# Liberator or Occupier:
# Indigenous Allies make the difference.


**A Monograph**

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# ABSTRACT

LIBERATOR OR OCCUPIER:  INDIGENOUS ALLIES MAKE THE DIFFERENCE.  By MAJ Duke C. Shienle, 54 pages.

   This monograph examines the potential roles of indigenous forces in the transition period from decisive combat through post conflict reconstruction.  More specifically, should Unconventional Warfare doctrine assess, train and develop suitable resistance forces for a post conflict security role.  Minimizing US ground presence in future conflicts asks the question, what missions are indigenous resistance forces suitable for? Within the Contemporary Operating Environment, resistance forces can bring unique skills, abilities and legitimacy to post conflict operations.  In this current era of US military supremacy, asymmetric opponents will focus on post conflict to defeat US goals. The monograph will be evaluated in terms of three security related criteria: protection of populace, protection of key individuals, institutions, and infrastructure, and reform of local security institutions.

   A review of the Contemporary Operating Environment and its impact on Unconventional Warfare Doctrine establishes a baseline for developing criteria, assessing an Operation Provide Comfort case study and delineating potential critical tasks and events.  Unconventional Warfare doctrine focuses on Guerilla Warfare followed by demobilization of the resistance force. Changes in modern warfare suggest a larger role for indigenous forces across the range of military operations.  The case study explores how Special Forces trained Kurdish resistance forces in stability operations using the collateral activity of Humanitarian Assistance.  Operation Provide Comfort both strengthened the legitimacy of the Kurdish forces and facilitated combined combat operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Advising resistance leadership also provides a venue to assess the resistance group's suitability for security operations, shape the leader's strategic goals and build long-term bonds.  Special Forces maintain the ability to train both combat and stability operations based on their expertise in and the commonality of Unconventional Warfare and Foreign Internal Defense core tasks.

   The monograph concludes that irregular forces are a critical component to post conflict success.  To facilitate this contribution, UW doctrine should train suitable resistance forces for an interim security role in post conflict.   The study also suggests the need for overarching doctrine to incorporate irregular forces, operating in a guerilla, proxy or surrogate role, into US military operations.   Training, advising and leading indigenous forces across the spectrum of conflict have the potential to create unique strategic and operational effects.   Indigenous focused activities can be the most potent (and only unique) combat multiplier Special Forces brings to the modern battlefield.

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# CHAPTER 1:  Modern Warfare

Success on the modern battlefield is increasingly not judged by the culmination of Rapid

Decisive Operations (RDO), but by the establishment of a stable and secure post-conflict

environment.[1]  The ability of the military to reduce the turbulent transition period between RDO

and civilian rule has become the measure of this success.   The role of indigenous resistance

forces to help bridge the gap between destabilizing and stabilizing military operations is

addressed by asking the primary research question of "Should Unconventional Warfare doctrine

develop resistance forces for both Combat and Stability operations"?  This analysis of

Unconventional Warfare doctrine is driven by changes the Contemporary Operating Environment

has imposed on military operations.[2]  The ability of US forces to coalesce irregular forces,

coalition partners, defeated government entities and international organizations into a stable,

functioning government in order to speed the transition to civilian rule is a yardstick of success.

Modern military operations require the simultaneous ability to conduct both destabilizing

combat operations and stabilizing security missions.[3]  These distinctly different missions require

diverse capabilities, skill sets, organizational structure and methodology.  The transition between

combat operations and stability operations is not just a phase of maneuver, but a distinct

methodology encompassing military, civilian, international and indigenous participants.[4]  Combat

forces not trained in the necessary skills for post-conflict, combined with the desire of the

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[1] RDO: Methodology of how the US asymmetrically assaults an enemy force from every direction and dimension where the enemy has no counter.  This attack creates a loss of enemy coherence and critical capability.  See also A. Echevarria's article, RDO, Assumptions based critique, Army War College, 2001.

[2] Scott Feil, *Building Better Foundations for Post Conflict Reconstruction,* Center for Strategic and International Studies, pg 13, Accessed 2 August 03 at http://www.pcpproject.org.  The Contemporary Operating Environment describes the changing geopolitical conditions and asymmetric capabilities of potential national and transnational opponents.

[3] Charles Krulak, The strategic corporal- Leadership in the 3 block war,  *Marine Magazine*, January 1999, pg 4.

[4] Alexander Walczak, *US conflict termination; Transition from warrior to constable- a primer,* US Army War College, Carlisle Pa, April 1992, pg 16.

commander to maximize combat power, increases the duration or gap between these two distinct operations. Within the Contemporary Operating Environment, success requires the near simultaneous application of both destabilizing and stabilizing operations.

### Importance of the Study

The importance of this study lies in its ability to provide a potential alternative to enhance post-conflict success. Unconventional Warfare doctrine is focused on the resistance leadership who often inherit the results of decisive combat.[5] As a primary linkage of indigenous forces to conventional operations, Unconventional Warfare doctrine influences the range and scope of US military options.[6]

If one establishes that indigenous irregular forces have unique abilities essential for success in post-conflict, then it is essential to plan for and train these irregular forces for future security duties. This monograph discusses if Unconventional Warfare doctrine should transition resistance forces from Combat to Stability operations. This analysis will be accomplished by asking three secondary research questions to examine, refine and review the primary research question.

First is an examination of the modern battlefield and its interaction with Unconventional Warfare by asking, "Does Unconventional Warfare doctrine match the Contemporary Operating Environment?" Next the suitability of resistance forces in post-conflict and the unique skills sets resistance forces bring to stability operations will be identified by asking "Can Special Forces shape resistance forces toward an common end state?" Finally the change methodology and ability of Special Forces to coordinate this transition will be delineated by asking, "How should

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[5] FM 3-05.20, *Special Forces Operations*, Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, NC, June 2001, pg 2-3

[6] FM 100-25, *Doctrine for Army Special Operations Force* , Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, NC, , August 1999, pg 2-3

Unconventional Warfare doctrine transition resistance forces to stability operations?" Viewed within the lens of the research criteria, these questions will identify how to shorten the gap between destabilizing and stabilizing operations thus answering the primary research question.

**Criteria:**

Criteria are derived from the AUSA/CSIS Post Conflict Reconstruction Framework.[7] This joint study was published as a baseline document for use in the post conflict reconstruction process. As stated in its purpose "It is designed to help indigenous and international practitioners conceptualize, organize and prioritize policy responses. By laying out the range of options, the framework is intended to help identify shortfalls and gaps in the reconstruction process and capabilities." The framework addresses the turbulent transition period between the end of "violent conflict and the return to normalization." The CSIS framework is organized into three phases: initial response, transformation and fostering sustainability. Initial response directly supports the security pillar through military supervision of basic security, stability and emergency services.[8]

The framework identifies four pillars for reconstruction: Security, Justice and Reconciliation, Social and Economic Well Being, and Governance and Participation. While irregular forces interact in all four areas, the Security pillar is the most applicable for resistance forces. Irregular forces are familiar with local areas, populace and customs. They are already on the scene and can provide rapid response during the transition period before the implementation

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[7] CSIS framework is part of the Post Reconstruction project chaired by GEN ®Gordon Sullivan and John Hamre. The project is designed to improve the efforts of the military and other actors in post-conflict operations. The framework lays out the goals within each phase (Initial response, Transformation, and Fostering sustainability) across all four pillars of reconstruction.

[8] Association of the US Army (AUSA) and Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), *Post Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework*, , Washington DC, 2002, pg 2, Accessed 5 August 2003 at http://www.pcpproject.org.

of reconstruction. Finally the skills required for security operations closely parallel resistance force combat operations.

Security "addresses all aspects of public safety, in particular establishment of a safe and secure environment of legitimate and stable security institutions." [9] Security is essential to set the conditions for an integrated reconstruction plan. The security pillar consists of six areas, which are: control of belligerents; territorial security; protection of populace; protection of key individual, infrastructure and institutions; reform of indigenous security institutions; and regional security. Screening these six security subheadings distills three that are critical to post-conflict transition and applicable to irregular forces. First is protection of populace, second is protection of key individuals, infrastructure and institutions and third is reform of local security institutions.

The military can set the conditions for full spectrum reconstruction activities. To move forward, the local inhabitants must be able to operate without fear. Thus the keystone criteria of protection of populace will be evaluated. Security is tied to stabilization and a perception of personal safety.[10] This creates an environment that fosters the growth of the Justice, Economic and Governance pillars focused toward a new representative government.

Protection of key individuals, infrastructure and institutions represents the second leg of the criteria. Military forces are expected to provide immediate protection for the vital physical and intellectual infrastructure of the host society. Select political, judicial and the international representatives must be protected.[11] The local populace and international community hold the occupying power accountable and responsible to provide key and essential services. Maintaining these services increases the legitimacy of the interim forces and lowers the cost, duration and

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[9] Ibid, pg 3.
[10] Scott Feil, *Building Better Foundations in Post Conflict Reconstruction*. pg 3
[11] FM 3-0, *Operations*, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, pg 9-7.

scope of reconstruction.  Quickly re-establishing basic services, industry and authority provides a sense of normalcy, goodwill and maintains the momentum gained during combat operations.

While the first two criteria are immediate and compelling, the long term and insidious threat is the indigenous organizations that control the physical security measures in a country. Thus, reform and reconstitution of local security institutions constitutes the final leg of criteria. Authoritarian regimes usually remain in power due to their sophisticated population control measures and the ability of civil and military forces in maintaining the status quo.[12]  The new government must replace the strongest ideologues of the previous regime, and also convince the majority of these previous regime forces into supporting the new leadership.   Both former and new security forces must integrate into a new organization, inoculated in representative principles and the rule of law.

