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**About the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned:** The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) is part of the Training and Education Command (TECOM) of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), located at MCB Quantico, VA. The MCCLL mission is to collect, analyze, manage, and disseminate knowledge gained through operational experiences, exercises, and supporting activities in order to enable Marines to achieve higher levels of performance and to provide information and analysis on emerging issues and trends in support of operational commanders and the Commandant of the Marine Corps Title 10 responsibilities. MCCLL manages the Marine Corps Lessons Management System (LMS) and the Consolidated Data Repository (CDR) databases, and reports findings, trends and issues through verbal, written and electronic media.

Visit the MCCLL Website at: [www.mccll.usmc.mil](http://www.mccll.usmc.mil)

Customer relations management support for the MCCLL Website and questions about the newsletter should be directed to: [harry.t.johnson@usmc.mil](mailto:harry.t.johnson@usmc.mil) or [michael.jones@usmc.mil](mailto:michael.jones@usmc.mil) Telephone: 703.432.1279 DSN: 378.1279

**From the Director: MCCLL Online Surveys**

The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) continues to strive to improve the services we provide our Marines, as well as the support furnished to other military services, joint users, and the lessons learned community as a whole. One of the mainstays in the set of tools we use to gather information necessary to support both warfighters and researchers has been "paper" surveys soliciting information from various groups of Marines. Up until recently, conducting these surveys involved "bubble sheets and Number 2 pencils". As one of the key elements of our ongoing improvement program, we recently implemented an online survey capability to help us streamline information gathering, as well as the analysis of results. Initially, the online survey software will be used for two purposes: (1) obtain feedback from users on what they like and do not like about our website and products, and (2) collect quick-turnaround information on topics that are of interest to specific communities of interest.

Many registered users already know about the online survey capability since they received an invitation via e-mail in November requesting their input on the features and products available through our website. The MCCLL Web User Survey was a great success with a response rate of over 20%. The survey was our attempt to determine those areas in which we are succeeding in providing useful services to our customers and those areas in which we are falling short. We would like to thank everyone who participated in the survey, and intend to use the results to enhance our products and services. Some of the preliminary results of the survey are highlighted [here](#).

Some users have commented on the fact that this particular survey was sent to them several times after they did not respond initially. In order to obtain a sufficient number of responses to obtain statistically significant results, it was necessary to send reminders to users who may have let the initial survey request become "buried" under other e-mails. We hope that these reminders were not too much of an annoyance, and again would like to express our appreciation to the Marines and others who took the time to provide us with their responses. We are currently planning a number of other online surveys, including an ongoing survey to solicit feedback on staff NCO leadership capabilities.

Your observations and comments on this or any other topics are welcome. Please contact the MCCLL Director, Col Monte E. Dunard, USMCR, at:

[monte.dunard@usmc.mil](mailto:monte.dunard@usmc.mil) Telephone: 703.432.1286 DSN: 378-1286

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### Preliminary Results from the MCCLL Web User Survey

The initial MCCLL online survey, soliciting feedback from users of the MCCLL website, has provided us with valuable insights that we hope to use in improving website features and products and services that we offer. We are continuing to evaluate the results of the survey in detail from both a statistical and practical standpoint. However, some of the preliminary results may be of interest to our users:

- **Demographics (Rank):** 36% of the respondents were officers (most common rank was O-4), 26% were enlisted (most common rank was E-7), and 35% were civilians (either DoD civilians or Government contractors).
- **Demographics (Military Service):** 45% of the respondents were active or reserve Marine Corps officers or NCOs, 14% were active or reserve military from other Services, 35% were DoD civilians/contractors, and 7% were "Other".
- **Demographics (Number of Deployments):** Of the military respondents, 2% had been deployed 5 or more times, 4% had been deployed four times, 14% three times, 28% two times, 28% one time, and 24% had not yet been deployed.
- **Website Ease of Use:** 60% of respondents found the website to be easy or very easy to use, 36% found it comparable to other sites, and 4% found it difficult to use.
- **Usage of the Website:** The typical user reported visiting the site one or two times a month and spending 15 to 30 minutes there; 75% of respondents had read at least one MCCLL topical paper.
- **Specific Products:**
  - 94% of those who receive the MCCLL monthly newsletter found it to be useful (Note: of those who have not received the newsletter, 50% asked to be included on the distribution list);
  - 83% of those who receive the MCCLL Safety Corner found it to be useful (22% of those who have not, asked to be put on the list).
- **Overall Assessment:** 95% of respondents would recommend the website to others as a useful source of information.

We intend to report on the results of this survey in greater detail in future newsletters and identify any actions that we intend to pursue to respond to your feedback.

Thanks again!

