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Tactical Lessons For Peacekeeping
U.S. Multinational Force in Beirut
1982-1984
Major Ronald F. Baczkowski, USMC
Executive Summary
Research Question: Were the Marine Amphibious Units (MAUs) employed
in Beirut, Lebanon from August 1982 to February 1984 properly trained,
equipped, and organized to conduct peacekeeping operations? If so, were
there tactical reasons for the 24th MAU's failure? What are the tactical
lessons learned for future peacekeeping forces?
Discussion:
The U.S. Multinational Force (USMNF) operated in Beirut, Lebanon from
25 August 1982 to 26 February 1984. During this period four different MAUs
served as peacekeepers. The USMNF was initially successful; but, as the
strategic and tactical situations changed, the peacekeepers came
increasingly under fire. On 23 October 1983, a lone terrorist destroyed
the headquarters building of BLT 1/8, killing 241 Marines and sailors and
wounding over 100 others.
This study examines the tactical situation and how it changed. It
analyzes how the training before employment may have assisted or prevented
the tactical-level forces from operating effectively. It examines both
positive and negative lessons learned through critical analysis. It
provides many details concerning the actual tactical situation so the
reader can conduct his or her own critical analysis and come to their own
conclusions.
Conclusions:
MAUs can be used in peacekeeping operations if the mission is
carefully defined, the situation is fairly constant, and the operation is
relatively short duration. By extension to their modern equivalents,
forward-deployed and rapid-deployment combat forces can also be used in
peacekeeping operations under the same conditions. These type forces have
the equipment, personnel, and discipline required to conduct short
duration peacekeeping operations.
However, peacekeeping operations are normally decentralized and are
conducted in a constantly changing environment over a long duration. Under
these conditions, forward-deployed units lack the specialized training and
education necessary to conduct peacekeeping operations. Combat forces,
which are not trained in peacekeeping theory and tactics, are restricted
to operate in a predictible set-piece pattern as directed by their higher
headquarters. This pattern creates a vulnerability in the peacekeeping
force that can be exploited by parties hostile to the force. Additionally,
when faced with unfamiliar stressful situations combat forces, which are
not specially trained for peacekeeping, tend to respond as they would in
conventional combat and not the way they should respond in peacekeeping.
Excessive force makes the peacekeepers a party to the conflict instead of
a neutral third party.
If forward-deployed combat forces are the initial rapid-response force
committed to peacekeeping operations, they should be replaced by specially
trained peacekeeping forces as soon as possible.
CHAPTER ONE:
Introduction
At approximately 0622 on Sunday, 23
October 1983, the Battalion Landing Team (BLT) Headquarters building in
the Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) compound at Beirut International Airport
was destroyed by a terrorist bomb. This catastrophic attack took the lives
of 241 U. S. military personnel and wounded over 100 others. The bombing
was carried out by a lone terrorist.
The spectacular loss of life at so little cost to
terrorists led to two separate investigations concerning the security of
the U. S. Multinational Force (USMNF) positions in Beirut before the end
of 1983. The U. S. Department of Defense Commission on the Beirut
International Airport Terrorist Act, also known as the Long Commission,
focused on the force's ability to operate in a terrorist environment.
Among its findings it concludes "that the USMNF was not trained,
organized, staffed, or supported to deal effectively with the terrorist
threat in Lebanon." The day before the release of the Long Commission
report, the U. S. House of Representatives' Investigations Subcommittee
published a separate report, which focused on the adequacy of Marine
security. While both reports conclude the security of the tactical-level
forces was inadequate at the time of the bombing, they focus primarily on
measures taken to protect against the specific threat of terrorism. They
pay little attention to the other aspects of the peacekeeping mission.
In an interview conducted almost five months before the terrorist
attack, the MAU Commander, Colonel Timothy J. Geraghty, stated the
greatest threat to the USMNF was terrorism. Tactical-level commanders
recognized the possibility of a terrorist threat and took what they
considered appropriate action against this threat. However, they also had
to consider many other factors besides terrorism while carrying out their
mission. The Long Commission came close to recognizing these other factors
in its conclusion:
That although it finds the BLT and MAU Commanders to be at fault, it
also finds that there was a series of circumstances beyond their control
that influenced their judgment and their actions relating to the security
of the USMNF.
Tactical-level commanders misjudged the relative importance of
terrorism as a factor as compared to other factors affecting their
mission.
Since the release of the Long Commission report, the USMNF in Lebanon
has been studied from many different perspectives. The U. S. Naval War
College uses the Beirut failure as a case study to analyze national and
strategic- level decisionmaking. The commitment of U. S. military force
and subsequent catastrophe receive credit in part for the development of
the Weinberger Doctrine that outlines the criteria for the use of U. S.
military force in a crisis. Several analyses conducted by students at the
U. S. Army Command and General Staff College and U. S. Naval War College
examine the USMNF's performance from the perspective of operational art.
The one thing all these analyses have in common is that they focus on
higher-level decisionmaking. This emphasis is understandable given
Clausewitz's concept that "[w]ar is a continuation of politics by other
means." Failed strategy will never achieve political objectives whereas
tactical-level failure may still result in strategic success if the
strategy is sound. While the Long Commission and House Subcommittee's
reports highlight the reality of terrorism at the tactical-level, most of
the lessons learned about peacekeeping have been at higher levels.
Small-unit tactical lessons about peacekeeping have received little to no
attention.
Ironically, battalion-sized units are the most likely units to get
involved in future peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, the latest
developments in communications technology link tactical-level activities
more closely than ever to the strategic-level as government, public, and
military leaders see tactical-level developments at the same time. With
the recent increase in peacekeeping operations, tactical lessons learned
from past operations are receiving more and more attention. Unfortunately,
at the tactical-level, the tendency is to over-simplify lessons learned
from the USMNF and focus primarily on force protection.
As a result of this tendency and the previous high-level focus of
analysis, many complex and subtle tactical lessons learned from the USMNF
are being lost. The latest U. S. Army manual on the subject, FM 100-23
Peace Operations, uses seventeen "historical perspectives" to
reinforce its points, but not one example is from the USMNF. While some of
the lessons learned by the USMNF are in this manual, they are "disguised"
as text appearing more like a list of "do's and don'ts." The USMNF
experience in Beirut provides numerous examples that illustrate the "why"
of peacekeeping, not just the "how."
Peacekeeping has some general principles, but every operation must
accurately account for its own unique circumstances. The complexity,
diversity, and unique characteristics of peacekeeping operations warrant
detailed analysis to get an appreciation for the challenges facing
peacekeepers. The Marines and commanders of the USMNF operated in a
confusing environment under numerous restraints while executing a mission,
which even today is not a primary mission nor fully understood. Over a
period of eighteen months, thousands of decisions were made by four
different MAU commanders, five different BLT commanders, and over 5,000
individual Marines and small-unit tactical leaders. Even though some
decisions ultimately can be linked to the bombing of the BLT Headquarters,
many good tactical-level decisions were made. The thought and rationale
behind those decisions offer numerous lessons to future peacekeeping
forces. Furthermore, while some decisions contributed to the loss of life
and failure, those decisions were made with the thought that they were the
best decisions given the situation and resources available at the time.
Hindsight allows perfect judgment of past decisions. However, valuable
lessons can be learned by analyzing decisions made by members of the USMNF
with consideration for the situation as it existed at the time.
In all likelihood forward-deployed forces will be thrust into future
peacekeeping roles. They will also be faced with making decisions in
complex, unfamiliar situations. We can understand this dilemma by
examining the thought process of those individuals tasked with the
tactical-level decisions for the USMNF operations in Lebanon. This paper
will examine the USMNF's tactical- level decisions and actions in Lebanon
from 1982 to 1984 through critical analysis. It will examine if the MAUs
participating in MNF peacekeeping operations were organized, trained, and
equipped properly to conduct peacekeeping operations. It will examine the
tactics and procedures used and evaluate their effectiveness. Finally, it
will draw conclusions as to the feasibility of using forward-deployed or
rapid-deployment combat forces in peacekeeping operations.
CHAPTER TWO: Setting the stage
On 6 June 1982, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) attacked into Lebanon
on the first day of Operation Peace For Galilee. What was initially
declared to be a limited offensive designed to create a buffer zone for
the northern Israeli settlements soon turned into a siege of Beirut, a
cosmopolitan city of over one-half million people. In its pursuit of the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) tactical forces, Israel violated
the sovereignty of Lebanon, engaged in major battles with Syria, and
backed its quarry into a corner.
