ba'athists without exception from taking part in the reconstruction was to exclude most of the very Iraqi professionals whose services must prove crucial in any scheme to rebuild the country."¹⁰ The magnitude of removing the top six layers of the ruling elite without financial compensation was aligned to Bremer's deliberate slowing-down of the political process.

By making these decisions, the US Administration knowingly signalled its intent to ignore the lessons from past campaigns, as the revered French COIN practitioner Hubert Lyautey had remarked during the French-Algerian war over 50 years earlier:

“...therefore, don’t disturb any tradition, don’t change any custom. In every society there exists a ruling class, born to rule, without which nothing can be done. Enlist that class in our interests.”¹¹

It was upon this foundation that the CPA intended to foster a democratic process over three phases. The problem was that Iraq had *never* experienced democracy before and that each phase marked a significant change in policy and implementation.¹² The lessons from all three phases have one common denominator – the lack of planning for Phase IV allowed an *ad hoc* process to emerge in which the lack of coordination and shared objectives exacerbated the challenges of establishing legitimate, democratic governance in Iraq.¹³ Foremost among these is recognition of the importance of preplanning and pre-positioning of resources for post-conflict situations.

The first phase from January-May 2003 has already been considered in Chapter Five. It revolved around the predominance of the Pentagon in the planning process and its disregard of the Future of Iraq project; the creation of ORHA, and the firmly held but wildly optimistic hope in the Chalibi promise. It was a phase which witnessed massive and systematic looting throughout the Iraqi state and the unwillingness and inability of a thin veneer of Coalition forces to stop it. It was a period in which ORHA lacked the authority, tools or security to regenerate Iraq’s political institutions. But above all, the period set Iraq on a course for which it was unprepared. The lack of a plan allowed Divisional commanders to conduct their own campaigns based on their previous military experiences. For some that experience had been dominated by conventional warfighting such as Operation DESERT STORM¹⁴ in which there was a firmly held view that politics was for politicians and as they were not in theatre yet, the military still held sway. For others however, experience in the Balkans and on other expeditionary style operations meant that some military leaders at least understood the essence of political primacy over all else.

Above all during this period, there was not only a failure to understand the difference between a resistance movement, an insurgency and guerrilla warfare, but then to acknowledge that an insurgency existed. According to a senior British commander, “the big error...was failing to understand what we were facing which was not an insurgency on day one but a resistance to occupation. And you deal with resistance to occupation in an entirely different manner to the way you deal with an insurgency. Insurgency is there in order to change the face of politics.”¹⁵

The second period began after Bush’s triumphal speech aboard USS Abraham Lincoln, the arrival of the CPA to subsume ORHA, and Bremer’s decisions regarding ‘de-Ba’athification’ and the IGC. Phase IV had unofficially begun but the lack of understanding over the value of the political process hampered the general development of the country. This was despite local councils being elected across the 18 provinces. It was also a period dominated by hazy and indecisive CPA politics in which decisions were changed overnight and strategy thought out in an *ad hoc* fashion by inexperienced but over-eager American officials. The result was that the “CPA had become the enemy’s best asset.”¹⁶

Attempts to give the political process momentum had deeply frustrated the Division Commander of 1 US Marine Corps Division during the summer of 2003. Having fought its way to Baghdad during the war, it had been re-deployed to Najaf after May. The Division had already initiated an ambitious reconstruction and re-politicisation process based on planning conducted before the war and in the absence of any direction from Baghdad. During the summer, the CPA ordered the Division to organise elections in Najaf as General Mattis, the Divisional Commander recalls,

“We had [local] elections lined up to start in July. In June I suddenly got the word that we had to run elections right now. So began CPA’s episodic involvement in Najaf. They had heard of this guy named Sadr and decided we had to run an election right away. Sadr couldn’t have mattered to anything though. Lets not dignify this f*^!%r but they say we had to do elections right now. We said, ‘wait a minute, you’ve got to build polling places, an infrastructure, get Iraqis to run this thing’ and they said no you have got to do it right now. So we go on TV and finally

we got it all set up and they said no elections because Sadr's going to win. And we said 'no, Sadr's not going to win. Let the people decide this. There's this guy called Sistani and others who have authority.' It didn't work. They cancelled the elections. We lost a great deal of credibility there. So we decided we had to deal with somebody here. I don't care if we elect a board of school teachers, anybody, because if we had appointed someone they would have been accused of being stooges of the Americans. People like their own imperfect government more than our form of perfect government. The CPA showed a shocking lack of historical perspective. We [the Coalition] were learning by experience which is a pretty shitty way of doing it after 5000 years of fighting."¹⁷

As the insurgency grew in confidence over the summer, it began to alter its tactics by targeting local councilmen and those CPA officials working with them. The increasingly-heavy fortification of the Green Zone in Baghdad made it increasingly difficult for Iraqi politicians to get in and for CPA officials to get out. The political process began to stagnate. Security costs started to escalate.¹⁸ There was a growing disconnect between CPA policy announcements and the reality on the ground. On 19 August 2003, a truck bomb destroyed the UN headquarters in Baghdad and killed the Secretary General's Envoy. It was an ominous signal of intent by the insurgents to prevent the political and economic reconstruction process countering the effectiveness of their campaign.

The third period culminated in the country's first ever elections on 31 January 2005. Despite the efforts of insurgents to prevent the elections from taking place (on 30 January 2005 there were 70 attacks; on polling day there were 298), a mixture of luck and excellent military plans that incorporated Coalition troops and ISF ensured the elections could take place.¹⁹ The enthusiasm with which Iraqis went to the polls ushered in a brief moment when there was genuine hope and expectation that political primacy had diffused the insurgents. That enthusiasm quickly turned to despair as Iraq's newly elected ministers quarrelled with each other over the composition of the government as General Kiszely recalled,

“...the tragedy was that it took three months to form a government. The counter-insurgency momentum was lost at all levels and replaced by lame ministers feathering their own nests and in-fighting. Although there was a post-election operational ‘pause’ for counter-insurgents and insurgents alike, the insurgents came out stronger.”²⁰

Since the announcement of the *shi`ite*-led government on 28 April 2005, 264 Coalition troops (of which 6 have been British) and 918 members of the Iraqi Security Forces have been killed. The swing to political primacy has almost been reversed.

The lessons that must be drawn from this are two-fold. First, that comprehensive political planning must be conducted before occupation. These must be controlled and led by politicians and not military leaders. The *ad hoc* nature of political fostering exposed the frailty of the planning process. As President Dwight Eisenhower famously said, “plans are nothing; planning is everything.”²¹ Secondly, Coalitions must do everything in their power to ensure that political opportunities are never missed or allowed to wither. It is especially true for countries in which democracy is a new phenomenon. Political opportunism must be aligned to the elements of control and respect throughout a campaign. One senior British civil servant described the requirement, “...control and respect are both necessary to take a foreign, resentful and xenophobic pupil through to another state. The only sensible policy was the one that Garner had started.”²²

COORDINATED GOVERNMENT MACHINERY

Historical examples of previous COIN campaigns indicate the difficulty in bringing together the four lines of operation. Iraq is no exception where it took over a year to accept the value of the principle. The reasons for this are varied and widespread but stem mostly from the CPA’s inception and the nomination of V Corps to replace CFLCC. Neither organisation held the other in high regard. Both worked for Rumsfeld²³ Unschooled in the requirements of ‘nation-building’ in Iraq, he had aligned himself to Bush when the President remarked before the war that “I oppose using military force for nation-building. Once the job is done, our forces are

peacekeepers. We ought to put in a UN protection [force] and leave.”²⁴ Rumsfeld’s domineering, intrusive and dictatorial style translated into an unsettled foundation from which all three attempted to govern Iraq. That had as much to do with a refusal to adopt a COIN posture as it had with their dysfunctionality, internecine Beltway politics, and British hesitancy.

From a British perspective, the effect was deeply worrying, as one senior MOD official recalls, “The Pentagon had suddenly become Foreign Policy, a strategic-level thinking shop which it is not equipped to do. It is not inherently consultative, the checks and balances don’t work and the linkages to us are much weaker. So we were left out in the cold at the strategic level.”²⁵ Furthermore, the CPA staff during the first year was mostly young, inexperienced and unable to cope with the demands placed upon them by the military. “They were coming in for 90 days, for 180 days, but they had never worked together before and that will not work in a counter-insurgency fight. They were like a self-licking ice-cream cone – whatever they decided had no effect on my battalion commanders.”²⁶ Hilary Synnott, the British Foreign Office official appointed to run CPA (S) at the end of 2003, recalls that the CPA’s “infant bureaucracy...was attracted by the challenge and convinced of the need. They were predominantly...youngish government officials...who were not deterred by the prospect of discomfort.”²⁷

Secondly, Rumsfeld selected the wrong style of headquarters to replace CFLCC and appointed an armoured division commander “not tutored in counter-insurgency”²⁸ to lead the campaign against the growing resistance movement. Even at the time there was widespread concern that V Corps and Lieutenant General Sanchez were the wrong type of formation and wrong type of commander for Iraq.²⁹ As one retired US officer stated,

“V Corps was the wrong headquarters with poor communications and poor skills. It was wrong from so many different perspectives and it was also low down on the food chain. Officers wanting to get their Joint-Duty credit are posted to the Pentagon or one of the Combatant Commands. Its staff were not the brightest or the best. It was simply not a HQ designed to do what was required of it.”³⁰

It was a view shared by one senior British commander who recalled, “Britain had to influence the campaign by seconding bright officers into key posts in Sanchez’s HQ because his staff was simply not good enough to fight the campaign.”³¹

As the security situation deteriorated the CJTF-7 and CPA staffs, lacking the experience and familiarity with COIN doctrine to cope with the rapidly-evolving theatre,³² resorted to an approach with which each was familiar. For CJTF-7 it was simple – elevate the military Line of Operation over all others. As Lieutenant General Kiszely recounted, “Sanchez’s staff put up a slide showing the doctrinal template with all four lines of operation. The military line was twice the size of all the others. The majority of the division commanders present then all agreed, ‘We do the military piece.’”³³ The problem was that in the absence of anyone else the military had to perform every task, from political negotiation to humanitarian assistance to food rationing.³⁴

There were few problems where commanders felt comfortable with such a wide remit but in those parts of the country where military commanders felt unsure of the non-military activities fell away. The overall effect was that CJTF-7 pursued the tactical and operational segments of the campaign with single-minded vigour. The vacuum was left at the strategic level where the political and military interface was left to create its own headlines. That allowed the other Lines of Operation to drift along aimlessly, without the structure that a Campaign Plan would give them in conjunction with the military line. The consequences would be drawn out over the next two years.

In the absence of a campaign plan, and without *any* operational direction from CJTF-7, divisional commanders across theatre simply pursued their own campaign objectives in a fashion akin to “warlords in receipt of orders but not necessarily following them.”³⁵ As one US divisional commander recalled, “I got no guidance from Baghdad for the first 45 days of the campaign [after 1 May 2003].”³⁶ How they orchestrated their respective campaigns depended on a number of factors, not least their ability to understand what the other lines of operation entailed. The evidence

indicates that many didn't. What is clear is that for much of the first year a wide gulf existed between those units who pursued a military-led campaign in suppressing an emerging insurgency, and those that understood the delicate intricacies of counter-insurgency campaigning.

