This article was published in the
July 2005 volume of the
SWJ Magazine.
The Operationalization of
DIME
LtCol Harold
Van Opdorp, USMC
Current United States National Security policy
documents and future global trends drive the requirement to create and
maintain an operational level organization to integrate the four
elements of national power: diplomatic, informational, military and
economic (DIME). From the policy perspective, one can trace the
requirement to operationalize DIME to National Security Presidential
Directive 1 (NSPD-1), released 13 March 2001 and the National Security
Strategy (NSS) of the United States of America. NSPD-1 lays down the
organization of the National Security Council System to accomplish this
task. The national security policy infrastructure turns to the National
Security Strategy of the United States for overall direction. Last
published in September, 2002, the NSS describes a world where, “America
is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing
ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic
technologies in the hands of the embittered few.”
The desire to avoid another attack against the
United States like the September 11 attacks serves as the largest
catalyst for United States intervention abroad. However, the
ever-present crisis related to basic humanitarian failures throughout
the world will continue to lead to increased U.S. involvement globally
that will require the need to integrate the elements of national power
at the operational level. In the 1990s, the United States experienced a
three-fold increase in the number of ‘complex emergencies’.
Future trends identified in the National Intelligence Council’s 2020
Project indicate that the number of complex emergencies will continue to
increase, particularly in the Sub-Saharan Africa region and significant
parts of Southeast Asia. These trends lead one to believe that the
United States will become more involved in regional crises around the
world in the interests of its national security. Critical to the
success of the United States in this regard will be its ability to
operationalize the elements of its national power in order to meet its
national security needs? By establishing a Joint Interagency
Coordination Group focused on integrating the elements of national power
at the operational level, the United States can better prepare itself
for successful execution of complex emergencies and stabilization and
reconstruction operations in the coming decades.
The Joint Interagency Coordination Group.
At the operational level of war, the goal of
military planners is to adopt a plan that accomplishes strategic
objectives within the theater or area of operation. “Activities at this
level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives
needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to
achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying
resources to bring about and sustain these events.”
As a whole, the Department of Defense is well practiced and effective at
planning at the operational level. The same can not be said about the
national interagency community. Often seen as a dysfunctional
organization or effort, the interagency community typically lacks the
unity and focus to provide long term solutions to the problems often
confronting it. The reasons for this are many but a significant factor
contributing to this deficiency is the lack of an organization and the
accompanying doctrine devoted to an operational level focus of
interagency activities designed to provide lasting effects on the
post-conflict landscape.
What the operational level of interagency
activities includes are those activities where major humanitarian
relief, civic assistance, and infrastructure rebuilding efforts are
planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives
within theaters or areas of operation. The basic activities at this
level of crisis resolution involve linking the services and capabilities
of interagency organizations to the strategic goals of the United States
by establishing operational objectives, coordinating capabilities,
initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain
these events. Similar to the way Joint Pub 1-02 describes the
activities that take place at the operational level of war, the
activities that take place at the operational level of crisis, “imply a
broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure
the logistics and administrative support of tactical forces and
provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve
strategic objectives.”
[Emphasis added] Tactical forces in this case may include an engineer
battalion providing vertical construction support, a relief agency
providing basic human services or a civilian police team providing
training to perspective new police forces, while tactics in this case
encompass the menagerie of specific actions that interagency groups take
when applying resources to and fixing problems.
The disparate entities that could potentially
make up the interagency body that would respond to current and future
crises need an organization to facilitate the planning and coordination
efforts of interagency activities at the operational level of crisis.
Creating an effective Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) is
the first step.
Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) has looked at the
development of a JIACG for some time according to an article that
appeared in the Autumn 2002 issue of Joint Forces Quarterly.
“The enhanced integration of civilian and military agencies on the
operational level was under consideration at JFCOM before September 11,
2001. Both the organizers and participants in Universal Vision ‘01
grappled with the issue of coordination. By the end of the exercise,
the concept for an interagency staff directorate on the regional command
level had emerged.”
