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Featured Articles

[MCCLL Classified Repositories](#)

[Scout Sniper Lessons Learned Conference](#)

[Military Working Dogs](#)

[Reserve Augments: Setting Conditions for Success](#)

[Needed: After Action Reports!](#)

[Coming Soon: Infantry Battalion C2 Training](#)

[Medical Support in a Mountainous Environment](#)

[Needed: Standard Operating Procedures!](#)

[Marine Aircraft Group-16](#)

[MCCLL "Binders" Support Training Requirements](#)

[Contractors in the Battle Space](#)

News

[New Counterinsurgency Manual](#)

[Knowing the Enemy](#)

[Newsletter from the Naval Operational Medicine Institute](#)

[Mattis on the Marines](#)

Book Review

[The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq](#)

About the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned: The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) is part of the Training and Education Command (TECOM) of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), located at MCB Quantico, VA. The MCCLL mission is to collect, analyze, manage, and disseminate knowledge gained through operational experiences, exercises, and supporting activities in order to enable Marines to achieve higher levels of performance and to provide information and analysis on emerging issues and trends in support of operational commanders and the Commandant of the Marine Corps Title 10 responsibilities. MCCLL manages the Marine Corps Lessons Management System (LMS) and the Consolidated Data Repository (CDR) databases, and reports findings, trends and issues through verbal, written and electronic media.

Visit the MCCLL Website at: www.mccll.usmc.mil

Customer relations management support for the MCCLL Website and questions about the newsletter should be directed to: harry.t.johnson@usmc.mil or michael.jones@usmc.mil Telephone: 703.432.1279 DSN: 378.1279

From the Director: MCCLL Classified Repositories

Many of the respondents to our initial Web User Online survey were not aware that the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) has extensive classified repositories that have proven to be valuable sources of information on tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and other sensitive topics for combat units supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The security classification (or sensitivity) of many tactical lessons, observations, and TTPs has necessitated that they be posted to our classified website. The relatively good SIPR access for some major commands in OIF has meant that deployed Marines with security clearances (as well as soldiers, sailors, airmen, government civilians and contractors) have been able to access these valuable resources. Senior decision makers, as well as Marines with CONUS SIPR accounts, also make extensive use of our classified website for research purposes and for planning future activities.

Obviously, only a relatively small percentage of the total number of users are able to access these classified repositories; however, our survey indicated that many who would be able to access them through their SIPR accounts are not even aware of the existence of this useful resource (located at: <http://www.mccll.usmc.smil.mil>)

In addition, many current users of our SIPR website who have not visited the site recently will be surprised to learn that it has been upgraded with the same "look and feel" as our unclassified site. Recent topical papers are now prominently displayed on the home page, with "Communities of Interest" under development to serve as forums for classified discussions.

If you are registered on the classified site (or are able to register), you might be interested in receiving a weekly rollup of TTPs that we distribute to interested users, with the latest information on enemy TTPs observed in theater and emerging friendly TTPs to counter these enemy tactics. Please contact MCCLL (jonesmr@mccdc.usmc.smil.mil) with your SIPR e-mail account information if you would like to be on distribution for this product.

We invite all users with SIPR access to begin using our classified system and see whether it can serve as a useful resource to meet your individual needs.

Your observations and comments on this or any other topics are welcome. Please contact the MCCLL Director, Col Monte E. Dunard, USMCR, at:

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Featured Articles

[MCCLL Classified Repositories](#)

[Scout Sniper Lessons Learned Conference](#)

[Military Working Dogs](#)

[Reserve Augments: Setting Conditions for Success](#)

[Needed: After Action Reports!](#)

[Coming Soon: Infantry Battalion C2 Training](#)

[Medical Support in a Mountainous Environment](#)

[Needed: Standard Operating Procedures!](#)

[Marine Aircraft Group-16](#)

[MCCLL "Binders" Support Training Requirements](#)

[Contractors in the Battle Space](#)

News

[New Counterinsurgency Manual](#)

[Knowing the Enemy](#)

[Newsletter from the Naval Operational Medicine Institute](#)

[Mattis on the Marines](#)

Book Review

[The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq](#)

Scout Sniper Employment Lessons Learned Conference

The special abilities, training and equipment of the Marine scout sniper have proven to be valuable assets in conflicts extending from World Wars I and II and Vietnam to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Snipers can provide highly accurate rifle fire against enemy targets that cannot be engaged successfully by other rifleman due to range, size, location, or visibility. Sniping requires the development of basic infantry skills to a high degree of perfection, including (obviously) long range marksmanship, but also field craft skills that can help ensure maximum effective engagements with minimum risk. Although sniping has often proven to be a force multiplier, some OIF and OEF commanders have expressed concern about inconsistent sniper performance that has reduced their combat effectiveness and the trust placed in them by their commanders.