British commanders did understand better than many of their American counterparts. They forged a Divisional campaign under the twin auspices of PSO and COIN. Minimum force and maximum local political ownership were the dominant themes. It was an approach that achieved a general consensus of support aligned to the *shii* population being generally more receptive to foreign occupation than their *sunni* counterparts. Sensing an opportunity to demonstrate British military capability against American culpability in the centre, Whitehall slowly began to turn a blind eye to the rest of Iraq and began to concentrate its efforts on the southern provinces. It was a strategy that angered some British senior officers and civil servants working in Baghdad. They saw an opportunity to influence the direction of the US-led campaign.

At the political level in Baghdad, much of that anger revolved around the practical interpretation of UN Security Council Resolution 1483. According to one CPA official, it was fundamental to understand who was accountable,

“Although we had the South East and it was the main focus of the MOD and DFID, the difficulty that London had in formal terms was that under the resolutions Britain was co-equally responsible for the administration of an occupied territory throughout [the country]. But what they put in the centre was not large enough or weighty enough to have an effect on the American running of the whole thing. We held 50% theoretical responsibility but we certainly had not put in a 10th of 50% of resources to carry that out. And we didn't have a co-equal commander on the ground to express British interest.”³⁷

Here was a nation that prided itself on prosecuting successful COIN campaigns and who understood better than arguably any other nation the value of Unity of Effort. Instead it turned its back to where the real problems in Iraq were. As one senior official described during a meeting of senior commanders in London in late 2003,

“When I came back and said that this is going to won in the centre or it won’t be won at all, that you can look after yourselves in the south-east if you want to but it will go to the hell in the centre unless you start asking some really serious questions about where this is all going, it was regarded as an unwelcome message.”³⁸

The effect was clear. Building a coordinated government machinery across the Lines of Operation depended on the commitment of both the US and UK governments, but each was seeing the campaign in starkly different terms. Had the UK accepted its political responsibilities and had the US allowed it a greater role in shaping the campaign, the first year may well have had a different outcome. But talk of commitment rarely matched the reality. In Baghdad, Britain’s senior commanders and diplomats had to forge their own identities and write their own job descriptions based purely on their own experiences. Meanwhile Whitehall urged them to ‘influence’ the overall campaign. But when the British staff attempted to get London to contribute to building a coordinated government machine in Iraq, their demands fell on deaf ears. That was tied to the US reluctance to accept that the military campaign was failing by sending interns instead out experienced political and economic reinforcements. What had developed by the end of 2003 was an *ad hoc* organisation dominated by young and inexperienced American civil servants determined to implement a Marshall-like plan in Iraq.

In Basrah, the chain of command remained frustrated over military hegemony in the rebuilding process and the intractable difficulties of staffing the CPA headquarters with the right experts for sufficient periods of time. As Hilary Synnott recalls,

“...the tour length for most civilians was initially a mere three months [which] was far too brief to be effective. And all too often the deficiencies of such short tours were compounded by a lack of succession arrangements: key specialist areas were left with gaps or, frequently, no succession at all. This inevitably led to loss of information and of experience, and to confusion and dismay on the part of the Iraqis we were trying to assist. What we needed was expertise in technical,

administrative and political fields and, ideally, a modicum of knowledge of the customs and practices of the country, or developing countries more generally.”³⁹

Major General Andrew Stewart, the British GOC in MND (SE) throughout much of 2004, was similarly frustrated,

“By the end of December 2003 the new CPA Regional Headquarters (South) had spent £4.6 million on getting set up. New computers, a new building, new furniture and they had brought out a load of experts in water, sewage, electricity and so on. It took 6 weeks to get organised. Then the decision was made in February [2004] to close the CPA (S) on 30 June 2004. Hilary had spent 6 months establishing CPA (S) and here I am going to have to spend 6 more months dis-establishing the CPA (S). So in the end we got five weeks work out of them. What started out as a good idea at the time became a disaster in terms of practicalities. It was a great shame.”⁴⁰

By the summer of 2004, a fresh sense of urgency to find a political solution was coupled to the dissolution of CJTF-7 and the CPA and the handover of political power to the Interim Government Council (IGC). It also coincided with the departure of General Sanchez and Ambassador Bremer and the arrival of General Casey and Ambassador Negroponte. Most significantly, a Campaign Plan was written in August bringing together the four lines of operation with a viable and achievable end state. Much of the emphasis has now been placed on reinforcing the Iraqi ministries’ control of the direction that their country is taking. And all the time the insurgency has continued to wage its war against those budding but fragile institutions. Fighting it remains the Coalition’s main effort, but it is a fight that has been hampered by its inability to understand, collect and analyse information, and then disseminate actionable intelligence.

INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE

There is widespread agreement among Western analysts that the insurgency has crudely exposed the weaknesses of the Coalition's information-gathering and intelligence-processing cycles. Those weaknesses highlight the lack of planning for phase IV, expectation of a swift victory and return home, and a preference for war-fighting over nation-building. Above all, it is clear that both the US and UK intelligence branches were geared up to fighting conventional wars and not to collect and decipher HUMINT on the levels that were required. As one commander stated during the war-fighting phase,

“I had perfect situational awareness. What I lacked was cultural awareness. I knew where every tank was dug in on the outskirts of Tallil. Only problem was, my soldiers had to fight fanatics charging on foot or in pickups and firing AK-47s and RPGs. Great technical intelligence. Wrong enemy.”⁴¹

The lack of ‘good information’ derived from an institutional reluctance on the parts of US and British militaries to analyse in intricate detail the realities of occupying a Middle Eastern country. At its most basic level, Coalition forces failed to learn much about Iraqi culture, “those norms, values and modes of thinking that survive change and remain meaningful to successive generations.”⁴² Iraq's history⁴³ and that of the wider Middle East, its tribal structures and politics, and Islam; all were initially given scant attention.

Had they been, then Coalition forces would have known that entering a house in Iraq while wearing shoes is disrespectful; that forcing a man to lie face down on the ground and putting a boot on his neck shames him or that killing an Iraqi tribesman demands either blood money or blood spilled in return. They would have understood the non-written codes of honour and shame, patronage and protection, factionalism and strife. They would have begun to understand the multi-layered structure to tribal politics and what the effect of removing the regime would have on them; as one *sunni* tribesman reminded, “We follow the central government...But of course if communications are cut off between us and the centre, all authority will revert to the

shaykh.”⁴⁴ They would have realised that 30 years of state-imposed suffocation did little for personal initiative and sense of community outside the confines of the tribe. They would have recognised the effects of the war with Iran and the sanctions following 1991. Similarly they would have realised that the great majority of ordinary Iraqis joined the Ba’ath Party to secure a future and so ‘de-Ba’athifying’ six layers of its hierarchy would inevitably incite a violent reaction. And finally, if they had understood Islam and its place in modern Iraqi history they would have realised that Saddam had positively encouraged its revival during the 1990s, thus banishing the notion that it was a secular state devoid of radical Islamists.

Even when dealing with tribal shaykhs, Coalition forces learned on the job as General Mattis recalls, "Iraqi *shaykhs* lie, they cheat, they steal; it was something that I came to understand very quickly. It was all part of their culture and *we* had to understand that."⁴⁵ There remains a failure to understand the motivation behind martyrdom operations and the role of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leading *jihadi* in Iraq. Who would die so wantonly? It beats American intelligence officers.⁴⁶

These failures led to a series of highly critical reports. In early 2004, the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) published a scathing report about the Coalition in which,

“...the authorities entered houses usually after dark, breaking down doors, waking up residents roughly, yelling orders, forcing family members into one room under military guard while searching for the rest of the house and further breaking doors, cabinets, and other property. They arrested suspects, tying their hands in the back with flexi cuffs, hooding them, and taking them away. Sometimes they arrested all adult males in the house, including the elderly, handicapped, or sick people. Treatment included pushing people around, insulting, taking aim with rifles, punching and kicking, and striking with rifles. Individuals were often led away in whatever they happened to be wearing at the time of the arrest – sometimes pyjamas or underwear...In many cases personal belonging were seized during the arrest with no receipt given...In almost

all incidents documented by the ICRC, arresting authorities provided no information about who they were, where their base was located, nor did they explain the cause of the arrest. Similarly, they rarely informed the arrestee or his family where he was being taken or for how long, resulting in the defacto disappearance of the arrestee for weeks or even months until contact was finally made.’’⁴⁷

Coalition confusion over the campaign it was fighting led General Abizaid in late 2003 to declare that the conflict in Iraq as a “classical guerrilla-type campaign” despite there being no centre of gravity; no clear leadership despite Zarqawi’s pretensions to the role; no attempt to seize and actually hold territory, despite Fallujah being used a base; and no single, defined or unifying ideology.⁴⁸

Even when it became clear during the summer of 2003 that it had changed to an insurgency, there was reluctance in CENTCOM and the Pentagon to admit to its existence or agree on its size and strength. The CIA station in Iraq, despite being the largest in the world and the biggest since Saigon during Vietnam 30 years ago “has had little success penetrating the resistance and identifying foreign terrorists involved in the insurgency.”⁴⁹ Even the senior leadership of the US Administration cannot agree on its size when as recently as last month General Abizaid contradicted the Vice President’s assertions that the insurgency was “in its last throes” by stating that “in terms of overall strength of the insurgency, I’d say it’s about the same as it was.”⁵⁰

Nor were the British adept at understanding the true nature of the *sunni* insurgency because its forces were not facing it on a daily basis. Even when 1 BW BG was deployed to the Sunni Triangle in November 2004, it found that its capabilities could do little to dent the insurgents’ effectiveness. In order to confront the threat that *sunni* insurgents posed, British commanders supplemented the BG’s G2 cell with strategic intelligence assets. But even with all of these assets, the BG could gain little understanding of the insurgency in the North Babil area which killed four of their soldiers and injured 17 others.⁵¹

Where does the Coalition sit now more than two years after it occupied the country and started to fight a resistance movement? If it is true to itself, it will accept that still

has little understanding of the insurgency's groupings, its cell structure, tactics or true ideologies. As the November 2004 campaign review in Baghdad indicated, the Americans are now accepting that their main effort is not to fight the insurgents but to build up the capability of the Iraqi Security Forces to fight it for them.⁵² Meanwhile it continues to search for clues while the daily toll from suicide bombers increases. That Iraq is now a front for Islamist jihadists can not be disputed and information on them is always going to be difficult to understand. The real mis-fortune, and one that the Coalition should have understood, is that the overwhelming majority of the insurgency is home-grown. How to identify and separate them from the vast number of innocent Iraqis has become the challenge.

