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**Marine Corps Center for
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About the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned: The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) is part of the Training and Education Command (TECOM) of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), located at MCB Quantico, VA. The MCCLL mission is to collect, analyze, manage, and disseminate knowledge gained through operational experiences, exercises, and supporting activities in order to enable Marines to achieve higher levels of performance and to provide information and analysis on emerging issues and trends in support of operational commanders and the Commandant of the Marine Corps Title 10 responsibilities.

Visit the MCCLL Website at: www.mccll.usmc.mil

Customer service support for the MCCLL Website and questions about the newsletter should be directed to: harry.t.johnson@usmc.mil or michael.jones@usmc.mil Telephone: 703.432.1279 DSN: 378.1279

From the Director: Virtually every lesson in our system has been provided by Marines based on their operational combat experiences. All Marine units are encouraged to submit their after action reports and related documents to ensure that their "good ideas" reach decision makers and influence program decisions.

You are welcome to contact the Director with your comments: Col Monte E. Dunard, USMCR, Director MCCLL monte.dunard@usmc.mil Telephone: 703.432.1286 DSN: 378-1286

Life Cycle of a Collection Effort: Detention Operations

In our January 2006 newsletter, an article on "Getting Good Ideas to Decision Makers" discussed the participation by MCCLL in a number of recent programs to enhance training or make needed changes to force structure. An additional example, presented here, concerns recent changes that have been made in the training and equipping of Marines supporting enemy detention operations. (Note that this example also serves to highlight the life cycle development process employed in MCCLL data collection efforts.)

In April 2005, MCCLL assembled a team comprised of members from Headquarters, Marine Corps, and the Training and Education Command (TECOM) to employ the process shown [here](#) for the purpose of collecting lessons from OIF concerning detainee operations. During pre-deployment training at MCCLL, the team members developed a collection plan outlining the specific information to be acquired, including different classifications of detainees, the process for determining assigned classifications, and details of the treatment extended. The team deployed to Iraq in May 2005 and collected 38 observations and lessons. Subsequently, they developed an updated course on enemy detainee operations that included classes on: (1) supervision issues, (2) disciplinary procedures and (3) the Geneva Convention. A TECOM Mobile Training Team (MTT) then deployed beginning in July 2005 to teach the course to senior NCOs and officers at the school houses.

An ancillary benefit of the collection effort resulted from an observation by MCCLL analysts that biometric automated toolsets (BATs) were needed to support training requirements. MCCLL recommended that specific requirements for BAT in support of enemy detainee operations be identified, training shortfalls in the use of such toolsets be determined, and requirements for BAT training equipment in CONUS be established. Subsequently, on 26 June 2005 the Commanding General, II MEF, directed that the toolsets be acquired for training purposes.

Based on this collection effort, MCCLL also produced a topical paper on the use of biometric systems in theater that can be viewed here: [I MEF Employment of Biometric Systems in Iraq](#).

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MarineNet Pre-Deployment Training Offerings: The Marine Corps College of Continuing Education (CCE) is forming a partnership with the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) to provide a new Pre-Deployment Training Program (PTP) for unit leaders and other Marines scheduled for deployment.

The CCE Marine Learning Network (MarineNet) is the Marine Corps distributed Intranet that globally provides Marines and others with the ability to learn via the appropriate interactive media when and where learning is needed. By working closely with the Marine Corps Training and Education Command (TECOM) Centers of Excellence, the operational forces, and other Services, the CCE is able to provide a robust capability to furnish standardized training rapidly to Marines without regard to traditional boundaries. Custom training packages can be developed and hosted on MarineNet to support Marine Corps organizations. The target audience for most learning products offered on MarineNet are active and reserve Marines, however, all DEERS eligible active/ reserve/ retired military, government employees and family members are eligible to take a wide variety of e-courses, and all courses are offered free of charge.

The PTP site on the MarineNet, provides the MAGTF staff, small unit leaders, and individual Marines with resources to develop, plan, and execute pre-deployment training in accordance with Marine Corps doctrine and approved standards. The MCCLL staff is working closely with MarineNet on a capability to link current lessons resident on the MCCLL system with the online training programs. The objective is to work together so that the PTP becomes the "one-stop shop" for deploying units and Marines. The PTP provides:

- For unit leaders:
 - Lesson Plans
 - Training & Logistics Plans
 - Access to relevant lessons contained in the MCCLL Lessons Management System (LMS)
(**Note:** This capability is coming soon)
- For all Marines:
 - Access to MarineNet Courses
 - Publications and References
 - Useful Links

For access to the PTP, log on to [MarineNet](#) and select "Course Catalog" from the menu and click on "Pre-deployment Training Program (PTP)".