In general, from an Israeli perspective, the original motives for war
justified the use of force. As the military operations took on a life of
their, own regardless of what was briefed to or directed by the
government, the Israeli people began to question the legitimacy of the
operation especially as Israeli casualties began to rise. Operation Peace
For Galilee soon became a complex quagmire creating problems between the
military, government, and people comparable to the problems faced by the
U. S. during its involvement in Vietnam.
The IDF faced a major dilemma. To continue the siege of Beirut meant
increased casualties with no appreciable gain while simultaneously
increasing domestic pressure against military operations. In addition to
putting pressure on the PLO, the siege also placed extreme hardship on the
Lebanese people. Civilian suffering increased international pressure
against Israel. An attack into the city to destroy the PLO could result in
enormous casualties to the IDF. Additionally, a physical assault would
require extensive dismounted infantry troops, but the IDF was organized
and equipped primarily for mechanized infantry and armored operations. To
quit the siege or to not assault would cause Israel to fall well short of
its original objectives.
The U. S. also faced a dilemma. Israel had always been considered an
ally in an unstable region, which was traditionally hostile to the U. S.
and its interests. However, the IDF invasion created an even more unstable
environment that not only threatened the safety of U. S. citizens in
Lebanon, but risked escalation into a major regional conflict. To
intervene, the U. S. risked hurting its ally. To not intervene, the U. S.
risked intervention by some other power and thereby suffer a loss of
influence in the region.
An acceptable compromise was reached that promised to stabilize the
situation. Lebanon asked the U. S., France, and Italy to provide a buffer
between the IDF, Syrian forces, and the PLO so that the PLO could be
safely evacuated through the port of Beirut. This would end the stalemate,
save face for the PLO, and allow Israel to achieve its objective of
security for its northern settlements. Before the MNF could evacuate the
PLO, the numerous parties involved had to reach an agreement as to the
terms of the operation. This condition was met on 20 August 1982.
On the same day the IDF launched its attack into Lebanon, an Amphibious
Task Force (ATF) made up of Amphibious Squadron 4 (Phibron 4) and the 32d
Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) entered the Mediterranean. Without time to
conduct a face-to-face turnover with the 34th MAU, the unit it was
relieving, the 32d MAU was ordered directly to modified location (MODLOC)
100 miles off the coast of Beirut.
On 24 June 1982 the 32d MAU evacuated 581 civilians from Juniyah,
Lebanon in a Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO). After the NEO, the
ATF returned to MODLOC in anticipation of further operations ashore. While
some ships rotated to ports for maintenance, others remained just
offshore. Finally, when it became more certain Marines were needed and at
the request of the Ambassador, the MAU sent a liaison party ashore lead by
Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Johnston, Commanding Officer of BLT 2/8. The
ATF ships assumed MODLOC on 16 August and prepared for another mission.
The 32d MAU landed a 800 man contingent in Beirut on 25 August 1982 as
part of a multinational force to oversee the evacuation of the PLO
guerrillas. Upon successfully completing its mission, the ATF departed for
Naples on 10 September 1982.
With the task complete, the ATF relaxed its alert status and began much
needed maintenance on its ships. A series of unexpected events unfolded
soon after the ATF arrived in Naples. On 22 September 1982, the ATF began
its return to Beirut because of the assassination of Bashir Gemeyal, the
recently elected President of Lebanon, and the Sabra and Shatila Refugee
Camp massacres. The mission assigned to USCINCEUR by JCS and then
ultimately to the ATF was:
To establish an environment which will permit the Lebanese Armed Forces
to carry out their responsibilities in the Beirut area. When directed,
USCINCEUR will introduce U. S. forces as part of a multinational force
presence in the Beirut area to occupy and secure positions along a
designated section of the line from south of the Beirut International
Airport to a position in the vicinity of the Presidential Palace; be
prepared to protect U. S. forces; and, on order, conduct retrograde
operations as required.
This mission remained in effect until 23 October 1983.
While the 32d MAU evacuated the PLO, the 24th MAU, a similarly sized
and equipped unit, departed the U. S. on 24 August 1982 and conducted two
amphibious training exercises en route to Beirut. It relieved the 32d MAU
on 1 November 1982. The 24th MAU took up the same positions as the 32d MAU
but extended its presence in Beirut to the eastern sector of the city by
patrolling the "Green Line." Additionally, Marines commenced training air
assault units from the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) on 13 December 1992.
The 32d MAU, which had just been relieved, arrived in the U. S. on 24
November and was redesignated the 22d MAU. The MAU headquarters changed
some key personnel, most notably the Executive Officer and Operations
Officer (S-3), but Colonel Mead remained the MAU Commander. In addition to
changing personnel in the headquarters staff, the MAU received operational
control (OPCON) over three entirely new subordinate elements. The key
point is that none of the major subordinate elements (MSEs) of the 22d MAU
had worked with each other until 24 November 1982, which was just barely
60 days before the MAU's next deployment. After a two-week leave period, a
brief work-up, and transit, the 22d MAU arrived in Lebanon to relieve 24th
MAU on 15 February 1983.
The 22d MAU continued the expanded patrolling of 24th MAU and continued
to improve the survivability and habitability of positions around the
airport. During Colonel Mead's second tour in Lebanon, the environment
started to change for the USMNF. First, during a routine dismounted foot
patrol on 16 March 1983, five Marines were wounded by a grenade. On 18
April 1983, a car bomb exploded destroying the U. S. Embassy in Beirut,
killing 63 people, of which 17 were Americans, and wounding 100 others. As
a direct result of the bombing, the mission of the USMNF expanded to
include providing security for the temporary U. S. Embassy, which was
housed in the Duraford Building and the British Embassy.
On 30 May 1983, 24th MAU (this time under the command of Colonel
Timothy J. Geraghty), relieved 22d MAU. The 24th MAU continued the mission
of the previous MAUs occupying the same positions and carrying out the
same types of activities. The 24th MAU's patrols differed from those of
its predecessors because they included an LAF fireteam with its
squad-sized Marine patrols.
Around the same time as the changeover between the 22d and 24th MAUs,
Israel had signed an agreement on 17 May 1983 with the government of
Lebanon (GOL) stating it would withdraw its forces south of the Awali
River. This agreement was signed without consulting Syria or the numerous
factions surrounding Beirut. On 4 September 1983, the IDF started its
withdrawal.
Increased incidents of indirect fire around Marine positions began on
22 July as the IDF prepared to withdraw. By 22 October, Marine casualties
totaled seven killed and 64 wounded as a result of direct and indirect
fire weapons. In response to the increased threat, Marines had ceased
patrolling and begun to respond more aggressively progressing from
direct-fire weapons, to mortars, to 155mm artillery and naval gunfire. Not
only did naval gunfire support Marine positions around the Beirut
International Airport (BIA), Colonel Geraghty was ordered to use naval
gunfire to directly support the LAF engaged with Druze militia in Suq Al
Gharb on 19 September 1983. The neutrality of U. S. ground forces, already
in question, now had clearly been lost.
On 23 October 1983, a truck bomb, described earlier, exploded in BLT
1/8's headquarters killing 241 Marines and sailors. Although no new
mission was formally assigned to the 24th MAU, this event marked a major
change in the way Marines operated in Lebanon with survivability taking
precedence over presence. Extraordinary effort was made to disperse units
to protect against potential follow-on terrorist acts, but lack of
resources and lack of protection against indirect fire slowed down this
effort.
On 19 November 1983, the 22d MAU relieved the 24th MAU. En route to
Beirut, the 22d MAU had participated in combat operations in Grenada.
During Operation Urgent Fury, the 22d MAU conducted amphibious assaults,
conventional combat, and evacuation operations. While operating in
Grenada, the MAU was commanded by Colonel Faulkner, who like Colonel
Geraghty, was deploying to Beirut for the first time. However, when the
22d MAU arrived in Lebanon, Brigadier General Jim R. Joy assumed command
of the MAU and was designated Commander U. S. Forces Ashore Lebanon.
Colonel Faulkner assumed the Chief of Staff position for what now was
essentially a brigade staff. The two reasons most often given for this
change are: (1) the other contingencies were commanded by generals and so
a U. S. general was needed for representation, and (2) a general along
with a larger staff was required given the increase in external support.
Additionally, the 22d MAU received a clearer mission. Because the Long
Commission determined that the previous MAUs had perceived the maintenance
of an operational airport in Lebanon as an implied task, the 22d MAU was
given a clearly specified task to defend its positions. The focus of 22d
MAU's mission changed from presence to defense. Increased engineer support
arrived, and strong combat-oriented defensive positions were built. By 5
January 1984, every USMNF member had his own bunker for living and
working. Even though the Marines had good protection, the bulk of the 22d
MAU was withdrawn to amphibious shipping on 26 February 1984. The
withdrawal from BIA marked the end of the USMNF's military "presence" in
Lebanon. The only significant force from the MAU remaining ashore was at
the British Embassy and Duraford Building providing security for the U. S.