In an effort to address scout sniper performance in a comprehensive manner that can then be used in helping to train follow-on units, the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) sponsored a Scout Sniper Employment Lessons Learned Conference in October 2006 at Quantico that was attended by 14 Marines, all of whom had sniper ground combat and/or sniper employment training experience. The attendees included four officers (one major, one captain and two first lieutenants) and ten enlisted Marines (ranging from sergeant to master sergeant). The objective of the conference was to obtain as many opinions as possible on the current state of scout sniper performance. Attendees from Headquarters, Marine Corps Plans, Programs and Policy (PP&O) helped to balance the tactical level input from scout snipers. The unclassified portion of the conference has now been documented by MCCLL in the topical paper: [Scout Sniper Employment Lessons Learned Conference: Lessons and Observations.](#)



Scout snipers from 3d Bn, 4th Marines, move to the second floor of an abandoned home in Fallujah while searching for a suitable site for observing the city. In addition to being a combat force, scout snipers can provide valuable intelligence from their hidden positions.

Among the key observations from the scout sniper conference included:

- **Perceptions:** Perceptions of sniper performance varied widely; from the opinion that Marine snipers were indispensable in reducing casualties from enemy snipers to a statement that they were essentially useless. (Note that one of the primary purposes of the conference was to examine ways to exploit Marine sniper capabilities to counter enemy snipers.)
- **Capabilities:** Sniper teams are all-weather, day/night offensive and defensive firing platforms. They can also have a significant psychological effect on the enemy. Presently, they are being used primarily for observation in the counter improvised explosive device (IED) fight. As noted above, they can be an integral component of the intelligence collection cycle.
- **Limitations:** Some of the attendees expressed the opinion that the lack of training and experience among sniper teams is viewed as the operational limitation that most affects their performance. Since scout sniper platoon organizations varied from battalion to battalion, there appears to be no adherence to table of organization (T/O) and table of equipment (T/E) authorizations.
- **Personnel:** A major conference theme was that there were scout sniper billets being filled by Marines with insufficient sniper training, resulting in inconsistent combat performance.
- **Pre-deployment Training (PTP):** Since scout snipers are typically required for most of an infantry battalion's PTP, the battalion commander has absolute control of their training. The proposed Infantry Battalion Enhancement Period Program (IBEPP) is designed to assist in building an infantry battalion training program that incorporates the training of each battalion element. If implemented, IBEPP will help ensure that sniper team training is adequately addressed.

Please see the complete MCCLL report, [Scout Sniper Employment Lessons Learned Conference](#), on these and many other observations, as well as the final conference recommendations.

Featured Articles

[MCCLL Classified Repositories](#)

[Scout Sniper Lessons Learned Conference](#)

[Military Working Dogs](#)

[Reserve Augments: Setting Conditions for Success](#)

[Needed: After Action Reports!](#)

[Coming Soon: Infantry Battalion C2 Training](#)

[Medical Support in a Mountainous Environment](#)

[Needed: Standard Operating Procedures!](#)

[Marine Aircraft Group-16](#)

[MCCLL "Binders" Support Training Requirements](#)

[Contractors in the Battle Space](#)

News

[New Counterinsurgency Manual](#)

[Knowing the Enemy](#)

[Newsletter from the Naval Operational Medicine Institute](#)

[Mattis on the Marines](#)

Book Review

[The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq](#)

Military Working Dogs

Military working dogs (MWDs) have proven to be an extremely valuable asset for Marine combat units (as well as U.S. Army units) in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The use of dogs as military support assets began in earnest in 1942, when the "K-9 Corps" was initiated as part of the U.S. Army's Quartermaster Corps, with a major push to recruit war dogs to be guards at civilian war plants. Over 19,000 dogs were procured during World War II, although about 45% of them were eventually rejected as unsuited for training. As the dogs were trained for their duties, their "dog handlers" also began receiving training. Eventually, military dogs in WWII, in addition to being sentry dogs, began serving as scout and patrol dogs, messenger dogs, and mine detection dogs. Dogs have continued to be used in the U.S. military since then, with about 1,500 deployed during the Korean War and 4,000 in Vietnam. In OIF and OEF, they have proven their usefulness in the detection of explosives and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), cordon and knock search missions, cache sweeps, and vehicle checkpoints.

Marine dog handlers in Iraq have quickly learned that the extreme heat and dryness of the Iraqi summer is a serious problem for many dogs. Handlers have often had to design strategies of their own for keeping their dogs cool, including fabricating mist fans and outfitting their dogs with ice vests. With only a few veterinarians deployed in OIF, medical care for the dogs must often be provided by corpsman.

In an effort to determine whether significant new lessons could be learned from MWD training programs and employment of the dogs during OIF operations, the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) sponsored a MWD collection effort in Iraq in July and August 2006. Although the final report for this collection effort is expected to be classified, MCCLL has published an initial "Quick Look" Report at the unclassified level that can be accessed at: [Military Working Dog Operations in OIF 05-07, Quick Look report.](#)



A Marine MP uses a military working dog to screen bags for bombs and bomb-making materials at an Iraqi police recruiting drive in Qa'im, Iraq.

