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**About the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned:** The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) is part of the Training and Education Command (TECOM) of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), located at MCB Quantico, VA. The MCCLL mission is to collect, analyze, manage, and disseminate knowledge gained through operational experiences, exercises, and supporting activities in order to enable Marines to achieve higher levels of performance and to provide information and analysis on emerging issues and trends in support of operational commanders and the Commandant of the Marine Corps Title 10 responsibilities.

Visit the MCCLL Website at: [www.mccll.usmc.mil](http://www.mccll.usmc.mil)

Customer relations management support for the MCCLL Website and questions about the newsletter should be directed to: [harry.t.johnson@usmc.mil](mailto:harry.t.johnson@usmc.mil) or [michael.jones@usmc.mil](mailto:michael.jones@usmc.mil) Telephone: 703.432.1279 DSN: 378.1279

**From the Director: Accessing MCCLL Documents:** During the past two months, many newsletter readers have been confused by the requirement for a "second login" in order to access documents contained in our repositories. This feature was added to the MCCLL website in January 2006 in order to provide greater document security. For this reason, even though you have already logged on to our website, the following login screen is displayed the first time that you attempt to access a document:

You are then required to log in again with the same user ID (complete email address) and password. We recognize that this is inconvenient, but this feature is necessary to ensure that unauthorized users are not able to access documents that (although unclassified) are not for public dissemination.

We would also like to express our appreciation to users for their patience as we "fine tune" our website and add new features and additional content. Virtually every lesson in our system has been provided by Marines based on their operational combat experiences. All Marine units are encouraged to submit their after action reports and related documents to ensure that their "good ideas" reach decision makers and influence program decisions.

You are welcome to contact the Director with your comments: Col Monte E. Dunard, USMCR, Director MCCLL [monte.dunard@usmc.mil](mailto:monte.dunard@usmc.mil) Telephone: 703.432.1286 DSN: 378-1286

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**About the Daily Digest:** Many users of the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) website are unfamiliar with one of its most powerful features, the **Daily Digest**. This feature allows MCCLL authorized users to inform us about their areas of interest and then receive automatic notification when information addressing any of these topics is added to one of our repositories. In order to make use of this feature, all a user has to do is click on "**MYPROFILE**" at the top left of the home page, scroll down to "Your Daily Digest Search Terms", enter up to ten key words, and then save the information. An example is shown here:

YOUR DAILY DIGEST SEARCH TERMS	
1	communications
2	SATCOM
3	HF
4	VHF
5	network management
6	frequency management
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8	EPLRS
9	Blue Force Tracker
10	Iridium

Once the Daily Digest information has been entered, the MCCLL system will automatically notify users when information has been entered into the system that addresses one of their topics of interest.

We encourage all authorized users to sign up for the Daily Digest in order to make full use of one of our most popular offerings.

**Upcoming Products & Events:** A number of MCCLL products and events are planned for the next few months that may be of interest to readers:

- **User Survey.** In a forthcoming newsletter, MCCLL will announce a survey to obtain feedback from readers of our newsletter and users of our website. Our objective will be to identify user likes and dislikes and to obtain suggestions on ways in which we can improve our products.
- **Family Readiness.** A MCCLL topical paper addressing family readiness issues, as a key factor in overall unit readiness, will be available soon.
- **ACE Commanders Conference Lessons Learned.** A topical paper summarizing the observations and lessons that were identified during the MCCLL-sponsored ACE Commanders conference in December 2005 will be published shortly.
- **Marine Advisor Collection Effort.** A MCCLL team recently completed interviewing Marine advisors in Afghanistan and returning Iraqi Security Force (ISF) advisors transiting through Kuwait. The results of these collection efforts will be available soon.
- **Staff Judge Advocate Collection Effort.** An effort is ongoing to collect observations and lessons concerning staff judge advocate issues. This effort involves not only interviewing and surveying military lawyers, but also surveying commanders to identify their perspectives on legal issues.
- **Small Craft Company Lessons Learned.** A MCCLL staff member recently interviewed members of the Marine Corps Small Craft Company to solicit their observations, lessons and experiences in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The resulting topical paper is intended to provide the Navy with valuable information as it assumes responsibility for the riverine "brown water" mission.
- **Humanitarian Assistance (HA)/Disaster Relief (DR) Lessons Learned.** Based on the extensive documentation that MCCLL has accumulated on recent HA/DR operations such as the tsunami relief effort during Operation Unified Assistance (OUA) and the humanitarian assistance provided in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, we are preparing a topical paper summarizing the many Marine Corps lessons learned from these operations.

