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The material reproduced in its entirety below is the work of the author(s) listed.  Its terms of use at publication or specific grant of permission allow for this reproduction.  SWJ is pleased to be able to present this relevant material in this forum, and reminds all readers that full credit for the work is due to its author(s).

 

Partnering with the Iraqi Security Forces

Lieutenant Colonel P.C. Skuta, USMC

“Do not try to do too much with your own hands.  Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly.  It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them.  Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is.  It may take them longer and it may not be as good as you think, but if it is theirs, it will be better.”

 

- T.E.  Lawrence, “Twenty-Seven Articles,” Arab Bulletin, 20 August 1917           

 

Training Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to be capable of providing security for Iraq is a central campaign objective of the Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF-I).  One of the essential tasks assigned to Task Force 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines (TF 2/7) during Operation Iraqi Freedom-II was to, “train and conduct operations with the Iraqi Security Forces.”  This article presents insights and lessons learned by TF 2/7 while partnering with the ISF.  Cultural keys to success, understanding how to train an Arab military force, and the internal unit costs associated with training the ISF are discussed.

T. E.  Lawrence

TF 2/7 used the advice offered by T.E. Lawrence as a salient compass to navigate the challenges of partnering with the Iraqis.  Lawrence summarized key tenets of a successful approach of working with Arab armies in his Twenty Seven Articles in 1917.  Here, he outlined principles to assist other British officers to work effectively as he had.[1]   Many of these articles can be adopted as a doctrinal foundation for the thrust of a unit’s ISF training effort.  His advice proved beneficial towards understanding the behavior of many ISF soldiers from areas in the west-central Al Anbar province, along the Euphrates River between Ramadi and the Syrian border.  This is the area where TF 2/7 operated for the majority of the Iraq deployment. 

Of the pre-deployment training TF 2/7 would change, or wish there had been more of, it would be to read, understand, and adopt more of Lawrence’s observations.  The more the battalion implemented his principles, the more successes the Iraqis achieved.       

The battalion accomplished the task of training and conducting operations with the ISF by teaming with the Iraqi National Guard (ING) 503d Battalion and several local area police departments.  This article cites examples of one ING unit.  Similarities existed with local police forces, but the ING experience was much more constructive. 

The 503d was able to achieve an initial Iraqi-only capability for providing some aspects of local security within a four month period.   In addition to daily security duties within the local area of operations, elements of the 503d Battalion conducted limited offensive operations as well.  For example, the 503d conducted several successful cordon and searches of local villages independent of TF 2/7.  Another prominent example is the 503d being designated as the Regimental Combat Team-7 (RCT-7) main effort during an RCT attack to destroy insurgents in west-central Al Anbar in mid-October 2004.[2]

Keys to Unlocking Success: Trust, Start Off Slow, and Personal Relationships

            First, establish trust.  The pre-eminent factor in accomplishing successful training and operations with the ISF is the establishment of mutual trust between individuals and units.  Trust establishment was accomplished by sharing simple staples of everyday life in Iraq that mattered to the ISF soldiers—drinking tea, smoking cigarettes, eating, talking about tribe, family, and at times religion, for instance.  It was only after trust was established between TF 2/7 and 503d leadership that the two partners were able to hire and fire over 300 ING soldiers that were either unfit for duty or sympathetic to the insurgency (to include arresting the 503d battalion commander).  Trust establishment also led to Iraqi-only operations in a relatively short time period.  This mutual sharing of trust opened a window to one another’s worlds, which both the Iraqis and Marines generally enjoyed.  

Simple things between individuals matter in Iraqi culture.  Once individual trust is established, a foundation is formed from which more mature relationships can evolve.  Young Marines were able to use U.S. popular culture in the same way Iraqis used their lives to open doors to relationships—everything from magazines, to music, to family were used to develop trust and relationships.  As a consequence the Iraqis responded much more candidly and energetically towards TF 2/7 presence.  Subsequently, Marines continued to build on the foundation of mutual respect as soldiers.  During combat with insurgents, trust provided the necessary cohesion between TF 2/7 embeds and 503d Battalion units.