Making the Same Mistakes? In a recent publication from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Daniel H. French raises some interesting points about our military today making the same tactical mistakes in training as we have in the past. He asks, *"Are the officers we select for promotions and command stupid or do they simply lack tactical experience and a sense for warfighting? Are our staffs incompetent or just poorly trained? Surely, they all read the same magazines on their profession of arms, see what has to be fixed, and have the capability to put together a training plan focused on these 'needs improvement' trends. Do they not understand training, training management, and their warfighting capabilities? Are the combat training centers too difficult a problem for them to solve? Are they looking at the right things; identifying the right problems; and, more importantly, are they looking at how they might be able to fix the problems? Is doctrine too rigid, complicated, and lacking flexibility, or do they not understand doctrine? How can a (military) that is so great not fix simple things?"*

He discusses three areas that can solve many of these problems if commanders understand them. The first is to establish a training program. This requires commanders to determine what the training objectives are and have a clear vision of what must be accomplished during a training cycle. The foundation for good training rests with the commander's ability to identify the training objectives and understand what the unit must do to be successful in accomplishing the mission(s) they will be assigned. Training for warfighting and the myriad other missions with which our military may be tasked requires detailed preparation.



see [more of this article](#)

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Making the Same Mistakes? (continued) By focusing our small unit leaders first on the preparation for training and then on conduct of the training event, leaders help ensure successful execution. By putting a system in place and making better use of time, leaders can conduct meaningful training. Leaders need to make training as realistic as possible, focusing on battle training, not on teaching garrison classes. Marines and soldiers join the military in wanting a physical and mental challenge, not to be put to sleep with unimaginative, boring training. We need to create an environment that looks, feels, and smells like combat. Create the "fog and friction" of combat so our leaders become adaptive to every situation. Today's environment and threat certainly provide questions as to what future battlefields will look like, but one Ranger after Somalia probably had it about right when he said, *"I must train my soldiers to live-fire in situations that are confusing and turmoil surrounds them. If they perform well here, they will perform well in combat."* Sounds like a pretty good philosophy for creating a training program.

The second area Mr. French discusses is training execution. Training must be as close to the actual conditions the commander expects to encounter as possible. It must have all the sights, sounds, feel and smells, or we are wasting our time. He recommends the "crawl, walk, run" method for training. The "crawl" phase is very basic and lays the foundation for understanding and learning. As units move to the "run" phase, they should see complex live-fires, limited visibility, MOPP IV, and the "fog of war." At home station training, he recommends renewed emphasis on marksmanship training. It must be carried forward to combat marksmanship, where weapons are fired under combat-like conditions. During one live-fire convoy ambush training evolution, the participants jumped off the truck, assumed a good prone firing position, and let the rounds fly. Unfortunately, no targets fell. They had never been taught to move to a position from which they could see and engage their targets. They had also never fired from the kneeling unsupported or standing position. While this seems simple, unless people are trained and are confident in moving under fire with their weapons, they will not be combat marksmen. Everyone, whether combat arms, combat support or combat service support, must become proficient riflemen. The current conflict and those for the foreseeable future portend a battle that will surround us, and an enemy that will be everywhere. That means leaders must train convoy live-fires for support personnel and provide classes not only on military occupational specialty related subjects, but also on warfighting. These include tasks such as how to prepare range cards, prepare fighting positions, and emplace claymore mines, and the proper use of hand grenades. There will be much uncertainty on tomorrow's battlefield, and rear areas provide lucrative targets for the enemy. All Marines and soldiers must be trained and capable of protecting themselves and understanding what it takes to win.

Mr. French's third area of importance is decision making. He sees processes such as the military decision making process or the Marine Corps Planning Process as being well suited for organizing one's thoughts for warfighting, particularly at the higher echelons of command. They provide an excellent framework for teaching staff planning to subordinates and allowing them to see why the process is important and that creating a product is not the key. The process should provide an understanding of the enemy, the terrain, and the unit. But he also believes that such processes are too slow and cumbersome for the quick, agile, tactical planning that will be expected by commanders on the future battlefield. He believes that strict, blind adherence to the process tends to look at the fight in a linear fashion instead of orchestrating activities throughout the battlespace.

Mr. French provides an example of how he thinks it may work in the future. Once mission guidance is received from higher headquarters, the commander and S3 begin to develop a course of action. The commander takes time to visualize the fight, discuss options with the S3, and then writes the draft intent while the S3 works on an overlay. The fire support coordinator begins to look at essential fire support tasks and how he will support the scheme of maneuver, and the commander begins working his commander's critical information requirements. The executive officer or the battle captain should come forward and pick up the products and ensure having the same vision of the fight as the commander and return to the staff, which then evaluates available capabilities to meet the commander's requirements, providing estimates of supportability. The entire process should take no more than six hours at the regiment or battalion level from receipt of mission to issuing orders. In his wrap up, Mr. French reminds the reader to execute training as if preparing for war and establish clear standards for units and individuals on what is expected for success. To be successful, a unit must be proficient at squad and platoon training. Multi-echelon training is important, but leaders must place a clear focus on these basic elements if units are to succeed. Commanders must be held accountable. Staffs must maintain their proficiency during major training events. When a unit deploys, every operation and every day for the staff is a tactical planning exercise that must include daily jumping of the (combat) operations center. Look at execution and determine: What was the problem? or What was done right? Get observer/controllers to help determine the best way to fix something and clearly identify problems as either a training issue, a resource issue, or a competency issue of the commander and/or staff.