The directorate became known as the JIACG.
Subsequent to 9/11, the JIACG has mostly taken on
a counter-terrorism flavor, expanding on the Joint Interagency Task
Force- Counterterrorism Asia Pacific that was already in existence in
PACOM at the time. Admiral Blair, then the Commander, U.S. Pacific
Command, expanded the task force by, “…granting it a broad interagency
mandate as well as coordinating authority.”
In February 2002, the National Security Council deputies committee
approved the JIACG concept and instructed the regional combatant
commanders to implement the concept. However, in their guidance, the
deputies committee limited the JIACGs to coordinating counter terrorism
plans and objectives only.
Limiting the JIACG to counter terrorism fails to
meet the full needs of the strategic objectives of the United States.
To achieve the goals that the president has laid out in the NSS, the
JIACG should take on a much greater role, particularly because meeting
the United States’ strategic goals requires the coordination of all the
elements of national power at the operational level. Keeping the focus
of the JIACG on counter-terrorism would be like having a Marine
Expeditionary Force operational planning team focus on ground operations
only. Such a singular focus limits the overall breadth of potential
that the elements of national power encompassed in the interagency
community can bring to bear to crisis situations. The JIACG should go
beyond the PACOM model and should be organized and focused on providing
operational level interagency plans, asset allocation guidance,
execution over-site and responsibility, and sustainment expertise
designed to meet the operational objectives of interagency activities.
However, if the PACOM model serves a valuable long-term capability for
countering terrorism and should remain, a similar but more broadly
focused organization should be established that accomplishes the
operational level integration of interagency activities and focuses on
the full spectrum of planning from the first engagement to the final
victory. Currently, the JFCOM J-9 continues to work the
development of the JIACG Prototype, conducting numerous workshops and
other events in an effort to develop further the full spectrum JIACG
concept.
The foundation of JIACG operations should be
guided by several enduring general considerations that include unity of
effort, centralized planning, decentralized execution, common
terminology, and responsiveness. Joint Publication 0-2 explains that
unity of effort at the strategic level “requires coordination among
government departments, between the executive and legislative branches,
nongovernmental organizations, and among nations in any alliance or
coalition.”
Unity of effort at the JIACG level will be the critical element that
makes or breaks the operational success of an overall mission. The
myriad of stereotypes, agendas, biases, and other influences that the
interagency participants will bring to the JIAGC organization can exert
tremendous pressure on the overall direction and effectiveness of the
organization. This, in turn, can jeopardize the attainment of the
operational and subsequently the strategic objectives of United States
intervention abroad. More difficult to overcome than the conflicting
pressures listed above will be the chaotic situations that interagency
actors will find themselves working in overseas. Mitigation of this
chaos requires a unified effort that has all players working towards the
same common goal. Critical to this unity of effort is centralized
planning.
The planning effort of the JIACG, or something
comparable, must be centralized in order to synergize effectively the
capabilities represented and to allocate the resources and assets
available to the JIACG. Resources (particularly funding) and special
skills are the two elements the interagency community brings to a crisis
situation. If the planned application of those resources is not
centrally planned, the organization runs the risk of duplicating efforts
or of over committing assets in one area while another area is
overlooked.
However, once the JIACG has developed the plan,
its execution must maintain a decentralized character. Because of the
tremendous scope of activities that the JIACG will be responsible for,
it is impossible to maintain centralized control over plan execution.
To do so would require such a large headquarters organization to be able
to track all the activities under the JIACG, that the decision making
process would overwhelm the actual execution cycle. The time required
to make and pass on decisions from a central point would take such a
long time that the issue requiring the decision in the first place would
become moot. The more effective way to execute plans in the stability
and reconstruction environment is to establish a framework for decision
making in a well thought out detailed plan that is thoroughly briefed to
decentralized teams empowered to take appropriate actions they deem
necessary. To further enhance the plan for the interagency community,
the JIACG must incorporate common terminology to the planning and
execution of stability and reconstruction operations. The JIACG must
make every effort to explain the tasks, requirements, and issues of a
general nature in common terms that everyone understands in order to
mitigate any unnecessary confusion or misunderstanding that could delay
action by the JIACG.