SEPARATING THE INSURGENT FROM HIS SUPPORT

The Coalition has used a number of methods over the last two years to achieve the effect outlined by the principle. On the one hand it has attempted to do so by pure military force combined with economic regeneration projects – the carrot and stick approach. This was combined with an Information Operations campaign that singularly failed to either deliver its own message or garner an understanding of how information flows in the Middle East. Above all, the Coalition could never decide on where it should fight the 'hearts and minds' campaign. It is clear after two years that the struggle in Iraq is not for the minds of *jihadists* who are simply "impervious to persuasion"⁵³ but for the minds of the majority of ordinary Muslims who sit on the fence undecided. More than anything else, the campaign in Iraq has become a battle of perceptions in a war over ideas.

The military campaign to separate the insurgents from their base of popular support has oscillated from low level raids and arrests to the deliberate, combined-arms, joint assault on Fallujah in November 2004. While Fallujah was an undoubtedly a tactical success, argument prevails over its strategic implications and the long-term disillusion of the *sunni* population. That operation aside, the military campaign has been dominated by activity further across the Spectrum of Conflict that has affected far more *sunnis* than the 250,000 in Fallujah. And it is this campaign which has served as the greatest recruitment vehicle for the insurgency, the more so when the Coalition has suffered from the Information and Intelligence failures previously documented.

The consequences of getting it wrong are disastrous, as Shaykh Ghazi Yawar, the interim President of Iraq, reminded a group of journalists,

“The United States is using excessive power. They round up people in a very humiliating way, but putting bags over their faces in front of their families. In our society, this is like rape. The Americans are using collective punishment by jailing relatives. What is the difference from Saddam? They are demolishing houses now. They say they want to teach a lesson to the people. But when Timothy McVeigh was convicted in the bombing of Oklahoma City, was his family’s home destroyed? You cannot win hearts and minds of the people by using force. What’s the difference between dictatorship and what’s happening now?”⁵⁴

The Coalition has attempted to blunt the sharpness of its military campaign by a series of short and long-term economic regeneration projects throughout the country. The effects of these have been two-fold. On the one hand it has led to the Coalition managing the expectations of Iraqis more than was originally planned. On the other hand, the perception among commanders is that short-term, highly visible projects save their own soldiers lives. By offering provinces the opportunity of a better future if they reject the insurgents, the Coalition has found itself *having* to deliver on its promises. Failing to deliver is perhaps its greatest mistake. Major General Chiarelli, the Commanding General of 1st Cavalry Division throughout much of 2004 and early 2005 firmly believed that a disproportionate amount of time and money should be spent on Sewage, Water, Electricity and Trash (SWET) in order to avoid fighting other battles elsewhere. Evidence suggested that there was a clear correlation between the presence of insurgent cells and poor conditions.⁵⁵

While British commanders did not disagree with the American approach, they were concerned that the security-development nexus was being misinterpreted. Major General Andrew Stewart, the British GOC in MND (SE) in 2004 recounted,

“When Fallujah took place [April 2004] a load of aid was thrown into al Anbar province to demonstrate that we [the Americans] really do care from just blowing the place up. That took more money away from the

rest of country and from the South-East so in the one place where there was sufficient security to enable NGOs and contractors to work we put no money into out of the Coalition. [In contrast], the one area where there was *no* security and where there was *significant* threat was where we were throwing all of our money. So we were reinforcing failure and it didn't matter because the perception was that the Brits are putting their money into Basrah so everything must be fine. But it wasn't. When I took General Abizaid and Paul Wolfowitz around the city they were pointing out all of the rubbish and sewage and asking what was happening. Here was Basrah, the Gateway to Iraq with the country's only port, a functioning airport, the land link to the Persian Gulf, and the security to allow development to take place. You have to reinforce success.”⁵⁶

Despite these concerns, the overwhelming British reliance on American funds to tackle the nexus prevented a re-allocation of those funds towards Basra. The four central provinces remained the US's Main Effort under the guise that, in the short term, the population's perceptions are more important than the physical benefits derived from expenditure with longer-term effects.⁵⁷

The insurgents have adopted a sophisticated strategy to attack the Coalition's ability to deliver the expectations. They are attempting to make the country ungovernable by following the Russian slogan of 'the worse, the better'; by the audacity and boldness of its attacks will provoke the Coalition into taking steps that alienate or anger the population; and by directly eroding the will of the Coalition and its domestic support by inflicting casualties and 'death by a thousand cuts.' It has retained the psychological initiative by persuading large numbers of the population that until the Coalition leaves Iraq, their lives will only get worse.⁵⁸ In pursuing this strategy it employs a range of tactics to include kidnappings, executions and the use of suicide bombers. These allow for "made-for-television" events in which "the audience is more important than the act itself."⁵⁹ Their overall strategy is "...to turn Iraq into what Afghanistan was before autumn 2001: a public relations windfall for their ideologues; a training ground for their 'rookies'; and even a safe-haven for their leadership.”⁶⁰

It is into this environment that Coalition forces are attempting to win the hearts and minds of the population and win the battle of perceptions. The challenge is steep and occasionally insurmountable and one in which large portions of the *sunni* Arab population simply refuse to talk to Coalition forces. The Black Watch realised the scale of the challenge on reaching North Babil,

“Back on the west bank, Delta Company discovered a severed torso beside a detonated daisy chain of artillery shells. It appeared that the would-be bomber had initiated the device prematurely, blowing him to hell sometime before he was expected. The discovery was a grim reminder of the enemy’s determination. Even on the west bank people seemed suspicious and a little afraid of the troops. The cause of this lay in two areas – first, talking to Coalition troops was not advantageous to one’s health if observed by insurgents; and, while collaborators could forfeit their lives for getting too close, their families might also pay the ultimate penalty. This was gruesomely highlighted by the discovery of two bodies, assumed to be those of police officers, who had been executed with a shot in the back of the head at close range. There were signs around their necks explaining that similar fates would befall others who helped the Coalition. Aside from being terrified of the insurgents, it was clear that local Iraqis had developed a considerable fear of American troops. Any car that approached a Black Watch patrol would stop and put its four way flashers on to indicate innocent intent; similarly, pedestrians would put their hands above their head and stand rigidly still.”⁶¹

At its inception, the Coalition’s IO campaign failed to appreciate that the passage of information flow in Iraq and the Middle East is predominantly rumour-orientated tied to the tribal and inter-personal nature of Arab society.⁶² When it came to information collection, Coalition forces would have known that rumours had been the staple diet of ordinary Iraqis for over 30 years.⁶³ Known as ‘whispering campaigns’ or the ‘*souktelegraph*’, rumours “are as effective as radio broadcasts in spreading their message.”⁶⁴ One US Marine articulated the failures,

“We had a lack of understanding about how information flows. We were focused on broadcast media, and metrics. But this had no impact because Iraqis spread information through rumour. Instead of tapping into their networks, we should have visited their coffee shops.”⁶⁵

Force protection measures prevented US soldiers from doing so. In early October 2003, rumours that stipend pay for former Iraqi soldiers would be cut off resulted in rioting in both Baghdad and Basra, leaving two Iraqis dead, dozens injured, and several businesses burned down.⁶⁶

Above it, it was a campaign that was full of contradictory messages. On the one hand it advocated the building of a free press by pouring money into a Stateside-model of television stations. On the other it shut down newspapers, such as Moqtadr al Sadr’s al-Hawza newspaper in Najaf for publishing anti-Coalition editorials, and banned imams and clerics from preaching inflammatory sermons. It did not matter that the moves were justified; the perception was that the Coalition was authoritarian and imperial and not advocates of a free press. It was an impression not helped by senior American and British commanders reading the nightly news broadcasts in the stale and domineering fashion not dissimilar to how the Ba`ath Party had delivered its news broadcasts.⁶⁷

NEUTRALISING THE INSURGENT

On the surface, operations in Iraq have demonstrated the fundamental differences between the US and UK militaries’ approach to neutralising the insurgent. One could easily deduce from this assessment that the US military, having been raised on a diet of bombs and bullets, cares little for the ‘softer’ approach preferred by the British Army. Following such an argument would assume that both militaries are tackling the same style of insurgent. Previous arguments have discounted this. The debate over how best to neutralise the insurgent in such an inflammatory setting and with more tools at their disposal has also raised the concerns of political administrations, the wider Muslim world and the international community. Historical analysis of past counter-insurgency campaigns should quash any contemporary political doubts that

kinetic solutions will only exacerbate an insurgency. During the Malayan Emergency for example, British forces killed over 10,000 insurgents.⁶⁸ The challenge in Iraq comes with the insolvable dilemma of killing radical Islamist insurgents who actually seek death and are seemingly flocking to Iraq as volunteers for martyrdom operations. The fact that over 130 suicide bombs have been detonated since 1 April 2005 has positively encouraged the enthusiasm of those following in their wake. Were it not for the casualties they are inflicting, suicide bombers could almost be ignored as they are neutralising themselves.

The real challenge is to identify the tipping point where soft tactics need to be set aside for a more robust and kinetic approach. During the first year of the campaign, the *general* American approach reflected the preference for war-fighting over other lines of operation. This was epitomised by what many American commanders called ‘the Baghdad syndrome’ whereby the US’s heavy armoured Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) would adopt an Israeli approach to counter-insurgency warfare. Buildings would be deliberately destroyed by tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles, the results of which simply alienated the population. It wasn’t just the heavy armoured formations in Baghdad that saw the insurgency in black and white terms. In Mosul, where 2nd BCT of the 101st Airborne Division was launching precision strikes against the house containing Uday and Qusay Husayn, members of the US Special Forces working alongside called in two USAF A-10s to destroy not just the building containing the brothers but every building in a 100m radius. The infantry commander on the ground refused to use them, especially as a mosque was 200m away.⁶⁹ When the decision was made to kill the brothers, the brigade fired 18 TOW and countless .50 calibre rounds missiles into the house. It achieved a decisive and even legendary effect.⁷⁰ The key is to understand that comprehensive kinetic action is often required especially in a country whose citizens understand its power.

The lessons for British COIN doctrine concerns the reluctance to use force combined with a much more rigid set of ROE and a cultural aversion to using excessive force built on its colonial history.⁷¹ The events surrounding the November 2004 assault on Fallujah, which involved the peripheral actions of the Black Watch BG, represent a useful forum from which to draw the right lessons for British COIN.⁷² At the heart of the debate is the question about what conditions would need to be in place for the

British Army to replicate the US military's assault on the city. In other words, would or could the British Army ever 'do a Fallujah?'

By the autumn of 2003, Fallujah had become not only a base a broad range of Iraqi insurgents but more importantly a symbol of *sunni* Arab and Iraqi nationalism, "the truest expression of Iraqi identity."⁷³ In a sense the city represented a microcosm of the entire insurgency and counter-insurgency campaign since the fall of the regime in May 2003. At its very core, Fallujah is a city built on secular tribalism with its associated anti-imperialism and resistance to authority. Its citizens felt not only cheated by the perception of broken American promises, but enraged by the actions of its soldiers who showed scant regard for local culture and customs. After the murder and mutilation of four private security contractors on 30 March 2003, the USMC's 1st Marine Division had been ordered to launch a direct military assault onto the city in a bid to capture those responsible. After five days of national and international condemnation concerning how the assault was being conducted, the Marines were ordered to stop the assault, hand over responsibility for the security of the city to the Iraqi Fallujah Brigade, and withdraw.