The criteria define success in terms of the contribution to post-conflict operations and the ability of Special Forces to transition resistance forces to stability operations.  In each chapter, the criteria screen the secondary and tertiary questions for suitability, validity and functionality. Taken together, these three criteria provide the foundation to build the necessary environment and conditions within all four pillars of the CSIS framework.  In Chapter Two, the criteria provide a vehicle to summarize the need for change in Unconventional Warfare doctrine.  In Chapter Three, the criteria explore how flexible doctrine is incorporated in a real world setting.  In Chapter four, the criteria are analyzed to validate the change methodology into and during post-conflict operations.  Finally, the last chapter uses the criteria to analyze and draw conclusions on the validity of the research question and to make recommendations for further study.

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[12] FM 3-05.201, *Unconventional Warfare Operations*, Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, NC, pg 1-9.

**Problem Statement:**

Unconventional Warfare doctrine increases the turbulent transition time between decisive combat and post-conflict reconstruction by not training resistance forces for post-conflict responsibilities. The discrete missions of destabilizing Unconventional Warfare and stabilizing Foreign Internal Defense delay the potential contributions of resistance forces to security operations.[13] CSIS has created methodologies for a smooth transition during post-conflict. Unconventional Warfare doctrine should likewise adopt methodologies for a smooth transition into post-conflict. Current Unconventional Warfare doctrine is based on a Cold War model that focuses on building indigenous irregular forces and their supporting infrastructure, executing combat operations (raids, sabotage and subversion) followed by demobilization of these irregular forces.[14] Lessons learned in Northern Iraq, Kosovo and Afghanistan stress the need for rapid transition of these irregular combat forces to stabilizing security operations.

Special Forces are organized and equipped to lead this transition due to their experience in Foreign Internal Defense, Humanitarian Assistance and expertise in cross-cultural communication.[15] The Contemporary Operating Environment requires resistance forces for both combat and stability roles across the spectrum of modern conflict. Linking Unconventional Warfare doctrine to Foreign Internal Defense doctrine can shorten the gap between combat and post-conflict. By providing forces on the ground that can identify friend from foe, generate public support, organize local security systems and preserve vital infrastructure, Special Forces led irregular units can shorten this transition period

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[13] Robert L. Kelly, *US Army Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Doctrine: Engine of Change or relic of the Past?,* Naval War College, Newport RI, January 2000, pg 8.

[14] JP 3-05.3, *Joint Special Operations Procedures*, US Government printing office, Washington, DC, 25 August 1993, pg IV 7- 8.

[15] Allan E Day, *Implications of Surrogate Warfare,* Naval War College, Newport RI, February 2002, pg 22.

**Organization of the Study**

With the problem statement developed, the next step is to outline in what manner and order this paper will answer the primary research question of "Should Unconventional Warfare doctrine develop resistance forces for both Combat and Stability operations"? A foundation describing both Unconventional Warfare and resistance forces will first be laid. Then Operation Provide Comfort will analyze the interaction of Special Forces with resistance forces and finally, the transition from combat to stability operations will be outlined.

The second chapter asks: "Does Unconventional Warfare doctrine match the Contemporary Operating Environment"? The range of answers derived at the end of this chapter: the need for resistance forces in stability operations and that Unconventional Warfare doctrine does not completely address this requirement, will partially answer the thesis question and provide facts and background.

The Kurdish Pesh Merga case study provides a vehicle to analyze the potential contributions of resistance forces during and after Operation Provide Comfort.[16] Applying the criteria to this case study illustrates the suitability of transitioning irregular forces to security units by asking, "Can Special Forces shape resistance force activities toward a common end state?" This case study will demonstrate the need for resistance forces for post-conflict operations, the flexibility of Special Forces to organize and train these forces, and how Pesh Merga forces were able to evolve into a legitimate semi-autonomous government in Northern Iraq.

The fourth Chapter identifies critical tasks, events and synchronization in the paradigm shift from destabilizing to stabilizing Operations. The transition is addressed by answering the question" How should Unconventional Warfare doctrine transition the resistance force to stability operations?" The commonalities of Unconventional Warfare and Foreign Internal Defense core

tasks and the ability of Special Forces to train both missions allow resistance forces to transition into post-conflict operations. The fifth and final chapter consists of conclusions and recommendations that summarize the results of this study and identify areas of future research.

This monograph will conclude that Unconventional Warfare doctrine should assess, train and then transition suitable resistance forces into a post-conflict security role. Developing resistance forces for both combat and security operations are necessary for success in modern warfare.

### Scope and Limitations

This paper will focus on the role of Special Forces in both Unconventional Warfare and stability operations. Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and Interagency organizations are beyond the scope of this study. Special Forces organizational changes will not be discussed, instead the research will examine joint doctrine and Special Forces capabilities to lead resistance forces in both combat and stability operations. This study presumes some aspect of conventional US support during the decisive combat phase. This support can range from maneuver ground forces to an air campaign.

This Chapter laid out the importance, criteria, problem, structure, and limitations of this study. The next chapter will build upon this foundation by conducting an overview of Unconventional Warfare doctrine, dynamics of resistance forces and review the interaction of Unconventional Warfare with the Contemporary Operating Environment.

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[16] Pesh Merga is a Kurdish term meaning "Those who risk death". It describes the armed fighters affiliated with the various Kurdish political organizations.

# CHAPTER TWO:  Unconventional Warfare Environment

Developing an understanding of the issues and terminology involved with Unconventional Warfare is necessary to discuss the current environment, identify the impact of the Contemporary Operating environment on military operations and build a broad understanding of resistance movements. This is accomplished by asking, "Does Unconventional Warfare doctrine match the Contemporary Operating Environment?"  This chapter will also discuss the unique skills a resistance movement brings to stability operations and the commonalities of modern insurgency to build a framework for further discussion.

Delineating the impact of the Contemporary Operating Environment on Unconventional Warfare doctrine is accomplished by asking four tertiary questions.  First is to understand the original goals for Unconventional Warfare by asking, "How has Unconventional Warfare evolved over time?"  This historical overview provides a benchmark to evaluate how the Contemporary Operating Environment changes modern war by asking "Does the Contemporary Operating Environment require a different role for Unconventional Warfare?"  Next is to identify if resistance forces can contribute to post-conflict transition by asking "Do resistance movements bring unique skill to the post-conflict environment".  Finally an overview of resistance movements is included by asking, "What common elements are shared by resistance movements?"  The commonalities identified will assist military planners to integrate and synchronize resistance movements into a campaign plan as discussed in Chapter four.  Taken together, these four questions identify the change in Unconventional Warfare that is imposed by the Contemporary Operating Environment and outline potential solution sets that are explored in subsequent chapters.

Irregular forces have historically made a huge imprint on post-conflict and the formation of a new governing architecture. As stated by Diane Davis; "The creation of a nation state as a

secure political entity rest as much on irregular as regular armed forces…the importance of these irregular armed forces has been severely neglected".[17] To understand the impact of the Contemporary Operating Environment on Unconventional Warfare, one needs to first explore the wide range of US military policies toward utilizing indigenous forces. This will be accomplished by asking, "How has Unconventional Warfare evolved over time?"

### U.S. involvement with Unconventional Warfare

The US association with Unconventional Warfare dates back to the French and Indian Wars.[18] The Civil War, Indian Wars, Philippines, and finally Vietnam all featured irregular forces fighting both alongside and against US conventional military forces.[19] During World War II, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) conducted unconventional operations.[20] The growing Cold War threat of the Soviets prompted the Department of Defense to create dedicated forces for Unconventional Warfare in 1952.

US Army Special Forces was founded on 19 June 1952, expressly for conducting Unconventional Warfare.[21] This organization was a response not only the force imbalance between NATO and the Soviet bloc, but also the tenacity and durability of resistance forces in countries such as Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania.[22] Unconventional Warfare was originally applied as an economy of force (Shaping) operations in support of a conventional

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[17] Diane Davis and Anthony Pereira, Eds, *Irregular Armed Forces and their role in Politics and State Formation*, New York, Cambridge Press, 2003, pg 1.Dr Davis ia a professor of political sociology at MIT.

[18] Robert L. Kelly*, US Army Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Doctrine: Engine of Change or relic of the Past?,* pg 19.

[19] John D. Wagelstein, "Preparing the US Army for the wrong war, Education and Doctrinal Failure,"*Small Wars and Insurgencies*; Winter 1999, pg 29.

[20] Richard H. Smith, *OSS- The secret History of America's first CIA*, Berkley CA, University of Calif Press, 1972, pg 1.

[21] Aaron Bank, *From OSS to Green Berets: Birth of Special Forces*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1987, pg 116.

[22] Robert L. Kelly, *US Army Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Doctrine:  Engine of Change or relic of the Past?* pg 1.

campaign plan.  For example, the 10<sup>th</sup> SFG was tasked to organize, train and coordinate up to 50 indigenous battalions in Eastern Europe for guerilla warfare in support of a NATO defense of Western Europe.[23]

The Cold War Unconventional Warfare model focused on guerilla warfare against invading Soviet forces.  The 1951 FM 31-20 defined Guerilla warfare as "operations carried out by small forces… with the objective of harassing, delaying and disrupting   ."  By 1959, the doctrine had evolved and linked Guerilla warfare to Counterinsurgency.[24]  In 1969, Special Reconnaissance and Direct Action were added to the original Special Forces mandate.[25]  The transfer of Counterinsurgency back to the Army also removed the stabilizing nation building tasks imbedded in the CIA counterinsurgency programs.  This loss of multilateral capabilities such as Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations was not rectified until 1987 with the creation of SOCOM under the Cohen-Nunn amendment.[26]

The political aspects of Unconventional Warfare and its integration with Information Operations were painfully exhibited to the US military in Vietnam.  "In Vietnam, US beaten politically by a protracted war not accompanied by a battlefield loss.  The US must be prepared to use Unconventional Warfare without conventional force to match the enemy in Psychological Operations and political objectives."[27]

The NATO and Vietnam examples both reflect a Cold War doctrine within the context of a democratic vs. communism ideology.  The world situation has moved to a more complex,

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[23] Aaron Bank *From OSS to Green Berets: Birth of Special Forces*, pg 241.
[24]  Shelly L. Stanton, *Green Berets at War, US Army SF*, Novato CA, Presidio Press, 1985, *pg 34*.
[25] Kenneth Tovo, "Special Forces Mission focus for the future", *Special Warfare*, Winter 1996, pg 13.
[26] United States Department of Defense, *SOF  posture statement 2003-2004,* Special Operations Command*, McDill AFB, FLA, pg 9.
[27] United States Army Special Operations Command, *AFSOF Vision 2020 Statement*, Fort Bragg, NC, October 1997, pg 14.

disjointed political order. [28]   The dynamics of this new political order will be explored by asking,

"Does the Contemporary Operating Environment require a different role for Unconventional

Warfare"?