Military leaders must accept the challenge to fix what needs to be fixed in order to truly be the best military in the world.

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Hypothermia During Wounded Transport: Hypothermia, defined as a core body temperature of less than 95 degrees Fahrenheit (35 degrees Centigrade), is accelerated in a wounded patient by the body's own survival processes. When subjected to a trauma, the body constricts the flow of blood to the extremities and concentrates the blood in the torso and brain areas, making the wounded individual more susceptible to hypothermia. Data from one Level III Combat Support Hospital (CSH) in Iraq showed that approximately 9% of arriving patients exhibited some degree of hypothermia.

In a discussion with the MCCLL Operations Officer, the Chief Surgeon of a U.S. Army CSH requested that existing data be evaluated on the incidence of hypothermia in trauma patients treated and evacuated during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). This evaluation resulted in a MCCLL report designed to highlight the problem and to broaden awareness of hypothermia facts, particularly for those outside the medical community. The report also identified promising alternatives for preventing or mitigating future occurrences. It can be reviewed at : [Hypothermia Incidence in Trauma Patients and Prevention/Mitigation Measures](#)



A wounded Marine is carried onto a CH-46E of the Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 364.

HMM-364 was responsible for flying casualty evacuation missions in Al Anbar province, Iraq, in support of the II MEF (Forward) CASEVAC team.

Selected Recommendations and Observations from the Hypothermia Report:

- **Hypothermia Awareness**
 - Increase awareness of the serious problems caused by hypothermia at all levels of casualty care.
- **Reporting Requirements**
 - Joint Medical reporting requirements for key data elements should be standardized for all levels of medical facilities.
- **Hypothermia Prevention and Management Kit (HPMK)**
 - Navy medicine should consider testing and implementing either the the Hypothermia Prevention and Management Kit (HPMK), which has been recommended by the U.S. Army Institute of Surgical Research (USAISR), or a similar capability.
 - The contents of the HPMK include a heat reflective skull cap, self-heating shell liner and heat reflective shell.
- **Individual First Aid Kit**
 - A skull/shower cap made of "space blanket" or other thermal material should be considered for the Individual First Aid Kit
 - Training should emphasize that the cap be used immediately on trauma patients (wound permitting) regardless of the outside temperature.
- **Blood/Fluid Warming System**
 - Blood/fluid warming systems should be purchased and distributed to the lowest level of care possible.
- **Other Warming Means**
 - Use of the following warming capabilities should be considered for use as far forward in the theater as possible: blizzard rescue blanket, "ready-heat" blanket, and hypothermia prevention system cap. Alternatively, as a less desirable capability, a heavy duty space blanket covered by a wool green blanket should be used.
- **Body Temperature Monitoring**
 - Continuous body temperature monitoring devices should be available (particularly for Level III) with alarms when the core temperature is less than 37° C.

Please refer to the complete report at [Hypothermia Incidence in Trauma Patients and Prevention/Mitigation Measures](#) for additional issues, observations and recommendations.

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Seven Months in Ar Ramadi: The 2d Battalion, 4th Marines. In October 2003, the 2d Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment received notification of its inclusion on the force list of units being deployed with the First Marine Division (1st MARDIV) to Operation Iraqi Freedom II (OIF II). The battalion had been stationed in Okinawa during OIF I, so had watched on the sidelines while other battalions in 1st MARDIV fought their way to Baghdad. When the battalion was notified of its early February 2004 deployment, it stood at only sixty percent of its authorized manning strength, with only three months to prepare for deployment. During the next sixty days, the battalion nearly doubled in size, predominately through an infusion of privates fresh out of the schools of infantry. Senior NCOs were also late in arriving, creating many leadership problems; however, the battalion focused on the personnel at hand, with the sergeants and corporals honing their leadership and tactical skills in preparation for a decentralized fight. Even so, upon deployment, the average squad leader was only a 21-year old corporal.

In March 2004, 2/4 replaced a light infantry battalion of the Florida National Guard that had served for nearly a year in Ar Ramadi. Based on the 2/4 experiences during the next seven months, LtCol Paul J. Kennedy, Battalion Commander, submitted observations and lessons to MCCLL that provided a synopsis of activities the battalion experienced in its operations in an around Ramadi.

The MCCLL report on the lessons learned by 2/4 during its seven-month combat tour is based on these observations and lessons and the candid comments and reports of Marines involved in this operation. Leaders from the platoon through the battalion levels provided their observations, with MCCLL doing little to alter the intent or tone of their comments. The high level of professionalism and military aptitude demonstrated by the individual and unit performances is clear from the report and is testimony to the Marine Corps reputation for innovation and adaptation and the highest standards of excellence in the art of warfare.