Six months later, with the insurgency launching waves of attacks from the relative security of the city, and in order to set the conditions for the elections in January 2005, the US launched a second military assault on the city with the support of the 1 BW BG on its southern flank. From its very inception, the prospect of the assault, let alone the request for British assistance, alarmed a number of British officers serving in Iraq as well as in London. Much of their concern had to do with the prospect of alienating the *sunni* population in the long term. The US chain of command cared little for disagreeable views. Lieutenant General Kiszely summed up the American view and the effect that the operation had,

"Fallujah was a rat's nest that had to be cleared out and it was in danger of taking the insurgency to the next level up, the level at which it can hold ground. And that is very dangerous. Suicide bombers were coming out of Fallujah and hostages like Ken Bigley were going in. We had to be seen to be preventing it. The other solutions were not practical. The actual

assault was, in military terms, highly successful. It was a killing blow to the insurgency and, security notwithstanding, it didn't prevent the *sunnis* from participating in the elections.”⁷⁴

The actual assault by units from the US Marines, US Army and the Iraqi Security Forces⁷⁵ was undoubtedly a tactical success. Although many insurgents had fled the city before the assault began, a significant portion remained. US forces killed over 2000 of them with less than 100 civilian casualties.⁷⁶ General Kiszely visited the city five days after the assault had ended, “I was in charge of Phase IV in Fallujah. I don't think that I saw six buildings that hadn't been shot. It was a PR own-goal waiting to happen; humanitarian disaster, diseases of biblical proportions and so on. The Information Operations campaign was up to the Iraqi ministries but getting them to work together was very difficult.”⁷⁷

The decision to launch a full military assault onto Fallujah had not been taken lightly. The contrasting views not only of senior British generals in Baghdad reflected a similar debate in London where concern over the American approach had been growing since the spring assault. Earlier in the year, reports that British commanders were deeply unhappy with the American approach had been leaked to the press. According to one British officer in southern Iraq, “My view and the view of the British chain of command is that the Americans' use of violence is not proportionate and is over-responsive to the threat they're facing. They're not concerned about the Iraqi loss of life in the way that the British are.”⁷⁸

When the Black Watch BG deployed to North Babil in support of the Fallujah operation the perception among the media was that the British were going to show the Americans how to prosecute counter-insurgency warfare. Within 10 days of its arrival, the Battalion had had four soldiers killed by suicide bombers and over 17 more injured. In response to the heightened threat, the CO had requested a change to the British Rules of Engagement that the Battalion had been operating under since its arrival in the province. The request stated,

“The acute threat in the BRACKEN AO now requires us to consider the circumstances in which insurgents participating in attacks who are not

themselves armed (such as those directing fire) can be lawfully attacked. The clear evidence of sophisticated planning and co-ordination of mortar and rocket attacks, and the use of IEDs and ambushes, makes clear that each attack (and each element of each attack) contributes directly to the imminent threat to BW throughout their AO. It is on this basis that the use of force (and where necessary lethal force) against all of those participating in the preparation and conduct of attacks against BW/Coalition/ISF (including the planting of IEDs and observation/adjusting fire) is necessary.”⁷⁹

The results were immediate. Not only had a great pressure been lifted from the shoulders of the BG’s soldiers operating on the ground, who feared the prospect of prosecution for wrongful killing nearly as much as they did the insurgents, but it allowed the BG to operate with much greater freedom. The Op BRACKEN report outlined the freedom of action now bestowed on the soldiers,

“A further attack was considered imminent [a suicide bomber had just attacked the Vehicle Check Point]. Corporal Mitchell set up the block 150 metres away and battened down his crew to maximise their protection. A large queue of traffic built up at his block. At 1100hrs he and his gunner Private Douglas noticed three vehicles pull up to the front of the queue of traffic. Two vehicles stopped, but the third burst through and set off at speed towards the parked Warrior. There was almost no time to react, but Corporal Mitchell instantly recognised the threat of a suicide bomber. Any hesitation would have been fatal not only to his crew, but to the soft skin vehicles that were due to cross the bridge behind him. He ordered the firing of warning shots above the vehicle and, when the car failed to stop, he had no hesitation in ordering the gunner to fire at the vehicle. The shots from Private Douglas hit the target first time and brought the car to a standstill just short of the Warrior.”⁸⁰

The change in British tactics when faced with the greater threat puts into context the requirements of modern-day counter-insurgency operations and what ‘neutralising the

insurgent' actually means. The success of the Fallujah operation in November 2004 and 1 PWRR's actions in Al Amarrh in August 2004 prove that modern COIN doctrine must accommodate tipping points whereby soft diplomacy is replaced by kinetic action. It is even more important when COIN campaigns are prosecuted in nations which have a high threshold for violence.

LONGER-TERM POST-INSURGENCY PLANNING

The Coalition's track record on reconstruction and development has been characterised by a similar mixture of success and failure to the other COIN principles. The lack of planning for Phase IV was a fundamental hindrance, as was the absence of an historical perspective when it came to understanding the state of Iraq's economy since 1990. Coalition commanders were staggered to discover that Iraq's economic infrastructure, in particular its oil processing and delivery means, were locked in 1950s stagnation. Again the culture of 'warlordism' among US senior commanders was evident; those who had experienced the calming influence of economic projects in previous campaign did their utmost to persuade the CPA of the benefits. The difficulties that the Coalition has faced have been accentuated by the dual requirement to stand up defunct and leaderless Iraqi ministries, fight a multi-layered insurgency, rebuild the ISF, and adapt psychologically to the prospect of a protracted occupation. In broad terms, Coalition successes and failures tended to have common themes.

Successful projects tended to be high profile, nationally sponsored events where security was either not an issue or it had been mitigated by a comprehensive security plan. The operation to introduce the new Iraqi dinar in the autumn of 2003 was considered a great success because it had been a comprehensively planned military operation in tune with the capabilities of the US military and combined with a widespread IO campaign. The prospect of failure generated intense government interest in Washington where no expense was spared to ensure success. Other large-scale projects that were given strategic visibility and the concentrated planning efforts of the US military, such as the salary and pension payments to former Iraqi military personnel, were similarly successful.

The Commanders Emergency Response Programme (CERP) was an unbridled success because it allowed commanders the flexibility to use projects for operational as well as economic reasons. Delivered in monthly instalments, the amount of CERP funds varied according to the ability of Congress to approve the overall budget process. Once free of Washington, the value of CERP lay in its ability to generate short-term economic and social regeneration at the local community level. Indeed the combined success of large-scale projects and CERP depended to a large extent on the security situation not being a constraining factor.⁸¹

In contrast, the Coalition's failures often coincided with high social cost.⁸² Its inability to secure the delivery of subsidised fuel throughout much of the Campaign met with intense resentment and hostility and placed greater pressure on the domestic oil infrastructure which in turn became a systematic target for the insurgents. There was often a need to get a CPA sponsor on board with a project to ensure that it had the right level of exposure and ownership. The *ad hoc* nature of the CPA throughout much of its tenure prevented this from happening for many projects that commanders on the ground urged action on. For instance, plans for agricultural reconstruction languished without a committed CPA sponsor.⁸³ Furthermore, the relief that commanders with the arrival of fresh trunks of CERP money was coupled to anguish and concern when bureaucracy stopped the flow. Unfortunately the need for auditable funds did not prevent severe Iraqi corruption from taking place. This hindered every attempt by the Coalition to revive the economy.⁸⁴

Given these broad themes it is vital for future British COIN doctrine to register the fundamental importance of this final principle⁸⁵ and to read the evidence presented by senior Coalition commanders as to the importance with which they attached to it. Four lessons stand out. First, the lack of pre-invasion planning.⁸⁶ Secondly, the extent to which Britain, and thus DFID, was willing to contribute to the rebuilding of Iraq in accordance with its dual responsibilities under UNSCR 1483. Thirdly, how development and regeneration were stifled by the auditors' regulations concerning the appropriation of CERP and other funds. The fourth failure concerns the inability of the Coalition to improve the basic necessities of economic life in Iraq, such as electricity and the supply of oil. As one senior British civil servant remarked,

“something is wrong if we still cannot improve the power in Basrah [despite two years of trying].”⁸⁷

Blame must be shared between the US Administration, the Pentagon and the British government. At its core lay a fundamental weakness in the intelligence picture concerning the state of Iraq’s infrastructure as one British civil servant stated,

“We did not appreciate the level of infrastructural collapse, nor the fact that there were no civilian structures to work with. We overestimated that in London. You couldn’t go in and mend it if it didn’t exist and so the scale of the rebuilding process was not appreciated. We simply did not know enough, one of the consequences I suppose of closing your Embassy. Closing the Embassy in 1991⁸⁸ meant that we didn’t have enough eyes and ears on the ground in form of diplomatic and information-gathering assets. We also did not appreciate the level of decay or destruction.”⁸⁹

In Washington DC, the senior officials tasked to head major reconstruction projects were not brought together to develop a strategy until February 2003. When they did meet their forecasts were shaped more by speculation than information about the state of Iraq’s economy. This was aligned to the US Administration’s reluctance to deal with the onerous task of ‘nation-building’. However once the US realised the extent to which it was required to pour financial assets into Iraq it has used every asset at its disposal to do so. Unfortunately the British government, unwilling to share the burdens imbued within UNSCR 1483, felt ill-disposed to contribute. DFID lay at the heart of the debate.

DFID’s mission is to eliminate world poverty.⁹⁰ Its mission does not correspond necessarily with the British government’s foreign policy and the political nature of the organisation prevented, and still does, a greater involvement in Iraq. Clare Short, the Cabinet Minister in charge of DFID at the start of the war, had strong feelings about the Government’s intentions to invade Iraq. According to one civil servant,

“Clare Short did not want to do Iraq and she had a capacity to frustrate wider policy. She was a very strong, very opinionated minister who did not want to divert her budget outside of fighting poverty. She had ideological objections to Iraq and so DFID’s role in Iraq was minimal. And then what was put in place after the [military] victory in Iraq was shambolic so even if you wanted to plug into ORHA it was very difficult when it was a tangled wreck. It was only when Clare Short left that you could start to influence the debate.”⁹¹

The consequence was instant and the effect deeply damaging to Britain’s position in the Coalition. It was no longer able to influence the campaign. Another senior civil servant attempted to convince Whitehall the damage that was being done by Britain’s reluctance to share the responsibility outlined by UNSCR,

“When I was later asked ‘Why aren’t the Americans listening to us?’ I told them to not expect me to have 50% of the influence [in accordance with UNSCR 1483] when you are putting in 2% of the resources. The Americans don’t respect people who put in 2%; put in 10% then you might make them listen. At the moment we are not contributing to the American area of difficulty. It was at that moment that the man from the Treasury told the meeting, ‘I will remind you that the Chancellor says that there is nothing left to spend in Iraq and 2% it will remain.’”⁹²

Although DFID’s contribution did improve after Short’s resignation on 12 May 2003, the South-East and Britain continued to rely on American financial support. Hilary Synnott recounts,