### Contemporary Operating Environment

The Contemporary Operating Environment is a model that describes the geopolitical

conditions and asymmetric capabilities that are characteristic of national and transnational

potential adversaries.[29]   Recent examples of Unconventional Warfare tied to the Contemporary

Operating Environment include US support of the Nicaraguan Contras from bases in Honduras.

US forces were not directly engaged in combat, but were powerful combat multipliers training,

equipping and advising the indigenous forces in their resistance struggle.[30]   During Operation

Enduring Freedom, US airpower SOF provided the Afghani Northern Alliance resistance

movement firepower superiority, liaison with other forces and logistics support.[31]

Unconventional Warfare operations in Afghanistan also allowed Department of Defense

and Department of State personnel to identify future leaders, screen them for suitability and

groom them for future leadership in the interim government.[32]   Identifying the critical

requirement to shape the resistance leadership's political vision forces Unconventional Warfare

doctrine to address the political aspects of modern war.

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[28] Gary M Jones. and Christopher Tone, "Unconventional Warfare: Core purpose of Special Forces." *Special Warfare*, Summer 1999, pg 9.

[29] United States Department of Defense, Joint Forces Command, *Joint Operational Environment, Into the Future*, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, October 2003, pg 62.

[30]  John Pradus*, Presidents Secret War, The CIA and Pentagon covert operations from WW2– Persian Gulf*, Chicago, Elephant Press, 1996, pg 486.

[31] Micheal Gordon, "New US War: Commandoes, Air strikes and allies on the ground."  *New York Times,* 29 December 2001

[32] Jack Simpress and Colum Lynch, *Leaders shifting focus to Interim Government*. Washington Post, 15 Nov 2001, Accessed 20 December 03 at http://www.washingtonpost.com.

The breakup of the Soviet Union transformed the landscape from a bipolar confrontation into a collage of social, religious and cultural trans-national conflicts.[33]  In the Contemporary Operating environment, use of indigenous irregular forces is often the only acceptable military option.[34]  As stated by BG Jones" If Unconventional Warfare is to be relevant, we cannot restrict it to an unlikely Guerilla Warfare scenario that conveniently allows us to avoid the political issue. We must recognize Unconventional Warfare's inherent political nature….".[35]  While these ongoing political, social and legal changes stretch Unconventional Warfare doctrine to adequately fit the wide varieties of regional conflicts, they also demonstrate the US Army's increasing requirement for irregular forces.[36]

If there is an increased need for irregular forces based on the Contemporary Operating Environment, does this not require an enlarged view of Unconventional Warfare within the Contemporary Operating Environment?  To answer this question, the current architecture of Unconventional Warfare doctrine must first be summarized.

US sponsored insurgency is based on a seven-phase model.  Summarizing from FM3.05-201 (*Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations*) these are Phase I Preparation, Phase II Initial Contact, Phase III Infiltration, Phase IV Organization, Phase V Buildup, Phase VI Combat Employment and Phase VII Demobilization.  Phases I and II; are used to assess the situation, build popular support and set the conditions for the introduction of US forces.  These two stages typically require a regional presence and periodic contacts with the various resistance forces. Phases III and IV, are where the Special Forces team links up with the resistance force and create an integrated command structure.

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[33], Samuel P. Huntington, The *Clash of Civilizations*, New York, Touchstone Press, 1996, pg 20.
[34] Allan E. Day, *Implications of Surrogate Warfare*. Pg 26,
[35] Gary M. Jones and Christopher Tone, "Unconventional Warfare: Core purpose of Special Forces.". BG Jones is the current Commanding General of Special Forces Command.

Phases V and VI, are where the resistance conducts guerilla warfare to destabilize the hostile power and or tie down enemy forces. Special Forces synchronize and enhance the effects of the resistance force by coordinating their actions with the conventional force and providing the technical expertise to integrate air support.[37] Under Rapid Decisive Operations, US forces need to link up with resistance forces and start conducting combat operations almost immediately. Maintaining liaison contacts with the resistance leadership and understanding their weapons, training and support base will allow US forces to conduct the rapid Unconventional Warfare as observed in Afghanistan during 2001.[38]

The combat employment phase is where the resistance force can potentially be transitioned to interim security forces. The resistance force can then protect the populace and key instructions, thus meeting criteria one and two. As conventional combat forces secure an area, the indigenous forces can provide security and ensure the advancing conventional force maintains combat power forward.

Phase VII, Demobilization is where the resistance forces revert to National Control. This can be realized by shifting the resistance force to a "regular force or demobilization".[39] Psychological Operations, Civil affairs and International agencies are key players during this phase by promoting unity, coordinating transition plans and establishing legitimacy for the interim government.[40]

The de-mobilization phase is often the most difficult part of the 7-phase Unconventional Warfare model. Historical examples show various degrees of successful demobilization. As put

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[36] Brian L. Thompson, *Surrogate Armies, Redefining the Ground Force*, , Naval War College, Newport RI, February 2002, pg 18.
[37] FM 3-05.20, *Special Forces Operations*, pg 2-3.
[38] John Barry, A New Breed of soldier, *Newsweek,* 10 December 2001.
[39] FM 3-05.201, *Unconventional Warfare Operations*, pg 1-12,
[40] *FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces,* Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, NC, August 1999, pg 3-11-3-17.

by Alec Cope in *Irregular Forces in State formation* "the problem is not getting soldiers, but getting rid of them". Veteran organizations such as the American Legion and German Free Corps after World War I were powerful political elements that shaped national policy in their respective countries.[41] The rise of the Fascist party in 1920 Italy is traced to Italian veteran organizations of WWI. [42]

As stated in FM 3.05.201 "demobilization planning (and training) must start when the United States government decides to sponsor a resistance force".[43] Successful transition from phase VI through phase VII is contingent on a clear vision of the strategic end state and the role of indigenous resistance forces in this vision. This clear vision must be articulated to the international community, local populace and irregular forces through the Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations assets that support the transition from combat to stability operations.

Describing the evolution and phases of Unconventional Warfare, identifying the changes based on the Contemporary Operating Environment and outlining the contributions of Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs still leaves questions about the resistance movement themselves. What essential capabilities do a resistance movement possess? Can resistance movements be a positive contributor to the overall plan? These areas are explored by asking "Do resistance movements bring unique skills to the post-conflict environment?"

**Resistance Force Capabilities**

The resistance force needs to maintain their legitimacy with the civilian populace. The criteria of protect the populace, and key institutions and individuals is especially critical within the insurgents own base societal network. Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs can cement

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[41] Diane Davis and Anthony Pereira, Eds, *Irregular Armed Forces and their role in Politics and State Formation*, pg 23,
[42] Ibid, pg 65
[43] FM 3-05.201, *Unconventional Warfare Operations*, pg 1-18,

the bond between the resistance force, citizens and their new country and should be used, not just to maintain support for the resistance forces, but also to shape them into a wider understanding of their future role in post-conflict.[44]

Evolving international standards related to the conduct of land warfare has drastically enlarged the rights and classification of non-combatants. Cumulatively these changes reduce the effectiveness of military operations against irregular forces. Otherwise stated "the question is whether public opinion on this matter will so constrain military operations that certain kinds of strategy are effectively precluded".[45] US forces unfamiliarity with various tribes, dialects and customs hinder discriminate targeting and apprehension. Indigenous forces have the unique ability to distinguish friend from foe and can work with the civilian populace from a position of creditability that foreign forces cannot match.[46] As outlined in the problem statement, indigenous forces maintain the cultural filters to delineate hostile intent and separate noncombatants from fighters. The ability of indigenous forces to stabilize a region is a linchpin to international recognition and funding. Key to this recognition is to operate within international law. [47]

As we address the capabilities of resistance movements and concurrently identify the positive role irregular forces can play in modern warfare, questions remain about the various insurgent movements themselves. Do insurgencies have a common organizational structure? What are the strengths and weaknesses of an insurgent force and especially their leaders? This will be addressed by asking, "What common elements are shared by resistance movements?" Even with the rapid change seen in the Contemporary Operating Environment, certain

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[44] FM 3-05.201, *Unconventional Warfare Operations*, pg 1-19.
[45] Diane Davis and Anthony Pereira, Eds, *Irregular Armed Forces and their role in Politics and State Formation*, pg 345 (Roxbourgh).
[46] Charles Krauthammer, *We don't Peace keep*, Washington Post, 18 December 2001, Accessed 18 December 2003 at http://www.washingtonpost.com.

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commonalities exist among insurgencies.  A military headquarters cannot adequately employ irregular forces without an appreciation of their capabilities, vulnerabilities, structure and leadership.