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**Lessons for Leaders:** In the past few months, the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) has produced a number of topical papers that address issues of relevance to new leaders (as well as more experienced leaders). Five of these papers have now been compiled into a consolidated report that is offered as a resource for commanders at all levels, as well as other interested Marines. This report is scheduled to be provided to attendees at the March 2006 CMC Commanders Course.

The first three reports included in this document summarize the results of a series of MCCLL-hosted conferences conducted from late May to August 2005: the GCE Commanders Lessons Learned Conference, the Non-Commissioned Officers Lessons Learned Conference, and the CSSE Commanders Lessons Learned Conference. (Note that a report documenting the fourth conference (with ACE commanders) will be published at a later date.) The fact that the first three conference reports have been so well received by the participants was a deciding factor in their selection as the foundation for the consolidated paper.

These conference reports have been combined with two other topical papers: a report documenting the lessons provided to MCCLL by the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines and a report summarizing the MCCLL-sponsored focused collection effort with the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines. The resulting report, "[Lessons for Leaders](#)", a [Compilation of Reports for New Commanders](#), is now available on our website for review and downloading.



LtCol Conlin, Commander of the 1st Bn, 7th Marines, talks to his Marines in An Najaf.

### Selected observations from "Lessons for Leaders":

The "Lessons for Leaders" report includes an executive summary that provides an overview of common observations that have been noted in lessons and observations from many sources by Marines who participated in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Some of the observations from the summary are:

- **Organization**
  - USMC lacks an adequate force structure to perform some missions, such as EOD, MPs, CA, and PSYOPS. Marine forces should prepare for some non-traditional missions.
  - There are insufficient FACs/JTACs or Air Officers for fighting in urban operations.
- **Manning**
  - Fleet Assistance Program (FAP) requirements during pre-deployment training impede combat preparations.
  - Units frequently do not get manned to near T/O strength until just prior to deployment.
  - Orders to school and normal billet rotation patterns prevent stabilized unit leadership.
- **Training**
  - Every Marine needs to train for combat marksmanship and weapons handling.
  - Small unit leaders may require refresher training to regain MOS technical and tactical proficiency.
  - The Marine Corps lacks sufficient quantity and quality of urban training ranges for MOUT (Note that this deficiency is currently being remedied).
  - Reserve units should be engaged early for pre-deployment planning and training.
- **Equipping**
  - Individual Marine equipment needs to be "better, lighter".
  - Marines lack communications assets for on-the-move, over-the-horizon communications.

These and other observations are highlighted in the report, along with certain themes that are often the sources of tension between the needs of the combat forces and the Marine Corps' ability to satisfy these needs. These themes include: unit manning policies, the fielding of new technology, and the equipping of individual Marines (particularly infantry Marines). For a complete discussion of these issues, please see the complete report at: "[Lessons for Leaders](#)".

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**Ground Mishaps in Operation Iraqi Freedom:** Safety continues to be a critical area of concern to the Marine Corps, as it is to the other Services. The identification of common causes for mishaps is considered to be essential to the identification of additional measures for prevention and mediation.

The new Secretary of the Navy, Don Winter, emphasized this in his recent [department objectives for 2006](#) by including safety as the fourth objective:

*"Emphasize Safety: Manage risk to improve mission effectiveness and to safeguard the people and resources of the Navy-Marine Corps Team."*

In recognition of this objective, the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) has published a topical paper on the issue of "ground mishaps", highlighting incidents (other than aviation-related mishaps) that have occurred in OIF. As of the date of publication of this paper, sixty-nine Operational Ground Class A or B mishaps in OIF have resulted in fatalities. Of these, 62% have involved vehicle incidents. Other ground mishaps have included negligent discharge of weapons and ordnance handling. In response to this situation, deployed Marines have submitted many observations and lessons on these topics. These have been carefully reviewed by MCCLL and addressed in a new topical paper that can be viewed at: [Ground Mishaps in Operation Iraqi Freedom](#).