Among the observations from the Quick Look Report are:

- Most MWDs receive pre-deployment training at the home station, although some do not receive any specialized training due to lack of ranges and equipment. Some handlers also have not received specialized training. USMC has requested funding for MWD handlers and dogs to attend training at Yuma Proving Ground and Mojave Viper. Effective training should be in an environment similar to the climate and terrain to be encountered in theater. The teams should conduct improvised explosive device (IED) lane training based on the current theater threat; dogs should also be trained using large quantities (more than 7 lbs.) of explosive odors.
- Age is a major factor for deploying MWDs in Iraq, with dogs older than eight years routinely having medical issues while deployed. Only Category I (fully capable) dogs should be deployed.
- Specialized search dog (SSD) (off-leash) employments should be focused on units that are conducting route clearance and security missions. These dogs are generally employed only 0 – 100 meters from the handler due to the threat of indigenous wild dogs.
- Since commanders generally do not know the capabilities of the SSD teams prior to arriving in theater, they should receive comprehensive briefings by the handlers on proper MWD employment.



A military working dog with 24th MEU in the northern Babil province sits beside his issued protective gear, including a flak jacket, safety goggles, and "booties" made for canines.

Featured Articles

[MCCLL Classified Repositories](#)

[Scout Sniper Lessons Learned Conference](#)

[Military Working Dogs](#)

[Reserve Augments: Setting Conditions for Success](#)

[Needed: After Action Reports!](#)

[Coming Soon: Infantry Battalion C2 Training](#)

[Medical Support in a Mountainous Environment](#)

[Needed: Standard Operating Procedures!](#)

[Marine Aircraft Group-16](#)

[MCCLL "Binders" Support Training Requirements](#)

[Contractors in the Battle Space](#)

News

[New Counterinsurgency Manual](#)

[Knowing the Enemy](#)

[Newsletter from the Naval Operational Medicine Institute](#)

[Mattis on the Marines](#)

Book Review

[The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq](#)

Reserve Augments: Setting Conditions for Success

The training, preparation, and experience levels of reserve Marines, especially those who are sourced to fill Individual Augmentation requirements on staffs above the company level, is an issue that has been raised on a number of occasions. While company grade reserve officers are generally prepared for the duties they will perform upon mobilization, reports from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), indicate that there may be deficiencies in how officers are selected and trained to fill individual augment (IA) and liaison billets on higher level staffs. The limited professional development opportunities for career reserve officers and staff NCOs above the company level and their typical career paths has been a major factor in their performance in these higher level staff assignments.

The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) received a request from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, of the Marine Corps Mobilization Command for information on the training and experience level of reserve Marines and on the satisfaction in their performance expressed by gaining commands. In addition, MCCLL addressed the satisfaction level of the reserve Marines themselves in their preparations for their duties.



LtGen John W. Bergman, Commander, Marine Forces Reserve (MFR), speaks with Marines from the Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 774 during a breakfast at Al Asad, Iraq.

In interviews, active duty commanders expressed the opinion that experience on or with a division or higher level staff was extremely beneficial for IAs to be able to integrate effectively. Those officers who had experience on higher level staffs on active duty had an advantage over those with no such staff experience. Active duty commanders believed that the IAs were generally able to perform if given enough time to get up to speed on the requirements and expectations of the billets assigned. They also indicated that success or failure in a billet was not due to whether a Marine was active duty or a reservist, but was a function of his or her background and experience. As stated by one commander:

"To be useful at the headquarters level, augmentees must be familiar with the plan and must have the relevant skill sets."

Based on the many comments from commanders concerning the IRR augments, MCCLL has published a short "Quick Look" Report: [Reserve Augments – Setting Conditions for Success](#).

Among the many substantive recommendations in the MCCLL report are:

- A training package for reserve officers should be developed to better prepare them to serve as augmentees to higher level staffs, with material from Action Officer 101 courses, MAGTF 101, the Marine Corps Rapid Response Planning Process (R2P2) and Marine Corps Planning Process (MCP2).
- Reserve units should be provided with sufficient time to conduct battalion level training between notification of deployment, activation and deployment.
- The pool of reserve Marines trained in joint operations and high-level staff processes should be broadened:
 - Implement the RC Joint Officer Management Program (DoD Instruction 1215.20), signed in January 2003.
 - Take advantage of emerging JPME courses (i.e., the Naval Reserve Distance Learning Course and the Advanced JPME course to be taught at the Joint Forces Staff College).
 - Develop a way to track these officers and staff NCOs in the personnel system.
- The visits by MSTP Mobile Training Teams to high-level reserve staffs should be increased.

Please see the referenced [Quick Look Report](#) for a complete discussion of these and other recommendations.

Featured Articles

[MCCLL Classified Repositories](#)

[Scout Sniper Lessons Learned Conference](#)

[Military Working Dogs](#)

[Reserve Augments: Setting Conditions for Success](#)

[Needed: After Action Reports!](#)

[Coming Soon: Infantry Battalion C2 Training](#)

[Medical Support in a Mountainous Environment](#)

[Needed: Standard Operating Procedures!](#)

[Marine Aircraft Group-16](#)

[MCCLL "Binders" Support Training Requirements](#)

[Contractors in the Battle Space](#)

News

[New Counterinsurgency Manual](#)

[Knowing the Enemy](#)

[Newsletter from the Naval Operational Medicine Institute](#)

[Mattis on the Marines](#)

Book Review

[The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq](#)

Needed: After Action Reports!