### Organization of Resistance forces

While the dynamics of each conflict drives the specific structure of the resistance force, leadership functions are spread generally within three branches: political, intelligence and military.[48]  The political branch is the visible leadership and public spokesman who rally support to the organization's cause.  The intelligence branch is often compartmentalized and is used to both collect information and create subversion in the government.[49]  The largest is the military branch where the resistance forces are broken down into Guerilla forces and Auxiliary support personnel. Guerillas are the overt fighting force in the insurgent movement.  Auxiliary personnel are the support wing that feeds, transports, houses and hides the resistance members.

The strengths of any resistance movement are in their familiarity of the foe, culture and local terrain.  They also have creditability among the local populace based on their affiliation with and treatment of the civilian populace.   These attributes are balanced by a limited strategic vision of their end state and the roadmap to reach these ends.  "Resistance forces can be dominated by fanatical true believers or even use their cause as a pretense for vendettas or criminal activity against civilian populace".[50]  A key aspect of their strength is the goals, methodology and vision of the resistance leadership.

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[47] Association of the US Army  (AUSA)and Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), *Post Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework*, pg 1, Accessed 5 August 2003 at http://www.pcpproject.org.
[48] FM 3-05.201, *Unconventional Warfare Operations*, pg 1-4.
[49] Ibid, pg 2-7.
[50] Davis, Diane and Anthony Pereira, Eds*, Irregular Armed Forces and their role in Politics and State Formation*, pg 347, (Roxobourgh).

Resistance leaders should focus on improving quality of life but often their only desire is personal power. Otherwise stated "Principal objective of the captain was acquisition and or expansion of their military jurisdiction and consolidation of power."[51] This warlord mentality unfortunately represents large numbers of regional leaders and Unconventional Warfare operations should use caution engaging these elements. While the sponsoring of resistance movements will be explored further within Chapter Three, the mentality or ideology of a resistance movement will be discussed next.

Ideology allows irregular forces to identify wrongs in the current system, connect with popular grievances and promote their own brand of government. Specific grievances based on social, economic or political persecution is the building blocks of an insurgency.[52] The fragmented nature of developing countries with the wide variety of tribal, cultural, and geographic separations precludes one all encompassing message. This motivational dynamic playing off social, religious and ethnic bonds is best summed up by Alce Campbell "Ideology is the cheap alternative to expensive labor markets. Troops fighting for causes are often willing to fight and die cheaply."[53]

This chapter addressed the history, evolution, and traditional applications of Unconventional Warfare up to the end of the Cold war. It then explored the impact of the Contemporary Operating Environment on Unconventional Warfare doctrine to emphasize both the destabilizing and stabilizing capabilities of resistance forces. This dual capability can assist the resistance force transitioning into a post-conflict security force. Next the organization, leadership and dynamics of resistance movement were discussed to delineate the commonalities

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[51] Ibid, pg 159 (Batalas).

[52] United States Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps, *FMFM 8-2 Counterinsurgency Manual*, Quantico VA, January 1986, pg 3-5.

[53] Diane Davis and Anthony Pereira, Eds, *Irregular Armed Forces and their role in Politics and State Formation*, pg 95 (Campbell).

among these organizations. The refined results are that Unconventional Warfare maintains the flexibility to adapt to changes in modern warfare, should sustain its integration with Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs, and that phase seven of the Unconventional Warfare framework, demobilization, is the focal point for change.

The increased requirements for stabilizing operations identified within the Contemporary Operating Environment matches the unique capabilities of resistance forces, while the commonalities and organizational structure of the various movements provide a framework for the military to integrate Unconventional Warfare forces into both combat and stability roles.[54] The following case study explores the steps taken by the US to forge the Kurdish Pesh Merga resistance into a functional political and military body. This is accomplished by asking, "Can Special Forces shape resistance force activities toward a common end state?"

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[54] , Gary M Jones and Christopher Tone, "Unconventional Warfare: Core purpose of Special Forces." pg 7,

# CHAPTER THREE:  Kurdish Unconventional Operations

Building upon the foundation created for understanding irregular forces and Unconventional Warfare doctrine, this chapter applies them to an operational setting.  Operation Provide Comfort provides a backdrop to assess the suitability of irregular forces for stability operations and the enlargement of Unconventional Warfare doctrine required within the Contemporary Operating Environment by asking "Can Special Forces shape resistance force activities toward an common end state?"  To meet these goals, four main points will be addressed.

First, the origins and organization of the Kurdish Pesh Merga is identified by asking, "What are the commonalities of the Kurdish resistance forces?"  Next Operation Provide Comfort discusses the Pesh Merga's role in the criteria of protection of populace and protection of key individuals, institutions and infrastructure by asking, "How did Special Forces shape Kurdish forces toward a common goal?"  The post Provide Comfort phase from 1996-2003 then discusses the Pesh Merga's consolidation under an umbrella government and a increasing appreciation of their responsibility within the third criteria, reform and reconstitution of local security institutions.  Whether these steps facilitated the smooth security transition of Northern Iraq after Operation Iraqi Freedom will be analyzed by asking "Did Operation Provide Comfort improve interoperability during Operation Iraqi Freedom?"  Finally, an analysis of the various Kurdish resistance forces and their suitability for post-conflict activities is analyzed through a set of screening criteria by asking "How do you evaluate resistance movements for suitability in post-conflict?"  To understand the dynamics of the Kurdish resistance, and to successfully superimpose the framework for resistance movements discussed in Chapter two onto the current situation requires a brief history of the Kurdish people, leadership and the three main resistance groups.  This background and comparison is conducted by asking, "What are the commonalities of the Kurdish resistance forces?"

**Kurdish Pesh Merga**

The military roots of the Kurdish struggle predate the Ottoman Empire.[55]  During the 1980s Iran –Iraq war the Kurdish tribes largely supported the Iranian forces.  Iraqi forces retaliated by dropping mustard gas on Kurdish villages in Iraq during 1987-1988.[56]  These gas attacks brought international attention to the plight of the Kurds and galvanized the Kurdish hatred of the Baathist government of Iraq.  Buoyed by statements of support from President Bush and other international leaders, the Kurds rose up, after Gulf war in 1991, against the Iraqi government and seized several key towns (and oilfields) in Northern Iraq to establish a Kurdish homeland.[57]

From August - November 1991, Iraqi units brutally crushed the Kurdish uprising forcing over 1.5 million Kurds to flee the country.[58]  Faced with a humanitarian crisis, the US and other nations deployed to Southeast Turkey and Northern Iraq in Operation Provide Comfort in April 1992 to assist the Kurdish refugees.  The US developed and utilized leaders within the fragmented Kurdish resistance forces to facilitate this humanitarian effort.[59]

Three main groups dominated Kurdish resistance forces during the 1990s.[60]  The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Coalition of Kurdistan (PKK) are the primary groups and they represent a wide range of Kurdish goals, interests, geography and population.  Their ideology, organization and actions throughout the

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[55]  Mehrdad R Izardy, The *Kurds- a concise handbook*, , Washington DC., Taylor and Francis, 1992, pg 3.

[56] Heather L. Wagner, *The Kurds- Creation of the modern Middle East*, ,  Philadelphia, PA, Chelsea House, 2003, . pg 69.

[57] Michael A. Schiesl, *The objective of US Military intervention in Northern Iraq between Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom*, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, June 2003, pg 1.

[58] L.H. Brune, *America and the Iraq crisis 1991,* Claremont Ill, Regina, 1993, pg 128.

[59] Stephen Pelleteri, "Managing strains in the Coalition, What to do about Sadaam?", *Strategic Studies Institute*, 1997, pg 7.

[60] Peter Lambert, *The US and the Kurds, Case Studies in US Engagement*, Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey CA, June 1998, pg 86-87.

years also demonstrate the evolution and transition of resistance movements into insurgent and terrorist organizations.

The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) coalesced in the 1980s as a tribal insurgency focused against the Iraqi forces of Saddam Hussein. Their battles with Iraqi soldiers during the 1980 were one of the primary reasons for the destruction of Kurdish villages conducted by the Iraqis after the conclusion of the Iran- Iraqi war. Led by Jalal Talabani, they are more modern and less focused on tribal or religious leaders. While maintaining strong ties to Iran, they look to a more modern future for the Kurds.[61]

The second main Kurdish group is the Kurdish Democratic Party, which gains its power from its tribal and religious grass roots with the clerics, sheiks and land.[62] The KDP is based within the powerful Barzani clan and is currently led by Masoud Barzani.Both the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Kurdish Democratic Party are resistance movements that transitioned into insurgencies and coalesced into a legitimate semi-autonomous Kurdish governing body.

This contrasts with the Patriotic Coalition of Kurdistan (PKK), which is focused on Kurdish rights within Turkey and has conducted a long insurgency campaign against the Turkish government. The Patriotic Coalition of Kurdistan is not tribal but politically organized, and is the most violent and modern of the Kurdish resistance forces.[63] The Patriotic Coalition of Kurdistan was founded as a resistance movement and has degenerated into a terrorist organization due to its lack of strategic vision based on legitimate methodology and a desire to provide protection and basic services for their following.[64] In large part the different political directions taken by the three organizations (PUK, KDP, and PKK) are directly related to the vision of their leadership.

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[61] Mehrdad R. Izardy, The *Kurds- a concise handbook*, pg 207.
[62] Ibid, pg 206.
[63] ibid, pg 207.
[64] Heather L Wagner., The Kurds- Creation of the modern Middle East, pg 63.

The Kurdish leadership has long been torn between tribal affiliation, religious and secular differences. The tribal aspects inhibit a meritocracy and tend toward nepotism, provincialism and sectarianism.[65] Masoud Barzani of the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan leader Jalil Talabini has slowly coalesced into one overarching organization. These leaders control military actions, but also have evolved into political figures and visible spokesmen for their movement.