Corpsmen from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 161 rush through a sand storm to aid wounded Army soldiers involved in a HMMWV rollover incident. The "Greyhawks" then evacuated the soldiers to a nearby hospital.

### Selected information from the MCCLL topical paper:

#### Vehicle Mishap Statistics

- Vehicle mishaps have accounted for 54% of all Class A and B mishaps in OIF and 62% of all Marine fatalities from these categories of mishaps.
- All but one of these mishaps involved tactical vehicles
- 17 of these mishaps involved rollovers, 9 were vehicle collisions, 5 involved vehicle-related drownings, and 6 were Marines struck by vehicles while on-foot:
- **Vehicle rollovers**
  - Resulted in 15 fatalities and 11 injuries
  - Contributing causes were: top heavy armored vehicles, poor road conditions, inexperienced drivers, high speed, poor visibility, chaotic civilian drivers, and the high threat environment.
- **Vehicle collisions**
  - Resulted in 9 Marine fatalities and 4 injuries.
  - Most occurred either during convoys when a following vehicle struck the vehicle in front, a vehicle hit a parked/abandoned vehicle during low visibility conditions, or a collision occurred at an intersection
- **Vehicle-related drownings**
  - Resulted in 12 Marine fatalities.
  - Occurred when Marine vehicles slid into canals or rivers.
- **"Pedestrian" Marines**
  - Six Marines were killed when struck by a tactical vehicle while engaged in various activities

Please refer to the MCCLL report for a discussion of prevention and mitigation measures, such as improved training, and an overview of other safety-related issues: [Ground Mishaps in Operation Iraqi Freedom](#).

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**1st Battalion, 5th Marines Focused Collection Effort:** A Training and Education Command (TECOM) sponsored lessons learned collection effort with the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, upon its return to Camp Pendleton in December 2005, was the third in a series of focused collection activities targeting returning Marine Corps infantry battalions. The MCCLL collection team was an experienced group of military and civilian professionals who brought a wide range of interests and expertise to the collection effort. They interviewed over 50 returning officers and NCOs to obtain observations and recommendations resulting from their six-month combat tour in Ar Ramadi. Based upon these 1/5 interviews and the previous focused collection efforts (as well as the Ground Combat Element (GCE) and Combat Service Support Element (CSSE) Commander's Conferences and the NCO Conference), it is clear that operating forces see a strong and direct link between the effectiveness of pre-deployment training and their readiness and ability to conduct effective operations in theater. The observations and lessons of 1/5 have been vetted and documented in the MCCLL report: [Pre-deployment Training lessons and Observations from 1st Battalion, 5th Marines](#).



A machine gunner with Company C, 1st Bn, 5th Marines, relieves a member of the Iraqi Intervention Forces (IIF) from his security post on an Ar Ramadi street corner. Marines from 1/5 provided a training program in patrolling fundamentals for their IIF counterparts.

### Selected observations and lessons on pre-deployment training:

Although there was a consensus that the 1/5 deployment was a success, the battalion would have benefited from additional pre-deployment training in the following areas:

#### Vehicle Training

- More realistic HMMWV and MTRV training would have been beneficial, particularly with the up-armored HMMWV (UAH). The handling characteristics of the UAH are significantly different from those of the unarmored hardback HMMWV; a considerable learning curve is required for Marines unfamiliar with the UAH characteristics.
- All Marines require more practical application in preventive maintenance, operating procedures, and driving skills on the HMMWV and MTRV.

#### Infrared Target Pointer and M203 Day/Night Sight

- These assets were generally not available for pre-deployment training. Since the Marines were unfamiliar with the items, they initially hesitated to use them in theater

#### ACOG

- Insufficient ACOGs were available during pre-deployment training. Marines were required to repeat the battle sight zero process in theater after receiving their ACOGs.