### Iraqi Lessons Learned Center Community of Interest



As the responsibility for the security of the citizens and institutions of Iraq transitions from U.S. and coalition forces to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), it becomes increasingly important to identify improvements that can be made in ISF training and their tactics, techniques and procedures. The focal point for these improvement efforts is the Iraqi Lessons Learned Center (ILLC), established in 2005 with assistance from the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL), the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), and joint and NATO lessons learned organizations.

With the assistance of MCCLL and CALL, the ILLC is now conducting an extensive data collection effort to solicit information from Iraqi officers and enlisted personnel on the quality of training they have received from coalition forces (from an Iraqi viewpoint). The collection effort will address Iraqi Army Division training being provided by (1) the U.S. Army, (2) Iraqi Special Forces, (3) the United Kingdom, and (4) the U.S. Marine Corps. The results of this collection effort should be available shortly.

The ILLC has already produced nine topical papers on a variety of topics based on their initial collection efforts. Many within the U.S. lessons learned community will be interested in reading these topical papers and learning how the Iraqis themselves view the transition. These topical papers have now been translated from the Arabic and are included in a new [ILLC Community of Interest \(COI\)](#) hosted on our website home page. The COI also provides discussion forums for Marines and others to offer their opinions on the topical papers, provide suggestions on ways to improve ISF training, and also to offer their own experiences in working with the ISF or other elements of Iraqi society. It is critically important that every effort be made to improve the capabilities of the ISF and ultimately enhance the quality of life of ordinary Iraqis. We encourage all Marines and others with knowledge or experience in these areas to join the ILLC discussion groups.

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## Distributed Operations in Afghanistan

Prior to the deployment of 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines (1/3) to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in December 2005 and January 2006, one of the platoons (1st Platoon, Company B) was selected to undergo specialized distributed operation (DO) training to prepare it for the types of operations conducted in Afghanistan. The training was provided by a team from the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) and was one component of an Initial Operational Capability Experiment. The MCWL team included noncommissioned officer instructors from the British Royal Marines and Australian Army. The training focused on re-emphasizing a "patrolling" culture within Marine infantry units and enhancing small unit leadership. Success in distributed operations is considered to be related to three key factors: Can a unit sustain itself, does it have the fire power to protect itself, and does it have mobility?



Marines from 1st Platoon, Bravo Company, 1st Bn, 3rd Marines, call for air support during their training in 29 Palms as part of the MCWL experiment to distribute operations to lower-level small unit leaders.

Following small unit leader training at MCWL and platoon training at Fort Hunter Leggett, CA, the DO platoon's initial tasking in Afghanistan was patrolling and conducting surveillance along the Peshe River valley. The winding, constrictive, primitive road between Asadabad and Camp Blessing was a major target for improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and mines at constricted locations, with the river on one side and steep cliffs on the other. The platoon divided into eight to ten separate elements, occupying observation posts at key points along the road and repeatedly disrupted insurgent forces attempting to emplace IEDs. They were able to cover a linear area over three kilometers long for a week at a time. The platoon's capabilities were viewed by 1/3 leadership as a force multiplier and an exceptionally effective method of employment in low intensity combat.

Upon the return of 1/3 from OEF, a team from the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) interviewed 43 key leaders and Marines and surveyed 266 Sergeants and below concerning the DO platoon's training and employment. The results have now been documented in the [MCCLL Topical Paper, entitled Distributed Operations in Afghanistan, First Battalion, Third Marines, Observations and Lessons from OEF VI.](#)

Once deployed to the Kuna Province of eastern Afghanistan, 1st Bn, 3rd Marines, was actively involved in disrupting IED emplacements. Here, an assaultman from the battalion prepares to launch a bag of fuses into a fire created to destroy paraphernalia that would likely have been employed as IED components. The paraphernalia were discovered among a thousand pounds of explosives.



### Note: The concept of distributed operations is not new to the Marine Corps!

Historically, Marine Corps commanders have distributed their forces based on three main considerations:

- Distribute to the smallest unit that is able to protect itself.
- Ensure positive communications; the distribution of smaller units at greater distances requires a longer range communications capability.
- Ensure competent leadership at the lowest level; small unit leaders must be able to take action in the absence of orders and understand where the unit fits in the bigger picture.

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## Company Commander's Lessons Learned Conference

During the past year and a half, the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) has sponsored a series of conferences designed to bring together Marines with common backgrounds and experiences to discuss their observations and insights from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The objective of these conferences has been to identify common themes and lessons that should be passed on to those who will follow them into these theaters. Previously, MCCLL has sponsored the following conferences (with results documented in MCCLL topical papers):

- [Ground Combat Element \(GCE\) Lessons Learned Conference](#)
- [Non-Commissioned Officers Lessons Learned Conference](#)
- [Combat Service Support Element \(CSSE\) Lessons Learned Conference](#)
- [Air Combat Element \(ACE\) Lessons Learned Conference](#)
- [MAGTF – MEF Command Element \(CE\) Lessons Learned Conference](#)

These topical papers have also been incorporated into a compilation of reports for new commanders, called [Lessons for Leaders](#).