After action reports (AARs) are one of the primary sources for documenting lessons and observations that can have an impact on future training, equipment and personnel decisions, as well as, development efforts. One way in which AARs can receive the greatest visibility within the Marine Corps community is through their entry into the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) Lessons Management System (LMS), with individual lessons extracted and disseminated to relevant interested parties. This is one of the reasons that the new [Marine Corps Order 3504.1](#) calls for the submission of AARs to MCCLL as part of the Marine Corps Lessons Learned Program (MCLLP).

Although MCCLL attempts to sponsor as many collection efforts as possible with units deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) or returning from these theaters, it is not feasible to survey as many units as we would like. The submission of AARs to MCCLL is a viable alternative. In addition, units may introduce issues in their AARs that MCCLL is not aware of that can then be addressed in future collection plans.

An excellent example of a battalion AAR is one from 3d Battalion, 3d Marines (3/3) that was provided to MCCLL by II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) after 3/3 had returned from deployment in OIF 05-07. This particular AAR raises many substantive issues and provides thoughtful recommendations in such areas as command and control, maneuver tactics, intelligence at the company level, detainee handling and processing, kinetic and non-kinetic operations, logistics, and force protection. 3/3 has specifically tailored their recommendations to assist follow-on units in their preparations for deployment. Many of the lessons from the AAR have been extracted and entered as individual lessons in the LMS. The complete AAR is available at: [Task Force 3d Battalion, 3d Marines \(TF 3/3\) After Action Review for Combat Operations in Iraq](#).



MCCLL invites units to submit their approved AARs, either directly to the Center using the [SEND AARs/SOPs](#) feature on the home page of our website, or through your command channels. The lessons that you have learned through your deployments are of greatest benefit only if they are passed on to those who will follow you into the theater.

Iraqi soldiers lead suspected insurgents after they were apprehended in Baghdadi with the assistance of the Weapons Company, 3d Bn, 3d Marines (3/3). Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and 3/3 also recently completed a census operation in Baghdadi called Operation Guardian Tier IV to help put names and faces to residents throughout the city. During its deployment, 3/3 was responsible for training the ISF, providing security, and engaging insurgents in Baghdadi and in the Haditha Triad region (comprised of the three Euphrates River towns of Haditha, Barwanah, and Haqlaniyah).

Coming Soon: Infantry Battalion Command & Control Training

MCCLL will soon publish a topical paper focusing specifically on command and control training requirements for infantry battalions. This paper is being produced in conjunction with the Command and Control Training and Education Center of Excellence (C2 TECOE) of the Training and Education Command (TECOM) based on post-deployment lessons learned collections in October 2006 with three battalions returning from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF): 3d Battalion, 3d Marines (3/3), 2d Battalion, 7th Marines (2/7), and 3d Battalion, 6th Marines (3/6).

A "Quick Look" Report from the 3/3 collection effort has been published. MCCLL and C2 TECOE intend to incorporate the lessons and observations from the 2/7 and 3/6 collection efforts with those from 3/3 to produce a comprehensive topical paper on the overall command and control training requirements of infantry battalions. In the meantime, the 3/3 Quick Look is available at: [Infantry Battalion Command and Control Training: Lessons and Observations from 3d Battalion, 3d Marines](#).

Featured Articles

[MCCLL Classified Repositories](#)

[Scout Sniper Lessons Learned Conference](#)

[Military Working Dogs](#)

[Reserve Augments: Setting Conditions for Success](#)

[Needed: After Action Reports!](#)

[Coming Soon: Infantry Battalion C2 Training](#)

[Medical Support in a Mountainous Environment](#)

[Needed: Standard Operating Procedures!](#)

[Marine Aircraft Group-16](#)

[MCCLL "Binders" Support Training Requirements](#)

[Contractors in the Battle Space](#)

News

[New Counterinsurgency Manual](#)

[Knowing the Enemy](#)

[Newsletter from the Naval Operational Medicine Institute](#)

[Mattis on the Marines](#)

Book Review

[The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq](#)

Medical Support of Operations in a High Altitude, Mountainous Environment: Quick Look Report

From October to December 2006, a collection team sponsored by the Mountain Warfare Training Center (MWTC) and the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) visited units in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan to address issues related to medical training, equipment and operations in mountainous, high-altitude terrain. The collection team surveyed both Marine and U.S. Army units in Afghanistan in order to obtain a sufficient cross-section of experiences in the difficult terrain encountered in OEF.

MCCLL will shortly prepare a topical paper with a complete set of recommendations derived from this collection effort. However, in the meantime MCCLL has prepared a "Quick Look" report with some initial observations from the collection: [Medical Support of Operations in a High Altitude, Mountainous Environment: Lessons and Observations from OEF.](#)



Machine gunner with Lima Company, 3d Bn, 3d Marines, helps to provide security as a CH47 Chinook helicopter prepares to drop medical supplies near the Marines' position high in the Hindu Kush mountains of Afghanistan.