#### MOUT

- Although MOUT training at Camp Pendleton was adequate, it is perceived as not realistic enough. The emphasis should be placed on rules of engagement and communications skills.

#### SASO

- SASO training could also be improved by adding a more realistic setting, i.e., more closely approximating the environment of Al Anbar Province.

#### Medium and Heavy Machine Guns

- Every GCE Marine should be trained on the M249, M240G, MK19, and M2, as well as the M203 and M79 grenade launchers.

#### Mounted & Dismounted Patrols

- Land navigation training should be improved to emphasize mounted and dismounted urban land navigation.

Please refer to the MCCLL report for a complete discussion of these training issues, as well as other observations in the areas of intelligence, C2, communications, counter-IED, logistics, medical and other topics: [1/5 Pre-deployment Training Lessons and Observations](#).

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**MCCLL Data Managers:** On the front lines of customer relations management for the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) are the data managers. When users of the Lessons Management System (LMS) have a question concerning the technical details of the MCCLL website or require assistance with their user accounts, their queries are routed initially to one of the data managers. These MCCLL staff members are responsible for providing a first response to queries and requests for assistance. If a question is outside of their area of expertise, they are responsible for identifying the individual(s) within the Center who can provide the required degree of support. The data managers, for the most part, have extensive Marine Corps experience, so they not only know the details of the MCCLL Lessons Management System (LMS), but also have a good understanding of the Marine Corps environment and ongoing combat operations. They strive to ensure that their responses are not only technically accurate, but also consider the operational requirements of the Marines who are requesting assistance. Some of the specific responsibilities of the data managers are:

- **Manage user accounts and provide customer support.** The data managers ensure that users are provided with the appropriate level of access to the LMS and receive timely responses to requests for assistance.
- **Support requests for information (RFI).** Generally, RFIs are routed initially to the data managers who query the system to obtain all available information on a particular topic. Although authorized users of the LMS can perform "google-type" queries on their own, the data managers may have additional background information on the topic or are aware of previous query results.
- **Provide LMS training.** The Data Managers provide LMS training to many individuals and organizations, either at our facility in Quantico, VA, or telephonically.
- **Manage the data in the MCCLL repositories and populate the LMS with current operational information.** The data managers also perform daily downloads of current operational data from the theaters, search for new AARs, SOPs, and other documents that should be added to the MCCLL repositories, and add lessons to the system from unit AARs and other sources.



The MCCLL Data Managers (William Richardson, Mike Jones, Kevin Pulliam, Cecilia Montoya-Gilbert, and Harry Johnson), all with military backgrounds, provide customer support, manage the data in the MCCLL repositories, and respond to RFIs.

Note that the Data Managers are also responsible for development and production of the MCCLL monthly newsletter.

### More About the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned:

(Extract from an article scheduled for publication in an upcoming issue of the Marine Corps Gazette)

The mission of the MCCLL is to collect, analyze, manage and disseminate knowledge gained through operational experiences, exercises, and supporting activities in order to enable Marines to achieve higher levels of performance and to provide analysis, information, and recommendations on emerging issues and trends in support of Marine operating forces and the Commandant in executing his Title 10 responsibilities. These lessons form the institutional memory resulting from the experiences of Marines during operations, exercises, and the day-to-day business of organizing, training, equipping and providing Marines.



see [more of the article](#)

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### Extract from An Upcoming Marine Corps Gazette Article (continued):

The MCCLL provides a robust garrison and deployed collection capability while offering a significant resource for archived data, retrieval systems, and RFI support. The center preserves letters of instruction (LOIs), standard operating procedures (SOPs), training programs, and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) while providing interfaces with operational, analytical, and historical institutional memory. At the same time, the center maintains the web-based, user-friendly lessons management system (LMS) to capture and utilize lessons learned. All this should reduce the collection requirements burden on our operating forces and support organizations by reducing or eliminating repetitive, stovepiped collection.

One of the primary goals of the MCCLL is to shorten the time from operational observation to institutional action. This is accomplished in several ways, to include passive collection through the Marine Corps Lessons Management System (LMS) and active collection in support of contingency operations. The result will be the preservation of the Marine Corps' substantial investment in equipment, facilities, infrastructure, software, and assessment tools while avoiding the waste and inefficiency inherent in repeated startups. Dissemination of lessons learned in support of the operating forces is provided via the knowledge databases maintained by the MCCLL.

