The material reproduced in its entirety
below is the work of the author(s) listed. Its terms of use at
publication or specific grant of permission allow for this
reproduction. SWJ is pleased to be able to present this relevant
material in this forum, and reminds all readers that full credit for the
work is due to its author(s).
Lessons Unlearned - Ignoring the Past
Major Adam Strickland
20 February 2005
As a Marine who has served
in Iraq and now conducts Small Wars research for the USMC, I am repeatedly
asked about documents or studies outlining lessons learned. While
there are literally hundreds of documents to be reviewed, I am not
convinced they are titled correctly. Like many Marines; Colonel T.X. Hammes
to name one; I am of the opinion that most of these works are more
correctly titled “lessons observed” or “lessons to be
learned,” for surely we have not done a good job at learning from either
these studies or from our past experiences as a military or nation.
Unfortunately, after reading through this morning’s paper, it became clear
that both the Iranians and North Koreans have.
Sources are
reporting the Iranians are increasing the size of their Basiji Corps in
order to engage in irregular and protracted warfare if invaded by a
U.S.-led coalition. Many might argue that they have simply learned from
the Iraq example, but they would be ignoring the true root of this
strategy as outlined and practiced by Mao Tse Tung and Ho Chi Minh. While
many hesitate to compare current and potential operations with our Vietnam
experience, there are several valuable
lessons. They include: the perils associated with
supporting an unpopular regime, counterinsurgency operations, irregular
warfare and influence operations (Phoenix), protracted warfare,
interagency operations (CORDS), targeting difficulties, and the Combined
Action Program (CAP). While we may have failed to appreciate the wealth of
knowledge produced from Vietnam; the Afghani rebels who fought the Soviets
from 1979-1989 did not, nor do those that continue the insurgency in Afghanistan today.
Prior to deploying to
Iraq, I was told that several copies of Mark Bowden’s book
Blackhawk
Down had been found amongst the property of Saddam loyalists. It was
further reported by several sources that Saddam himself was a huge fan of
both the movie and book. Should this be a surprise to anyone? Saddam had
simply learned that in a counterinsurgency, less capable and equipped
forces could negate the technological advances of the world’s only
superpower by engaging in irregular warfare in densely populated areas
where it would be difficult for the U.S. to properly identify and target
enemy forces. Many could safely argue that the April 2004 attack on U.S.
contractors and subsequent desecration of their bodies was simply an
imitation of that suffered by Task Force Ranger personnel at the hands of
Somali irregulars in 1993. While U.S. forces quickly took the offensive
into Fallujah in response, within a week they had been pulled back. Did
this not validate the idea of “death by a 1000 paper cuts” to Saddam
loyalists, and further reinforce the lessons learned from Somalia?
Much is made
over the potential of a nuclear capable Iran; however, should this be of
such concern as to create discussion over preemptive strikes and
war? Who is the bigger nuclear threat - Iran or Pakistan?
Which nation’s intelligence services support the world's largest foreign fighter
force, in Kashmir, and provided the material support necessary
for the Taliban to come to power in Afghanistan? Yes - our ally -
Pakistan. While we continue our efforts in support of world democracy and
self-determination, our most critical allies in the Global War on Terror
remain in states incongruous with this end. Saudi Arabia continues to
maintain an autocratic and repressive regime, Egypt holds elections that
are about as fair as those that Saddam conducted, and let us not forget
that President Musharref came to power as the result of a coup. Is there
some degree of hypocrisy here? Is this not an example of “do as I say, not
as I do?” Again, what does history show us? The U.S. pressed for change
and democracy in South Vietnam and in the end supported a coup that
overthrew a staunch anti-communist, ally, and popular Diem; in favor of a
succession of ineffectual military juntas. We have misjudged the intent or
public support for leaders in Chile, Guatemala, Iran, Cuba, Haiti,
Cambodia, and Iraq. Our insistence on democratic elections in Iraq has led
to an overwhelming Shi’a victory, and most likely a Shi’a dominated State
with close ties to Iran. Is this what we wanted or intended?
As for nuclear weapons, I
seem to recall a Small War known as the Cold War in which the U.S.
successfully prosecuted a campaign based off of Mutually Assured
Destruction. If MAD worked against the Soviet Bear, shouldn’t we give it a
try against the North Koreans and Iranians? Maybe if it was made clear to
the Iranians, that regardless if the attack came from Tehran or from one
of their proxy forces such as Hezbollah or Islamic Jihaad, the result
would be the same, we would not need to speak of preemptive war. Again,
why not stick with something that worked in the past?
As for sanctions, I agree
with former Ambassador David Passage, they simply do not work. As anyone
who has served in Iraq can verify, sanctions only further impoverished the
Iraqi people, while not affecting Saddam. In Libya, soon after sanctions
were lifted, Gaddafi announced that the Libyan’s had a tremendous surplus
of money and, as a result, would purchase weapons worth billions of
dollars from the French. Is this
what sanctions truly do, force despots to save money for a better days?
Truth be told - radical Muslims that seek a Salafist State - want to
revert to simpler times; unencumbered by modern items and technological
advances, thus sanctions support their end-state aspirations.
In the end, we must
continue to collect information in an attempt to ensure that lessons
observed become lessons learned; however, based off the assumption that we
fail to recognize and incorporate lessons from 1965, it will most likely
be some time before we get around to those from 2005.
|