As a continuation of the ongoing series of lessons learned conferences, MCCLL sponsored a conference in September that included eleven officers with recent company command experience in OIF and OEF. The objective was to document their observations and lessons, identify areas in which training for follow-on units could be improved, and identify tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) that have proven to be successful in combat situations. The results of the conference have now been documented in the MCCLL topical paper, [Company Commander's Lessons Learned Conference, 20 – 21 September 2006, Lessons and Observations from Company Commanders in OIF and OEF](#).



The company commander of Charlie Company, 1st Bn, 25th Marines, leads a security patrol through the streets of Fallujah. During this operation, the patrol received small arms fire from insurgents in the Souk district of the city.

## Among the many substantive recommendations offered during the conference by the company commanders in attendance were:

- The best training for prospective company commanders was considered to be the Ground Occupational Field Expansion Course (OFEC). This training should be provided to non-resident Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS) graduates prior to their joining operating force units.
- There is a need for an intelligence analysis capability at the company level. Common, interoperable intelligence software and hardware should be provided to the company.
- Units should be provided with the same types and quantities of equipment for their pre-deployment training program (PTP) that they will employ in theater.
- The Infantry Squad Leaders Course (ISLC) and Infantry Unit Leaders Course (IULC) should count as professional military education (PME) equivalent for promotion credit. All prospective platoon sergeants, particularly those returning to the operating forces after a 'B' billet assignment, should attend IULC. Squad leaders should attend ISLC.
- A national biometric toolset (BATS) database should be established in theater to facilitate exchange of information among areas of operation (AOs)

For a complete discussion of these and many other company-level issues see the complete topical paper at: [Company Commander's Lessons Learned Conference, 20 – 21 September 2006](#).

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## Searching the MCCLL Repositories

All of the lessons and documents contained in the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) repositories are accessible through the MCCLL website and can be located through a powerful search engine that is available to all "authorized users" of the website (i.e., those users who have registered on our site using a .mil or .gov e-mail address). We have found that many authorized users are not aware of the impressive search capabilities that are available to them. On the other hand, other users have informed us of the excellent results they have obtained even when searching on topics that are relatively "obscure".

Anyone who is familiar with the capabilities of "google-type" searches will recognize these same features in the MCCLL search engine and should be very comfortable with the search parameters available. Users who have not accessed our website recently may not realize that the google-type search is now easier than ever to use. Instead of having to click on [GOOGLE TYPE SEARCH](#) on the left-hand side of the home page, the search can be conducted immediately from a search box on the top left of the home page:



The google-type search accesses all of the repositories available through the MCCLL website. Your search results may include not only lessons, but also after action reports (AARs), briefings, topical papers, transcribed interviews, standard operating procedures (SOPs), photographs, etc. When conducting your search, it is helpful to know some of the tips that can either broaden or limit the scope of your search depending on your particular needs. Clicking on the search help button:  will provide an extensive list of hints that can help you to tailor the search. The following is only a representative sample of the many search tips that are available:

#### Quick Tips

For more information, click the link in these quick tips:

Omit Non- <a href="#">alphanumeric characters</a>	rotor wing (for rotor & wing)
Use <b>and</b> to require <a href="#">multiple keywords</a>	engines and fuel
Insert a <b>space</b> between words to search for <a href="#">phrases</a>	communication satellites
Enclose words in <b>double quotes</b> to search on a <a href="#">string</a> , not case sensitive	"museum of natural history"
Enter a <b>comma</b> between words to search for <a href="#">any</a> of the words	army, navy
Enter your search terms in <b>lower case</b> to search for those terms in <a href="#">any case</a>	helicopters
Capitalize <a href="#">proper nouns</a> to search for specific people, places, or products	John Colter, Netscape Navigator
Narrow your searches by using <b>and</b> if a search term <a href="#">must appear</a> on a page	museum and art
Exclude pages by using a <b>not</b> if a search term <a href="#">must not appear</a> on a page	museum not Paris
Combine these techniques to create a specific search query. The better your description of the information you want, the more relevant your results will be.	museum and "natural history" dinosaur not Chicago

Although the google-type search is the most powerful search capability available on the MCCLL website, users can also search the lessons and observations by clicking on [VIEW OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS](#) and entering search terms into "Quick Search". This search capability is much more limited and may result in "too many" results. For example, a search on "IED" will yield lessons that contain the words, "buried", "hurried", "varied", etc.