“They [the Americans] paid Iraqi salaries and stipends and financed the over-whelming majority of projects administered by CPA (South) as well as those conducted independently by contractors. The civilian team in the south, and the British government, might have had their own ideas for the conduct of operations, but they ultimately had little leverage, beyond persuasive argument, with which to shift the Baghdad-based bureaucracy.”⁹³

This inevitably led to frustrations within the British chain of command in Basrah which at one time was forced to request CPA help in the purchase of Iraqi police uniforms that British forces were training.⁹⁴ There was even a time when the Danish government plausibly maintained that they provided more funding for the civilian side, as a proportion of GNP, than Britain.⁹⁵

The lack of DFID investment was tied to a dearth of staff on CPA (South)'s Economic Development desk. British commanders and diplomatic staff thereon had to play a careful and sensitive game with the CPA in Baghdad whose own sights were fixed firmly on regenerating the Sunni Triangle. According to General Stewart,

“The Americans saw the south-east as a British-run patch with a British-military lead, the Foreign Office running the CPA with British development and they thought that all of our money was going into the South-East. And of course none of our money was going into the South-east. It was going into a central fund and then being allocated.”⁹⁶

British commanders and diplomats thereon had to play a careful game in which they had to convince their American counterparts that the South-East was worth their continued investment. Furthermore, they were unfamiliar with the stiffer American auditing procedures that Congress, in an attempt to stop previous bouts of corruption had enforced during the first autumn. General Stewart became particularly frustrated with the procedures:

“The propriety rules were a farce, an absolute farce. There was more money in Iraq than we knew what to do with but we just couldn't spend it. It was down to things like the \$18.4 billion that was coming from America had been cleared by Congress and Congress wanted to know what it was going to be spent on – this much on sewage in Baghdad, this much on bridges in Basrah. And they had seen the programme which was going to take six years and you had to follow that programme. If you wanted to change it you couldn't and therefore if you wanted to produce an additional bridge in Basrah bearing in mind that we had blown the

whole lot up in 1991, therefore it would be a good thing to produce a bridge, you couldn't because four years down the line they were going to spend \$250 million on three bridges. And all I wanted was \$2.5 million to build one bridge which would be visible. Everything that we had done up to then had been invisible – sewage, water, trying to get the electricity to work. Adding generators to a completely decrepit system which very cleverly the insurgency identified that if you targeted it would demonstrate that the occupying forces were useless.”⁹⁷

The sum of these issues, combined with the Coalition's inability to manage expectations, meant that the basic necessities of economic life did not improve across Iraq in over two years of occupation. Basrah's electricity output reduced from 23 hours before the war to 14 hours after two years of occupation.⁹⁸ Iraq's water treatment facilities never recovered their pre-war capacity; sewage continued getting dumped into rivers and children kept on appearing in hospitals with the associated ailments of drinking untreated water. Iraq has even continued to import its oil to fill the shortages. At the core of all of the problems is the most fundamental dictum that reconstructing the economy and restoring security are so inextricably interconnected that strategies to achieve these two goals must be fully integrated to be successful.⁹⁹

Above all, the Coalition displayed such ignorance of Iraq's history and the incendiary perception of its occupation that it attempted to rebuild its economy on a model that had worked in Eastern Europe after the Cold War. An example of the hubristic approach was encapsulated in CPA Order 39 in September 2003. Believing that foreign direct investment would provide the injection of funds, technology and expertise to breathe life into Iraqi economy, the Order reversed long-standing Iraqi law by permitting full ownership in most sectors of the Iraqi economy, less oil. The policy generated intense controversy. Among citizens deeply aware of their own history, the Order was perceived as a ploy to permit foreign domination of the economy. Even the impression that FDI would be drawn to Iraq was based on false optimism; FDI tends to stay away from economies dominated by violence.

SUMMARY

Lacking a plan, the US and UK Coalition was forced to forge an approach in Iraq that one senior British commander cited as “probably a national and international disgrace.”¹⁰⁰ Once it had accepted that an insurgency existed, it still took a great deal of time to study similar campaigns and understand that principles of warfare are generated by experience. Instead the Coalition, with the American politico-military as its chief culprits, was adamant to discover for itself a new set of principles by which it could achieve success. Britain simply sat content on the sidelines while the American efforts further north imploded. A series of lessons can be drawn from both nations’ campaigns which should be used to craft not only future COIN doctrine but interventionist policy.

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⁵⁶ Interview with Major General Stewart, 4 May 2005

⁵⁷ Russell Glenn, *Urban Operations*, RAND, 2004, p.84

⁵⁸ Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, "Insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, Change and Continuity," Strategic Studies Institute paper, 2004, p.8

⁵⁹ Ibrahim al-Marashi, "Iraq's Hostage Crisis: Kidnappings, Mass Media, and the Iraqi Insurgency," *MERIA*, Vol.8, No.4 (December 2004), p.4. The quote of "made for television events" comes from Jon Alterman at CSIS.

⁶⁰ Alexis Debat, "Vivisectioning the Jihad," *The National Interest*, no.76, summer 2004, p.22 cited in Daniel Byman, "Five Bad Options for Iraq," *Survival*, vol.47, no.1, Spring 2005, pp.7-32

⁶¹ Op BRACKEN report, 2004

⁶² "If leaflets, newspapers, or radio broadcasts are likened to bullets, then rumour must be likened to a torpedo; for once launched, it travels of its own power." Knapp, 1944

⁶³ Saddam had even run a Committee of Positive and Negative Rumours. Information provided by International Defence Analysis (IDA), Washington DC, 19 April 2005

⁶⁴ Sharabi, 1966 cited in Stephanie R. Kelley, "Rumours in Iraq: A Guide to Winning Hearts and Minds," US Naval Postgraduate Studies, September 2004, downloaded from www.smallwarsjournal.com

⁶⁵ Montgomery McFate, "Does Culture Matter: the Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 38, July 2005. Downloaded from www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/toc38.pdf

⁶⁶ Associated Press, "Stone Throwing Ex-Soldiers Confront Troops," *Houston Chronicle*, 4 October 2003 cited in Stephanie Kelley, "Rumors in Iraq: A Guide to Winning Hearts and Minds," *US Naval Postgraduate School*, September 2004

⁶⁷ The Arab approach to information transmission relies on passion and gestures. Many praised the performance of former US Ambassador Christopher Ross, who addressed Arab television audiences in

fluent Arabic soon after 9/11. According to some Arab communication experts, however, Ross spoke like a hesitant diplomat, repeating his words and thoughts without any passion for what he was stating, suggesting Arab audiences were less impressed than those in Washington, DC. (Fakhreddine 2002) On the other hand, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who speaks no Arabic and had to use a translator, was able to overcome the language barrier with a passionate delivery on the Arab television network al-Jazeera. "Every facial, body, and hand gesture Blair made with each word he uttered seemed to communicate genuine belief in what he had to say." (Fakhreddine 2002) For a full discussion see Stephanie R. Kelley, *Rumours in Iraq: A Guide to Winning Hearts and Minds*, US Naval Postgraduate report, September 2004; downloaded from www.smallwarsjournal.com

⁶⁸ Interview with Lt Col R J E Willams, March 2005. Colonel Williams urged the British military to not underestimate this COIN principle.

⁶⁹ Personal experience, 22 July 2003, Mosul, Iraq

⁷⁰ Legendary in that the citizens of Mosul have never forgotten the display.

⁷¹ See Chapter 3

⁷² One could argue that Fallujah represented a microcosm of the entire campaign from an insurgent and counter-insurgent perspective. Studying the political machinations behind both assaults effectively displays samples of all of the mistakes that the Coalition has made in Iraq. Unfortunately this is outside the scope for this paper.

⁷³ Nir Rosen, "Fallujah – Inside the Iraqi Resistance," downloaded from www.atimes.com/atimes/others/Fallujah/html

⁷⁴ Interview with Lt Gen Sir John Kiszely, 4 July 2005

⁷⁵ Because Fallujah was predominantly *sunni* the ISF units were predominantly *shi'a* or Kurdish

⁷⁶ Interview with Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszely KCB MC, Watchfield, 4 July 2005

⁷⁷ *ibid*

⁷⁸ John Shovelan, "British forces concerned by American tactics," 13 April, seen at www.abc.net.au/am/content/2004/s1086139.htm

⁷⁹ Additional Guidance on ROE for Op BRACKEN, given to author.

⁸⁰ Op BRACKEN report, 2004

⁸¹ Anne Ellen Henderson, "The Coalition Provincial Authority's Experience with Economic Reconstruction in Iraq, Lessons Identified," *United States Institute of Peace*, No. 138, April 2005 downloaded on 11 July 2005 from www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr138.html

⁸² *ibid*

⁸³ *ibid*

⁸⁴ In Mosul in late 2004, the Chief of Police's Liaison Officer to US forces, having worked with them for over 18 months as the conduit for police salaries in the city, absconded with over \$90,000 of salaries.

⁸⁵ The subject gets only two paragraphs in current British COIN doctrine, although it does cede that "this last principle probably holds the key to the effective application of all the other five principles." Above all, the principle acts as a safeguard against the emergence of the political conditions whereby the insurgent first appeared.

⁸⁶ The recommendations from this first point will be presented in the final chapter

⁸⁷ Interview with senior British civil servant, April 2005

⁸⁸ 12 Jan 1991. For a full history of the British Embassy in Iraq see www.britishembassy.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/Showpage&cid=1052839096382

⁸⁹ Interview with Foreign Office official, May 2005

⁹⁰ <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/>

⁹¹ Interview with British civil servant, London, May 2005

⁹² Interview with British civil servant, London, May 2005

⁹³ Hilary Synnott, "State Building in Southern Iraq," *Foreign Affairs*, June 2005

⁹⁴ Lieutenant General Sir John McColl, March 2005, Wilton

⁹⁵ Synnott, p.42

⁹⁶ Interview with Major General Andrew Stewart, London, 4 May 2005

⁹⁷ *ibid*

⁹⁸ Synnott. "State-building in Southern Iraq," *Survival*, Vol.47, No.2, Summer 2005, p.43

⁹⁹ Celeste J. Ward, "The Coalition Provincial Authority's Experience with Governance in Iraq, Lessons Identified," *United States Institute of Peace*, Special Report 139, May 2005

¹⁰⁰ Interview with Major General Tim Cross, Netheravon, May 2005

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE FUTURE: AN ERA OF SMALL WARS

“This is no longer a war of massed fires and easily traced manoeuvre but rather a war of subtle intelligence acts, positive precise strikes and the painstaking work of institution building [in which] the enemy seeks to wait us out.”

General John P. Abizaid¹

A NEW CONTINUUM...

Britain faces an era of small wars in which it will be confronted with the challenge of fighting national and global insurgencies inspired by Arab nationalists and Islamist extremists. Invariably that challenge will be shared by a ‘coalition of the willing’ or as part of a collective international alliance. It will encompass a multi-layered strategy of expeditionary warfare involving the deployment of its Armed Forces to far-flung corners of the earth, and fervent attempts to defy trans-national insurgents from pursuing their agenda on British soil. One can classify their campaign as one of ‘rear’, ‘close’ and ‘deep’ operations.² The sooner the British nation and her Armed Forces in particular, re-align its strategic goals the more likely it is to defeat this growing menace across all three fields.