The first attempt at a Kurdish representative government was in 1991 as the Kurdish Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan formed the Kurdish Front. Iraq answered with a blockade of Kurdish lands that weakened the Kurdish tribes, but left a political, security, and judicial power vacuum that the Kurds exploited.[66] The Iraqi forces followed this blockade with a ground attack in August 1991 that forced thousands to flee to Southern Turkey. These attacks created the conditions for Operation Provide Comfort where US forces shaped and coordinated Kurdish forces toward common humanitarian goals.[67] The development of Kurdish forces was based on flexible interaction, local empowerment and facilitated by the training and skill sets Special Forces soldiers possess. The interaction between Special Forces and the Kurdish forces is evaluated by asking, "How did Special Forces shape Kurdish forces toward common goals?" This question will be addressed by first setting the conditions and background, then describing Operation Provide Comfort in terms of the three elements of Flexible interaction, Local empowerment and Special Forces unique skill sets.

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[65] Mehrdad R. Izardy, The *Kurds- a concise handbook*, pg 206.
[66] Peter Lambert, *The US and the Kurds, Case Studies in US Engagement*, pg 85.
[67] Gordon Rudd, *Operation Provide Comfort: One more tile in the mosaic 6 Apr-15 July 1991*, US Army Center for Military History, 1997, pg 15.

**Operation Provide Comfort**

The plight of Kurdish refugee families led to the United Nations to pass Resolution 688 that identified a requirement for humanitarian intervention.[68]  The resolution gave the US a mandate to lead a coalition of 30 countries and over 12,000 US soldiers that eventually entered Northern Iraq in April 1992.[69]  This operation had both a military role of deterring Iraqi forces and a humanitarian relief mission.[70]  The U.S. forces under the command of LTG Shalikaveli created a no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel in Iraq and a ground security zone in the mountains regions of Iraq bordering Turkey.[71]  The flexible interaction of the coalition leadership with the Kurdish forces contributed to the success of Operation Provide Comfort.

The Joint Task Force Alpha commander BG Potter was tasked with providing access to both the humanitarian assistance camps and later the Kurdish resettlement back to Iraq.[72]  The US commanders were frustrated by the fragmented nature of Kurdish tribal society.  Even the most routine decisions had to be agreed upon by all tribal leaders.  Both Commanders slowly engaged this problem by using soldiers from 10th SFG to develop Kurdish leadership and indigenous organizational structure within each of the camps.[73]

Local empowerment ensured Kurdish mayors, civil authority and security forces all consisting of Kurdish personnel were formed, trained and employed within the camps.  Riots and injuries surrounded the food distribution process until Special Forces organized the process using

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[68] Heather L. Wagner, *The Kurd- Creation of the modern Middle East*, pg 108.

[69] House of Representatives, Armed Forces Committee, Report of LTG John Shalikashvili, *DOD Relief for Kurds in Iraq* , Washington DC, 4 September 1991, pg 12.

[70] Michael A. Schiesl, *The objective of US Military intervention in Northern Iraq between Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom,* , pg 4.

[71] LTG Shalikavili was the Deputy EUCOM commander at the time of Operation Provide Comfort.  His JTF A Commander (BG Potter) was the SOCEUR commander.

[72] House of Representatives, Armed Forces Committee, Report of LTG John Shalikashvili, *DOD Relief for Kurds in Iraq,* pg 11.

[73] Ibid, pg 17.

Kurdish leaders and subsequently held the leaders accountable for camp administration.[74]  The organizational, interpersonal and cultural skills essential for success in Unconventional Warfare and Foreign Internal Defense proved essential during Operation Provide Comfort.  As stated by a Special Forces NCO in the Provide Comfort AAR, "The skills learned in UW/FID training proved invaluable in working with the Kurds".[75]  These unique skills sets of Special Forces soldiers were the third foundation of success.

Special Forces also integrated the activities of numerous Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that help in medicinal, food and water distribution and reconstruction.  As stated by LTC Rudd from the Center for Army History "The Special forces units brought cohesion and management to efforts already in progress and introduced them where they were not present".  These efforts cemented the relationship between the Special Forces soldiers and Kurdish leadership, and forced the diverse Kurdish elements to develop infrastructure to provide security and basic services.  These efforts eventually galvanized the various Kurdish leaders to coalesce into an umbrella organization in order to win legitimacy and a voice at the international level.[76]

With Provide Comfort providing the backdrop, the Kurds conducted elections in May 1992.  Barzani from the Kurdish Democratic Party won a slight advantage, but more importantly the Talabani led Patriotic Union of Kurdistan abided by the results and agreed to power sharing agreements under the auspices of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG).  This power sharing resulted in a de-facto shadow government within Iraq.[77]  The KRG began to provide basic services for the Kurdish people thus meeting criteria one; protection of populace and criteria two,

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[74] Gordon Rudd, *Operation Provide Comfort: One more tile in the mosaic 6 April – 15 July 1991,* pg 15.

[75] Department of Defense, US Army JFK Special Warfare Center, *Operation Provide Comfort lessons Learned*, November 1992, pg 179.

[76] Peter Lambert, *The US and the Kurds, Case Studies in US Engagement*, pg 86.

protection of key institutions and individuals.  These steps increased the creditability and

legitimacy of the Kurdish Regional Government.  This power sharing arrangement was supported

by US diplomatic efforts and the military forces located in Turkey and Northern Iraq.  As stated

by Department of State spokesman Ken Burns, "… work to create stability in northern Iraq

without Sadaam's forces in play."[78]

The Special Forces contingent in Zakho, Northern Iraq departed in August 1996 ending

ground military interaction until pre Operation Iraqi Freedom.[79]  The air cover provided by

Operation Northern Watch over the Kurdish autonomous regions continued the US military

interaction with the Kurdish Pesh Merga's.  While authors have speculated about US goals

toward the Kurdish Pesh Merga and the associated autonomous Kurd regions, "The safe haven

was to be use as a intelligence platform, and a staging base for the destabilization of the regime

and eventual overthrow of Hussein".[80]   The military bonds created and sustained through the

1990s paid dividends during Operation Iraqi Freedom.  This will be explored by asking "Did

Operation Provide Comfort improve US- Kurd interoperability during Operation Iraqi Freedom?"

### Operation Iraqi Freedom

The US military contacts established during 1990s with the Kurdish Pesh Merga set the

conditions for the smooth interaction of Special Forces with the Pesh Merga and their integration

with US combat operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom.[81]  The Kurdish shadow government

used the Pesh Merga fighters to control looting and protect vital institutions during the transition

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[77]  Mark Cowell, "Turks says Bush rejects Kurdistan", *New York Times*, 4 September 1992.
[78] Nicolas Burns, DOS spokesperson, News Conference, 23 September 1996, in Scheisel
Monograph.
[79] Michael A. Schiesl, *The objective of US Military intervention in Northern Iraq between
Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom,* pg 5.
[80] Scott Ritter, *Endgame, Solving the Iraq problem once and for all*, New York, Simon and
Schuster, 1999, pg 133.

period after defeat of the Iraqi military.[82]  The growth, development and interaction of the

Kurdish Pesh Merga from Operation Provide Comfort to Operation Iraqi Freedom allowed them

to protect the populace, institutions and leadership.  While the relationships developed during the

1990s provided a framework for Special Forces to superimpose military operations with the

Kurdish Pesh Merga during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the long term challenge is to maintain

influence, and close relationships with a resistance group during the long road through

reconstruction.

The US military must carefully assess whether an insurgent group understands its role to

promote a stable and safe environment leading to a strong nation or merely focuses on their own

power and profit.  This assessment should be a linchpin decision to determine which resistance

forces is the 'force de jour' for post-conflict security operations.  If we admit that success in post-

conflict is based on the resistance forces commitment to a stable and secure nation, we must

acknowledge the criticality of evaluating the various resistance forces.  This is accomplished by

asking, "How do you evaluate various resistance forces for suitability in post-conflict security

operations?"

**Screening criteria for resistance forces**

The military pressures of the Iraqi Baathist forces and the political requirements for one

voice drove the different Kurdish political groups to set aside their differences.[83]  The search for

international legitimacy and a political influence caused the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan/Kurdish

Democratic Party coalition to expel the Patriotic Coalition of Kurdistan in October 1992 due the

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[81], Jamie McIntrye, *Pentagon officials: Special Forces in Northern Iraq,* CNN Washington Bureau, 30 JAN 2003, Accessed 20 December 03 at http://www.cnn.com.
[82] Cagaptay Saner, *US and Kurdish Forces keep Iraq Northern Front Stable*, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 7 April 2003, pg 1.
[83] Stephen Pelleteri, "*Managing strains in the Coalition, What to do about Sadaam?"* pg, 7,

Patriotic Coalition of Kurdistan's continued support of terrorism within Turkey.[84]  The umbrella

Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) understood that to maintain international support for the

Kurdish movement the Pesh Merga must renounce terrorism and adhere to international norms of

military and political behavior.  These actions demonstrate an increasing cooperation and

understanding of the requirements to be recognized as a legitimate force.

The Patriotic Coalition of Kurdistan was not a suitable resistance movement.  The

Patriotic Coalition of Kurdistan's dependence on terrorism and unwillingness to seek a negotiated

settlement excluded them from U.S. military or political support.  This exclusion caused a

backlash of Patriotic Coalition of Kurdistan attacks against the Kurdish Regional Government but

also was a bellwether moment that galvanized the Kurdish coalition.[85]  The Kurdish Regional

Government (KRG) within Iraq united behind a common set of goals, norms and vision.  This

gradual sophistication of the Kurdish Pesh Merga suggests a model that can be used to evaluate

other resistance forces.