The Quick Look report notes that dismounted medical support for operations in mountainous terrain has inherent difficulties that are not necessarily addressed by current unit training and issued equipment. Among the preliminary observations from the Quick Look report are:

- Many units do not have the assets or environment during training to realistically replicate CASEVAC and MEDEVAC operations in mountainous terrain.
- Evacuating a casualty from the field to the next level of care can take as long as 72 hours. There is a need for formalized training on extended patient care for every corpsman deploying to combat.
- Current individual physical fitness standards (and Iraq-centric pre-deployment training) do not adequately address the difficulties encountered in dismounted operations in mountainous terrain.
- The standard meal, ready to eat (MRE) does not provide adequate nutrition for dismounted operations in this type of terrain. Many Marines and soldiers lost 20 to 40 pounds of bodyweight during their deployment. (At least one soldier was evacuated due to malnutrition and a 60 pound weight loss.)

Needed: Standard Operating Procedures

The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) often receives requests from Marines for examples of standard operating procedures (SOPs) that can be used as guides by their own units in developing their SOPs. Since our current repositories contain only a limited number of SOPs to support these requests, we actively solicit current SOPs from Marine units, particularly those that have been developed specifically to support combat operations in OIF or OEF.

Recently, MCCLL acquired an excellent example of an infantry battalion SOP that may be of interest to many Marines. The [2nd Battalion, 7th Marines Combat SOP](#) is considered to be an outstanding example of an SOP to serve as a day-to-day guide for the battalion's command, control and communications activities in combat operations, as well as during peacetime training. The SOP was written after the battalion had undergone Mojave Viper training and incorporates the lessons learned and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) from the exercise. In addition to covering the standard reports, C3 and operational planning, it incorporates the latest guidance on counterinsurgency operations. This SOP is also in a handy format that allows it to be carried in the utility trouser side cargo pocket (even though it is over 600 pages long).

Featured Articles

[MCCLL Classified Repositories](#)

[Scout Sniper Lessons Learned Conference](#)

[Military Working Dogs](#)

[Reserve Augments: Setting Conditions for Success](#)

[Needed: After Action Reports!](#)

[Coming Soon: Infantry Battalion C2 Training](#)

[Medical Support in a Mountainous Environment](#)

[Needed: Standard Operating Procedures!](#)

[Marine Aircraft Group-16](#)

[MCCLL "Binders" Support Training Requirements](#)

[Contractors in the Battle Space](#)

News

[New Counterinsurgency Manual](#)

[Knowing the Enemy](#)

[Newsletter from the Naval Operational Medicine Institute](#)

[Mattis on the Marines](#)

Book Review

[The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq](#)

Marine Aircraft Group-16

One of the major elements of the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 05-07 has been the Marine Aircraft Group-16 (MAG-16), based at Al Asad air base. The Group is responsible for approximately 150 Army and Marine Corps fixed and rotary wing aircraft, a number that has varied as squadrons rotated in and out of Iraq. MAG-16 provides aviation support to I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) (Forward) in Western Iraq, primarily Al Anbar Province. During the past year aircraft utilization of MAG-16 assets has increased by 150% over the previous year. Despite the increase in operational tempo, the MAG staff has not been able to support some ground commander requests for support due to insufficient assets. Operations have been constrained by the number of aircraft and pilots deployed, with pilots generally being the limiting factor. In particular, rotary wing assault support assets have experienced a significant increase in the requirement to move personnel throughout the area of operations.

In an effort to determine what lessons, observations and friendly tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) could be learned from current MAG-16 operations, the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) sponsored a collection visit with MAG-16 in August 2006. The results of this collection effort have now been documented in the MCCLL topical paper, [Marine Aircraft Group-16: Lessons and Observations from OIF 05-07](#).



At Al Asad, Iraq, a plane captain with Marine Attack Squadron 513, MAG-16, guides an AV-8B Harrier jet piloted by the executive officer of MAG-16.

Some of the key lessons and observations from the MAG-16 report are:

• Operations:

- The MAG staff observed that assault support assets were not used wisely. Examples included (1) individuals not showing up for their lift because they got an earlier flight, but no one was informed and (2) two CH-53s flying from Al Asad to Korean Village and back, with each one only delivering two third country nationals.
- There was a lack of "jointness" in air operations. The communications and coordination among the services was perceived to be lacking. (The MAG-16 Commander believed that coordination has improved, but additional improvement is needed.) There was concern over the high number of "near mid-air" collisions.

• Organization:

- The MAG-16 Commander recommended changes in the overall personnel structure, including trimming the MAG staff.
- The attachment of Army liaison officers to the MAG staff would have improved the efficiency and tasking of Army units by the MAG.
- There needs to be a separate staff to manage the base infrastructure and support the day-to-day operations of the base, rather than having the wing staff also responsible for base operations.

• Training:

- MAG personnel had not been trained on the Army personnel casualty report (PCR) which they were required to submit for attached Army aviation units.
- Trained electricians were needed to support the base infrastructure (with 220 volt, 50 hertz power vice the 110 volt, 60 hertz requirement of U.S. equipment and generators).

Please see the complete MCCLL topical paper at: [MAG-16 Lessons and Observations](#).