The 2/4 report can be reviewed and downloaded at : [Seven Months in Ar Ramadi: Observations from 2d Battalion, 4th Marines](#)



Marines with 2d Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment lead anti-Iraqi fighters into a room for processing after a firefight in Ar Ramadi.

The 2/4 Battalion Commander has stated the following concerning the lessons documented in the report: "Most are items that we understood before deployment but they became acute issues in practice. Not all were successfully enforced 100% of the time, but they are all truisms. The unique conditions within Ar Ramadi required that 2/4 establish and maintain three (3) bases across the city, each with varying levels of adherence to these rules. The company commanders became very adept in running the respective bases but the learning curve was steep. Hopefully some of these bullets flatten the curve. The same held true for tactics. All four maneuver elements (Weapons Company was a five platoon mobile assault company) developed and evolved their methods of fighting to the point that if a threat manifested itself, the entire battalion could be in the fight within less than an hour, the lead company within minutes." The issues identified in the report should be reviewed in the context of this deployment and should provide a wealth of information to other infantry battalions on almost every aspect of OIF combat employment.

Among the anecdotes and lessons are many on topics such as: Training/Preparation, Weapons, Ammunition, Vehicles, Enemy Contact, Communications, Maintenance, Uniforms and Equipment, Casualty Tracking and Handling, Prisoners, Complacency, Hygiene, Internal Security, Entry Control Points, Administration, Media, and Corpsmen/Attachments.

The report is considered to be a valuable source on tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for all Marines serving in Iraq.

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Military Advisor Support Collection Efforts: As Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) moves into its next phase, the importance of the Marine Corps' role in providing military advisors to the Iraqi defense and police forces cannot be over emphasized. The success of achieving a stable Iraqi sovereignty is critically dependent on the efforts of the Marines serving as advisors to the various Iraqi security forces. Because of this, MCCLL has expended significant resources and effort supporting ongoing planning activities designed to ensure that Marine advisors are as capable as possible. The recent MCCLL efforts have involved four interrelated activities:

1. Posting a forum on the MCCLL website to solicit comments from Marines who have been trained at the SCETC course for military advisors. Over 100 comments have been received from current and former advisors. The forum is located [here](#).
2. Publishing a topical report that summarizes the comments posted to the forum. The topical report can be viewed at: [Summary of Forum Comments from Former and Current Marine Military Advisors](#).
3. Conducting a survey to solicit comments on the topical report from current and former advisors to determine whether there is general agreement with the observations and recommendations contained in the report. Almost [100 responses](#) have been received from Marine advisors. These comments showed broad consensus on the substance of the report and did not result in any changes to the report's observations or recommendations.
4. Sponsoring an ongoing data collection effort with Marine advisors who are completing their current tour in Iraq. Once this data collection effort is complete, the topical report may be revised (stay tuned).



A Marine from the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward) Military Transition Team (MiTT) instructs an Iraqi soldier in the defense of his position at the Hit Train Station in Iraq.

MCCLL Transcribed Interviews: The MCCLL-sponsored interviews with Marines that are providing military advisor support will become increasingly valuable as the military focus in Iraq transitions more and more toward ensuring that the Iraqi security forces are able to maintain order and stability without U.S. assistance. As mentioned in the January newsletter, these interviews are of greatest benefit when they have been transcribed, with links incorporated to key words and "needs" statements.

As an example, in early January, Col Ray Ruhlmann from the MCCLL staff conducted an interview with Col Joseph "Jody" Osterman, the current Senior Advisor to the 1st Iraqi Division. Col Osterman is responsible for 17 Military Transition Teams (MiTTs) that are providing training to the Iraqi division (and living and working with them). Of these 17 ten-man teams, eight are Marine Corps and nine are Army. They are deployed throughout the Iraqi division (one at the division level, four at the Brigade level and 12 at the battalion level). Col Ruhlmann's interview with Col Osterman has been transcribed by the MCCLL transcriptionists (Jodi Bailey and Janet Paton) and can be accessed at: [Interview with Col Osterman, 1st Iraqi Division Senior Advisor](#).

In the interview, Col Osterman outlines the training that he received at the Security Cooperation Education and Training Center (SCETC) at Quantico and provides suggestions for improving training, as well as working more successfully with the Iraqi soldiers. He describes the "cultural battle rhythm" that Marines should expect when working with the Iraqis and indicates that they "are nowhere near as sensitive as they are played out to be in terms of a lot of the cultural sensitivities." He indicates that at this point the Iraqis "are pretty good at their tactical stuff", but the "harder part that we're working on right now is to get the battalion's, brigade's, and division's staffs working, with proper staff, staff functioning, and planning for the future."