Britain’s Armed Forces, and her American counterparts, are physically and conceptually under-prepared to wage this war. Counter-insurgency operations in Iraq are only now beginning to prove that. Iraq is not unique. To Islamists, operations in Iraq are as valuable as those in Afghanistan in the 1980s.³ Future intervention operations involving Western forces in Muslim states will likely attract a global ‘caravan’ of Islamist *jihadists*. There is a real danger that Britain’s armed forces may treat Iraq as an operation that only the US military can learn anything from. Our operations in the South-East, though occasionally tempered by flashes of insurgency, reinforce the perception that we have got the doctrine right. We can either watch the US military undergo its Transformation and Lessons Learned procedures with parental curiosity or play a leading role in the American-led debate on the premise

that operations in Iraq *are* the future of COIN warfare. At the heart of the debate are three subjects of critical importance - 'Understanding the Environment', 'Winning the Battle of Perceptions' and 'Unity of Effort'. For Britain's armed forces, standing smugly on the "sidelines simply yelling advice"⁴, is no longer an option.

UNDERSTANDING THE ENVIRONMENT

Future intervention operations will be "anthropological in nature"⁵ in which "figures are more or less like Colonel Creighton, the ethnographer-scholar-soldier in *Kim*, Rudyard Kipling's great novel about spies and insurgents in colonial India. Creighton sees the world from a totally systematic viewpoint. Everything about India interests him, because everything in it is significant for his rule."⁶ Successful campaigns in the future will not rely solely on units simply reconfiguring themselves into appropriate COIN structures, or attending comprehensive training packages, six weeks before deployment and then revert to more traditional ORBATs on return. Instead the emphasis must be on breeding a culture in which our soldiers and officers become specialists in potential areas of conflict. As military historians are keen to remind us, "every [my emphasis] effort must be made to know your enemy before the insurgency begins."⁷ Global insurgency is upon us and we are some way behind. In order to catch up a number of adjustments need to be made:

1. The US and UK militaries need to re-evaluate the significance of T.E. Lawrence. Although the contents of *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* and his other books on Arabia are illuminating, the real message lies in the fact that the British Army encouraged and supported Lawrence to immerse himself in Arabia for lengthy periods of time in order to achieve specific objectives.⁸ The nature of the threats facing Britain today requires an urgent re-evaluation of this policy. Selected officers should be moved into a separate and viable career stream in which they are posted overseas to become cultural and political experts. This stream should be in addition to the five others that the British Army encourages its officers to specialise in. It should revolve around broad range of Deputy Defence Attaché appointments for post-Staff College majors. These officers would then remain associated with "their" region for the remainder of their careers. It need not matter that they may not be posted to the country of future interest or threat, but they must be posted to the region. Those

officers must then be given the opportunity of learning the four main components of a foreign land – its language, history, culture and religion. As one British senior officer put it, “I wish I could have been given the opportunity to really study future threats over a ten year period; that is the only way we are going to achieve parity with them.”⁹

2. The MOD, Foreign Office and other government departments involved in Britain’s operational deployment needs to re-evaluate the length of tours for military and civilian personnel. The US Army now conducts year-long tours of Iraq, the US Marine Corps seven months, and the British Army six months. Certain groups of civilians were spending as little as 90 days in theatre.¹⁰ In an environment where tribal leaders view the Coalition as a “weak tribal shaykh”¹¹, and where the strength of inter-personal relationships is measured over time, six month military deployments are damaging to the overall campaign. Generally speaking, units tend to spend their first six weeks familiarising themselves with their new Area of Operations; four months is then spent tackling the insurgency and building the institutions before the units starts its preparation for re-deployment home; during that time the majority of the unit’s soldiers are more interested in not getting killed than defeating the insurgents. The US army has proved that the taxing nature of year-long tours can be offset with generous financial incentives and mid-tour leave.¹² Not only would they improve the ability of soldiers to understand and read the culture, but it would greatly enhance the intelligence-gathering process and the Coalition’s credibility.

3. Counter-insurgency operations in Iraq have exposed the weaknesses in the Coalition’s intelligence structures. Pre-disposed to finding and analysing conventional capabilities, their *raison d’etre* must now be to concentrate on the collection of information from humans about humans. In the wealth of material that US forces read before they crossed from Kuwait into Iraq, there was little mention of Saddam’s *Fedayin* forces but within a week their attacks had forced Lieutenant General Wallace to admit that “...the enemy we’re fighting is a bit different from the one we had war-gamed against.”¹³ Over two years later and there remains almost universal condemnation of intelligence procedures in Iraq that ignore the wealth of low-level HUMINT and tactical information from the Arab Street. Assessments of the insurgency’s strength, structure, ideologies and tribal affiliations remain rooted in a

Western systems-based approach. It seems increasingly clear that the insurgency is mostly tribal-based yet those assessments seem only to come from Arabists, not Westerners.¹⁴ One analyst stated that

“...we have yet to integrate all the resources and understand how the various hostile elements are organised, resourced and directed. We need a better understanding of the political, ethnic and religious seams in Iraq, how they are affected by influences from outside the country, particularly Iran, and how positive influences can be exploited. [It requires] greater Iraqi involvement in the field at every level.”

Highly capable and robust Red Cells, manned with Arabists where possible should be added to the more traditional G2 cells at battalion level and above.¹⁵ This will allow interrogators to see through the fact that the majority of captured insurgents told interrogators what they wanted to hear.¹⁶

As Kitson reminds us, “If it is accepted that the problem of defeating the enemy consists very largely of finding him, it is easy to recognise the paramount importance of good information.”¹⁷ Intelligence Cells that generate ‘good information’ must become the cornerstone around which everything else is built.¹⁸ Furthermore, the tactical and operational value of UAVs was viewed as a “key battle winner. The feed was pushed down to battalions and utilised at company level.”¹⁹

5. Failures in intelligence collection stemmed not only from a lack of HUMINT specialists but in the speed with which information is turned into actionable intelligence. The affliction has spread across all Western militaries that simply spend too long processing actionable intelligence. As one commander stated, “...the speed of response is too slow. Military units on high readiness should have the intelligence and act on it in a greatly compressed time frame.”²⁰ Instead of formation-level intelligence processes, the Battle Group or Task Force should be the hub around which the intelligence collection process revolves. Strategic intelligence should be shared between the J2 cell and Civil Military Operations Cell at formation headquarters and the BG J2 cell.²¹

6. Speed of response must also be improved in regards to learning about the insurgents' TTPs. American units often discovered that what they were being taught in training before they deployed was different when they reached Iraq. The US Army's 1st Cavalry Division quickly discovered that insurgents were changing their TTPs within 3-5 days of first using them. This differed with the 3-5 months that they had been told. To counter the speed of enemy adaptation, the Division developed CAVNET, an intranet chat room to post information was available to 80% of the Division's tactical commanders.²²

7. Unit commanders should be empowered to establish their own intelligence networks and HUMINT sources. "A battalion commander, a company commander, ought to be able to go out and pay their own sources... The policy has to change to allow a commander to develop his own intelligence in an urban environment."²³ This in turn will transfer the weight of information collection to the lower echelons, multiplying the nodes of collection for analysts to process further up the chain. BG intelligence cells, supplemented with greater access to strategic analysis tools such as mapping software, satellite imagery and high-resolution long-range cameras, will gain ownership and understanding of an AO and, most importantly, the intelligence that emanates from it.²⁴

Some units in the US military had already changed their ORBATs between deployments. The 1st Marine Division (USMC), on being notified in November 2003 that it would be returning to Iraq in January 2004 for a second tour, this time in the heartland of the Sunni Triangle, initiated a series of changes that placed the battalions in prime position to engage the insurgents. At its most basic level, there was an understanding that,

"When you're in an urban environment, everyone is a collector. There is just a massive input coming in. It's not just intelligence people or HUMINT people. It's everybody. Even in a small town of 5,000 people, there's so much going on... We're going to mitigate that this time by beefing up the battalion intelligence section. We're tripling it in size... We're stripping people out from other units that aren't deploying and taking them out of the [air] wing."²⁵

Furthermore, it removed Brigade HQs entirely, allowing Division HQ to talk directly to battalions. It created a Divisional Tactical Fusion Cell that brought together the mass of information being collected by the battalions.²⁶ The Division went further than just changing ORBATs and beefing up the intelligence cells. In analysing the Baghdad-Fallujah-Ramadi-Syria corridor, the Division planners realised that it would never have enough troops to dominate the ground so in the weeks before it deployed it created a Community Policing policy that utilised the experiences of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) in policing the “rat line that runs from LA to Mexico.”²⁷ It also tackled the lack of Arabic speakers by not only bringing in Arabists to help train the soldiers but making one platoon in every battalion take 30 days of intense language training before the Division deployed.²⁸ This platoon would supplement the basic Arabic that every other soldier learned. Most of Iraq’s problems are anthropological in nature. The British Army must improve its anthropological understanding of them.

UNDERSTANDING COALITION CAPABILITIES

Britain has never before had to prosecute a counter-insurgency campaign as a junior partner in a multi-national Coalition. That has led to a series of disagreements with how the campaign is being fought serving as a timely reminder that “multi-nationality creates friction.”²⁹ The source of friction revolves around two entirely different approaches to COIN warfare. For the first year of the campaign, the US was convinced that the insurgents could be defeated militarily, reflecting its familiarity with set-piece battles and conventional war. In contrast, the British favoured a politically-motivated strategy that gave Iraqis ownership of the country’s problems while it provided military support. As the campaign progressed, the US began to realise that it was in danger of losing the campaign unless it accepted British and others’ advice and adopted a more traditional COIN strategy focusing on all of the Lines of Operation.³⁰ At the same time, the UK struggled to fuse its Lines of Operation together because it found itself no longer engaged in prosecuting a COIN campaign in the South East but PSO and SSR. For America, Iraq is the front on which it is fighting its War on Terror. For Britain, Iraq is another expeditionary operation. The distinction is critical because it reflects the true nature of Coalition warfare in

which domestic political agendas often outweigh military considerations. In order to improve its understanding waging counter-insurgency warfare in a Coalition, a number of recommendations are made:

1. It is vital to build a framework that allows the Coalition's senior commander and each of the contributing countries to understand each others' capabilities. Lieutenant General David McKiernan, who commanded the Land Component Command in Phase III and whose previous appointments include DCOS-Ops in the ARRC during its deployment to Bosnia, stated that at its most basic level there must be

“the realisation that every Coalition contributor comes with a different left and right limit of what they can do militarily. It is very important [for the senior commander] to learn early on what those limits are for that national contingent. One of the challenges that you have will be how much offensive capability your coalition partners have. Everyone will be there for SASO, everyone will be there to protect the force and serve defensive tasks. But if you have actionable intelligence to force operations, I doubt that every nation will have the same charter that the UK or US has. And when you are looking at the greater width of COIN and Peace Support Operations, coalition partners will bring capabilities that apply somewhere along this spectrum. For example you will have nations that will have bring a wonderful civil affairs or engineering or medical capability, so you will know how to put the Coalition together and then how to use it. Lesson number one is to understand the left and right limits.”³¹

It is a lesson echoed by Lieutenant General James Mattis who commanded Task Force 58 in the opening days of the Afghanistan War.