When conducting an analysis of irregular forces for suitability in a post-conflict security

role, the following four tenets should be addressed: Acceptance of Rule of Law; Acceptance of

Representative Government; Cross cultural Support Base within the target country; and Unity of

Effort within the resistance forces.[86]

Using these four tenets as an examination tool, it is obvious the Patriotic Coalition of

Kurdistan was a force not willing to accept the responsibility of a creditable and legitimate

resistance movement.  In addition, the Patriotic Coalition of Kurdistan maintained their power

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[84] Peter Lambert, *The US and the Kurds, Case Studies in US Engagement*, pg 88.
[85] Chris Hedges, "An odd alliance subdues Turkish Kurds rebels,  *New York Times*, 24 November 1992", pg 1.
[86] As with the monograph criteria, the above four tenets are embedded within the CSIS Framework for Post Conflict and are also derived from Joint doctrine (JP3-07, MOOTW, pg II5-7) and Joint Stability and Support Operational Concepts, pg B-7-A-7.

base through criminal activity.[87]  This contrasts with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the

Democratic Party of Kurdistan, which coalesced into a de-facto government. Resistance forces

committing to these four tenets can lead to their integration into stability operations and the

creation of a stable, legitimate social structure.

Any screening must take into account both the cultural, moral and political norms of the

irregular forces.[88]  Acceptance and tolerance of individual rights, peaceful dissent and democratic

principles form the framework of any assessment.  The end state should be a force inoculated in

representative government and the rule of law.

Working with indigenous forces through Unconventional Warfare or Humanitarian

Assistance as in Operation Provide Comfort can provide the working framework to build

affiliation, bonds and influence with resistance forces.[89]  These operations provide an opportunity

for the resistance force to enhance their coordination with conventional forces, and develop an

appreciation of their role in post-conflict reconstruction.  Concurrently the resistance force adapts

their behavior in order to receive creditability leading to legitimacy and a constructive role in the

post-conflict environment.

Special Forces interaction with the Kurdish leadership during Operation Provide Comfort

shaped the Kurdish appreciation of role in re-establishing civil order.  Or as stated in the

Operation Provide Comfort AAR, "Employing the Kurd leaders also gave Special Forces an

indirect authority over them".[90] The end result was that the Kurdish coalition was ready and able

to re-establish order after the fall of Saddam Hussein during Operation Iraqi Freedom, thus

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[87] Heather L. Wagner, *The Kurds- Creation of the modern Middle East*, pg 63.
[88] FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, Department of the Army, Washington DC, February 2002, pg 3-7
[89] House of Representatives, Armed Forces Committee, Report of LTG John Shalikashvili, *DOD Relief for Kurds in Iraq,* pg 17.
[90] Gordon Rudd, *Operation Provide Comfort: One more tile in the mosaic 6 April – 15 July 1991*, pg 16.

validating the primary research question concerning the criticality of indigenous organizations in stability operations.

Operation Provide Comfort identified the flexibility required of Unconventional Warfare within the Contemporary Operating Environment. This flexibility and the commonality of indigenous focused activities are reinforced during Operation Provide Comfort. Several Special Forces soldiers in the Joint Task Force-A remarked that their required operational duties and responsibilities in Kurdish areas are essentially the same as those prepared for in Foreign Internal Defense/Unconventional Warfare training.[91] Flexible interaction, local empowerment and Special Forces unique skills were the keys that answered the second tertiary question, "How did Special Forces shape Kurdish forces toward a common goal"?

Interaction with the Kurdish resistance forces also demonstrated the need for Unconventional Warfare doctrine to address both combat and stability roles. Pesh Merga fighters understood their importance and role in combat operations. Special Forces organized and developed the Pesh Merga's recognition of their role in stability operations. Analysis of Operation Provide Comfort reinforced the leadership and mentoring role of Special Forces as they influence and shape the resistance leadership's appreciation of legitimate methods and military cooperation.[92] This analysis was conducted by answering the third tertiary question "Did Operations Provide Comfort improve interoperability during Operations Iraqi Freedom?"

Viewing the case study within criteria one, protection of populace and criteria two, key infrastructure and individuals, the Pesh Merga transitions from loosely organized fighters to security forces protecting their civilian populace. The Kurdish leadership came to realize their responsibility in stability operations by coalescing into a semi autonomous government and

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[91] Department of Defense, US Army JFK Special Warfare Center, *Operation Provide Comfort lessons Learned*, , November 1992, pg 179.
[92] Ibid, pg 187-188.

expelling the Patriotic Coalition of Kurdistan forces from their organization. By purging their group of the terrorist Patriotic Coalition of Kurdistan they validated the importance of criteria three, reform and Reconstitution of security force.

The accompanying screening criteria provided a sieve to evaluate the resistance forces and assist in the key question "How do you evaluate resistance movements for suitability in post-conflict?" In Operations Provide Comfort, US forces assisted the diverse resistance elements to coordinate activities, develop appreciation of rule of law and coordinate their military and political activities. Taken together, the analysis clearly supports the secondary question of "Can Special Forces shape resistance activities toward an overall combined end state."

Unconventional Warfare forces operating in the Contemporary Operating Environment should be able to conduct the full spectrum of military operations. While irregular forces are conducting offensive operations (Raids and Sabotage) against the government, they should concurrently provide for and improve the lives of their non-combatant supporters and dependents.[93] The dual requirement of concurrent combat operations and stability operations reinforces the evolution of modern warfare identified in Chapter Two and highlights the change needed for Unconventional Warfare doctrine to bridge the gap between combat and stability operations. The next chapter will build upon this duality to complete the bridge between destabilizing and stabilizing operations by describing how and when resistance forces should transition to a stability role.

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[93] FM 3-05.201, *Unconventional Warfare Operations*, pg 1-16.

# CHAPTER FOUR:  Mechanics of Change

With the conditions set for understanding how the Contemporary Operating Environment has impacted resistance groups and Unconventional Warfare, this chapter is ready to address the question "How should Unconventional Warfare doctrine transition resistance forces to stability operations?"  The key tenets from the preceding chapters are that resistance forces are critical for post-conflict success and that resistance forces should be able to conduct the full spectrum of military operations.  Also illustrated was that Unconventional Warfare doctrine currently does not bridge the gap between destabilizing decisive combat and stabilizing post-conflict. These tenets reinforce the primary research question of "Should Unconventional Warfare doctrine focus on utilizing resistance forces in post-conflict reconstruction?" by answering the what, why and who. Answering why resistance forces are critical for post-conflict security operations and using the screening criteria in Chapter three to identify who among the various resistance groups should be involved in post-conflict operations frames the equation.  Given this background, this chapter we complete the equation by answering when resistance forces should transition and, most importantly, how to implement this paradigm shift to stabilizing operations.  This process will be accomplished through three tertiary questions.

Answering the following tertiary questions will facilitate the transition of irregular forces into an interim security force.  The first is methodology to successfully integrate irregular operations into the campaign plan thus meeting criteria one, protection of populace and criteria two, protection of key institutions and individuals by asking, "How does Unconventional Warfare maintain synchronization with the overall Campaign plan".  Key in this methodology is to identify when to transition resistance forces to stability operations.  Second is to maintain leverage and influence on the diverse resistance forces and their varied ambitions after the conclusion of major combat action by asking "How does Special Forces sustain unity of effort

between resistance forces and conventional forces?"  Finally, the resistance force assuming an interim security role drives Special Forces to transition from an Unconventional Warfare to a Foreign Internal Defense role in support of this new responsibility. This transition completing the bridge carrying resistance forces from destabilizing to stabilizing operations and meeting criteria three, reform of local security institutions is accomplished by asking "Can Unconventional Warfare forces transition 'in stride' to stability operations?"  This transition from combat to stability operations also provides an exit strategy for Special Forces by fostering a stable and secure environment.  With reform of security organizations ongoing, Special Forces can then transition its responsibility to other forces.  The first step in this process is to tighten the bonds synchronizing irregular forces within the overall campaign plan by asking the question, "When irregular forces transition to stabilizing operations, how do they maintain synchronization with conventional forces"?   To answer this question, we must first understand the C2 relationships in place between resistance forces and the joint task force.

### Synchronization with conventional operations

Within any military operation, success can be gauged by the ability of each force to integrate within the overall plan.[94]  If we accept this gauge of success, we must validate using resistance forces in post-conflict by asking "How does Unconventional Warfare maintain synchronization with the overall Campaign plan?"   This synchronization starts with the combined and joint interoperability established through liaison officers and an integrated headquarters.  The resistance and Special Forces leadership jointly form a combined headquarters, called the Area Command to synchronize their activities.[95]  This headquarters serves as the linkage back to the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) that is integrated

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[94] FM 3-0, *Operations*, pg 2-6.

into the Joint Task Force. At the Joint Task Force or similar headquarters, Special Operations

Coordination elements are in place to integrate irregular forces into the campaign plan.[96] While

the Special Operations Command Control Element (SOCCE) is a mission dependent force

attached by the Joint Special Operations Task Force to the Joint Task Force, the Special

Operations Coordination Element (SOCORD) is an assigned cell within each Corps G3 section.

The Joint Special Operations Task Force working in conjunction with the SOF liaison

elements can maximize the contributions of an Unconventional Warfare force. Key to this is a

clear understanding by both the conventional commander and the resistance leadership on the

intent and expected end state of irregular force operations. Or as stated by Pudas "Success in

coalition warfare depends on the ability of American commanders to harmonize the capabilities,

doctrines, and logistical forces from various cultures."[97] Specific tasks that Unconventional

Warfare forces can accomplish to enhance overall capabilities include personnel recovery, force

protection, targeting, battle damage assessment, and intelligence collection.