We invite all users to conduct your own searches and see if our repositories contain documents or lessons in your areas of interest. **Happy Hunting!**

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## Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)

Throughout its history, the Marine Corps has been called upon to perform non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) to ensure the safety of U.S. citizens who have found themselves in the middle of foreign conflicts or emergency situations. Marines supported eight major non-combatant evacuations in the 1990s, beginning with the evacuation in 1991 of 2,400 civilians from Monrovia during the Liberia civil war and ending with the evacuation of 105 civilians from Asmara, Eritrea, in 1998. Since then, the Marine Corps has supported three evacuations in the 21st Century, with the latest being the evacuation of U.S. citizens in July/August 2006 from Lebanon during the hostilities between Hezbollah militants and the Israeli Army.

A Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) team, including a representative from the HQMC Historical Division, deployed to Bahrain/Kuwait in October to conduct one-on-one interviews with key personnel on the staff of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) responsible for conducting the Lebanon NEO. The 24th MEU successfully completed all U.S. government NEO objectives, beginning with the initial 5,000 evacuee requirement and eventually evolved into the need to evacuate 15,000 U.S. citizens. One of the keys to the success of the mission was the ability of the MEU staff to anticipate evolving NEO requirements and establish an excellent working relationship with the embassy staff.

The initial results of the MCCLL collection effort have now been documented in the "Quick Look" Report, [Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations \(NEO\), Lessons and Observations from the 24th MEU NEO of the American Embassy, Beirut, Lebanon](#).



Marines assist U.S. citizens as they wait to board a CH-53 transport helicopter at the U.S. embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, for a flight to Cyprus.

### Preliminary recommendations from the [MCCLL Quick Look Report](#) include:

- MEU pre-deployment training should continue to emphasize more complex NEO scenarios that involve robust intelligence, communications and interagency responses.
- The Marine Corps should maximize opportunities for interfacing with the Department of State (DOS) as part of pre-deployment training and DOS Foreign Service training and during MEU deployments.

MCCLL is currently developing a formal written report on the Lebanon NEO that will be published shortly and featured in a forthcoming newsletter. **Stay Tuned!**

Once arriving in Cyprus, American citizens exit the CH-53 to make arrangements for their final destinations.



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## Marine Aviation Observations and Lessons

Over the past three years, Marine aviation has been required to adapt to an ever changing environment in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), as the focus has shifted from the high intensity conflict of OIF I to the current counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. Aviation combat skills required as a component of combined arms and integrated fire support are considered to be perishable and differ greatly from the skills employed in lower intensity conflicts. A major challenge for Marine aviation is to retain its ability to support high intensity conflicts (that still may arise on very short notice), while continuing to adapt to the necessities of fighting in today's COIN environment.

In response to a request from the Deputy Commandant for Aviation, the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) developed a set of talking points on Marine aviation, focusing on those that would be relevant to coalition partners. These talking points were based on lessons, observations and interviews contained in the MCCLL Lessons Management System (LMS) that highlight both successes and deficiencies identified by Marine aviation elements. Many of the most relevant lessons learned were identified during the [Aviation Combat Element \(ACE\) Commanders' Lessons Learned Conference held in March 2006](#). The MCCLL LMS contains aviation lessons from both Iraq and Afghanistan experiences and covers a range of subjects from assault support to unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operations to urban close air support (CAS).

The talking points provided to the Deputy Commandant have now been documented in a short MCCLL topical paper, [Aviation Observations and Lessons from Recent Operations](#).



Two AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters from Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 773, "Red Dogs", fly near Salerno Forward Operating Base (FOB) in Khost Province, Afghanistan, to provide Marines in squad-sized elements on the ground with the opportunity to practice close air support (CAS).

### Among the Marine aviation talking points presented in the MCCLL topical paper are:

- **Operations:** Recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have re-validated the Marine Corps doctrine of an integrated ground-air team with authority vested in the ground commander, and attack coordination and weapons release controlled by a forward air controller (FAC) or a joint terminal air controller (JTAC). **The importance of effective CAS cannot be over emphasized.**
- **Organize:** The liaison officers that squadron commanders have exchanged with Wings, Tactical Air Control Centers (TACCs) and Combined Air Operations Centers (CAOCs) became indispensable in the flow of information, including keeping the squadron commanders informed of current operations, future operations, requirements and expectations.
- **Train:** Sending instructors from the Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron (MAWTS) and Fleet Replacement Squadron Instructor Pilots to theater to fly combat missions with squadrons, and then returning to the schoolhouses with recent experience was praised as an effective program.
- **Equip:** Each battalion should be equipped with laser target designators so FACs can provide precision marks, since there are many occasions when the FACs need to target one individual building out of a group of as many as twenty closely spaced buildings.