Ambassador. However, this was a security force, not a peacekeeping force.
Using this chronology, the major events affecting the USMNF can be
grouped several ways. Benis Franks, in his history of U. S. Marines in
Lebanon 1982-1984, organizes his chapters based on MAU rotations and
refers to them as Beirut I through VI. Table 1 below offers another way to
look at Marine operations. The phases are based on external events.
The USMNF Phases
Phase |
Dates |
Events |
Unit |
1.00 |
24 June 82
25 Aug- 10 Sep 82 |
NEO
Evacuation of PLO |
32d MAU (Col Mead) |
2.00 |
29 Sep- 30 Oct 82
1 Nov 82- 15 Feb 83
15 Feb- 29 May 83
30 May- 3 Sep 83 |
Interposition between IDF and Beirut
citizens
Patrolling/LAF training
Terrorist attack US embassy
Combined patrolling |
32d MAU (Col Mead)
24th MAU (Col Stokes)
22d MAU (Col Mead)
24th MAU (Col Geraghty) |
3.00 |
4 Sep - 23 Oct 83 |
IDF withdrawal, NGF support
Terrorist bombing of BLT HQs |
24th MAU (Col Geraghty)
|
4.00 |
24 Oct - 18 Nov 83
19 Nov - 26 Feb 84 |
Rescue ops, aggressive self-
defense, position hardening
withdrawal |
24th MAU (Col Geraghty)
22d MAU (Col Faulkner)
|
Table 1
Analysis of Table 1 shows some interesting
relationships. Phase 1, also known as MNF I, was an operation in itself.
Its operational objectives were fairly clear and were successfully
accomplished over a relatively short period. Because it occurred over a
short period, Phase 1 involved only one U. S. tactical unit, the 32d MAU
led by Colonel Mead. Even though MNF I involved diplomatic and military
action, the military part of this operation received nothing but praise.
Therefore, any influence tactical-level actions had on the overall success
of MNF I can be attributed to one tactical unit, the 32d MAU.
Phases 2 and 3 are part of the same operation and shared the same
mission and objectives. While failure occurred during Phase 3,
tactical-level actions that may have influenced that failure cannot be
attributed exclusively to one tactical unit. Four different tactical units
operated in Lebanon during Phase 2. Phase 2 may or may not have influenced
events in Phase 3. Therefore, critical analysis of tactical-level actions
during both phases 2 and 3 is essential to identify potential linkage
between the two phases.
Finally, Phase 4 involved two different units. The objectives of Phase
4 (survival and withdrawal) were clearly different from any of the other
phases. Phases 2 and 3 may have determined the tactical environment in
which forces were to operate during Phase 4, but the mission was not the
same. In a symposium ten years after the BLT 1/8 headquarters bombing,
Colonel Geraghty said, "[T]he mission changed, but no one changed the
mission." In an interview with Benis Frank, Brigadier General Joy made a
clear distinction between the original mission and the one he had been
assigned when he said, "[T]he mission was changed to seize and defend vice
seize and secure." Phase 4 may be useful to analyze what the forces had to
do differently to survive, but clearly it was not the same "presence"
mission of Phases 2 and 3. Therefore, Phases 1 through 3 will be examined
to first determine if the USMNF's mission was peacekeeping, and if so how
the tactical-level forces carried out that mission.
Was This Peacekeeping?
Although the mission statement cited earlier contained no mention of
peacekeeping, the Long Commission found "the USMNF was implicitly
characterized as a peacekeeping operation." The report cites that
Presidential public statements, reports to Congress, and letters to the
United Nation's Secretary-General contributed to this characterization.
The report points out even the subject lines of the alert order and
execute order read, "U. S. Force participation in Lebanon Multinational
Force (MNF) Peacekeeping Operations. (Emphasis added)"
However, alert and execute orders were probably not seen by all of the
USMNF. Additionally, their deployed status made access to Presidential
statements, reports, and letters inaccessible to Marines, especially in
the case of early deployed MAUs. Certainly not every individual was
affected by these things to the same degree. The validity of the Long
Commission statement must be checked to determine the actual extent
Marines believed their mission was peacekeeping.
At the beginning of a Marine Corps Gazette article written by
Colonel Mead explaining Marine Corps involvement in Lebanon, the editorial
staff inserted the following subtitle: "The Commander's Overview of 32d
MAU's Peacekeeping Operation." In the article, Colonel Mead describes how
Marines cheered when they heard a special message from President Reagan
that read in part as follows:
You are tasked to be once again what Marines have been for more than
200 years--peacemakers. Your role in the Multinational Force--along with
that of your French and Italian counterparts--is crucial to achieving the
peace that is so desperately needed in this long-tortured city.
At the end of his article, Colonel Mead summarizes the accomplishments
of the 32d MAU during its deployment and writes, "We had learned what it
was like to be a peacekeeper!" Clearly the MAU Commander saw the mission
as peacekeeping. In this article, Colonel Mead also describes how the
small units briefed and prepared before each of the three landings in
Lebanon. Since Colonel Mead observed these briefs, a reasonable conclusion
is that Marines discussed the nature of their mission in the same context
as their MAU Commander. Therefore, we can assume that in the case of the
first MAU that went ashore in Lebanon, the Marines associated their
mission with peacekeeping.
Colonel Stokes' 24th MAU was the second MAU to participate in the USMNF.
In an interview on 15 March 1983, Colonel Stokes never used the word
"peacekeeping" to describe his unit's mission. He did describe his mission
as being a stabilizing factor among the people of Lebanon, the IDF, the
PLO, and the Syrians. Although he would not be the MAU Commander, he
hoped, when the 24th MAU returned to Lebanon in two months, the foreign
parties would be gone. The MAU could then expand its perimeter and provide
stability among the various Lebanese factions, which he described as the "Hatfields
and McCoys." While Colonel Stokes did not explicitly state that his
mission was peacekeeping, he implicitly described a peacekeeping mission.
BLT 3/8 was the Ground Combat Element (GCE) for Colonel Stokes' MAU.
This unit's postdeployment report, written to Colonel Stokes, is
peppered with the word "peacekeeping." The first sentence of this
report reads, "The Beirut peacekeeping mission was certainly the highlight
of the deployment." The remainder of the report goes on to describe the
different activities conducted in Lebanon. Clearly, BLT 3/8 saw the
mission as peacekeeping.
Since Colonel Mead returned to Beirut with the 22d MAU in February
1983, the Marines of this MAU most likely viewed the mission as
peacekeeping as well. In a second Marine Corps Gazette article,
Colonel Mead wrote, "The situation in Lebanon permeated everything that we
did prior to departure." Colonel Mead's assessment of the attitudes of his
Marines was that "[t]hey all wanted a chance to assist the Lebanese people
in their search for peace and the regaining of sovereignty over all of
Lebanon."
The Marine Corps Gazette is the professional journal of the
United States Marine Corps. The Gazette is widely read and
discussed by both officers and enlisted Marines. Certainly it would have
captured the attention of Marines preparing to deploy to Lebanon.
Therefore, a good assumption is that Colonel Mead's February 1983 article
influenced most if not all Marines of the 24th MAU who replaced the 22d
MAU in May 1983.
Colonel Timothy J. Geraghty, Commanding Officer of the 24th MAU, also
may have been influenced by how the two previous MAU Commanders, Colonels
Mead and Stokes, saw the mission. He assumed command of the 24th MAU from
Colonel Stokes before leaving for Lebanon and did a face-to-face turnover
with Colonel Mead before assuming command of U. S. Forces Ashore Lebanon
on 30 May 1983. In an interview conducted on 26 May 1983 he said,
Our commitment here is really a peacekeeping role. It is highly
political with [the] diplomatic side and political side overshadowing the
tactical side. It's a mission where we are providing a presence and that
implies a visibility, a flexibility in order for us to assist the Lebanese
government to regain their sovereignty.
At the small-unit level, in addition to what the average individual
Marine was getting from his seniors, he was bombarded with the idea he was
a peacekeeper. The nightly television news and local newspapers were
filled with peacekeeping stories that would capture any Marine's attention
as he was about to deploy. This was especially true around the time of
major events such as the bombing of the U. S. Embassy.