This enhancement of conventional capability reflects the sliding scale between

conventional and resistance forces. As the campaign moves toward the decisive combat phase,

resistance forces play a decreasingly important combat role. Resistance forces simply lack the

heavy weapons, communications, and training to maneuver side by side with conventional forces

in decisive combat. Resistance forces can be a force multiplier by securing cleared areas. In the

condensed modern battlefield describe by Gen Krulak in the "Three block war", resistance forces

are ideally suited to secure the third block that is conducting stability operations and allow the

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[95] I FM 3-05.201, *Unconventional Warfare Operations*, pg 1-16.
[96] FM 3-5.20, *Special Operations Forces*, pg 4-6.
[97] Terry J Pudas*," *Preparing Future Coalition Commanders", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Winter 1993/1994, pg 41.

conventional commander to focus forward at the enemy.[98]  Using irregular forces to secure a rear

area allows the commander to sustain the mass and momentum of his organic forces.

Utilizing resistance forces in this environment builds on their superiority in situational

awareness and local legitimacy and clearly meets criteria one, protection of populace and criteria

two, protection of key individual and institutions.  Using resistance forces as interim security

units in an economy of force support role reinforces the strengths of both the resistance and

conventional forces and allows the joint task force commander to simultaneously conduct both

the destabilizing and stabilizing operations demanded by modern conflict and embraced within

GEN Krulak's three block war concept.

The successful integration of irregular forces requires mission sets adapted to the

resistance force's capabilities and phased into the appropriate stages of the campaign plan.[99]

When nested within conventional force combat operations, irregular forces should consider

transitioning to stabilization operations at the start of decisive combat operations.  While

recommending slight adjustments of how to transition resistance forces, the above section stresses

when resistance forces should transition by highlighting the increased requirement for stabilizing

forces during decisive combat and resistance forces unique capabilities to meet this stabilizing

requirement.  Answering the how and when allow Unconventional Warfare forces to maintain

synchronization with combat operations.  The next step is to sustain this synchronization through

stabilization and security operations.  This is addressed by asking, "How does Special Forces

sustain unity of effort between irregular and conventional forces".

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[98] The 3 block war describes a condensed modern battlefield where Combat, Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance are concurrently occurring.

[99] FM 3-05.201, *Unconventional Warfare Operations*, pg 2-4.

**Leveraging Irregular Forces:**

"The closer a coalition is to victory, the more individual partners diverge from common objectives to pursue their own aims".[100] Pudas' statement regarding coalitions reinforces the difficulties maintaining unity of effort with resistance forces. The hardest element of an Unconventional Warfare operation is maintaining influence after the common enemy is vanquished. Humanitarian aid, international legitimacy and military support must all be part of the equation to maintain unity of effort. Influence and leverage should be based on an understanding of the resistance force desire for legitimate political power in the reconstruction process. This influence will be addressed in terms of interagency support, funding and leader interaction.

Humanitarian aid provides legitimacy with the civilian populace by meeting their basic needs. Food, shelter and security are the foundation and minimum requirement that any resistance movement must provide to their following. This legitimacy is a summation of not just moral, but also political and legal principles that envelops not just the irregular forces but also the interagency and international organizations providing the support. For example, USAID provided $43 million of aid (1/4 of its budget) in 1992 to support the Kurdish resistance.[101] Special Forces familiarity with interagency organizations, as demonstrated by the Provide Comfort case study, facilitates the non-military aid provided to the resistance movement.

Funding and equipment remains the primary instrument to maintain leverage on resistance forces. While money is the easiest method to influence resistance movements, money also has a short duration. The desire to increasingly link the resistance movement to US support must be matched by the financial reserves to sustain this arrangement. In the case of the Pesh

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[100] Terry J Pudas.*," Preparing Future Coalition Commanders," pg 55. Pudas is the DD of the DOD Force Transformation office.

Merga's, the CIA is estimated to have spent over 100 million on their anti Sadaam efforts.[102] Military equipment becomes a requirement to the resistance force both to maintain their relative standing in the post-conflict reconstruction and to sustain the interim security mission they are asked to conduct.

Leader training begins with the rapport established by the Special Forces team with the resistance leadership. This rapport and education is reinforced by slowly focusing the resistance leadership on their eventual responsibilities in the post-conflict environment. While the screening criteria outlined in chapter three assists in identification of future leaders, the education of these leaders must be subtle and constant. T.E. Lawrence described this indirect approach by stating" Keep a tight grip on his ideas and push them forward secretly so no one but him knows your role".[103] The critical glue that can hold the relationship together is the personal bond developed by the military and resistance leadership. Shared bonds of respect and cooperation are forged in combat and this personal relationship can prove critical as indigenous military leaders try their hands at security, reconstruction and government formation. The Army reinforces this concept by The Army after Next Board statement, "… establishing trusting relationships are the glue that holds a coalition together".[104]

US forces can maintain leverage by flexibility employing the elements of aid, funding and military equipment. These specific tools must be utilized within the larger context of maintaining bonds with the resistance leadership and supporting their desire for legitimacy and political influence. Now that we have identified how and when to transition resistance forces,

[101] Chris Hedges, *"Blockaded Iraq Kurds face fearsome winter", New York Times*, 27 November 1992.

[102] Peter Lambert, *The US and the Kurds, Case Studies in US Engagement*, pg 98.

[103] T.E. Lawrence, *The 27 articles of T.E. Lawrence from the Arab Bulletin, 20 August 1917*, Brigham Young University, created 18 July 1996.

[104] United States Department of the Army, *Report of the 'Army after Next' Board to the CSA,* Washington DC. 1997, pg 14.

*when* to implement this change and mechanism to maintain influence, we must complete the bridge to stabilizing operations by discussing how Special Forces conducts this paradigm shift to stability operations.   This will be accomplished by asking, "Can Unconventional Warfare Forces successfully transition "in stride" to stabilizing operations"?

Special Forces support to Unconventional Warfare and Foreign Internal Defense superimpose to a large degree based on both the commonality of tasks and the ethnic, cultural, and language capabilities Special Forces soldiers maintain. There have been efforts in the past to link indigenous focused activities. In 1994 COL(R) Boyatte, recommended changing Unconventional Warfare to Unconventional Operations "encompassing all activities associated with indigenous forces".[105]  This concept embraces both the duality of combat and stability missions for indigenous forces and the common training requirement for Special Forces supporting these operations.  Often the primary obstacle to interim security is former regime members and dissatisfied resistance groups.  Who is better to lead this counter insurgency fight than former resistance forces well versed in the methodology of destabilizing Unconventional Warfare operations?  These security operations can then meet criteria three, reform of local security institutions, by starting the reform process.

This duality of Unconventional Warfare and Foreign Internal Defense operations is also addressed by Gen Schoomaker; "Unconventional Warfare has several subsets; Guerilla Warfare, Subversion, Sabotage, Intel, E&R, and COIN that allows it to prosecute the continuum of conflict from peace to MTW ".[106]  This statement also reflects the flexibility required to interact with

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[105] Mark D. Boyatte, "Unconventional Operations Forces of Special Operations„" *Special Warfare*, October 1995.  COL Boyatte was the DCO of the Special Warfare Center and identified the commonality of skill sets working with indigenous forces across the spectrum of war and the need for overarching doctrine to support this.  See also Peter Marks article "Training and Advising Foreign Forces", *Small wars and Insurgencies,*  Spring 2001.
[106] United States Army Special Operations Command, *AFSOF Vision 2020 Statement*, Fort Bragg, NC, October 1997.

indigenous forces.  Unconventional Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense, Coalition Support Team, Humanitarian Assistance, and Theater engagement all demonstrate the various methods used to meet and interact with indigenous forces.  This flexible engagement was documented during Operation Provide Comfort where the collateral activity of Humanitarian assistance was used to facilitate interaction.  The common thread throughout these activates is the flexible interaction, rapport and advisor role established with indigenous forces.  Whether viewed through the lens of an overarching Unconventional Operations concept or by transposing a coalition support team (CST) model where Special Forces advises and supports indigenous forces through the entire spectrum of combat, Special Forces train and maintain the skill sets necessary to quickly transition from combat operations to stability operations.

The transition to stability operations also provides an exit strategy for Special Forces. Establishment of a stable and secure environment and reform of security organization meets all three criteria.  Special Forces can transition their responsibilities of other forces to include Civil Affairs, MPs, international organizations and civilian contractors.  As stability takes hold, the skill sets of these forces are better suited to lead the reconstruction process.[107]

This chapter answered the secondary question "How should Unconventional Warfare doctrine incorporate the resistance forces' transition to stability operations?" by describing the how and when this transition is conducted.  Embedded within this question is maintaining synchronization with the conventional force and maintaining leverage over the resistance force during the turbulent transition toward post-conflict reconstruction.  The duality of destabilizing Unconventional Warfare and stabilizing Foreign Internal Defense create a common set of tasks that allow Special Forces to lead resistance forces in both missions.  Special Forces cultural, and regional sensitivity combined with an indigenous language capability facilitates this transition.

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[107] Alex Walczak, *US conflict termination; Transition from warrior to constable- a primer, p*g 15.

Finally, the transition to stability operations, with the resultant increase in security, provides an exit strategy for Special Forces.

Viewing this paradigm shift within the monograph criteria, integrating resistance forces toward stability missions while conventional forces are conducting decisive combat meets criteria one, protection of populace and criteria two, protection of key institutions and individuals. Criteria 3, reform of local security organizations is an ongoing process that begins with screening resistance movements and then integrating new leaders inoculated in democratic principle and the rule of law. Answering the how and when of resistance force transition to stability operations completes the equation that provides both a process and justification for resistance force integration into post-conflict transition and recommends this integration be incorporated into future Unconventional Warfare doctrine.