Marines are formed into collection teams in order to accomplish active data collection during operations or exercises. The teams are made up of Marines provided by proponents and advocates, other organizations with a vested interest in lessons learned, and other functional organizations with an interest in learning from current operational planning and execution. For real-world contingencies, Marines assigned to these teams receive in-depth, pre-deployment training. The MCCLL provides collection team members with a comprehensive equipment issue to facilitate collection activities. MCCLL team members support their host organization's priorities and equities and, when appropriate, contribute information, data and lessons germane to improving their warfighting capabilities. Commanders of participating organizations provide support as needed and ensure that MCCLL collection team members are provided access to staff members and subordinate units so that they are able to complete their assigned tasks. Other USMC organizations collecting lessons from an area of operations should coordinate and integrate their efforts with the MCCLL in order to avoid duplication of effort and to optimize information flow and accessibility. The MCCLL has established an information management system that fully manages the lesson collection, verification, and dissemination requirements of the Marine Corps. The MCCLL is designed to provide professional, trained observation teams in order to maximize the benefit of information gleaned from their observations while providing timely feedback to commanders, the Commandant and all elements of the MAGTF.

There are normally three circumstances that would prompt establishing active collection lessons learned activities within a command's AOR. The Commandant may direct an active collection lessons learned effort; a MEF Commander or major subordinate command commander may request active collection lessons learned support; or an advocate or proponent may request an active collection lessons learned effort.

It is vital that everyone recognize the importance of capturing lessons, observations, and emerging tactics, techniques and procedures in the Lessons Management System. This requires active participation by all commands at every level in the collection of data and information on our operational experiences and the resulting lessons. Just as importantly, we must ensure that we have active dissemination of these lessons so that our Marines will not have to relearn through their own experiences the lessons of the past and so be better prepared to win our nation's battles.

Presently, the MCCLL has produced topical papers on *Convoy Operations in SASO, House Takedown, Urban CAS, Cordon & Search, Rifleman's Suite, Command & Control and Hearing Protection, Report on GCE Commanders Lessons Learned Conference, Report on CSSE Commanders Lessons Learned Conference*, and *Report on Non-commissioned Officers Lessons Learned Conference*. The observations and lessons generated by the center have already resulted in changes to pre-deployment training and several formal programs of instruction. The MCCLL web site ([www.mccll.usmc.mil](http://www.mccll.usmc.mil)) has recently begun topical forums to generate discussion on current issues of interest to Marines.

Our actions must provide and support a learning environment in which we recognize that MAGTFs will be successful, but will also discover shortfalls and workarounds. If we treat these shortfalls and workarounds as learning opportunities, the lessons will not be forgotten.

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#### [USMC Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning \(CAOCL\)](#)

As of January 2006, the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) is officially chartered as the Marine Corps' Culture and Operational Language Center of Excellence. The Center is responsible for ensuring that Marines are equipped with operationally relevant regional, culture, and language knowledge to allow them to plan and operate successfully in the joint and combined expeditionary environment.

Of particular interest to many Marines is the CAOCL online [Tactical Iraqi Arabic Resources](#). Marines can listen and study online with these tools and also order a 12-CD set with audio and text. The educational resources that are currently available or planned include:

- Tactical Iraqi Arabic
- Operational Culture Reading Program
- The Insurgency in Iraq: An Overview
- Negotiations and Bilateral Meetings
- Pre-deployment Self-paced Training (E1 -E5)
- Pre-deployment Self-paced Training (E6 - O2) (in production)
- Pre-deployment Self-paced Training (O3 and higher) (in production)
- Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) Advisors Self-paced Training
- The Culture of the ISF: Staff Culture, Organizational Culture (in production)
- Effective Information Operations: the Battalion Level (in production)
- Mapping the Human Terrain at the Battalion Level
- Third Country and Arab Journalist Operations (in production)
- Cultural Considerations in Convoy Operations (in production)
- Effective Use of a Translator in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), etc.