The greatest initial pressure the JIACG will
experience will be the requirement to provide an immediate response to
save lives, protect property and meet the basic human needs of food,
water, and shelter. Any initial delay in securing these basic needs
will have lasting effect to the legitimacy and effectiveness of the
JIACG effort. Two factors will provide the biggest challenges to the
JIACG in this effort: lack of experience of the organizations involved,
and access to the target population. As the JIACG begins to take
action, the organization will experience problems associated with the
start-up of any organization. Like the first game of the football
season, the JIACG’s timing and effectiveness will be off because of
unforeseen friction points that only are discovered once a plan is put
into action. The JIACG may have difficulty getting to the target
population at times because the security environment makes it
prohibitive to reach the target area. In either case, the JIACG has to
work through the challenges to provide relief to the target population
in an effort to establish itself as a legitimate effort in restoring
stability to the crisis region.
The general structure of the JIACG should
incorporate the fundamental capabilities that are commonly required in
stability and sustainment operations. These capabilities include, but
are not limited to: transportation, communications, public works and
engineering, information and planning, mass care, resource support,
health and medical services, hazardous materials, food distribution, and
energy. These ten functional areas serve as the skeletal framework that
a JIACG planning staff should use as a departure point when it begins to
identify what capabilities it should be able to provide as the JIACG
plans a response for a crisis. Planners should then identify the
required capabilities for a specific situation identified by an initial
assessment and mission analysis.
The Regional JIACG Headquarters.
The highest level JIACG organization should exist at the regional level,
similar in scope to a regional combatant commander within the Department
of Defense structure. Each Regional JIACG Headquarters should maintain
a long-term focus within its assigned region. Strategic guidance for the
JIACG Regional Headquarters should emanate from the National Security
Council and should provide direction to the JIACG in regard to achieving
long-term stability in the region. As crises emerge, the regional JIACG
HQ, upon receiving specific guidance appropriate for the crisis, should
then turn that strategic guidance into a campaign plan, identifying
campaign objectives designed to meet the overall strategic goals of the
United States.
The proposed organization of the regional JIACG
includes four primary staff sections, an administrative section and a
liaison section and is depicted in Figure 1. The National Security
Council would appoint the head of the regional JIACG Headquarters in
accordance with guidance passed in NSPD-1, keeping in mind that because
of the longer-term view of this headquarters, and the significant
involvement with diplomatic issues relating to foreign aid, the
Department of State would be best suited to handle the responsibilities
of the Regional JIACG Directorship. The relationship between the JIACG
and the Regional Combatant Commander would be one of coordination with
the National Security Council maintaining coordinating authority to
require consultation between the two bodies.
To coordinate efforts at the operational level,
the JIACG Regional Headquarters would form a sub-staff or deployable
JIACG. Similar to the formation of a JTF for a military operation, the
deployable JIACG would shape its deploying capabilities according to the
identified requirements needed to address the crisis situation. This
JIACG should look similar to the Regional JIACG Headquarters in general
organization, only to be amended to suit the specific situation. Figure
2 depicts the proposed organization of the deployable JIACG.
The deployable JIACG would be the primary forward
deployed headquarters to run interagency operations. The National
Security Council would specify the relationship between the deployable
JIACG and the military operations of the JTF deployed in the area to
ensure unity of effort and unity of command. Possible command
arrangements could include a supported and supporting relationship where
the National Security Council had determined which effort should have
the lead in the crisis situation. In responses viewed as primarily
humanitarian in nature, the deployable JIACG should be the supported
effort, while the JTF should be the supporting effort. If the situation
was such that military related issues composed the most significant
factors, the JTF should be designated as the supported effort while the
deployable JIACG should serve as the supporting effort. Many operations
would include plans that incorporated phases where the supported and
supporting efforts shift as the campaign unfolded. These shifts should
be mutually agreed upon between the military commander and the JIACG
Director and approved by the National Security Council.