Featured Articles

[MCCLL Classified Repositories](#)

[Scout Sniper Lessons Learned Conference](#)

[Military Working Dogs](#)

[Reserve Augments: Setting Conditions for Success](#)

[Needed: After Action Reports!](#)

[Coming Soon: Infantry Battalion C2 Training](#)

[Medical Support in a Mountainous Environment](#)

[Needed: Standard Operating Procedures!](#)

[Marine Aircraft Group-16](#)

[MCCLL "Binders" Support Training Requirements](#)

[Contractors in the Battle Space](#)

News

[New Counterinsurgency Manual](#)

[Knowing the Enemy](#)

[Newsletter from the Naval Operational Medicine Institute](#)

[Mattis on the Marines](#)

Book Review

[The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq](#)

MCCLL "Binders" Support Training Requirements

The [April 2006 edition of the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned \(MCCLL\) newsletter](#) featured an article describing procedures for accessing and developing "binders" on the MCCLL website. These binders can be developed by all authorized users of our system for their own research purposes by accessing [MYBINDERS](#) on the home page of our website and selecting [ADD A NEW BINDER](#).

Although many of the current binders in our system were developed for specialized purposes and may be of interest to only a limited set of users, others have been put together to satisfy more general needs and should be of relevance to a large number of our readers.

Specific examples of binders that might be of general interest include a set that MCCLL developed for our representatives at the Tactical Training Exercise Control Group (TTECG) in support of the training requirements of units participating in Mojave Viper exercises. Among these binders are the following:

- [Battalion Commander](#)
- [Battalion Executive Officer](#)
- [S1 \(Admin\) Section](#)
- [S2 \(Intelligence\) Section](#)
- [S3 \(Operations\) Section](#)
- [S4 \(Logistics\) Section](#)
- [S6 \(Communications\) Section](#)
- [Company Commander](#)
- [Motor Transport Officer](#)
- [Supply Officer](#)
- [AO Denver](#) (lessons that address this area of operations (AO) in Al Anbar Province)
- [AO Raleigh](#) (lessons that address this AO in Al Anbar)
- [AO Topeka](#) (lessons that address this AO in Al Anbar)

"Collaborative" binders on many of these topics are also available on our SIPR website. In addition, comprehensive information is available on our SIPR website in "Viewable" binders on such important topics as **"House Take Down"** and **"Cordon and Search"**.

Armed Contractors in the Battle Space

In December 2006, MCCLL participated in a training workshop at the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) at the Center for Strategic Leadership of the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, PA. One of the topics addressed at the workshop concerned the large number of civilian contractors that are providing services in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many of these services have traditionally been handled by the military. This situation raises a number of issues such as: Where do the contractors fall in the chain of command? How are communications maintained with them? How does the military track their movements?

A workshop 'read ahead' paper has now been added to the MCCLL repositories that highlights many of the issues related to the large number of civilian contractors in theater. The paper outlines topics that need to be addressed by the military, problems that the contractors themselves face, and some preliminary conclusions. One of the most interesting conclusions is the proposal that a line be added to the operations order (OPORD) for "Contractors in the Battle Space" that specifically addresses interoperability with civilian contractors.

Please see the complete workshop 'read ahead' at: [Armed Contractors in the Battle Space](#).

Featured Articles

[MCCLL Classified Repositories](#)

[Scout Sniper Lessons Learned Conference](#)

[Military Working Dogs](#)

[Reserve Augments: Setting Conditions for Success](#)

[Needed: After Action Reports!](#)

[Coming Soon: Infantry Battalion C2 Training](#)

[Medical Support in a Mountainous Environment](#)

[Needed: Standard Operating Procedures!](#)

[Marine Aircraft Group-16](#)

[MCCLL "Binders" Support Training Requirements](#)

[Contractors in the Battle Space](#)

News

[New Counterinsurgency Manual](#)

[Knowing the Enemy](#)

[Newsletter from the Naval Operational Medicine Institute](#)

[Mattis on the Marines](#)

Book Review

[The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq](#)

News

New Counterinsurgency Manual

American Forces Press Service, December 18, 2006

Washington - "Learn" and "adapt" are the key messages of the new Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, which has just hit the streets. The [Counterinsurgency Field Manual, FM 3-24, and Marine Corps Warfighting Publication, 3-33.5](#), is a unique joint effort between the Army and Marines to put in place doctrine to help operators as they face the challenges of asymmetric warfare.

The manual codifies an important lesson of insurgencies: it takes more than the military to win. "There are more than just lethal operations involved in a counterinsurgency campaign," said Conrad Crane, director of the U.S. Army Military History Institute, in Carlisle, PA, and one of the leaders of the effort.

He said the team working on the manual decided early on to emphasize the interagency aspect of counterinsurgency fights. "The military is only one piece of the puzzle," Crane said. "To be successful in a counterinsurgency, you have to get contributions from a lot of different agencies, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and host-nation organizations. There are so many people involved to make counterinsurgency successful." All of these organizations bring important weapons to the campaign, "and you've got to bring unity of effort if you can to make it effective," he said.