For a complete discussion of these and many other talking points provided to the Deputy Commandant for Aviation, see the complete topical paper at: [Aviation Observations and Lessons from Recent Operations](#).

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### Contact List of MCCLL Representatives

As part of our continuing effort to provide enhanced services to MCCLL customers and also expand the capabilities of the small staff located at the MCCLL headquarters at Quantico, VA, we have now deployed representatives onsite at major commands and organizations throughout the Marine Corps, as well as with other DoD organizations.

The following contact information may be helpful in identifying specific individuals that you may need to contact on particular topics or issues. We intend to continually update this list in future newsletters

COMMAND	LOCATION	NAME	PRIMARY PHONE	E-MAIL
3D Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) Forward	Al Asad, Iraq	Col Danny McDade	318-341-1133	NIPR <a href="mailto:danny.mcdade@acemnf-wiraq.usmc.mil">danny.mcdade@acemnf-wiraq.usmc.mil</a>
				SIPR <a href="mailto:danny.mcdade@acemnf-wiraq.usmc.smil.mil">danny.mcdade@acemnf-wiraq.usmc.smil.mil</a>
I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Forward	Camp Fallujah, Iraq	Maj Craig Penrose	318-340-4848	NIPR <a href="mailto:craig.penrose@cemnf-wiraq.usmc.mil">craig.penrose@cemnf-wiraq.usmc.mil</a>
				SIPR <a href="mailto:craig.penrose@cemnf-wiraq.usmc.smil.mil">craig.penrose@cemnf-wiraq.usmc.smil.mil</a>
1st Marine Logistics Group (MLG) Forward	Al Taqaddum, Iraq	Capt Mark Fleming	318-342-2422	NIPR <a href="mailto:mark.fleming@cssemnf-wiraq.usmc.mil">mark.fleming@cssemnf-wiraq.usmc.mil</a>
				SIPR <a href="mailto:mark.fleming@cssemnf-wiraq.usmc.smil.mil">mark.fleming@cssemnf-wiraq.usmc.smil.mil</a>
Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA), Joint Forces Command (JFCOM)	Suffolk, VA	Col Gregory Jackson	757-203-6476 DSN: 668	NIPR <a href="mailto:gregory.jackson@jfc.com">gregory.jackson@jfc.com</a>
				SIPR <a href="mailto:j9067@hq.jfc.com.smil.mil">j9067@hq.jfc.com.smil.mil</a>
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				SIPR <a href="mailto:burkejd@29palms.usmc.smil.mil">burkejd@29palms.usmc.smil.mil</a>
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				SIPR <a href="mailto:smithmp@29palms.usmc.smil.mil">smithmp@29palms.usmc.smil.mil</a>
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## Civil Affairs Group Operations

In July 2006, representatives of the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) conducted an in-theater collection effort with personnel from the 3rd Civil Affairs Group (3d CAG) at Camp Fallujah, Iraq. The Group plays a key role in the prosecution of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in Al Anbar through its oversight of a variety of Marine Corps projects to assist in reconstruction efforts throughout the Province. Three of the four detachments of the 3d CAG are in support of the regimental combat teams or brigade combat teams of the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) in Iraq, and one supports the provincial Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC). The officer in charge of this latter detachment also serves as the advisor to the provincial governor on civil military matters. The CAG has liaison officers with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office, and the U.S. Embassy in Amman, Jordan (to support the repatriation of influential Iraqis such as sheiks and businessmen). Key subject matter experts from 3d CAG are positioned with a number of Iraqi Ministries including Energy, Finance, and Displacement and Migration.

Although the CAG had eight months advance notice of its deployment, the Group was not mobilized until December 2005 for a March 2006 deployment. With the continued demand for civil affairs capabilities and insufficient time to reconstitute units with all of the experience and skills necessary, CAGs have been forced to supplement their ranks with non-CA personnel. Only approximately 20 to 30 percent of the CAG personnel were trained in civil affairs or had previous CA experience.

MCCLL conducted interviews with key 3d CAG personnel after they had been deployed for about four months, addressing ways in which the organization, training and equipping of CAG units could be improved. The results of this collection effort have been documented in the topical paper: [Civil Affairs Group Operations, Lessons and Observations from 3rd Civil Affairs Group in OIF 05-07](#).



Marines from the 3d CAG, in conjunction with U.S. Army representatives, coordinate with the owner of a water treatment facility in Sadiquiyah, Iraq, on their joint efforts to fix the facility and provide citizens in the town with clean water.