Even while deployed, the MAU's unofficial newspaper published by the
Public Affairs Office had a masthead that read, "ROOT SCOOP,
Serving the men of the 24th Marine Amphibious Unit, U. S. Peacekeepers,
Beirut." In addition to the perhaps subtle message of its masthead, the
ROOT SCOOP frequently contained cartoons from U. S. newspapers
depicting the dilemma of "peacekeepers" subjected to "stray" rounds. A
Marine was likely to read these cartoons especially if he was feeling
frustration over what he could and could not do in return to the incoming
fire. The message was loud and clear; Marines were considered peacekeepers
even if they were getting shot at or if they were shooting back.
What Was Peacekeeping?
Clearly the MAU Commanders and their Marines thought the mission was
peacekeeping. We must now look at what was known about this type of
mission at the time. Quite simply, not much was known. The reason for this
lack of knowledge is not because peacekeeping was entirely new. The UN had
participated or was participating in at least twelve peacekeeping
operations with the first one starting in 1947. Additionally, the U. S.
had just begun the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), a non-UN
sponsored peacekeeping mission in the Sinai, in April 1982 as part of a
treaty the U. S. had worked out between Israel and Egypt.
The problem was peacekeeping doctrine had not been formalized. Although
several studies had been conducted by prestigious organizations such as
the Brookings Institute and the International Peace Academy, no general
consensus existed that the doctrine these organizations proposed was
valid. Regardless of whether or not the U. S. agreed totally or in part,
several of these studies offer some very good advice on peacekeeping to a
wide audience ranging from the individual soldier to the most senior
national-level decisionmaker. When developing the concept for the MFO
operations in the Sinai, UN peacekeeping tactics and procedures from
previous operations became the model even though MFO was not a UN
sponsored mission.
Not until very recently has the term "peacekeeping" been precisely
defined. The studies completed by 1982 did recognize "peacekeeping" as
meaning different things to different countries depending on which country
was using the term. They also recognized that some countries, especially
those which had considerable military power, did not necessarily subscribe
to the same concepts envisioned by the UN concerning the use of force and
coercion during peacekeeping operations. If force were involved, most
senior-level UN decisionmakers, who had extensive experience in
peacekeeping, agreed the mission was not peacekeeping. While no specific
terms were used to differentiate operations using varying levels of force,
a clear distinction was made between peacekeeping (no force) and
enforcement operations (some force).
Three notable figures in UN peacekeeping; Major General Indar Jit
Rikhye, Michael Harbottle, and Bjorn Egge, authored a book in which they
explained the tactics of peacekeeping. The authors eloquently address the
skepticism and arguments against peacekeeping. One concept in particular,
the absolute minimum use of force and only in self-defense, received a lot
of criticism. They concluded only through measures less than force, could
peacekeepers create conditions that were more likely to let diplomatic
measures work. In their book A Thin Blue Line, the authors state,
The "weapons" of the peacekeeper in achieving his objectives are those
of negotiation, mediation, quiet diplomacy and reasoning, tact and the
patience of a JOB--not the self-loading rifle.
The basic peacekeeping tactic of the time (a tactic known as
interposition) was to establish a neutral third party between two hostile
parties. This third party monitored agreements; reported and investigated
gunfire, unusual movements, digging and improvements in fortifications,
and any other suspicious activities. Peacekeepers were a deterrent because
neither of the hostile parties wanted to shoot at the UN, nor did they
want to be charged with aggression.
From this tactic and the theory of how it works, several key
requirements at the tactical-level stand out. All writers at the time
would have agreed the most important requirement was the third party must
be perceived as impartial. Impartiality once lost makes the third party
entirely ineffective because of lost trust, confidence, and respect on the
part of one or both sides. Impartiality is fragile. Frequently the
peacekeeper is referred to as the "referee." As such, he must assess blame
fairly. A popular saying is that if a peacekeeping force is unpopular with
both sides at the same time, then it is carrying out its duties
objectively and with impartiality.
There are numerous examples of how third parties lose their impartial
status because of simple things such as cultural differences, language
misunderstandings, or past histories that conflict with one of the
involved party's ideas of impartiality and acceptability. In most cases,
the loss of impartiality results in the removal of the third party from
the peacekeeping operation. Sometimes this removal involves only
individuals while at other times entire contingents. As can be imagined,
the difficulty and cost associated with sending an entire battalion-sized
contingent home can be staggering. The concept of impartiality was well
documented, and we can assume common knowledge by September 1982.
Another very clear point is that the peacekeeping force must be
accepted by all hostile parties involved in the conflict. Unlike the first
requirement, which focuses on the peacekeeping force, this requirement
focuses on the hostile parties. Larry Fabian of the Brookings Institution
explains the second requirement this way: "[T]he peacekeeping system can
function effectively only if the disputants show at least a modicum of
cooperation by voluntarily respecting a certain threshold of compliance."
They must want to stop fighting. If the parties want to stop fighting, why
do we need peacekeepers? Most often lack of trust prevents parties from
stopping the fight. A third party provides assurances that treaties will
be followed and neither side will gain an advantage by secretly violating
terms of the treaty. Fabian describes the relationship between
peacekeepers and disputants "like a partnership, conceived for limited
purposes and based on equally limited common ends. Peacekeepers are agents
not only of the international community but also, in a sense, of the
parties themselves."
A third requirement of peacekeeping is the absolute minimum use of
force. Since peacekeeping is normally carried out by military forces which
have been trained for war, this requirement can cause some discomfort and
seem illogical. The soldier's natural tendency is to use force or threat
of force to achieve a desired result. Major General Rikhye argues that
this tendency is exactly opposite the correct attitude required in
peacekeeping. He writes, "[W]ithout the correct attitude and approach on
the part of the third party, the chances of the intervention remaining
peaceful becomes unlikely." Larry Fabian dispels the popular thought that
more arms in peacekeeping are better because of the greater capacity to
impose punishment. He uses UN peacekeeping operations in Cypress as an
example to show the exact opposite is true. Any use of force whether
actual force, coercion, or too forceful persuasion will lead to the
perception the third party is not neutral but rather an adversary.
Care must be taken in defining force. There are different types of
force: armed and unarmed. Most soldiers can easily identify armed force.
Unarmed force is more subtle. It includes "the use of barricades,
manhandling, the use of heavy equipment to remove obstacles and the use of
tear gas." The use of unarmed force is still the use of force.
Self-defense, although a permissible use of force, must be carefully
defined. During early UN operations, self-defense meant: (1) defense of UN
posts, premises, and vehicles under armed attack, and (2) the support of
other personnel of the UN force under attack. As UN operations became more
complex, self-defense had to be adapted and not just limited to defense
against unprovoked attack. For example, in Cypress, force was authorized
to prevent "attempts by force to prevent [UNFICYP soldiers] from carrying
out their responsibilities as ordered by their commanders." In the Congo,
where UN forces actually faced mercenaries in the Katanga phase, rules of
engagement had to evolve to provide for a more proactive use of force in
self- defense. Self-defense expanded to include the use of conventional
artillery and even air defense weapons. Care must be taken not to lose
sight of the original concept of minimum use of force. The general rule is
force only in self-defense, and when no longer threatened, force is no
longer authorized.
While most of the existing literature in 1982 addressed peacekeeping at
the very high level, a considerable amount of information addressing
small-unit and individual peacekeeping requirements was embedded between
the pages of high-level discussion. Former UN Secretary-General Dag
Hammerskjold said, "Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only a
soldier can do it." Major General Rikhye felt soldiering skill was a
valuable asset, but it is not the only required peacekeeping attribute.
Furthermore, essential peacekeeping attributes are not found in any
military textbook. In his book, he spends twelve pages describing how
soldiers need to be trained in the proper attitude, approach, use of
language, cultural awareness, and properly prepared for environmental
adaptation. He discusses the use of professional soldier versus
nonprofessional and gives the advantages of using each type. He addresses
the differences in officer observers and tactical peacekeeping forces. His
analysis is very detailed and addresses the many nuances of peacekeeping
that would probably go unnoticed by those inexperienced in peacekeeping.
In his discussions, he goes to considerable length to describe how
improper individual preparation can adversely affect the entire
peacekeeping force. General Rikhye understood how closely the
tactical-level is linked to the strategic-level in peacekeeping
operations.
Charles Moskos studied the many different variables affecting the
individual peacekeeping soldier to determine if one type of soldier was
better suited for peacekeeping than others. His basic conclusion was
proper training and time on the job make good peacekeepers. In the process
of arriving at this conclusion, he provides a valuable perspective
concerning the requirements on individual soldiers and offers many
valuable peacekeeping vignettes with associated lessons. At the higher
tactical level, Major General Carl von Horn published a book on his
personal experience with peacekeeping during three major UN operations.