            Personal relationships.  Another essential aspect of making the partnership work at the lowest levels was to develop and maintain personal relationships.  As with trust, personal relationships are paramount.  Focusing on relationships at all levels—commanding officer-to-commanding officer, NCO-to-NCO was essential for successful outcomes.  Shared hardship and successful outcomes from encounters with insurgents were the most critical in gaining trust, respect, and cementing personal relationships.  Without personal relationships and trust, nothing seemed to move forward.  Developing meaningful personal relationships were catalytic to making operations successful.  At the same time, however, reliance on personal relationships is something the ISF must eventually move away from.  Professional character and performance—separated from personal relationships must eventually develop.

Start off slow.  Lawrence says, “Go easy for the first few weeks. A bad start is difficult to atone for, and the Arabs form their judgments on externals that we ignore.”  How true.  It was beneficial for the battalion to take a ‘crawl, walk, run” approach to training and operating with the ISF.  Especially if there is a lack of trust, and underdeveloped personal relationships, the Iraqis would be hesitant to adopt U.S. processes.  This was not because the Iraqis had a negative view of U.S. military techniques, quiet the contrary; it was because they maintained Arab and Iraqi pride. 

TF 2/7’s Combined Action Program (CAP) platoon followed the “crawl, walk, run” approach towards training to relative success.  The Iraqis usually simply wanted to show pride in their culture by doing things in a uniquely Arab way.  Early on, it was discovered that allowing them to demonstrate how they would like to perform a task was much more important in the long run if the Iraqi method accomplished the mission.

A common misstep is to consider the Iraqi way of establishing trust, desire to start off slow, and establish personal relationships as a laborious method, which some would label as lazy or complacent.  This turned out to be quite the opposite of reality, however.  The more the battalion (especially the CAP) adopted local customs the more the 503d responded.  The investment in time and patience is well worth the eventual gain.

Training and Operations --“If it is theirs, it is better…”

            Let the Iraqis train themselves, especially if the ISF unit has Iraqi Army veterans.   Finding veterans is essential, but take time.  TF 2/7 identified and recruited veterans early in the effort to stand-up the 503d Battalion.  TF 2/7 also adopted a “Train the Trainer” approach.  Initially the battalion trained a cadre of some two-dozen 503d non-commissioned officers that would eventually conduct individual and unit level training. 

TF 2/7’s military police platoon[3] conducted the initial training of the 503d non-commissioned officer cadre, using a Mission Essential Task List (METL) “Battle Focused” approach.  The training goal was to immediately gain an initial capability for the skills the 503d would require daily while confronting a complex domestic insurgency: weapons handling and marksmanship, patrolling, cordon and searches, vehicle checkpoints, and command and control.  Battalion staff planning instruction was even included.

In the following article the TF 2/7 CAP platoon discusses “Red Sleeves” and their effectiveness.  One careful piece of advice—do not ever take a “drill instructor” approach.  This approach only serves to widen the chasm between cultures; yelling at an Iraqi or losing one’s temper is counter productive.  Rather, use the ISF chain of command.  Teaching a cadre of trainers was beneficial.  Using the chain of command is indispensable. 

Internal Unit Costs – Battalion/Company Staff, Training, Logistics, and Communications

The “costs”—in terms of patrol presence in the AO, additional duties assigned to battalion staff members, and logistics—are significant for a battalion size unit supporting a CAP or other type of ISF training mission.  TF 2/7 had to make a simple, yet extremely difficult decision, for instance.  If the battalion dedicated a CAP to training the ING, an associated cost was to commit one company’s worth of combat power (the battalion was already minus one company to 1st LAR Battalion) to security of the 503d headquarters building, training the 503d, and operations against insurgents.  U.S.-only operations were favored at the time but eventually the Iraqis must be responsible for security. 