### Among the key recommendations from the CAG data collection effort are:

- **Manning.** The table of organization (T/O) of the CAG should be reviewed and updated to ensure sufficient personnel are available to accomplish assigned missions and conduct training.
- **Equipping.**
  - The table of equipment (T/E) should also be reviewed.
  - Roles should be clarified in the sourcing of equipment for mobilizing reserve units, and equipment deficiencies should be addressed.
- **Training.**
  - Sufficient time should be allowed between notification of deployment, activations and deployment to conduct unit level training.
  - A training package should be developed for reserve officers to better prepare them to serve as augmentees to MEF and higher level staffs. The package should include material from such courses as Action Officer 101, MAGTF 101, the Marine Corps Rapid Response Planning Process (R2P2), and Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPD).
- **Contracting.** Contracting requirements for CAG detachments should be assessed to determine any training or certification gaps in the ongoing contracting MOS reorganization and training effort.

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### The Safety Corner



### November Editions of the MCCLL Safety Newsletter

Three editions of the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) Safety Corner were distributed during November 2006. These newsletters focused on some of the most serious safety issues faced by Marines in combat and garrison environments:

- **8 November 2006 Safety Corner: Private Motor Vehicle Travel.** During fiscal year 2006, the Marine Corps lost 143 Marines and Sailors to private motor vehicle (PMV) accidents. During this same period, the Army reported the loss of 248 soldiers. Even though safety briefings conducted prior to every holiday emphasize safe driving, Marines continue to display risky behavior that results in unacceptable losses of our most importance resource. This edition of the Safety Corner features some good ideas from an AAV Company Commander on ways to reduce PMV accidents
- **15 November Safety Corner: Hearing Protection.** Hearing protection is usually addressed as a safety or medical issue. However, Marine combat leaders must recognize that preserving their ability to hear also preserves the ability to exercise command, control, and communications (C3) which is a tactical issue. It has a direct impact on success in combat. Protecting your hearing is the responsibility of every Marine. This edition of the Safety Corner addresses the need to wear ear plugs in combat situations, as well as in other noisy environments.
- **21 November Safety Corner: Alcohol Poisoning.** Too many Marines continue to turn to alcohol as the solution to the everyday stress encountered in their work or private lives. As a result, seven Marines died in fiscal year 2006 from alcohol poisoning. (This does not include motor vehicle deaths related to alcohol.) This edition of the Safety Corner has some sobering information on alcohol impairment, signs of alcoholism, signs of alcohol poisoning, and the responsibility that we all have to help our fellow Marines with alcohol problems.

### 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) (Forward) Safety Newsletter for November 2006

The November edition of the 3d MAW (Fwd) safety newsletter, "[Lines in the Sand](#)", includes a number of informative articles on safety issues faced in Marine aviation, as well as other elements of the MAGTF. November articles address such topics as the winter safety campaign of Multi-National Corps Iraq (MNC-I), unexploded ordnance (UXO), space heater safety, disposal of hazardous waste, and the dangers of C-wire emplacements.

Col Danny McDade, MCCLL's representative to 3d MAW (Fwd), as well as its Director of Safety and Standardization, points out that, with the reprieve from the heat of the Iraqi Summer, Marines may tend to reduce their vigilance in looking for fire hazards, etc. The use of space heaters can increase the potential for fires in the Winter. Only approved military heaters should be used; non-standard, un-vented commercial heaters are not authorized for use inside buildings. Carbon monoxide poisoning also poses a threat during cold weather operations. In addition, Iraqi Winters can bring violent dust storms that are dangerous for unprotected eyes and can also contribute to respiratory complications. Visibility during these storms can be a problem for vehicle drivers. A number of other Winter safety hazards are highlighted in the newsletter, as well.



See [all of the Lines in the Sand articles](#)

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#### Commandant's Planning Guidance

The new Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), Gen James T. Conway, has issued his planning guidance that includes his priorities for the next few years. Gen Conway emphasizes the imperative of placing the number one priority on those Marines and Sailors in combat and on winning the long war on terror (as characterized by the current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq). Gen Conway is committed to achieving a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio in order to avoid an adverse toll on Marines and their families. Achieving this ratio will "strengthen our capacity to train for any clime and place and fulfill our promise to be "most ready when the Nation is least ready"." Gen Conway closes his guidance with:

"This Nation has high expectations of her Marines — as she should. That confidence is the legacy of all those who have worn the eagle, globe, and anchor — one born from selfless service and a disciplined, educated approach to the profession of arms. Generations of Marines of every race, color, and creed have passed to us an abiding obligation to personify those traits that represent our Corps and the best of America. These traits are an inseparable part of our heritage — a heritage of service to our Nation, our Corps, our fellow Marines, and our families.

Marines, I am proud of you and I am proud of our success on the battlefield. The colors have been passed to a new generation: one worthy of the title "Marine" — and the legacy of our past. The men and women of today's Corps stand shoulder-to-shoulder with "those who have gone before" with a proud and deserved reputation of honorable and heroic service to our Nation. I am confident of our future as the Nation's Force of Choice: you have earned this distinction. Together, we will write yet another chapter of honorable service in the history of our Corps."