“If the senior commander does not have the military authority over the contributing nations, then his command will be entirely personality-based. You have then got to bring every national contingent commander in and find out what their forces are best at and find a way to use them. You can always expand. You must also ensure that your intelligence can

be read by all of those commanders and their staffs because the minute you shut people out you shatter the trust. In Iraq I had a platoon of Tongans assigned to the Division. They were commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel and they were very nervous about patrolling. So I put them in charge of the Division CP's security and they were first-class."³²

2. Precision with communications is critical in a COIN environment within a Coalition. National sensitivities over the use of military force and different interpretations of the ROE can have strategic consequences if the orders to deploy those forces are not understood. General McKiernan emphasised the point,

“Even a written order will have a different meaning to a British military unit and to a US military unit, even with the same language. Even in Coalition operations, precision of language and application of language to various nations is a very important practice. Those who write your plans must be cognisant of who the recipient of the orders are and the language used. We had a useful technique when the ARRC deployed to Bosnia of talking to the multi-national recipient of the order before you write it. You are almost putting the cart before the horse but you have to make sure that the order will be understood before you write it. And practice patience because nothing will happen at a pace that you're familiar with in your national military experience; it always happens slower.”³³

Much of the deceleration and delay comes from understanding and integrating the agencies that contribute to the other Lines of Operation in what General McKiernan gave the acronym DIME – Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economy. Equally, it is important to understand the roles and charters of the host of other NGOs, PMCs, civil servants and OGAs that have been operating alongside military forces in Iraq.

3. It is vital for commanders to understand that Coalition operations involves the sharing of 'battle space' with a plethora of other organisations such as NGO, PMCs, OGA and national and international media bodies. The presence of these 'outsiders'

can but will not necessarily represent a multiplication of his force across the Lines of Operation. Some will have to be discarded but others should be integrated into the Campaign Plan under the guise of a Comprehensive Approach. Many of the mistakes that the Coalition made during the early months of the campaign which subsequently fed the numbers of disaffected Iraqis and insurgents could have been avoided if CJTF-7 and the CPA had understood the full breadth of resources at their disposal.

WINNING THE BATTLE OF PERCEPTIONS

A poll conducted for CNN in March 2004 found that 71% of those asked thought that Coalition forces mostly as occupiers, not liberators.³⁴ In May 2004, 66% of ordinary Iraqis believed insurgents' claims that the "Coalition is trying to steal Iraq's wealth"³⁵ and in February 2005, almost two years after welcoming them as liberators, 71% of Iraqis opposed the presence of Coalition Forces in Iraq.³⁶ Among Muslims, the occupation remains a source of "deep humiliation and resentment [and] a constant reminder that the descendants of the great Islamic empires can no longer defend themselves and must answer to infidel powers."³⁷

The Coalition's efforts at separating the insurgent from the source of his support have been largely ineffective. Much of this has to do with its poor Information Operations campaign. Abu Ghraib did untold damage because it eroded the legitimacy and trust principles that the Coalition had emphasised since its arrival. At the root of the problem lies the failure to understand the Muslim culture and the power of the 'Arab Street'. The strength of the Iraqi and global insurgents is increasingly complex, as General Abizaid remarked, "When these few people become connected *virtually* it gives them strength beyond which they would have *geographically*."³⁸ Given that the enemy is brazenly effective at winning hearts and minds, it is time that the Coalition adopts a more offensive posture in order to regain the initiative. A number of proposals are recommended:

1. There is evidence to suggest that the foreign fighters operating in Iraq do not always have the support of the Iraqi-born insurgents. Many commentators have remarked that the images of beheadings, executions and suicide bombings are distinctly not Iraqi.³⁹ Furthermore, those groups of foreign fighters operating from

Saudi Arabia and Syria care little for the Iraqi population⁴⁰ and are attempting to incite civil or inter-tribal war, as one incident revealed:

“In Tal Afar last month, a Lebanese youth with his hands taped to the steering wheel of a Chevrolet saloon drove a bomb into a funeral procession, killing 25 mourners. Two more suicide bombers then struck the town, killing 35. These death tolls were unremarkable, but the victims were not. They seem to have been selected merely for being members of two tribes, the Sada and the Jolak, who are the (wholly secular) rivals of another tribe, the Qarabash, which happens to be on good terms with the local Islamists. In Iraq these days...a suicide bomber can be had for the asking.”⁴¹

The Coalition’s campaigns at training and equipping the ISF and an aggressive IO campaign must continue to exploit the elements of *fitna* or internal struggle within the Muslim community in Iraq. A wedge must continue to be driven between the tiny minority of foreign fighters and the much-larger majority of Arab nationalist insurgents. The January 2005 elections did this, only for the post-election vacuum to bring the groups together again. With further evidence suggesting that the number of Iraqi Islamist radicals is growing, the caravan of suicide bombers is targeting the vulnerable elements of the Iraqi state – the ISF and the Iraqi population before it attacks the Coalition troops who tactically have better adapted to these threats.⁴² Given the acceptance that Iraq’s problems are only going to be solved by Iraqis, the Coalition must train and equip the ISF to do so. A recent report suggested that:

“...much remains to be done. There is no maintenance or logistics system. There is no national command and control. Corruption is a threat factor of greater long-term danger than the armed insurgency. The insurgents have widely infiltrated the ISF. The ISF desperately needs more effective, long-term NCO and Officer training. Finally, the ISF absolutely must have enough helicopter air-mobility (120+ Black Hawk UH-60s), and a substantial number of armoured vehicles to lower casualties and give them a competitive edge over the insurgents they will

fight (2000 up-armour Humvees, 500 ASVs and 2000 M113A3s with add-on armour).”⁴³

2. Budgetary restrictions must be lifted on the amounts of CERP-style funds that are given for small-scale, highly visible projects. Despite the lack of tangible evidence that equates the availability of such money to saving Coalition lives and winning hearts and minds of the population, every Coalition commander interviewed for the paper said two things. First, that having the money allowed them to demonstrate that the Coalition was keeping its promises and improving the infrastructure and lives of the local population. Secondly, that when budgetary restrictions slowed down the supply of that money to the field commanders, the level of resentment and open hostility against their soldiers increased. Again, some commanders understood the relationship better than others and pinned their entire strategy on CERP funds. Major Generals Petraeus, Chiarelli, and Mattis all demanded more and more money. The former came up the phrase ‘Money is Ammunition’. General Chiarelli “waxed lyrical”⁴⁴ about how his regeneration programme for Sewage, Water, Electricity and Trash (SWET) in Baghdad saved Coalition lives. General Mattis labelled the CERP funds as ‘insurance money for my Lieutenant Colonels’ and warned the CPA that “if you don’t give dollars to my Lieutenant Colonels, you’d better give them more machine gun ammunition” because the frequency of attacks against his forces would increase.⁴⁵ But allocating more money is not enough, as McCaffrey’s report reminded, “Money doesn’t rebuild infrastructure – bulldozers and workers and cement do. The Coalition needs an Iraqi/Coalition effort principally executed by military engineers – and thousands of Iraqi workers.”⁴⁶

3. The security situation in Iraq is preventing journalists from travelling safely around the country. They cannot travel independently of Coalition forces without risking abduction or death. In some cases, the press has degraded to reporting based on secondary sources, press briefings which they do not believe, and alarmist video of the aftermath of suicide bombings obtained from Iraqi employees of unknown reliability. As a result, and with some exceptions, the media is putting its second team in Iraq.⁴⁷ It is therefore critical that the Coalition aggressively provides support to all journalists to allow them to follow the course of the campaign. This should be in the form of transportation, food, security and the return of a film to an upload site. Doing

so will have a greater effect on removing the journalist's mantra of "If it bleeds it leads". Images of chaos and destruction must be replaced by images of hope and improvement.

4. The American and British people are as impressionable and perceptive as those in Iraq. The campaign in Iraq has demonstrated that there are two Centres of Gravity – the population of Iraq and the electorates of the Coalition.⁴⁸ The IO campaign must target both by insisting that the prisms through which both populations view Iraq are represented. Evidence suggests that military leaders on the ground are talking to people they trust instead of talking to all reporters who command the attention of the American, British and Middle Eastern peoples.⁴⁹ The Coalition therefore needs to educate and support those institutions which do so. Some are openly hostile to the Coalition's presence in Iraq and are committed to showing it in the worst possible light. Commanders must make more effort in dealing with these journalists and not those they feel comfortable with. Journalists only report on information that is given to them. Shutting off hostile reporters serves only one purpose.

5. Units must appoint an IO campaign manager with sufficient rank, military experience and media training to present the commanders intent in a plausible and understanding fashion. In many senses this is the key battle ground upon which the success of the campaign will be judged. Daily meetings between commanders and staff must be held in which the *effects* of the campaign are judged. As General McKiernan recalls, the Commander of the ARRC in Bosnia held a daily Perception Management meeting,

"It was an inner circle sort of meeting that he would have with trusted agents. It was to really gauge on a daily basis how are we doing? Are we having the right effects along our lines of operation? How do we know? What is happening in the world of perceptions? How does the Commander know his operation is doing and what adjustments must be made?"⁵⁰

UNITY OF EFFORT

The Iraq campaign has not only demonstrated that national governments must coordinate their response to defeating an insurgency but that under the auspices of Coalition campaigning, there must also be unity of effort between partners. Britain's efforts at striking the right balance between both have been woefully inadequate from the pre-war planning sessions to the current prosecution of the campaign. The reasons for this are buried in political hesitancy, budgetary constraints and military capabilities. The real reason is that British policy-makers are sitting comfortably back safe in the knowledge that British military forces have not had to fight a counter-insurgency fight campaign in Iraq, and therefore there has been no need to adhere to the COIN principles. Even with its responsibilities under UNSCR 1483 Britain has been woefully carefree. All the major lessons have been generated by the US military, both from a bottom-up process of learning on the job, or from the strategic concern that it is caught in a quagmire. As a result the US Administration has fused every government department into a coherent body in order to defeat the Iraqi insurgency. It has appointed a Secretary of State for Post-Conflict Reconstruction. It is highly unlikely that the US military will deploy to an Iraq-like theatre again without the cross-government capability required for success. As Winston Churchill reminds us, "The United States invariably does the right thing, after having exhausted every other alternative." The prospects are not as encouraging for Britain's Armed Forces. The following improvements are required:

1. The UK should study closely the proposals currently circulating in the US about the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). Although initially a Counter-Terrorist body, it is now being adopted by the regional Combatant Commanders as a post-conflict body able to deal with crises such as Iraq. Its fulcrum is the belief that unity of effort at the strategic level 'requires coordination among government departments...non-government organisations, and among nations in any alliance or coalition.'⁵¹ Indeed unity of effort is the critical piece. The deployable body must adhere to a centralised planning but decentralised execution, use common terminology and be responsive and agile. Furthermore, the organisation must be equipped with a range of capabilities for Peace Support Operations of the like that Iraq has demonstrated. An example of how the body might look is at Appendix C.