His book addresses the conflict between military and political
requirements. While his book offers no prescription for peacekeeping, it
does offer valuable insight on the moral dilemma often created by
political decisions that may endanger tactical forces.
Other literature at the time discussed issues such as superpower
involvement in peacekeeping, UN sanctioned versus unilateral action, and
intelligence; but these issues concern decisionmaking levels beyond the
scope of this analysis. Additionally, insufficient intelligence support is
one of the major issues highlighted by the Long Commission's report, and
the problem was fixed before the final departure of the USMNF. This study
will focus on lessons not previously learned.
The point of the above discussion is to show the existing documented
knowledge concerning peacekeeping at the time the USMNF was committed in
Lebanon. Clearly peacekeeping tactics had been developed and were studied
by U. S. forces involved in other peacekeeping operations. However, the
body of knowledge was contained in scholarly texts not military manuals.
Having described the extent to which basic peacekeeping theory was
developed in 1982, we now have a theoretical model. We can use this model
to compare actual tactics used by the USMNF to the tactics we would expect
them to use through the application of theory.
CHAPTER THREE: MNF I
As described earlier, MNF I was a relatively short operation running
from 25 August to 10 September 1982. The Multinational Force consisted of
U. S., French, and Italian forces. The 32d MAU was the USMNF contingent
during the evacuation of the PLO through the port of Beirut. After much
debate concerning how the USMNF would be used, USCINCEUR finalized the
mission to:
Support Ambassador Habib and the MNF committee in their efforts to have
PLO members evacuated from the Beirut area; occupy and secure the port of
Beirut in conjunction with the Lebanese Armed Forces; maintain close and
continuous contact with other MNF members; and be prepared to withdraw on
order.
To carry out its mission, the 32d MAU established security with BLT 2/8
and control with a headquarters cell, which coordinated both internally
and externally to the MAU. Internal coordination involved positioning the
security force, recording the outflow of PLO, and maintaining support of
forces ashore. External coordination involved liaison with the LAF, IDF,
other MNF members ashore, and the U. S. Department of State.
The MAU was limited by diplomatic agreement to 800 personnel ashore.
The Aviation Combat Element (ACE) remained afloat and played an important
role shuttling diplomats and providing transportation for logistical
support. Most support services remained sea-based, but some personnel from
the MAU Service Support Group (MSSG) did land and carried out
administrative functions during the evacuation and established limited
supplies ashore. The Preventative Medicine Unit (PMU) carried out one of
the most important duties by certifying buildings as safe, establishing
sanitation facilities ashore, and improving habitability.
BLT 2/8 established security for the port by positioning two rifle
companies in a perimeter and controlling the entrance to the port with a
manned checkpoint. Lieutenant Colonel Johnston kept a third rifle company
off the perimeter and centrally located to act as an internal security and
reaction force. At the entrance to the port, Echo Company, commanded by
Captain McCabe, manned a squad-sized checkpoint in conjunction with French
and LAF forces. The operations of the perimeter and checkpoint were
designed to satisfy the agreements reached between all parties in Lebanon.
The most important agreements were between the Israelis and the PLO.
The PLO forces were widely dispersed throughout West Beirut. The IDF
had pushed into East Beirut but stopped just before entering West Beirut
along the Sidon Road, which had traditionally separated Muslim West Beirut
from Christian East Beirut. During the Lebanese Civil War, the Sidon Road
was a well-known divider and was called the "Green Line." The port lay at
the northern most point of the Green Line. Because of its central location
with respect to the dividing line, the port was within view of the IDF in
East Beirut. The IDF was able to monitor activity inside the port from
several tall buildings, which surrounded the facility.
The MNF interposed itself between forces to keep the Israelis from
attacking the PLO as they were evacuated. The French contingent manned
positions along the Green Line. The Italian contingent escorted elements
from the Syrian Army from West Beirut through IDF lines to the Bakaa
Valley. The USMNF interposed forces around the port to prevent the IDF
from attacking the PLO when they were most vulnerable, after they had
given up their arms and were concentrated in the relatively small confines
of the port.
The Israelis agreed to the evacuation of the PLO under certain
conditions. The most important of which was that the PLO could not keep
their heavy weapons. The government of Lebanon made the LAF responsible
for inspecting PLO forces as they evacuated to make sure this part of the
agreement was carried out. However, the IDF wanted more certainty, and so
while the U. S. did not actually disarm the PLO, the USMNF was charged
with verifying compliance with the disarmament agreement. The PLO was wary
of concentrating in one location. In addition to verifying disarmament for
the IDF, the positioning of the USMNF between the IDF and the PLO assured
no harm would come to the PLO. The USMNF was carrying out all the tasks
normally associated with peacekeeping as discussed earlier.
One of the key aspects of the USMNF was the operation of checkpoint 54,
the combined U. S., French, and LAF checkpoint at the port entrance. When
trucks carrying the PLO arrived at the port, they were allowed to enter
inside the perimeter but then were stopped for search. The Marine squad
physically positioned itself in front of the truck stretching across the
road to prevent the truck from going any farther. The LAF inspected the
truck for heavy weapons and when found clear would signal to the Marine
squad. The squad would move aside, the truck would move inside the port
and off load its PLO passengers. The passengers moved by a loading point,
staged their personal weapons and then got on the ship.
The Israelis had positions that overlooked the port. In one particular
building, the IDF had set up an observation point, which contained just
about every kind of electronic surveillance equipment available, to
include high power cameras to film the faces of every PLO fighter leaving
Lebanon. The IDF watched the departure of the PLO and whenever they
observed something that they felt violated the terms of the agreement
(which was frequent), they contacted the USMNF and the truck would be
reinspected. Until reinspection was carried out, the Israelis blocked the
departure and arrival of ships just outside the port.
To appreciate the difficult nature of the mission assigned to the USMNF,
one must remember the evacuation was being conducted after three months of
fighting between the IDF and PLO. Additionally, the hatred between the two
parties can be traced back to the beginning of Israel in 1948. The setting
of the evacuation was in a city that had been the scene of six years of
fighting in a civil war. The area around the port saw the most intense
fighting because it marked the dividing line between warring sides. Martyr
Square, the scene of the heaviest fighting during the civil war, was just
south of the port. Pictures of the square taken in 1982 look more like a
scene from World War II. The PLO, which was portrayed as a scraggly
terrorist organization by the American press, led to wide and varied
speculation on the terrorist threat. To add to the confusion was the fact
the PLO arrived for the evacuation wearing new uniforms, were freshly
shaven and had haircuts. Even though the PLO fighters were fairly well
disciplined, they had the peculiar custom of firing their weapons into the
air on full automatic to celebrate "victory" creating an unnerving if not
dangerous situation. When put in this context, the true nature and
complexity of the mission can be better understood.
Peacekeeping Training
What type of training did the USMNF have before the evacuation of the
PLO to prepare them for this unusual mission? Since the bulk of personnel
on the ground was from BLT 2/8, the training of that unit will be
examined.
BLT 2/8's postdeployment report starts out with the words:
During the predeployment period, the BLT's tempo of operations was
high, and when coupled with the many CEP's [Command Evaluation Program]
and inspections, it could be said that too much was being done in too
short a time.
The chronology of events shows a quick-paced schedule that started when
BLT 2/8 returned from a six month deployment on 1 July 1981 and lasted
until the battalion started its current deployment on 25 May 1982. In less
than one year, the battalion reorganized, assumed a follow-on and primary
air-alert-force responsibility, and stood a Commanding General's
inspection. Additionally, it served as an aggressor force for another
battalion's Combat Readiness Evaluation (CRE), and was evaluated itself on
crew-served weapons. The major unit exercises went just before deployment
when the battalion conducted a week-long Fire Support Coordination
Exercise and a two-week Mech Counter-Mech training exercise at Fort
Pickett, Virginia.
The postdeployment report does point out that the battalion's
individual companies spent 12-15 days in the field each month during which
they spent time on squad, platoon, and company tactics with emphasis on
non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO), mechanized warfare, and night
operations. However, with the exception of the NEO training, which was
done only at the company-level and below, most of BLT 2/8's training
focused on conventional combat operations.
The company-level NEO training would certainly have assisted in
evacuating the American citizens from Lebanon on 25 and 26 June 1982, but
BLT 2/8 remained on ship during this evacuation. The MSSG, which also
stayed on ship, provided the evacuation control center (ECC). While some
of the concepts and techniques used in a NEO would still apply to the
evacuation of the PLO, the amount of attention NEO actually received
during predeployment training is not certain.