See [the complete Guidance from the Commandant](#)

#### National Museum of the Marine Corps

##### Gallery of Grunts At the New National Museum of the Marine Corps, Heroes but No Heroics

By Henry Allen, Washington Post Staff Writer, Sunday, November 19, 2006

The new National Museum of the Marine Corps shows you the Marine Corps as it is, which is mostly enlisted men, anonymous grunts, and war as it is, which is dirty, crazy and endless. No victory parades up the Champs-Elysees or down Fifth Avenue through the tickertape, no full-dress surrenders, no girls kissing Marines at war's end, no wreaths, triumphal arches, reflecting pools or any of the World War II Memorial stuff on the Mall, no generals holding binoculars with one hand and pointing over the battlefield with the other, not that many officers at all, really. And just about no ideology about freedom, America the beautiful or making the world safe for democracy.

A staff sergeant named Steven Sullivan, one of the builders of the exhibits, last week stood inside the big circular hall that holds fighter planes and displays, which include a helicopter disgorging troops in Korea and Marines hitting the beach at Tarawa. He summed up the ethos of the whole 118,000 square feet of the place: "No grandiosity, no heroic garbage." One doesn't think of the Marine Corps shrinking from advertising its glamour: the Iwo Jima flag-raising monument, those grandiose TV ads with knights, dragons and swords, and the bumper sticker braggadocio: "Marines -- When It Absolutely, Positively Has to Be Destroyed Overnight." And there's the 210-foot spire that slants over the museum in unavoidable line-of-sight of travelers driving on Interstate 95 past the Marine base at Quantico.

The museum itself, however, is not about glamour; it's about the Marine mystique. And despite the glamour created by supremely adroit Marine public relations, the mystique is founded on -- of all things -- a willful and even perverse modesty. Not the modesty of Spartans or kamikazes, or the French Foreign Legion parading at a half-time funeral step with leather aprons and axes, but a pristine and hard-eyed dirt-farm stinginess, a nearly lost American poor-but-proud aesthetic that makes Marines enjoy their belief that they're always fighting with hand-me-down equipment and not enough troops (because one Marine is as good as 10 of any enemy, a belief that was just as wrong when the Confederate army believed it, too). There are also the casualties that provoke the perverse Marine boast that the corps is the finest machine ever developed for the killing of young American men. A friend of mine once heard a Marine colonel say to an Army colonel: "The Army uses tanks to protect men. The Marines use men to protect tanks."



See [more of the article from Washington Post Online](#)

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#### Counter Radio-Controlled Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare (CREW) Train-the-Trainer Courses

In an effort to ensure that Marines are fully proficient on counter radio-controlled improvised explosive device (IED) warfare (CREW) systems, the Tactical Training Exercise Control Group (TTECG) at 29 Palms, CA, has developed a three day train-the-trainer (T3) course that provides an overview of the various categories of radio-controlled IEDs (RCIEDs) and techniques to defeat these devices being encountered in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and on the CREW systems currently in the inventory to mitigate these threats. The students completing this training course are then able to go back to their units and train their fellow Marines on the valuable counter-IED tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) that they have learned.

The first day of the new CREW T3 course includes classroom instruction, while the second and third days consist of both classroom and practical application periods of instruction at Camp Wilson on IED "lanes" designated to provide realistic representations of RCIED threats likely to be encountered in theater. The first three sessions of this course were completed in November and December, with students attending from all three Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs). The next two classes are scheduled for January.

Additional information on these classes can be obtained from the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) representatives to TTECG: Mr. Michael Smith at [michael.p.smith6@usmc.mil](mailto:michael.p.smith6@usmc.mil) or Mr. Jim Burke at [james.d.burke.ctr@usmc.mil](mailto:james.d.burke.ctr@usmc.mil).

#### Militant Ideology Atlas

The *Combating Terrorism Center (CTC)* at West Point recently announced the release of the *Militant Ideology Atlas*, an in-depth study of the Jihadi Movement's top thinkers and their most popular writings. This is considered to be the first systematic mapping of the ideology inspiring al-Qaeda.

The report identifies the most influential thinkers in the Jihadi Movement and delineates the movement's key ideological vulnerabilities. It situates the Jihadi Movement within the various Muslim constituencies that Jihadi leaders seek to influence and persuade. Each constituency is responsive to leaders in the broader constituencies of which it is a part, but each also has its own set of thinkers that are best positioned to influence their base.