LtCol Lance McDaniel, a branch head at the Marine Corps Combat Development Center at Quantico, VA, said the manual is aimed at battalion-level officers and NCOs, but felt that all who read it could gain some insight into the difficulties of a counterinsurgency war. "We see this being part of the pre-deployment training units undergo," McDaniel said. "Once on the ground they can adapt the ideas from the manual to their particular location and enemy."

The Army and Marine Corps have shared field manuals in the past, but this is the first in which the two services worked closely to write, Crane and McDaniel said. "This was a real team effort of Army and Marine writers."



See [the complete report from the American Forces Press Service](#)

Knowing the Enemy

Can Social Scientists Redefine the "War on Terror"?

By George Packer, *The New Yorker*, 18 Dec 2006

In 1993, a young captain in the Australian Army named David Kilcullen was living among villagers in West Java, as part of an immersion program in the Indonesian language. One day, he visited a local military museum that contained a display about Indonesia's war, during the nineteen-fifties and sixties, against a separatist Muslim insurgency movement called Darul Islam. "I had never heard of this conflict," Kilcullen told me recently. "It's hardly known in the West. The Indonesian government won, hands down. And I was fascinated by how it managed to pull off such a successful counterinsurgency campaign."

Kilcullen, the son of two left-leaning academics, had studied counterinsurgency as a cadet at Duntroon, the Australian West Point, and he decided to pursue a doctorate in political anthropology at the University of New South Wales. He chose as his dissertation subject the Darul Islam conflict, conducting research over tea with former guerrillas while continuing to serve in the Australian Army. The rebel movement, he said, was bigger than the Malayan Emergency—the twelve-year Communist revolt against British rule, which was finally put down in 1960, and which has become a major point of reference in the military doctrine of counterinsurgency. During the years that Kilcullen worked on his dissertation, two events in Indonesia deeply affected his thinking. The first was the rise—in the same region that had given birth to Darul Islam, and among some of the same families—of a more extreme Islamist movement called Jemaah Islamiya, which became a Southeast Asian affiliate of Al Qaeda. The second was East Timor's successful struggle for independence from Indonesia. Kilcullen witnessed the former as he was carrying out his field work; he participated in the latter as an infantry-company commander in a United Nations intervention force. The experiences shaped the conclusions about counter-insurgency in his dissertation, which he finished in 2001, just as a new war was about to begin.



See [more of the article from The New Yorker Online](#)

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[Needed: Standard Operating Procedures!](#)

[Marine Aircraft Group-16](#)

[MCCLL "Binders" Support Training Requirements](#)

[Contractors in the Battle Space](#)

News

[New Counterinsurgency Manual](#)

[Knowing the Enemy](#)

[Newsletter from the Naval Operational Medicine Institute](#)

[Mattis on the Marines](#)

Book Review

[The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq](#)

News (continued)

Lessons Learned Newsletter from the Naval Operational Medicine Institute

As noted in our [February 2006 newsletter](#), the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) was pleased to have had the opportunity to work with the Naval Operational Medicine Institute (NOMI) in establishing its own lessons learned center (the Naval Operational Medical Lessons Learned Center (NOMLLC)). The Center's lessons management system became operational in January 2006 and can be accessed at: <https://www.mccll.usmc.mil/nomi>. MCCLL and NOMLLC intend to share many of the same lessons, relevant documents, and forums, especially those that address Navy corpsmen support to the Marine Corps.

Beginning in December 2006, the NOMLLC began publication of its own excellent newsletter. The initial issue includes many informative articles, including ones on tactical combat casualty care, the Naval Trauma Training Center, and combat and operational stress control. This issue also features the [MCCLL topical paper on traumatic brain injuries](#). MCCLL is proud to have played a small part in the establishment of the NOMI lessons learned system and in the planning for their initial newsletter. Readers who are interested in Marine Corps or Navy medical issues should register on the site noted above to begin reviewing the lessons and documents available and begin receiving the NOMI newsletter. The [December issue of the NOMLLC newsletter is available here](#).

Mattis on the Marines

"Pendleton commander upbeat about morale, progress in Iraq" from the *North County Times*, 2 January 2007

On Wednesday, North County Times reporter Mark Walker sat down for an exclusive interview with Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis, commanding general of Camp Pendleton's I Marine Expeditionary Force and commander of U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command.

Here are a few excerpts from that conversation:

On the conditions in Iraq:

Mattis: "The situation in al-Anbar, which is the Marine area, it's a cancer on Iraq. ... But al-Anbar does not have the sectarian violence that the rest of the country has. It's the Sunni triangle. In fact, the only area that has any significant Shia in it is an area on the eastern side and we have no sectarian violence. Interestingly enough, it's an area with Sunni and Shia living side by side, and we have no significant violence, I couldn't tell you why.

Fallujah is considered to be so changed for the better that Sunni fleeing out of Baghdad are going to Fallujah now. Who would have thought that two years ago? It sounds almost bizarre.

But unlike the sectarian violence elsewhere, it is al-Qaida in Iraq that the Marines fight. That said, after the second election, where for the first time Sunnis voted in very large numbers, al-Qaida moved in the area and basically declared war on the nationalist groups there. And the tribes realized they bought in with the wrong people.