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Iraqi Center for Lessons Learned: From late August to early November 2005, LtCol Donald Hawkins (then the MCCLL Operations Officer and currently its Integration & Technology Branch Head) deployed to Iraq to personally participate in the planning, development and implementation of the Iraqi Center for Lessons Learned (ICLL). Working with the Joint Center for Operational Analysis and Lessons Learned (JCOA-LL), the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), and the NATO Joint Analysis Lessons Learned Center (JALLC), LtCol Hawkins supervised development of the ICLL system based upon the software employed by the MCCLL. The objective was to implement a state-of-the art Iraqi lesson management system to collect information on terrorist activity in Iraq and share this information with other countries.



LtCol Donald Hawkins, shown here in Iraq in 2003 when he was with Task Force Tarawa, has completed three deployments in Iraq, the past two as the operations officer for the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL).

The software developer for the ICLL was Mr. Tom Cropper, MCCLL Webmaster and Principal Developer, who implemented the ICLL lesson management system with the same features and capabilities as those of the MCCLL system. Mr. Cropper performed much of the development during very late evening hours in order to maintain coordination with LtCol Hawkins and the ICLL team in Baghdad.

Working closely with an Iraqi translator on the conversion of the web pages into Arabic, Tom Cropper implemented the ICLL lessons management system (LMS) based on the MCCLL system "look and feel".



During his deployment in Iraq, LtCol Hawkins, along with representatives from JCOA-LL, CALL, and JALLC, worked with a 12-man team from the Iraqi Ministry of Defense that mirrored the skill sets of the MCCLL's own staff. LtCol Hawkins trained the Iraqi team on methods of data collection, synthesis of collected lessons into topical reports, and final dissemination of reports to decision makers. The Iraqi collectors then tested their understanding of the process by deploying to Fallujah for their initial data collection effort. Iraqi analysts subsequently produced topical papers based on the lessons collected.

The ICLL is now run by the twelve MCCLL-trained Iraqi officers, with on-call support available from NATO, CALL and MCCLL staff members. The ICLL was the first functional component within the new Iraqi Training Command. As noted by LtCol Hawkins, the ICLL and MCCLL will continue to work together, sharing information vital to achieving the crucial goal of Iraqi sovereignty.



The Iraqi Center For Lessons Learned (ICLL) became operational as of November 2005 with support from MCCLL, JCOA-LL, CALL, and the NATO JALLC.

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Naval Operational Medicine Institute (NOMI) Lessons Learned

For the past few months, the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) has been working closely with the Naval Operational Medicine Institute (NOMI) to assist it in establishing its own lessons learned system. The Naval Operational Medical Lessons Learned (MLL) program is designed to collect information and observations about episodes of healthcare in Navy and Marine Corps operational environments. The MLL program will provide a structured tool to assist healthcare providers in describing hidden opportunities and problems existing in the environments that they may encounter during Fleet and Forces operations and exercises.

The MCCLL Webmaster and Principal Developer, Mr. Tom Cropper, supervised development of the NOMI MLL, with the same features and capabilities as the MCCLL Lessons Management System (LMS). Mr. Cropper's role was much the same as his support to the Iraqi Center for Lessons Learned (ICLL) discussed [previously in this newsletter](#).

In addition, the MCCLL and the NOMI MLL will share many of the same lessons, relevant documents, and forums, especially, those that address Navy corpsmen support to the Marine Corps. In January, the NOMI MLL achieved an initial operational capability; their website is accessible [here](#).

Note: MCCLL is also now planning to provide comparable support to the Counterintelligence Community, helping this community to create a lessons management system that effectively supports its requirements.

Air Force Response to Hurricane Katrina

As an update to the [MCCLL Forum on JTF/MARFOR Katrina](#), the Headquarters, U.S. Air Force senior leader briefing that provides the AF "take-aways" from Hurricane Katrina is [now available](#). The briefing is significant since it not only addresses the Air Force response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, but also discusses the implications that the military response has on Homeland Defense, particularly in the event that a major event were to occur.

The aftermath of Katrina was the largest U.S. rescue and relief effort in history, compounded by the arrival of Hurricane Rita shortly afterwards. The Air Force provided a total force response that resulted in very successful support to the Civil Authorities. Still, the briefing identifies some areas that could be improved upon and addresses the need to better integrate Air Force capabilities into disaster preparedness and homeland security.

Exercise Urgent Quest (UQ) Initial Impressions Report from MCCDC C2I

The initial impressions report from Exercise Urgent Quest (UQ) is [now available](#). This exercise was the culmination of the six-year Coalition Combat Identification Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (CCID ACTD) that was approved by the JROC in December 2000 to evaluate and accelerate the acquisition of maturing technologies with CID potential in the surface-to-surface and surface-to-air operating environments. The exercise was conducted at the United Kingdom's Salisbury Plain Training Area from 19 Sep - 12 Oct 2005, with participants including units and/or observers from the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Sweden, Italy, France, Denmark, Australia and Germany.