The largest constituency is comprised of Muslims, people who follow the Qur'an and the example of Muhammad. This includes Sunnis (people who follow the example of the Prophet) and Shi'is (people who follow the example of the Prophet and his descendants through his son-in-law Ali), and ranges from secularists to fundamentalists. This constituency is much too broad to identify one or two individuals who shape opinion across the broad spectrum of Muslims.

The CTC's researchers spent a year mining the most popular books and articles in al-Qaeda's online library, profiling hundreds of figures in the Jihadi Movement, and cataloging over 11,000 citations, all of which are scheduled to be made available to academics and policy makers. Some of the empirically supported findings of the project are surprising:

- The most influential Jihadi intellectuals are clerics from Jordan and Saudi Arabia, two of the closest allies to the U.S. in the Middle East.
- Among them, the Jordanian cleric Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi has had the most impact on other Jihadi thinkers and has been the most consequential in shaping the worldview of the Jihadi Movement.
- In contrast, the study finds that Usama Bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri have had little influence on other Jihadi theorists and strategists.

The Executive Report is now available, summarizing the main conclusions of the comprehensive effort and provides policy relevant recommendations informed by these findings. The accompanying Research Compendium is available at <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/atlas> and a link to the entire data base will be available soon.



[The Militant Ideology Executive Summary can be review here](#)

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### Book Review

[Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq by Ahmed S. Hashim](#)

Review by Capt Sean D. Schrock from the Marine Corps Gazette

In the preface to his "preliminary full-length study" of the Iraqi insurgency, Ahmed S. Hashim soberly notes that "even if it is ultimately defeated, this insurgency has been costly. It did not have to be this way."

In the more than 3 years since the swift fall of the regime of Saddam Hussein, journalists, pundits, and polemicists have unleashed a torrent of publications about the conflict in Iraq. Works of expert historical, sociological, and politico-military analysis, however, have been relatively rare. Hashim's latest work is one such rarity. It presents a timely and thorough examination of the continuing aftermath of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

A Professor of Strategic Studies at the U.S. Naval War College, a specialist on Middle Eastern strategic issues and irregular warfare, and an advisor with U.S. forces in Iraq from fall 2003 to fall 2005, Hashim's latest work aims to tell "the story of [the Iraqi] insurgency and the U.S. responses to it." Setting for himself a complicated, difficult, and sometimes controversial target, Hashim's aim is true, revealing with clarity "the insurgency's origins, motivations, and evolution, and the U.S. policy and strategic and operational responses to it."

Hashim begins with a succinct narrative of the conventional war. Not merely rehashing the now-familiar history of the collapse of the Iraqi military and the toppling of the Ba'athist regime, Hashim reveals the historical antecedents and political and institutional factors that rendered the outcome of the conventional conflict a foregone conclusion and set the stage for the ensuing insurgency. The author next examines the nature of the insurgency—its origins, its geographical and ethnosectarian identities, its popular support, its diverse and fractured organizational and institutional infrastructure, and its operational goals and tactical concepts. Hashim describes the insurgency as "low-intensity, localized, and decentralized." It is "largely a Sunni Arab affair." It includes "a heavy concentration of Sunni Arab tribes whose members served in the armed forces and security services of the former regime." While it does not enjoy the support of all Sunnis, the insurgency's range "encompasses all classes and it is urban and rural." Although there has not been a massive influx of foreign terrorists and religious extremists, "they constitute a force multiplier and are willing to engage in operations that most Iraqi insurgents would prefer to avoid." The insurgents' primary aim has been to make the occupation so untenable and costly as to force the coalition to leave.

Hashim catalogues the severe structural weaknesses of insurgency, the most significant of which is "the fact that it is not a war of national liberation encompassing all the communities" of Iraq. The insurgency is also severely hampered by its deep organizational divisions and ideological disunity, the absence of viable Sunni political parties and leaders enjoying popular support and real influence with the Shi'a and the coalition, and few sources of external state support.

Hashim also probes a more significant question. What are the insurgents' motivations? He concludes that, primarily, the insurgency in Iraq manifests the Sunni Arabs' desire to protect their communal identity (intimately tied to the centralized Iraqi state and its Arab nationalist ideology and influenced deeply by the community's privileged position in Ottoman and 20th century Iraq) and reflects their profound fears of political marginalization and socioeconomic disadvantage in a "de-Arabized" Iraq dominated by Shi'a and Kurds. Divided politically and ideologically, with no effective or popular political movements (ironically, a legacy of their privileged but tightly surveilled status in Ba'athist Iraq), "one can argue that the insurgency has been the Sunni Arab means of political participation."



See the [complete review from the Marine Corps Gazette](#)

Other important works on the Middle East are included in the [Commandant's Supplemental Reading List](#) for Majors and Lieutenant Colonels deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan. Readers should also refer to the main library of books required to be read by Marines on the [Commandant's Professional Reading List](#).