BLT 2/8's Command Chronology goes into detail concerning other training
exercises and evaluations conducted before deployment, but briefly
mentions NEO training at the company level. This lack of detail indicates
the battalion probably did not stress NEO as much as other types of
training such as NBC operations. Furthermore, since this training was
conducted at the company-level and in the field, there is a good chance
that the quality of training varied from company to company. The battalion
had a good idea of its proficiency in marksmanship, NBC, crew-served
weapons, and fire support coordination because it had undergone external
evaluations in all these areas. However, it had no similar feedback on
contingency operations such as NEO.
In conclusion, while BLT 2/8 had trained in many areas over a short
period of time concentrating on conventional operations, it probably had
not conducted too much training on NEO before deployment. No mention was
made about peacekeeping training in either the command chronology or the
postdeployment report. Therefore, the majority of BLT 2/8's training in
this area had to come while Marines were embarked on ship moving to the
contingency site.
This point is supported by the Operations and Training section of BLT
2/8's postdeployment report. In the general summary, the report states,
"Deployment training was predominately mission oriented and specifically
driven by the three contingency operations." Some of the specific subjects
of training were NEO, military operations on urban terrain, and troop
familiarization with the areas of operation. Finally, the report goes on
to say actual participation in the three contingencies was in itself a
form of training in such areas as motorized patrolling, sandbag position
building, and laying barbed wire.
Of most interest is a total omission of training on the requirements of
peacekeeping. This omission may be for two reasons. First, peacekeeping
training may not have been mentioned because BLT 2/8 considered the
evacuation of the PLO as so similar to a NEO that it deserved no special
mention. A second reason might be that while the 32d MAU could foresee a
NEO before deployment, they had not considered evacuating the PLO or any
other form of peacekeeping as a likely mission.
From Colonel Mead's article in the Marine Corps Gazette
published after 32d MAU returned from Lebanon, the latter seems the most
likely. When the 32d MAU was placed in MODLOC off the Lebanese coast, the
most likely mission appeared to be a NEO. The MAU had prepared ahead for a
NEO and had a working file on that type operation. In addition to an
established SOP, the file had old Marine Corps Gazette articles
written about Operations Eagle Pull and Frequent Wind. During two
different interviews, the 32d MAU's Operations Officer and MSSG 32's
Commanding Officer mention a Fort Leavenworth study on the 1958 Lebanon
crisis, which also involved an evacuation. Both officers mentioned how
helpful this study had been and were able to cite the dysentery rate for
U. S. forces during the 1958 crisis. They were very proud that as a result
of using this study the dysentery rate of the 32d MAU was lower in Beirut
than it was for the MAU during liberty in Naples, Italy. The point of this
discussion is to show the 32d MAU did most of its specific training for
the contingency operations while in MODLOC. The MAU had written procedures
and historical studies on NEO operations. These assets probably
contributed to the successful NEO on 25 June 1982 and to the low dysentery
rate while operating in Lebanon.
However, considering the amount of written material on peacekeeping
operations and its format, planning for the evacuation of the PLO while on
ship was probably done with little formal guidelines. The 32d MAU departed
North Carolina on 25 May. The MAU was ordered to MODLOC "unexpectedly" on
7 June, and to standby for the PLO evacuation mission on 16 August. While
a fairly significant amount was written on peacekeeping operations, it was
not in any military manuals in 1982. Therefore written procedures and
historical studies were probably not available to the 32d MAU before
landing in Beirut on 25 August 1982.
This assumption seems valid since individuals discussed how helpful
historical studies of NEOs had been, but make no mention how studies on
peacekeeping had helped carry out the PLO evacuation. Therefore, it can
also be concluded whatever Marines knew about peacekeeping operations when
committed on 25 August came from an intuitive appreciation of the
situation, rather than from in-depth study or mastery of the subject.
Results
Given the lack of specialized peacekeeping training, MNF I went
surprisingly well. The 32d MAU won high praise for the part it played
especially given the unique and highly volatile nature of the environment.
Some specific incidents and statements show the Marines had a correct
appreciation for the situation and acted accordingly.
First, Colonel Mead felt large weapon systems such as tanks and
artillery may have an adverse effect on the Syrians and PLO. Therefore,
the forces that went ashore were lightly armed. Also, the Marines that
went ashore did not put magazines in their weapons. As explained by
Lieutenant Colonel Blankenship, the no magazine decision was a deliberate
decision that was designed to show the LAF, who was responsible for the
security of U. S. forces, the Marines trusted them. The BLT Commander,
Lieutenant Colonel Johnston also stated magazines were not inserted, but
at critical times designated marksmen did have loaded weapons and were
ready to engage targets if necessary.
The use of designated marksmen suggests the tactical-level commanders
clearly understood the peacekeeping principle of minimum use of force but
at the same time had a clear appreciation for the danger of an external
threat. The responsibility for designated marksmen would be well known
among the Marines; however, from outside the unit, the designated marksmen
would appear like every other Marine. Since twelve out of thirteen Marines
had their magazines removed, the threat of force was well concealed.
The rules of engagement (ROE) were designed to clearly explain and
guide the use of force. Marines were authorized to use force in
self-defense, but some leaders had a great concern over how they would
react on the ground. Because of their importance, the ROE were memorized
and drilled rigorously, the same way a Marine would be tested on his
general orders. While the drilling and memorization were good, it was only
the first step. Marines could not anticipate every action that might
threaten their safety during the evacuation. Instead of straight
memorization of the ROE, Marines needed to develop judgment concerning
their use. Situational exercises were used, but with questionable
effectiveness.
In one interview, an officer gave an example of a situation explaining
how Marines learned the ROE. The example went something like this: "If a
guy shoots at you and you feel it is directed fire and what not, then use
minimal force necessary to take care of the situation. If he is shooting
at you with small arms, you can return the fire with small arms and so
forth." This example is not a good one for situational training since: (1)
it provides a situation with no "gray area," and (2) it addresses only one
response. In an attempt to keep the ROE simple, the situations Marines may
have faced were over simplified.
While tactical-level leaders recognized the importance of understanding
the ROE and knew situational training was a good means to develop
judgment, this example suggests they lacked the experience to create
realistic examples of what types of situations Marines might face. Unlike
conventional combat operations for which BLT 2/8 had trained and been
evaluated on, they had never trained for peacekeeping operations. Since
they had no training and no standards to compare their performance with,
they had to make up their own standards. Because they had no examples of
peacekeeping operations, they had no certainty the procedures and
standards they had developed were correct.
Despite this lack of certainty, numerous examples of good judgment
exist. One example involves the turnover of the port from the French to
the USMNF control. While going into port on landing craft, the Marines saw
the French flag flying above the port. When the Marines arrived and
assumed responsibility for the port, the first thing they did was strike
the French flag and raise the Lebanese national colors. Given that one of
the most famous images of Marines is the American flag raising at Iwo Jima,
raising the Lebanese flag seems ironic. To not automatically raise the
American flag shows deliberate forethought that took into account the
mission and situation.
This incident reveals outstanding judgment; however, was this action
deliberate or just a coincidence? Colonel Mead tries not to make too much
of this incident in his article, but his Operations Officer, Lieutenant
Colonel Blankenship, who was in the boat with him at the time the French
flag was first sighted (along with about 100 other Marines), views the
incident differently. In an interview, Lieutenant Colonel Blankenship
explains that Colonel Mead used the French flag sighting as an opportunity
to make a point to Marines on the landing craft. Colonel Mead made sure
Marines understood that the flag represented colonialism and arrogance to
the Lebanese. Lieutenant Colonel Blankenship also noted that the raising
of the Lebanese flag by U. S. Marines did not go unnoticed by journalists,
both Lebanese and foreign alike.
Other examples show that even though Marines did not receive extensive
specialized training, they could carry out the peacekeeping mission. The
next example occurred at checkpoint 54, the entrance to the port. The
USMNF anticipated the arrival of Yassir Arafat around 1100 on 30 August.
Everything was going as planned when Arafat arrived unexpectedly at 1000.
Not only had he arrived early, but French vehicles along with French
Ambassador Henri were positioned in front and behind Arafat's vehicle. As
soon as the crowd outside the port, a mix of local civilians and media
realized Arafat was in the center vehicle they started to cheer and tried
to surround Arafat. The Marines at the checkpoint had distinct orders
about not letting vehicles other than the PLO through the checkpoint
because earlier the simultaneous arrival of French, Italian, and PLO at
the port had caused problems. The perimeter security was in danger of
being breached. Fortunately Colonel Mead and Lieutenant Colonel Johnston
arrived on the scene. The two most senior officers organized the Marines
to push the crowd back and Lieutenant Colonel Johnston directed the lead
French vehicles through and off to the side. With the route open, the
vehicle carrying Arafat could drive inside.