In effect, this meant that the ability of TF 2/7 to patrol the AO would become limited.  This risk was accepted only after gains were observed in 503d capability during training and operations.  Local Iraqis were also more accepting of competent ING presence, for example.  The ING themselves were eventually able to have lieutenants and captains lead patrols instead of field grade officers who were initially tasked to conduct the patrols.  As more and more training and operations were turned over to the ING, following the, “…if it is theirs, it will be better…” approach, the more dedication, motivation, and adherence to standards on the part of the 503d that were observed.  The more Iraqi cognizance of tactical advice in the Joint Coordination Center (JCC), where ING officers directed actions of their respective units over the radio, the more gains were noted in 503d ability to operate independently.

            The decision to place TF 2/7 battalion staff with the 503d to organize and begin operations from the JCC proved costly in terms of human resources.  Valuable expertise moved from the battalion main HQ to the ING HQ and JCC.  TF 2/7 transferred 15-20 personnel from the battalion main COC to the JCC for a period of almost four months.  The 503d staff badly needed a functional capability.  TF 2/7’s S3L and operations chief initially led the effort to train and establish the ING staff at the JCC.  Subsequently, this meant that junior Marines were required to perform above their pay grade in many functional areas.  The “cost” in this case was more supervision, time, and hours awake for senior staff required to supervise junior Marines performing new duties.  The JCC effort also severely strained TF 2/7’s ability to perform combat operation center (COC) functions. 

Keeping a portion of the battalion staff at the 503d also meant that the battalion main COC would be undermanned.   Current T/O for infantry battalions does not account for the demands of 24/7 operations of a battalion COC.  TF 2/7 required three battalion level COCs, one at the 503d headquarters, one at the TF 2/7 main, and a third at the battalion forward operating base, to frequently perform battalion-level functions.

            Logistics and communications were also appreciably extended beyond what a battalion organization normally maintains.  Only through creative use of local contractors facilitated by the 503d staff, stocking almost all classes of supply for a ten day “emergency period” with both the CAP and 503d, and dealing with an increase in communications T/E (double the infantry battalion T/E), were challenges overcome.  Having logistics resources such as vehicles, water bulls, stocked supply rooms, and ammunition staged to support the 503d, CAP platoon, and TF 2/7 security force resulted in elements of TF 2/7 becoming fixed.   

“The beginning and ending of the secret of handling Arabs is unremitting study of them. Keep always on your guard; never say an unnecessary thing: watch yourself and your companions all the time: hear all that passes, search out what is going on beneath the surface, read their characters, discover their tastes and their weaknesses and keep everything you find out to yourself. Bury yourself in Arab circles, have no interests and no ideas except the work in hand, so that your brain is saturated with one thing only, and you realize your part deeply enough to avoid the little slips that would counteract the painful work of weeks. Your success will be proportioned to the amount of mental effort you devote to it."

- T.E.  Lawrence, “Twenty-Seven Articles,” Arab Bulletin, 20 August 1917

Units deploying to Iraq in the future will most likely face a similar task of training and conducting operations with the ISF.  Cultural keys to success, unique aspects of training an Arab military force, and internal unit costs associated with any endeavor to train the ISF are critical and must be understood.  Keeping the training focused on the mission essential tasks required for success, having the Iraqis train themselves, and adopting many of the principles T.E. Lawrence discovered decades ago, will prove beneficial to improving Iraq’s security force capability.

LtCol P.C. Skuta is the Battalion Commander of Second Battalion, Seventh Marines
 


[1] Lawrence, T.E., Arab Warfare, “Twenty-Seven Articles, Public Broadcasting System (PBS).  Http://www.pbs.org/lawrenceofarabia/revolt/warfare4.html.  December 15, 2004.

[2] Tucker, Colonel Craig A. Commanding Officer, RCT-7, October 19, 2004, excerpt from correspondence:  “…TF 1/23, 1/8 and 2d Force Recon Co performed magnificently in an operation in the city of Hit (pronounced Heet) that killed 30 or so terrorists without harming an innocent Iraqi and restored both security and governance to a city taken over by the insurgents for a 72 hour period.  Of greater significance, the 503d Iraqi National Guard Battalion fought as the RCT-7 main effort, were the first ones into the city, and remain there today (Oct 2004) providing security for the community.”

[3] TF 2/7’s MP platoon was sourced from Military Police Company C, United States Marine Corps Reserve, Dayton, OH.

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