Critical to the early establishment of the
command relationship of the two organizations is the requirement to
establish the planning relationship between the two efforts.
Integrating the overall planning effort is one of the primary reasons
for creating and deploying the JIACG early, allowing the interagency and
the military efforts to develop mutually supporting plans that set the
stage for early success in the stabilization and reconstruction effort.
The section within the JIACG structure that would
incorporate the specialized capabilities of the interagency effort is
the Operations Section. This section would coordinate the delivery of
American assistance and oversee the activities of response teams. The
Operations Section in this proposal contains four branches; the
Operations Support Branch, the Human Services Branch, the Infrastructure
Support Branch, and the Emergency Services Branch. The breakdown of
specialized tasks within the branches is listed in Figure 3. As the
diagram suggests, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) would
head the operations section of the deployed JIACG. Traditionally, OFDA
has been the lead United States organization for coordination and
delivery of international relief making OFDA the best qualified and
obvious choice to head the operations section. To meet these new
requirements, OFDA would require a significant increase in personnel as
current USAID requirements fully incorporate the lean OFDA staff.
Also included in the diagram are recommended
departments and agencies that should serve as the leads for those
particular capabilities or stability and reconstruction functions. In
regard to synchronizing its efforts with the military forces in the
operating area, the Operations Section should be tied into the JTF
operations directorate and the current operations section through
liaison cells or even by co-locating the two sections, in order to
maintain the same situational understanding of the current situation on
the ground.
The Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004
The above discussion speaks to the
establishment of a two significant headquarters to direct interagency
efforts during international crises. Manning these headquarters with
the right mix of capable and experienced personnel could prove difficult
mainly the result of a lack of qualified personnel available to deploy
as part of a JIACG. One solution potentially rests in a bill recently
introduced in the United States Senate by co-sponsors Senators Richard
Lugar and Joseph Biden of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The
Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004
addresses the deficiency of qualified and prepared civilian personnel
able to respond to overseas crises and that the United States has placed
an over-reliance on the military for executing stabilization and
reconstruction operations. In his remarks introducing the bill, Senator
Lugar stated:
Our post-conflict efforts frequently have had a
higher than necessary military profile. This is not the result of a
Pentagon power grab or institutional fights. Rather, the military has
led post-conflict operations primarily because it is the only agency
capable of mobilizing large amounts of people and resources for these
tasks.
The inference in Senator Lugar’s comments is that
the civilian agencies within the government are not positioned to
respond in sufficient numbers to overseas crises. The Senator
continues:
There should be improved standing capacity within
the civilian agencies to respond to complex emergencies and to work in
potentially hostile environments. The agencies must be capable and
flexible enough to provide a robust partner to the military when
necessary or to lead a crisis response effort when appropriate. The
rapid mobilization of resources must be shared by the civilian agencies
and the military.
Combining the expeditionary qualities that
Senator Lugar has identified with the professional expertise that
resides in the various civilian departments and agencies in the United
States Government would go a long way to solving the manning issues of
the proposed JIACG organizations discussed above.
The Stability and Reconstruction Civilian
Management Act specifically would address three areas of interest: the
creation of the Office of International Stabilization and
Reconstruction, the establishment of a Response Readiness Force, and the
establishment of an education program for personnel involved with
stabilization and reconstruction operations. The Office of
International Stabilization and Reconstruction would fall under the
State Department and would primarily be responsible for, “Monitoring, in
coordination with relevant bureaus within the Department of State,
political and economic instability worldwide to anticipate the need for
mobilizing United States and international assistance for the
stabilization and reconstruction of countries or regions that are in, or
are in transition from, conflict or civil strife.”