The potential for Arafat to be assassinated in the confusion was high.
The presence of the two senior commanders narrowly avoided a catastrophe.
While the Marines were doing exactly as they were told, they were not
doing what should have been done. Had they realized all the implications
of refusing access, quite possibly they would have acted differently. Even
Lieutenant Colonel Johnston delayed making a decision until he checked
with the diplomatic chain to determine if the French had been approved
access. He was reluctant to yield to the French because it appeared as if
they were saying Arafat needed their security despite the security
provided by Marines. However, when he did make a decision, he kept the
situation from taking another turn for the worse by quietly waving the
French vehicles off to the side keeping them from mixing with other forces
inside the perimeter.
This event ended the way it did because the senior leaders were at the
point of crisis at the right time. Part of the reason they were on the
scene was they identified the arrival of Arafat as a critical event.
However, when Arafat arrived early and the French acted unexpectedly, it
created a situation for which the Marines lacked the highly developed
judgment required to disobey their task in order to satisfy the purpose of
their task. If a similar situation developed when key leaders were not
close to the scene, the results could have turned out quite differently.
This event also raises another point. Part of the mission statement
read, "[M]aintain close and continuous contact with other MNF members."
How could the French arrive unexpectedly? No central command had been
established. Even though liaison officers had been exchanged, their
effectiveness is questionable because individuals were not specially
trained for liaison duty. Therefore, when a problem came up, Lieutenant
Colonel Johnston did not check with his liaison party but went through the
State Department over hand-held radio. This lack of trained liaison teams
created an awkward communications path from one military force through a
civilian agency to another military force. Difficulties translating not
only from French to English but from civilian to military terminology
created relay delays at a time all members of the MNF needed to be working
together closely.
Another difficulty the 32d MAU had was appearing to be neutral. A key
requirement of peacekeeping is to remain impartial, but, possibly, Marines
could be used by either the IDF or the PLO to gain political advantage.
Although the Marines were a highly disciplined unit, they could be
manipulated or tricked into not being neutral in many ways. One way to
prevent them from being manipulated was to prohibit direct communications
with the IDF or the PLO. All communications were to be done through the
LAF, with whom the Marines were allowed to talk. This way, in theory,
Marines could not be manipulated by either side.
While this prohibition may appear to be a good solution to the problem,
it severely handicapped the Marines, especially in situations requiring
quick reaction. In effect, the ROE and the no-talk policy took
decisionmaking responsibility away from the small units and placed it at
the highest tactical-level or even some times at the diplomatic level.
Marines had to carry out their duties exactly as tasked instead of in
accordance with an overarching intent. One example has already been given
to show how rigid adherence to orders can be dangerous. Given the many
different situations that could face the individual peacekeeper, the
policy of centralized negotiating authority goes against what was stated
in Chapter Two about the weapons of peacekeepers being "negotiation,
mediation, quiet diplomacy...not the self-loading rifle."
However, this next example shows why centralized negotiation may have
been justified and prudent. As stated earlier, the IDF overwatched the
entire evacuation from the buildings surrounding the port. The MAU
headquarters did have direct communications with the IDF, who would
frequently call with complaints about prohibited weapons passing through
checkpoint 54. When they complained, the Israelis would also block the
flow of traffic coming into or out of the port, and the evacuation got
seriously disrupted.
The communications net was manned by Lieutenant Colonel Blankenship,
the 32d MAU Operations Officer. In an interview, Lieutenant Colonel
Blankenship commented that he got quite frustrated with the Israelis
constantly calling to complain (usually inaccurately) about weapons
getting on the ship. He went on to say how perturbed he became at the
Israeli officer on the other end of the line because the Israeli was only
a captain and knew he was talking to a lieutenant colonel. Still, the
Israeli was demanding and disrespectful. Finally, Lieutenant Colonel
Blankenship told the Israeli captain he was turning the handset over to a
lance corporal clerk who would relay the Israeli complaints.
Lieutenant Colonel Blankenship was very clever and avoided being
manipulated through his anger. However, this example shows how easy the
Israelis could bring out anger by understanding American military culture.
Most likely the abruptness and disrespect were deliberate to show Israel
does not respond passively to every wish of the United States. The fact
that they were able to anger a relatively senior and experienced officer
is evidence that the Israelis were masters of manipulation. Thomas
Friedman, in his book From Beirut to Jerusalem, makes a similar
observation concerning Middle East culture in general. Western culture,
which is very direct, is extremely vulnerable to a culture that for
thousands of years has practiced the indirect. Had a less experienced
individual been angered by the Israelis, he might not have been as clever
in diffusing the situation.
The dilemma for Marines in Lebanon was that they had to deal with
parties whose culture they knew nothing about. These parties, however,
understood American culture very well. In this context the no-talk policy
begins to make sense. Still, the policy was far from the ideal policy. In
an ideal world, the policy would have allowed Marines to talk to the PLO
and IDF when needed to carry out their mission, but also Marines would
have been culturally savvy and knowledgeable on peacekeeping to avoid
showing favoritism. The only way to make Marines culturally aware is
through training and education. At the time of the Beirut contingency, the
32d MAU could not carry out that training to the required degree.
Chapter Four: MNF II
MNF II lasted longer than MNF I. Although 32d MAU was the first MAU to
go ashore, four different MAUs occupied the ground during MNF II. As
discussed in Chapter Two, MNF II can be broken into three phases: (1)
initial landing to Israeli withdrawal, (2) Israeli withdrawal to BLT 1/8
headquarters bombing, and (3) headquarters bombing to withdrawal of U. S.
forces.
This chapter will analyze the first and second phases above because the
return of the USMNF was intended to give assurances to the Lebanese people
the Israelis would not be allowed to overlook another Sabra and Shatilla
massacre. Marines were interposed between Israeli forces and the Muslim
villages surrounding Beirut. The presence was intended to bolster the
feeling of security of the Lebanese people long enough until the LAF could
be trained and organized to carry out its own security for the sovereignty
of Lebanon.
The first thing that will be examined is whether the MAUs were
organized and equipped to carry out their missions. Colonel Mead wrote
that before going into Beirut the second time, the MAU recognized it did
not have all the right tactical forces to accomplish its mission. He made
reference to the MAU's "carte blanche" and requested all the forces the
MAU would need for MNF II. In less than 36 hours, the requested forces
were at the MAU's position. Furthermore, when the 32d MAU was relieved by
24th MAU commanded by Colonel Stokes, all 183 of the 32d MAU's
augmentation force were turned over to the 24th MAU. Colonel Stokes' MAU
was relieved by Colonel Mead and a similar transfer of assets occurred
again. When Colonel Geraghty's 24th MAU relieved Colonel Mead's 22d MAU,
it acquired not only the assets from the previous MAUs but also a U. S.
Army Field Artillery School Target Acquisitions Battery (FASTAB).
Another significant point is that when 32d MAU first arrived, not all
of its organic equipment came ashore. BLT 2/8 did not bring its tanks or
artillery ashore because of the nature of the mission. The personnel and
crews that operated this equipment were employed as provisional infantry.
When Colonel Stokes' MAU arrived, he brought the tanks and 105mm artillery
ashore. When Colonel Geraghty's 24th MAU arrived, 155mm artillery replaced
the 105mm artillery, and it was "teamed up" with counter-battery radar.
All these points indicate that if the MAUs lacked the proper assets or
special equipment needed to accomplish their mission, this shortfall was
only because the MAU Commander had failed to request that equipment.
Training
Similar to MNF I, the BLTs had the majority of the forces on the ground
during MNF II. This distribution of forces ashore is not to imply the
other major subordinate elements (MSEs) of the MAU were not important. The
MSSGs were major contributors providing sustainment, habitability,
engineering, and explosive ordnance disposal support as well as providing
maintenance, postal, exchange, and dental services. However the mission of
the MSSG during MNF II was similar to its mission anywhere it would be
deployed. Major Barnetson, MSSG 32's Commanding Officer, said, "The only
difference between the job we are doing here and anywhere else is that
here we do it with someone shooting at us." While arguably the personnel
of MSSG 32 needed some special training such as terrorism countermeasures
and reporting, its commander saw the mission as generally the same.
Therefore, training of the MSSGs before deployment will not be evaluated.