The overall result of completing the bridge transporting irregular forces from destabilizing combat operations to stabilizing security operations answers the Primary research question " Should Unconventional Warfare doctrine develop resistance forces for combat and in post combat operations?" by specifically identifying the why, who, when and most importantly how to accomplish this doctrinal shift. Summarizing the cumulative results distills the following points. First is to start incorporate irregular forces into the campaign plan and plan for resistance force security operations. Second is to apply the screening criteria early to identify suitable resistance forces. Third is to implement training to prepare resistance forces for stability operations and inoculate leadership in an appreciation of military cooperation, legitimacy and international recognition. Then conduct the transition during the decisive combat phase. Resistance forces then can act as "first responders" to provide interim security immediately after decisive combat into post-conflict reconstruction.

While answering the primary research question supports the enlargement of Unconventional Warfare doctrine to transition resistance forces into post-conflict operations, this

study also raised several questions, ideas and identified areas of future study.  The final chapter

will address these questions and explore related topics suitable for additional analysis.

# CHAPTER FIVE: Conclusions

This monograph conducted an analysis of Unconventional Warfare doctrine in relation to the Contemporary Operating Environment and US military operations by asking "Should Unconventional Warfare doctrine develop resistance forces for combat and stability operations"? The analysis suggested an increased requirement for indigenous forces in the transition phase from destabilizing combat to stabilizing post-conflict operations.

This realization and the change requirement implicit in it were analyzed within the secondary research question, "Does Unconventional Warfare doctrine match the Contemporary Operating Environment?" Answering why change is needed led to a case study to highlight the who and what of this change requirement. Special Forces interaction with Kurdish Pesh Merga resistance forces was examined to identify if resistance force can support this requirement for stability operations by asking "Can Special Forces shape resistance force activities toward a common end state?" The conclusions demonstrate both the unique abilities resistance forces bring to stability operations and resistance force's dual requirement for both a combat and stability capability. During Operation Provide Comfort, US forces forged lasting relationships by empowering Kurdish leaders. These relationships facilitated military interaction during Operations Iraqi Freedom. The three Kurdish resistance forces were then examined to distill screening criteria that could predict suitability for post-conflict security operations.

After delineating the who and what in Chapter three, the paper transitioned to identifying the when and how of post-conflict transition by asking, "How should Unconventional Warfare doctrine transition resistance forces to stability operations?" Critical for a successful transition include integrating resistance forces into the overall campaign plan and methodology to maintain leverage on the resistance force. The study verified that Special Forces possess the skill sets to coordinate the transition from destabilizing Unconventional Warfare to stabilizing Foreign

Internal Defense.  The transition to stability operations also provided an exit strategy for Special Forces to transfer their responsibility to other organizations.

The three secondary questions presented both reinforce each other and cumulatively answer the primary research question" Should Unconventional Warfare doctrine develop resistance forces for both combat and stability operations?"

Summarizing, Unconventional Warfare doctrine should train and transition suitable resistance forces into an interim security force.  Resistance forces possess unique capabilities in stability operations and can be integrated into the campaign plan.  Special Forces possess the skill sets to coordinate the resistance force transition to stability operations and the optimal transition time is early in the decisive combat phase.  In this current era of US military supremacy, Post conflict reconstruction has becomes the "decisive phase" of a campaign.  Unable to openly oppose US National Power, asymmetric opponents tend to focus on post-conflict activities to defeat US goals.  Special Forces coordinated irregular forces improve security and decrease the turbulent transition period of post-conflict reconstruction.

The situational awareness of irregular forces (cultural, geographic, social) allow them to focus US national power against the key nodes and decisive points of a complex and foreign social, political and military system. Recognizing and incorporating the contributions of irregular forces to post conflict can be achieved by integrating their capabilities in US military doctrine. Answering the research question generated specific recommendations to improve Unconventional Warfare doctrine and areas of further study.  The suggested changes to Unconventional Warfare doctrine will be addressed first.

### Unconventional Warfare Doctrine

Unconventional Warfare doctrine should rename phase seven from Demobilization to Post conflict to recognize and acknowledge the role irregular forces play in bridging the gap from combat to stability operations.  As stated by Alec Campbell in *Irregular Forces in State*

*Formation*: "Demobilized soldiers are a potentially decisive political force. They must be integrated into the reconstruction plan."[108] While demobilization will be required for irregular forces not meeting the screening requirement in Chapter three, other more suitable irregular forces can be a positive influence in post-conflict.

Current Unconventional Warfare doctrine also remains overly focused on guerilla warfare against a peer competitor. Future conflict will require a wider, more flexible vision of irregular force interaction with US military operations. Special Forces economy of force operations need to include the overlooked but critical Intelligence collection capabilities irregular forces provide the conventional commander.[109] Key to the utility of Unconventional Warfare doctrine will be its flexible ability to integrate effects within all aspects of national power.

Proper integration of national power is incumbent on creating overarching joint doctrine. Synchronizing concepts, terminology and methodology relating to training and advising indigenous forces will facilitate integration with joint force strategic and operational capabilities. Joint doctrine needs to link or build a bridge between the various phases of a campaign, more than the specific details within each discrete phase. Loss of momentum, cohesion and synchronization often occurs during these turbulent transition periods, while current doctrine focuses on the methodology within each discrete phase.

While leveraging joint capability increases the resistance force's combat power, military planners must not lose sight of the fact that post-conflict remains a ground centric environment. The enormous strides achieved in synchronizing ground, sea and air power during destabilizing combat operations does not directly translate to stability and support operations. While RDO integrates synergistic effects to quickly overwhelm enemy units with minimal ground forces, it

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[108] Diane Davis and Anthony Pereira, Eds, *Irregular Armed Forces and their role in Politics and State Formation*, pg 336.

does not reduce the heavy dependence on ground forces in post-conflict operations. Using resistance forces in stability operations, especially during the initial transition period after decisive combat, can reduce the requirement for large additional numbers of ground forces in post-conflict. Troops on the ground, not F16s in the air, or carriers afloat determine success in the post-conflict environment.

### Unconventional Operations

Unconventional Warfare doctrine could improve both its integration with Foreign Internal Defense and synchronization with conventional forces by developing a coordinating framework (Unconventional Operations) as discussed in Chapter four. Indigenous focused activities tied together as an integrated system and synchronized with conventional military operations become more than just a Flexible Deterrent Option (FDO) or engagement strategy, but a key ingredient to ensure success.[110] Unconventional Operations focused on training, advising and leading indigenous forces have the potential to create larger effects across the spectrum of conflict than Direct Action or Special Reconnaissance forces. Unconventional Operations can be the most potent (and only unique) combat multiplier Special Forces brings to the modern battlefield.

While stability operations remain a more complex, ambiguous, long-term mission, the military professional cannot deny their increasing importance in the Contemporary Operating Environment. Concurrent with honing their unilateral combat skills, Special Forces must continue to improve their capabilities in the linked skill sets of destabilizing Unconventional Warfare and stabilizing Foreign Internal Defense. Lessons learned in Turkey, Haiti, Bosnia and

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[109] Robert L. Kelly, *US Army Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Doctrine: Engine of Change or relic of the Past?* pg 32.

Afghanistan reinforce the unique cross-cultural capabilities Special Forces brings to this critical mission.

     Military stability operations working with indigenous, international and civilian partners are a roadmap for the future.  Working within the framework of Unconventional Warfare doctrine, Special Forces coordinated resistance forces can bridge the gap from combat to security operations thus reducing this turbulent transition period.

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[110] Indigenous focused activities include Unconventional Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense, Information Operations, Civil Affairs operations and the collateral activities of Coalition support, Personnel Recovery, Humanitarian Actions and  Intelligence activities.

# APPENDIX A

## Operational Definitions

As in any specialized field, Unconventional Warfare maintains and works within it own unique definitions and vernacular. A broad understanding of the key terms, missions and activities associated with irregular forces will clarify and support future discussion. An understanding of the basic terms will also facilitate analysis of their impact on military operations and political-military interaction.

**Unconventional Warfare** — A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. Also called **Unconventional Warfare.** (JP 3-05.5)

**Foreign Internal Defense** — Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called **Foreign Internal Defense**. (JP1-02)

**Civil Affairs** — Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. Also called **CA.** (JP 3-57)

**Psychological Operations** — Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The

purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called **PSYOP.** (JP1-02)

These are the missions that are normally associated with both stabilizing and destabilizing military support to foreign forces. Related activities can include Humanitarian Assistance, Coalition Support Teams, Intelligence Activities and Combat Search and Rescue.

Unconventional Warfare is often conducted in a different environment than conventional military operations and again uses a unique vernacular. Three main types of operations are identified.

**Overt operation** — An operation conducted openly, without concealment. (JP 3-05.3)

**Covert operation** — An operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. A covert operation differs from a clandestine operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of identity of sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation. (JP 3-05.3)

**Clandestine operation** — An operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. A clandestine operation differs from a covert operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the operation rather than on concealment of the identity of the sponsor. In special operations, an activity may be both covert and clandestine and may focus equally on operational considerations and intelligence-related activities. (JP 3-05.3)

Irregular forces range within these three operational environments.

A resistance movement is an organized effort by portion of the civil population of a country to resist the government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability. When the members of a resistance turn to violence they are often described as either insurgents or partisans.

**Insurgent**:  dedicated solely against constituted government (FM3-05.201)

**Partisan**:  dedicated solely against occupying power. (FM3-05.201)

Insurgent and partisan identifies whether the resistance member is fighting against a government or occupying power.  Where the term insurgent is often associated with terrorist, partisan can be compared to freedom fighter.


The following three terms identify the types of forces the US military will interact with in Unconventional Warfare.

**Irregular forces** — Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces. (JP 1-02)

**Guerrilla forces** — A group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory. (JP 3-05)

**Paramilitary forces** — Forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission. (JP1-02)

The above definitions were added to create a foundation and facilitate further development of monograph topics.  While not inclusive, the above list clarifies some common terminology used in the discussion of Unconventional Warfare.

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