#### [Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned Reports](#)

The Federal, state, and local response to Hurricane Katrina continues to generate additional reports and studies with many lessons learned. As these reports become available, they are being added to the [MCCLL Forum on JTF/MARFOR Katrina](#). The latest reports are:

- [A Failure of Initiative, Main Report & Appendices](#): The final report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina
- [The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned](#), the White House Report
- [In the Wake of the Storm](#), the American Bar Association Responds to Hurricane Katrina
- [Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita](#), the GAO Report

#### [Additional Items of Protective, Safety, or Health Equipment Eligible for Reimbursement](#)

The Commandant of the Marine Corps announced in early February that additional equipment has been added to those items that are eligible for reimbursement as part of the prescribed protective, safety, or health equipment on the DoD Shortage List. This additional equipment includes:

- Gloves, summer weight,
- Knee pads,
- Elbow pads,
- Deltoid and axillary protectors, and
- Side plate body armor.

The specific items of equipment and points of contact for the submission of reimbursement claims can be obtained from [MARADMIN 057/06](#).

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**On the Ragged Edge: Standing Up the Iraqi Army**

By LtCol Curtis L. Williamson III, USMC

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The disbanding of the Iraqi army in spring 2003 will serve as fodder for historians, Beltway think-tanks, newspaper columnists, and pundits for at least as long as the United States maintains a presence in Iraq. But for those assigned to build a new army, literally from the ground up, little time or need remains to debate the soundness of that decision. This task was without precedent for even the most senior uniformed advisors. Second only to creating a pluralistic system of governance, no other single issue presents as great a challenge to the future of Iraq as creating capable security forces. To date, the Marine Corps has provided hundreds of advisors from the grade of sergeant through colonel toward this mission—a mission earning a now well-worn designation: exit strategy.

In early 2004, the stated mission of the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team was "to man, train, and equip nine infantry brigades with limited capability . . . to establish the foundation of the Iraqi Armed Forces run by Iraqis." The new army was initially assigned a defensive role, as coalition forces made the transition to security and stability operations at the conclusion of major combat operations. The planned force structure called for 27 battalions, organized into 9 brigades of 3 divisions. Added to this was a battalion of mechanized infantry. The initial mission-essential task list for the infantry battalions called for units to be prepared to conduct tactical road marches, cordons and searches in an urban area, attacks against a stationary force, movement to contact, and defense.



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### Book Review

***Militant Tricks: Battlefield Ruses of the Islamic Insurgent* by John Poole**

Reviewed by William S. Lind

WASHINGTON, Nov. 18 (UPI) -- "Militant Tricks: Battlefield Ruses of the Islamic Insurgent" is the title of John Poole's latest book. Poole, a former Marine NCO and officer, is America's best writer on small unit tactics and techniques. His first book, "The Last Hundred Yards," should be in every fire team, squad and platoon leader's pack. More recently, he has written a series of books that attempt to explain the Eastern, indirect way of war to Western audiences. "Militant Tricks" is the most recent work in that series.

This is really three books in one, and all of them are good. The first book is a detailed description of how our opponents in Iraq and Afghanistan fight. Here Poole's subtitle, "Battlefield Ruses of the Islamic Insurgent", sums up his offering. Unlike Western forces that seek a head-on clash, Eastern warfare relies on tricks. Nothing is what it seems to be, Poole writes.

The military heritage of Asia Minor is quite different from that of France, Britain, and America. In Asia Minor, loose encirclements and tiny probes are more common than mass assaults. There, one can often win by running away. . . . Like the Chinese, southwest Asian insurgents practice the "False Face and Art of Delay." First, they show the Westerner what they want him to see. Then, they wait for him to make the first, incorrect move. Finally, they secretly launch a maneuver that he would not choose under similar circumstances.

Poole lays this way of fighting out in detail in Part II of his book. Using the ancient Chinese book "36 Stratagems of Deception" as his framework (I do not share Poole's view that Chinese thought directly influenced our current opponents, but the framework is still useful), he provides exactly the sort of material our soldiers and Marines need in Iraq and Afghanistan if they are to understand their enemies.



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