The information paper provides initial impressions, focused on the performance of CCID ACTD technologies, based on observations from the exercise itself, as well as after action sessions conducted immediately following each exercise event. The Joint Fires Integration and Interoperability Team (JFIIT), along with Service and country analytic teams, will now undertake a detailed review of the data gathered and provide a comprehensive report of exercise findings. This report is scheduled for completion by mid-February.

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Emerald Express

Emerald Express 06-2: Wargaming Division, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) hosts "USMC/SOCOM Operations: MCSOCOM Detachment One" Seminar

Emerald Express 06-2 (EE 06-2): USMC/SOCOM Operations: MCSOCOM Detachment One will be conducted in Quantico, VA, on 7 - 8 March 2006. *EE 06-2* is a component of the wider *Emerald Express* Program that, in turn, operates under the aegis of the USMC Small Wars Center of Excellence. *Emerald Express* is a continuing series of conferences and workshops designed to quickly garner critical insights, lessons learned, and residual issues from recent operations and the development of distinctive force capabilities, to ensure that a corporate memory is catalogued, and to distribute the results directly to as wide a range of appropriate organizations and individuals as possible, as well as inform and energize ongoing examinations of key issues. Recent *Emerald Express* events have addressed urban operations in *Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) I & II*, the interagency dimensions of *OIF*, humanitarian assistance (HA), stability and support operations (SASO) in *OIF*, USMC and Royal Marine operations in *Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)*, and operations in Haiti and the Horn of Africa (HOA). The point of contact is Major Todd Butler, todd.t.butler@usmc.mil.

See [additional information on the seminar](#)

Emerald Express 06-1: Military Support in Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief: There is also still time to register for the February Emerald Express seminar to be held on 14 - 15 February 2006 at Quantico. This seminar address Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Relief (HA/DR) issues that have been faced recently by the military. Additional information on this seminar is available [here](#).

Command Post of the Future (CPOF) Report from MCCDC C2I

The Tactical Development and Evaluation (TAC D&E) Final Report is [now available](#) for the Command Post of the Future (CPOF) Tactical Demonstration (TacDemo). The report provides a User Assessment of the demonstration which was conducted during the final seven days of MAWTS-1 participation in WTI 1-06.

The CPOF system was designed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to provide commanders and their staff with an advanced decision making environment, including real-time knowledge sharing that would directly impact team effectiveness, decision-making, planning and execution. The system was first fielded to the 1st Cavalry Division in Baghdad in March 2004. Since then, the architecture has been scaled up, with CPOF suites now deployed for both the 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions.

MAWTS-1 agreed to host the assessment of the CPOF conducted by MCCDC during WTI 1-06. The purpose of the MCCDC assessment was to observe, collect, and analyze data from Marine operators using CPOF in an operational environment. Twelve suites were placed at key planning and execution nodes within the exercise construct. Formal training was provided to Marines who would work with the CPOF on a day-to-day basis. The assessment was designed to determine if the unique capabilities of the CPOF in command and control and collaboration are desired and required in current or future Marine Corps C2 Programs of Record (PORs). MCCDC will compare the results of the assessment to Marine Corps PORs in order to determine efficiencies, deficiencies, gaps, and redundancies.

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News (continued)

Wartime Lessons: Marines Revamp Training After Learning What Works, What Doesn't in Iraq

By Rick Rogers, Staff Writer, San Diego Union Tribune
January 25, 2006

TWENTYNINE PALMS – The last time Lt. James Richardson went to war, his men trained in abandoned military housing not far from an outlet mall in Riverside County. Despite the unlikely venue, the Marines thought the training program would give them an edge against insurgents in Iraq. But once Richardson and the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines reached Iraq in August 2004, they learned that much of their preparation was useless and even dangerous. Their patrolling techniques, for example, bunched them up on street corners, where they were easy targets for snipers and hidden bombs. Their training had also focused too much on complex attacks and too little on street fighting. As for their cultural training, it was inadequate to nonexistent.

Richardson, a platoon commander who will again lead Marines to Iraq in March, shakes his head at the memory. "We practiced techniques last time that we literally couldn't use," said Richardson, 24. "The urban training we got before really didn't work."

His was not an isolated experience. Across Iraq, U.S. military commanders discovered fatal flaws in their counter-insurgency tactics. Back in the United States, the Marine Corps and Army set about devising more thorough, customized and realistic training programs. Some of their revamped methods will get a big test with the latest major round of deployments in Southern California. About 25,000 Marines and sailors, most of them from Camp Pendleton, will head to Iraq in the coming months. The Army, convinced that its urban combat strategies are on track, has focused on beefing up its cultural programs. Hundreds of Arabic speakers now populate its training sites in Germany, Louisiana and California. "We moved to another phase of operations in which the cultural aspect was important," said Army spokesman Lt. Col. Richard Harms. "It is no longer close in and destroy the enemy. We have to build relationships with Iraqis on the street."