What we are seeing now is a significant shift in the tribes. They are coming over. How does this manifest itself? How is it more than just my words? The Sunni sheiks are having their young guys join the Iraqi police. The reason is they will go to their local areas after they go to training academies in various countries outside of Iraq and they return, when they come back, they go back to their home areas.

So you've got the tribes shifting over, their kids joining the police. You've got the Iraqi army and the Iraqi security forces today, they are probably running around, about 52 percent of the casualties in our medical treatment facilities are Iraqi security forces. Which says something about the nature of the fight and the nature of the Iraqi troops who are now represented among the casualties. It's one way to indicate whether or not they are really in the fight or not.

So these are significant shifts right now. And the transition teams and the Marines who are over there, fighting in a very lethal area where the efforts have been unrelenting, have basically achieved successes that we would not have anticipated this early in this process."



See the complete interview from the [North County Times Online](#)

Featured Articles

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[Marine Aircraft Group-16](#)

[MCCLL "Binders" Support Training Requirements](#)

[Contractors in the Battle Space](#)

News

[New Counterinsurgency Manual](#)

[Knowing the Enemy](#)

[Newsletter from the Naval Operational Medicine Institute](#)

[Mattis on the Marines](#)

Book Review

[The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq](#)

Book Review

An example of the many important works addressing Middle East issues that are included on the [Commandant's Supplemental Reading List](#) for Majors and Lieutenant Colonels deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan is this month's featured book, *The Assassin's Gate*, by George Packer. The supplemental reading list is an excellent resource for any Marine deploying to OIF or OEF and augments the main library of books required to be read by Marines on the [Commandant's Professional Reading List](#). The books on both of these lists not only provide valuable information for Marines and other interested individuals, but can also stimulate thought and discussion among Marines. Some of the books even address controversial topics (as does this month's selection). (Note that a [new magazine article by the author is featured in our "News" Section](#) this month.)

The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq by George Packer

Review by Michael Hirsch, "Confessions of a HUMVEE Liberal," the Washington Monthly

This is an ambitious book, and it succeeds in most of its ambitions. George Packer is the Zelig of the Iraq War. He has been everywhere, it seems, and he has seen the conflict whole. He was there before 9/11, listening to the intellectual arguments of neocons and Iraqi exiles as they won the fight to take on Saddam. He was there in Ramadi and Fallujah as brave but under-supported soldiers like Capt. John Prior lost the fight for Iraqi hearts and minds. He has been in the homes of bereaved fathers like Chris Frosheiser, whose son was killed by an IED, sharing their raw anguish as they struggle to understand what America is fighting for at all in Iraq.

The Assassins' Gate: America in Iraq is the closest thing we have seen to a full history of the Iraq war, from its murky conceptual beginnings through the Bush administration's still-unexplained failures of planning, up to Iraq's present status as a quasi-quagmire with an unknowable future. Much of Packer's reporting in this book has appeared previously in his long articles in *The New Yorker*, some of it word for word. But we are lucky to have it back in book form: Packer's tales of Kurdish grievances over Kirkuk, and of his life among occupied Iraqis as their hopes are dashed, are among the most brilliant and evocative accounts of the Iraq war. Packer avoids the pitfalls of the usual reporter's book—which are typically collections of stories or notebook dumps—in part because of his skill as a narrator but also because *The Assassins' Gate* has a timeless theme: the often heart-wrenching and deadly difference between "abstract terms and concrete realities." "Between them," Packer writes, "lies a distance even greater than the eight thousand miles from Washington to Baghdad."

Packer begins and ends the book with the ultimate abstract dreamer, his friend Kanan Makiya, the Iraqi exile who is in a way the book's protagonist. We first meet Makiya well before the war, in Cambridge, Mass., in the 1990s, when regime change is still just a gleam in his eye and Packer seeks him out. Writing pseudonymously as Samir al-Khalil, Makiya first alerted the world to the savagery of Saddam's regime when he published *Republic of Fear* in the late 1980s. Packer's conversations over coffee with the obsessive but endearing Makiya, he says, turned the dream of a new Iraq into a real issue for him. Packer then moves to Brooklyn, where in the runup to the war he bumps, Zelig-like, into liberal intellectual Paul Berman while Berman is wrestling with "a fierce and solitary intensity" over the issue of how to tie the Ba'athism of Saddam together intellectually with the Islamism of Sayyid Qutb.

He begins to sense signs of trouble. We next find Packer in London as Iraqi exiles try to piece together a postwar government at the Hilton Metropole. He watches in dismay as Makiya's hopes for a postwar plan are torn apart in a chaotic power grab, and his fellow Iraqis brand him an out-of-touch naïf. Meanwhile back home, Dick Cheney is citing Makiya to Tim Russert as one of the Iraqis who has assured him that Americans will "be greeted as liberators."

Then, Packer actually goes to war, and the contrast between the hopeful ideas of his friends and what he finds in Iraq is even more devastating.



See the [complete review from the Washington Monthly](#)