2. DFID's mission statement must be aligned to achieving Britain's strategic objectives, much as USAID's is. Secondly, DFID's personnel must deploy with available and unconstrained funds as soon as the security situation allows it. Although much of this is housed within the newly-formed Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU), the danger that Britain will 'wait and see' what happens (i.e. as it has done in Iraq) will increase further pressure on the military. Again the US is providing the lead, as the recently signed Stabilisation and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act (2004) highlighted:

"There should be improved standing capacity within the civilian agencies to respond to complex emergencies and to work in potentially hostile environments. The agencies must be capable and flexible enough to provide a robust partner to the military when necessary or to lead a crisis response effort when appropriate. The rapid mobilization of resources must be shared by the civilian agencies and the military."⁵²

3. The West must improve its ability to learn the lessons from the past. As one senior British civil servant mused,

"One of the depressing things is that we are still asking the same questions as we were asking when we were in Bosnia. Unless you take the reins from the military and implement Security Sector Governance (SSG), liberation turns into occupation. We are still very slow at it. Must have a better national ability to react. If you have military coalitions you should have civilian coalitions like *Medicin sans Frontiers*. We need to send everyone in from lawyers, to policemen, to judges and they need to get there six months after the war and not two years. This is one of the great examples of how governments and international institutions have failed since the end of the Cold War. We are still getting caught out."⁵³

It is difficult to devise a mechanism whereby ministers and their departments are encouraged to support national foreign policy objectives. In Britain, the Prime Minister's Cabinet and Strategy Office is trying to do that with mixed results. The fact

that Iraq is an unpopular war does not help. Nor the fact that British forces are not suffering the same level of casualties as their US counterparts. However there is a growing concern that Britain is still locked in past rhetoric. In order to change it must analyse its and the US's experiences in Iraq. The nature of future threats demands it.

RE-ASSESSING BRITISH COUNTER-INSURGENCY PRINCIPLES

The six principles on which British COIN doctrine has been built since Malaya are still relevant to modern-day campaigning. However, due to the complexity of the insurgency, the fact that a Coalition is fighting it and the likelihood that future campaigns will likely be interventionist in nature, additional principles must be added. Indeed, the current principles also need to be massaged to reflect modern-day military doctrine. The following proposals are recommended:

1. The Political Aim and Political Primacy must be attuned to a clear enduring Political Vision acceptable to the majority.
2. Coordinated Government Machinery must be aligned to a fused inter-agency process that balances the political, economic, social and military response. This Interoperability is *critical* to the campaigns success and must take place *before* a military force deploys to a theatre. This is especially important for the Intelligence community into which national strategic assets must be added. Information Operations must become a J2 function.
3. Separating the Insurgent from his Support should be changed to Dislocation by offering an enduring and safer alternative to what the insurgents are proposing.
4. Neutralising the Insurgent remains paramount but variable ratchets of violence need to be applied to each grouping. This must be attuned to each grouping's core beliefs being challenged and sanitised.
5. Longer Term Post Insurgency Planning is perhaps the most fundamental of the principles. It allows the Campaign directors to demonstrate a better future but it requires the commitment of *all* government departments. Evidence presented

throughout this paper suggests that the majority of those departments are *under-*represented. Such support requires international support that has been secured before deployment and maintained throughout the campaign. The entire campaign must be resourced correctly

6. The campaign must be based on the rule of law. Legitimacy is key. This permeates across the spectrum of conflict and across the tactical-strategic divide. At the tactical and operational level, US Marine commanders noted that 60 of Fallujah's 100 mosques were being used as fighting positions or weapons caches. They concluded that the "use of mosques as a [weapons] storage facility or as a fortress to initiate attacks, causes the mosque to lose its protected status under the Rule of Law."⁵⁴ Furthermore, the actions at Abu Ghraib and Camp Bread Basket illustrate the strategic effects of tactical decisions.

7. Iraq has demonstrated that the insurgency follows a cyclical pattern and that the overall campaign has gone through a number of Tipping Points. The looting in April and May 2003 was one of those, the Abu Ghraib scandal another, and the euphoria over the January 2005 elections another. Each represents a mood swing between the Coalition and the insurgency. A campaign plan must identify these Tipping Points and apportion resources to coming out of each favourably. It is critical that the balance for each falls towards key campaign objectives.

8. Coalition forces must be able to demonstrate Operational Agility. They must be able to react to intelligence quickly and effectively. They must be armed with a range of capabilities outside of the traditional G3 functions to include military police, engineers, legal, linguists and others. They must be able to fight the Three-Block War, or as General Schoomaker, the Chief of Staff of the US Army recently said,

"The enemy is not predictable and the task-condition-and-standard in training cannot be expected to match every condition of war. The enemy will adapt and evolve, and we must train our Soldiers to be anticipatory and resilient to deal with rapidly changing and unexpected situations. Our Soldiers must be prepared to deal with the uncertainty

they will encounter, and bounce back when the enemy does not act the way we thought he would.”⁵⁵

A FUTURE OF SMALL WARS

The nature of future threats revolves five Small Wars threats – Global Network, Popular National Insurgency, Viral (apocalyptic) Cells, Clans/Tribes, and Feral Groups.⁵⁶ Each will have a close relationship with narco-crime and terrorist organisations, be adept at using Information Technology to broadcast their message and recruit, but will unlikely be state-sponsored. The CIA summed up the nature of future threats,

“Lagging economies, ethnic affiliations, intense religious convictions, and youth bulges will align to create a “perfect storm,” creating conditions likely to spawn internal conflict. The governing capacity of states, however, will determine whether and to what extent conflicts actually occur. Those states unable both to satisfy the expectations of their peoples and to resolve or quell conflicting demands among them are likely to encounter the most severe and most frequent outbreaks of violence.”⁵⁷

Large-scale conventional wars are now unlikely; insurgents groups would be foolish to meet the West on our terms. Instead the future will be one of small wars, expeditionary in nature, unconventional in execution, but still encompassing the entire spectrum of conflict. They will demand occasional set-piece battles such as that conducted by the US military in Fallujah in November 2004. Even when not engaged in these operations, units are likely to find themselves continuously fighting across the Full Spectrum of Conflict.⁵⁸ It will require increased speed of response to better human intelligence. It will need a much greater emphasis on training and education of our officers and soldiers in the combat multipliers of languages and socio-religious studies. It will necessitate Perception Campaigns that, using Margaret Thatcher’s words, “to starve the terrorist and the hijacker of the oxygen of publicity on which they depend”.⁵⁹ This future of small wars is *the* generational challenge for every arm of national government.

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- ³ Interview with UKSF, June 2005
- ⁴ Interview with Lieutenant General Sir John McColl, March 2005
- ⁵ Interview with LTG James Mattis, April 2005
- ⁶ Christopher Dickey, “Learning from the Pros,” *Newsweek*, 16 January 2004 cited in Bruce Hoffman, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” RAND National Security Research Division, June 2004, p.11
- ⁷ Julian Paget, *Counterinsurgency Campaigning*, Faber and Faber, London, 1967, pp.163-4
- ⁸ See Lawrence’s 27 Articles, Appendix ...
- ⁹ Interview with Brigadier James Everard OBE, March 2005
- ¹⁰ Individuals from many NGOs, from the CPA and now MNF-I.
- ¹¹ Insight by Lieutenant General Viggers, 30 June 2004. Observation made because the Coalition has been unable to enforce control over the tribes
- ¹² Personal experience supports this recommendation, as does the insightful comments made by Dr Patrick Sookhdeo about the nature of inter-personal relations in the Middle East.
- ¹³ Comment made by Lt Gen Scott Wallace, V Corps Commander, Iraq, date to follow.
- ¹⁴ One analyst interviewed said that “We think we know, but we’re never sure.”
- ¹⁵ The term given to the staff officers and analysts that war-game likely enemy movements. Recommendation made by Major General Andrew Graham, interview 10 March 2005, Upavon, UK
- ¹⁶ Major H. Joyneson, “Fallujah Lessons Learned Information,” email to British Embassy and passed to author, April 2005
- ¹⁷ Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peacekeeping*, Faber and Faber, London, 1971, p.95
- ¹⁸ Infantry battalions should treat the Intelligence Officer as perhaps the key staff officer. His staff should be supplemented with additional assets and be given every opportunity to find that ‘good information.’
- ¹⁹ Major H. Joyneson, “Fallujah Lessons Learned Information,” Questionnaire, undated
- ²⁰ Interview with Brigadier James Everard, British Army, February 2005
- ²¹ Interview with Lt Col RJE Williams, British Army, 22 March 2005
- ²² Comments by MG Chiarelli, CG 1st Cav Division, 22 March 2005 in email correspondence with British Embassy
- ²³ Col. Steven Boltz, G2, V Corps, interviewed by Dr Russell Glenn and cited in his study on *Urban Operations*, a copy of which was given to the author.
- ²⁴ Battalion J2 cells should be equipped with high-capability, long-range digital cameras that can be used to collect information on target houses, car details and so on. At the moment, these reside at the SF level only.
- ²⁵ USMC interview, cited in Dr Russell Glenn, *Urban Operations*
- ²⁶ It actually created the TFC out of the 7th of its 7 intelligence battalions.
- ²⁷ Interview with LTG Mattis, 21 April 2005
- ²⁸ All information about USMC changes given to the author during an interview with Lieutenant General James Mattis USMC, 21 April 2005, Quantico, VA. Effectively 9 platoons across the Division would be have ‘conversation’ Arabic.
- ²⁹ Interview with Lt Gen Sir John McColl, 18 March, Wilton, UK
- ³⁰ Much to the initial chagrin of American senior commanders, a British colonel wrote the Coalition’s only Campaign Plan. It has stood the test of time to the point where General Casey refused to talk to anyone else about campaign matters unless that British colonel was present.
- ³¹ Interview with US general, April 2005
- ³² Interview with LTG James N. Mattis, April 2005, Quantico, VA.
- ³³ All information concerning framework for understanding Coalition operations courtesy of Lieutenant General David McKiernan during an interview, 22 April 2005, FORSCOM HQ, Atlanta, 2005
- ³⁴ Iraq Index, p.37. Poll for CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll dated 22 March-9 April 2004

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- ³⁵ ibid, p.36
- ³⁶ "Iraq Index, Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq," *The Brookings Institution*, p.31; downloaded from www.brookings.edu/iraqindex on 11 July 2005
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- ⁴⁴ Major General Rollo, House of Commons Select Defence Committee...
- ⁴⁵ Interview with Lieutenant General James P. Mattis, 21 April 2005
- ⁴⁶ McCaffrey report, 4-11 June 2005
- ⁴⁷ ibid
- ⁴⁸ In the November 2004 Presidential Election, support for President Bush was weaker in those counties who had suffered fatalities than those that did not. In those counties that had no fatalities, the President won with 57% of the aggregate vote. For a full discussion on winning the Hearts and Minds of the US population, see Glenn Kutler, *US Military Fatalities in Iraq: A Two-Year Perspective*, Elsevier Limited on behalf of the US Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2005. Online at www.icasualties.org
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