While the Army remodeled, the Marine Corps rebuilt. The result is Mojave Viper, a little-known national training program based at Twentynine Palms. The month-long course in urban combat and cultural awareness gives commanders unprecedented flexibility in tailoring training to best suit their units' needs. About 8,000 Marines and sailors – including Richardson's men – have finished the course, which is held at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center on the Twentynine Palms base. Nearly all of the Southern California-based troops shipping out to Iraq for the next rotation are expected to be Mojave Viper graduates. Though not battle-tested yet, the training system is being described in historic terms. The program is "possibly the most realistic and comprehensive instruction ever introduced by the Marine Corps," said Maj. Gen. Richard F. Natonski, who is leading Camp Pendleton's 1st Marine Division back to Iraq. "Mojave Viper not only equips the Marines to meet the rigors inherent in combat, but it also imparts skills integral to the conduct of humanitarian operations so the Marines can best assist the Iraqis in fostering their new democracy." He added: "The feedback I have received from my commanders ... is very encouraging."

The last time around, Richardson and his battalion trained on a few acres at March Air Reserve Base with a handful of role players. This time, the training is on a scale worthy of a Hollywood epic. It includes almost 400 buildings in two villages set on 252 acres of desert, as well as nearly 350 actors, including about 50 Iraqi nationals, who play out scenarios typically found in Iraq. Richardson and his Marines, many of whom are heading to Iraq for the first time, got their initial exposure to Mojave Viper recently. Breaking down doors and searching buildings are routine tasks in Iraq, so much that Marines consider them as fundamental to their combat duty as blocking and tackling are in football. Yet the maneuvers are much more nuanced than they seem, as Staff Sgt. Jerry Rogers pointed out during a Mojave Viper session. For instance, Rogers told the Marines that it matters how close they are to one another when they enter a house. And it matters which foot they use to step through a doorway and how fast they do it. And it matters which direction each Marine follows once he's inside the home. And it matters how each person holds his weapons. And if someone is waiting for the troops on the other side of a door, responding correctly might mean not instinctively firing at that individual. So many little things matter, Rogers said, and each element has to be executed rapidly and flawlessly. "Sweep the room," Rogers told the young Marines gathered around him in a Mojave Viper setup. "Get dominant position. Don't get stuck in one part of the room. Make sure you get it right. Your speed will come later."



See more of [this article](#)

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Book Review

One Bullet Away: The Making of a Marine Officer, by Nathaniel Fick

Reviewed by Thomas J. Lucier

It isn't every day that a classics major from a liberal Ivy League school like Dartmouth College walks into a United States Marine Corps recruiting station and offers to join the green machine. But that's exactly what Nathaniel Fick did. And he's written a gripping book, aptly entitled, *One Bullet Away: The Making of a Marine Officer*, that brilliantly chronicles his transformation from being a carefree college student to a Marine infantry officer who led platoons of Marines at the very tip of the spear in Afghanistan and Iraq without ever losing a single man.

The book's title comes straight out of Marine Corps infantry officer training doctrine that stresses that every officer is literally "one bullet away" from assuming the leadership role of his fallen leader. The book is a straightforward and candid firsthand account of leadership at the platoon level by a cerebral warrior with a very vivid writing style, who makes readers feel like they're right in the middle of a firefight—where they're able to see the red and green tracer rounds whizzing by, smell the cordite and diesel exhaust fumes from the HMMWVs, hear the popping sound of small arms fire, and feel the earth move when mortar rounds hit the ground and explode.

Nathaniel Fick's Marine Corps odyssey began at Officer Candidates School (OCS) at Quantico in the summer of 1998, between his junior and senior years at Dartmouth. And it was at OCS that Fick was given a rude introduction to the Marine Corps way of doing things. After passing the rigors of OCS and graduating from Dartmouth in June 1999, the author raised his right arm, took the oath of office, and became United States Marine Corps 2dLt Nathaniel Fick. 2dLt Fick's first assignment after graduating from The Basic School and the Infantry Officer Course, was as the Weapons Platoon Commander, Company B, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (B/1/1) that was attached to the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (15th MEU (SOC)) stationed aboard the USS *Dubuque* (LPD 8). The *Dubuque* was on a port call in Darwin, Australia on 11 September 2001. Once the MEU got word of the terrorist attacks, they set sail for the Arabian Sea. After a brief stay in Pakistan, 1stLt Fick's platoon dug in at Camp Rhino in Afghanistan, where they provided perimeter security.

Upon his return from Afghanistan, Fick passed the selection process and completed the arduous Marine Corps reconnaissance course. Recon Marines may not get the publicity that the Navy SEALs and Delta Force operators get, but they know how to get down and dirty and take care of business. And that's exactly what 1stLt Fick did in Iraq when he led 2d Platoon, Company B, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, which was a part of Regimental Combat Team 1 that spearheaded I Marine Expeditionary Force into Baghdad.