The new office would also have responsibilities that included the
assessment of capabilities within the executive agencies available for
stabilization and reconstruction operations, planning for the full
spectrum of activities involved in conducting stabilization and
reconstruction operations, and coordinating with appropriate Executive
agencies when developing mobilization and deployment plans for
interagency contingency plans. The Office for International
Stabilization and Reconstruction would become the focal point for
planning, mobilizing, deploying, and assessing United States efforts
during stability and reconstruction operations.
The Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian
Management Act of 2004 requires the creation of a Response Readiness
Force (RRF). The RRF would have two components, the first of which, the
Response Readiness Corps, would consist of up to two hundred fifty
additional personnel from the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) and the Department of State to “provide assistance
in support of stabilization and reconstruction operations,”
in overseas crises. The Secretary of State and the Administrator for
USAID would be responsible for the recruitment, hiring, and training of
these personnel. The second component of the RRF, the Response
Readiness Reserve, would maintain a roster of capable and qualified
federal employees from throughout the government that would volunteer to
deploy in support of stabilization and reconstruction operations. The
Readiness Response Reserve would also maintain a minimum of 500
additional non-federal employees that would volunteer to deploy in
support of stabilization and reconstruction operations, provided they
had the training and skills required to support these operations.
The third critical element that the new bill
addresses is the establishment of a “stabilization and reconstruction
curriculum for use in programs of the Foreign Service Institute, the
National Defense University, and the United States Army War College.”
The curriculum would include topics regarding the global security
environment, lessons from previous international experience in
stabilization and reconstruction operations, an overview of the
responsibilities of the various executive agencies and the international
resources available to support stabilization and reconstruction
operations, foreign language training, and training exercises dealing
with simulated stabilization and reconstruction operations.
According to Senator Lugar, the curriculum serves
two purposes: “to bring together civilian and military personnel to
enhance their stabilization and reconstruction skills and increase their
ability to work together in the field.”
The latter purpose is the more important of the two, as it attempts to
take the military’s view of jointness and joint education to a national
level by bringing together in a training environment the various
military, federal civilian, and non-federal civilian leaders of efforts
that may find themselves working side by side during stabilization and
reconstruction operations. In addition to providing a common
understanding of the national effort required and possible during
stabilization and reconstruction operations, this educational setting
will provide a unique forum for the various individuals and communities
involved to ‘cross-pollinate’ with civil servants, members of the armed
forces, or civilian professionals that they may never have had to work
closely with in the past.
If passed by the Congress and placed into law by
the President, the Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management
Act of 2004 would provide a larger pool than currently exists to fill
the critical positions on a deployable JIACG headquarters and
effectively accomplish the mission of the JIACG. More significant than
that; however, is that this bill recognized that the United States
currently maintains a deficit of quality individuals trained to conduct
stabilization and reconstruction operations and takes steps to address
this deficit.
Conclusion
The United States’ effectiveness in stability
and reconstructions operations will serve as the true measure of success
in overseas engagement for the United States in current and future
operations throughout the world. Because of its standing National
Security Strategy, its desire to win the war against global terrorism,
and the fact that certain regions in the world are saddled with an ever
present humanitarian tragedy, the United States will be tied to an
increasing requirement to conduct stabilization and reconstruction
operations in the future. To meet this increasing requirement, the
United States will need to do more than employ the might of its military
forces. The United States Senate has already taken the first step by
proposing the Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act,
but to maximum the potential of its elements of national power, the
Unites States must establish a framework for coordinating and employing
its strengths as a nation. The creation of a Joint Interagency
Coordination Group with a deployable capability designed to
operationalize the elements of United States national power is the next
step in this effort.
LtCol Van Opdorp is an infantry officer
currently serving as the Inspector-Instructor of 2nd Bn 25th
Marines.
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