In Iraq, 1stLt Fick and his Marines shared a sacred bond of trust forged in combat that made his platoon a highly effective fighting unit. Fick's platoon spent most of its time battling against the ruthless and fanatical members of Saddam's Fedayeen militia, who didn't wear uniforms or operate under any preset rules of engagement, and they had absolutely no qualms, whatsoever, about using women and children as human shields in battle.



See [more of this review](#)

From the **Marine Corps Gazette** book reviews. Other book reviews are available at: [Marine Corps Gazette 2005 Book Reviews](#)

One Bullet Away, plus books on the Commandant's Professional Reading List, can be obtained through the [Marine Corps Association Bookstore](#).

MCCLL Collection Process (Detention Operations Example)

[Return to the Article](#)

Provide Pre-Deployment Training

Deployment Processing	0 Hours	Pre-Arrival
Weapons/Battle Skills Training	24 Hours	Battalion Training
Intel Training	5 Hours	
Collecting & Documenting LL	15 Hours	
Collection Toolkit	7 Hours	
Collection Plan Development	5 Hours	
TTP Evaluation	3 Hours	
TOTAL	59 Hours	

Develop Collection Plan

1) AREA OF INTEREST:

LEGAL CLASSIFICATION OF ENEMY DETAINEES RELEVANT TO TREATMENT WHILE INTERNED

Collection Objective

ANALYZE - the process for legal classification of detainees in current enemy detainee operations **IN ORDER TO** establish standard terminology and treatment criteria for implementation in training; this in turn will assist in meeting future operational needs.

Collection Tasks:

INTERVIEW OIC of Marine Regional Detention Facilities (RDF) and the Operations Officer over all RDFs

FOR INFORMATION ON terminology describing different classification of detainee and details of treatment extended; the process for determining or assigning classification.

IN ORDER TO determine standard jargon for describing detainee status and proper standards of treatment and housing of each classification. Identify a standard, legal procedure determine status.

Questions:

1. Are there detainees in the RDF who are considered to have POW/EPW status?
2. What are the legal statuses of detainees assigned to the RDF?
3. Are different status detainees housed separately?
4. What are the guidelines for treatment of each status?
5. How is the status determined?

Document Lessons & Observations in the MCCLL Lessons Management System

BATTLE BOARD ID IS: 353
 Created: 28 Apr 2005 15:37:45 BY: CW03 Thomas Dooley
 Updated: 24 Jun 2005 09:00:59 BY: Major William Czarniewski

Save SEND EMAIL

TYPE: PRIORITY: 1=High 5=Low

SECTION: LOCATION:

DESCRIPTION:

STATUS: SOURCE:

DUE DATE: COMPLETED DATE:

PRIMARY: SUPPORT:

LINKED LESSONS

LESSON ID TOPIC

- 17762 Biometric Automated Toolset System (BATS) in Enemy Detainee Operations
- 17763 Classification/Status of Enemy Detainees/Geneva Convention
- 17764 Training and Use of Non-Lethal Weapons in Detainee Operations Environment
- 17776 Enemy Detainee Intake Procedures/Requirements
- 17785 Rotation of Forces Conducting Detention Operations
- 17788 Communication Procedures in Regional Detention Facilities Between Staff Members and Detainees
- 17789 Cultural and Religious Concerns in Enemy Detainee Operations
- 17790 Detainee Operations Medical Issues
- 17791 Enemy Detainee Transfer/Release

Conduct Collections (Coordinated by MCCLL Liaison Officers)

- May 2: arrive in Al Asad: tour of Al Asad RDF awaiting trans to Fallujah to check in
- May 5: arrive in Fallujah: check in at MCCLL; in-brief with 2d MP Battalion; observe RDF operation
- May 14: to Kalsu: Observe operation at RDF Kalsu
- May 19: to Ramadi: Observe RDF Operation
- May 25: to Al Asad: Observe RDF Operation
- May 31: to Al Qaim: Observe RDF Operation
- June 4: to Fallujah: Check back in with MCCLL conduct interview, enter lessons, out brief with 2d MP BN
- June 11: Begin movement to Kuwait
- June 16: to Quantico

Provide Good Ideas to Decision Makers: Changes in Training, TTPs, Force Structure, Equipment, etc.

Enemy Detainee Operations Course MTT

EDOC Schedule of Events

050728-050729

- 28 July [SNCO'S AND OFFICERS](#)
- 1200-1300 SUPERVISION ISSUES -- CWO3 DOOLEY
- 1300-1400 DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES
- 1400-1500 Q & A
- 1500-1600 GENEVA CONVENTION

TRAINING DEVELOPED AS A RESULT OF THE TECOM INSTRUCTOR'S DEPLOYMENT IN A MCCLL COLLECTION