Similarly, the ACE made a huge contribution providing assault support
in the form of passenger transport and logistical support and even
provided some aerial reconnaissance. However, the ACE conducted its
mission very similar to the way they would on a normal deployment or even
in combat. Lieutenant Colonel Granville R. Amos wrote,
From 1 July 1983 through 31 December 1983, HMM-261 performed every
mission that a composite squadron could be tasked to do. The fruits of the
squadron's emphasis on tactical training prior to LF6F 1-84 were realized
during Operation Urgent Fury, and again in Beirut.
Therefore, the training conducted by the various ACEs before deployment
will not be evaluated either.
The training conducted by BLT 2/8 has already been discussed in the
previous section. While they received all their specialized training for
the contingency while on ship, the quality and level of detail of that
training come into question since they lacked the material needed to
conduct thorough training on the specific situation.
BLT 3/8 was the Ground Combat Element (GCE) for the 24th MAU, the
second MAU to go ashore during MNF II. BLT 3/8 had deployed on 24 August
1982 and had conducted two amphibious training exercise en route to
Beirut. Before its deployment, BLT 3/8 had focused its training on tasks
that would be conducted during these training exercise. In other words,
BLT 3/8 had prepared for combat, not peacekeeping. This unit's command
chronology for the period just before deployment shows it had conducted
the same pattern of training exercises as had BLT 2/8. Like its
predecessor, BLT 3/8 had no idea it would be employed in Lebanon before
its departure from Camp Lejeune. Therefore any specialized peacekeeping
training was conducted on ship with the same limited assets as BLT 2/8.
One thing BLT 3/8 did have, which BLT 2/8 did not have, was the
opportunity to read message traffic and intelligence summaries in an
attempt to discover early lessons learned by the 32d MAU. Additionally,
BLT 3/8 was able to conduct a leaders' reconnaissance the day before
landing. During this time, the unit they were relieving gave them all the
information they could based on their limited experience ashore.
Major Christopher M. Ayers, the Operations Officer for BLT 3/8 talked
about training during the transit and major concerns,
People are also concerned about differences between police
action--which we are not empowered to do--and activities, measures taken
for our own self defense--which we are empowered to do. The lines got
blurred in the PFC level sometimes, so during the transit we had to
clarify that [difference] to make everyone know that the only active
measures that we could take were in our own self defense after the source
had been identified.
This quote shows the BLT knew something was different about their
mission and worked hard to highlight those differences. Without resources
such as historical examples, the leaders had to "clarify" the situation
based on their own judgment. Major Ayers goes on to say this:
My major concern was an overreaction by the Marines. There was, of
course, by virtue of the age and grade of many people like myself having
not been in combat, I was afraid that maybe too many of our Marines would
be over anxious or would expect too much out there.
Major Ayers speaks of the dilemma that small-unit leaders had no point
of reference from which to teach.
The first BLT that was not already deployed when Marines were committed
in Lebanon was BLT 2/6, which was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Donald
F. Anderson. In an interview, the battalion commander outlined the
training his unit conducted before deployment. Training consisted of air
alert; fireteam, squad, and platoon training; company tactics and a
battalion MCCRES in October; and a Combined Arms Exercise during the last
two weeks in October. Interestingly, the training sounds just like the
training for BLTs 2/8 and 3/8.
BLT 2/6 joined the 22d MAU on 24 November 1982 but did not know right
up to deployment whether or not they would be committed in Lebanon. As a
result of this uncertainty, BLT 2/6 gave up the opportunity to gain
expertise on peacekeeping from the subject matter experts. Since the 22d
MAU, the larger organization to which BLT 2/6 belonged, had deployed and
returned from Beirut, there was some experience starting at the top with
the MAU Commander, Colonel Mead. However, most of the experience in
peacekeeping was gained while on the ground through an "intuitive"
approach rather than through a rigorous analytical approach examining
numerous previous peacekeeping operations. BLT 2/6 lost a valuable
opportunity to learn from both previous UN peacekeeping experience and
scholarly study.
In the same interview, Lieutenant Colonel Anderson said,
An infantry battalion can do a mission like this, but you need some
time to prepare for it. Luckily we had some time. I think if you would
drop one [BLT] in here initially, it would be very, very tight.
He went on to say he felt the 27 days his battalion had was enough
time. Included in this time were 17 days transit time.
BLT 1/8 was the GCE for 24th MAU. When the 24th MAU relieved the 22d
MAU, BLT 1/8 took over the positions of BLT 2/6. This battalion returned
from its last deployment in June 1982. Between 30 June 1982 and 11 May
1983, the battalion changed its commanders two times, stood follow-on air
alert twice and primary air alert once. Its individual companies
participated in a week-long amphibious refresher training course, and the
battalion as a whole had deployed to Fort Pickett, Virginia for fire
support coordination training and mech and counter-mech training. It stood
a Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation (MCCRES) before deployment, and
conducted an amphibious workup with the 24th MAU just before departing the
U. S.
Ironically, BLT 1/8 deployed to Lebanon nine months after BLT 2/8 went
ashore and yet their training schedules looked almost identical. The only
mention of specialized peacekeeping training was in its command chronology
that stated, "During the first part of May, the battalion spent preparing
to carry out its duties as the U. S. contingent to the Multi National
Peace Keeping [sic] Force in Beirut, Lebanon." While this statement
sounds as if BLT 1/8 conducted some specialized training, examination of
the other events during May suggests perhaps this training was primarily
conducted on ship similar to the way BLT 2/6 had conducted their training.
The command chronology list the events during May as:
Sequential List Of Significant Events
14 Apr - 2 May |
Max Leave Period |
11 May |
Embark/Depart Morehead City |
22 May |
Inchop to LF6F |
29 May |
D-Day in Beirut, Lebanon |
Table 2.
Table 2 shows that BLT 1/8 was in a deployed
status for almost two-thirds of May. The time between the maximum leave
period and the deployment date would be taken up with inspections,
preparations, property turn-in, last minute administrative details, and
movement to embarkation points. While BLT 1/8 possibly did train before
embarkation, more likely most of the training was conducted once on ship.
Benis Frank reinforces this idea when he writes:
Colonel Geraghty also gave a three-hour personal briefing
to embarked Marines and Phibron crew members in which he covered the
Marine-Air Ground Task Force organization; 24th MAU organization; the
history, religions, politics, and social culture of the Lebanese; the
foreign and domestic factions in Lebanon; the rules of land warfare and
engagement; public affairs matters and naval intelligence and operations.
From this passage, two points come to mind. First, the information
briefed by Colonel Geraghty is too much material to cover in just three
hours. Second, considering five ships were in the ATF, too much time was
dedicated by the highest ranking officer in the MAU at a time he must have
been very busy. The amount of time the MAU commander spent briefing
Marines indicates he felt this information was very important. It may also
indicate he was the only individual in the MAU who possessed all this
information. Just two days before sailing, Colonel Geraghty had attended
briefings in Washington at the Department of State and Headquarters United
States Marine Corps. Also, while it may have been possible to visit all
the ships, the LST 1188 USS Harlan County, was carrying causeways
that usually prohibit transferring personnel at sea. This complication
would make it very difficult for the MAU commander to address the Marines
on this ship. Therefore, even if special training was scheduled for the
Marines, this training was highly dependent on a few subject matter
experts who may not always have been available.
A conclusion from the above discussion is all units had about the same
amount and type of peacekeeping training. BLTs 2/6 and 1/8 could have had
more peacekeeping training than BLTs 2/8 and 3/8 if their operational
tempo had been less rigorous. However, they would have had to realize the
unique aspects of their mission was covered by several studies, but they
did not. As a result of these factors, most if not all training for the
USMNF had to be conducted on ship during transit. Unfortunately, once
deployed, the Marines lacked the assets, such as written material and
subject matter experts to train effectively.
Peacekeeping Tactics: The Tools
Having looked at the training, we will now look at the tactical
deployment of the GCEs. In an interview, Major Jack Farmer who had been
the assistant operations officer for 32d MAU and later the operations
officer for the 22d MAU explained the thought process behind how forces
were positioned at the international airport. His description provides a
very logical development of tactical level activities to execute the
USCINCEUR plan and reflects an iterative process that involves a give and
take between higher and lower level commands. As an example, the 32d MAU
was stretched very thin along the section of line it had been assigned.
The MAU informed USCINCEUR that it could not defend the line because the
line was stretched too thin. USCINCEUR responded that was okay because it
never intended the MAU to defend the entire line, it only wanted a
presence along the line. The MAU was able to accomplish its task through a
series of strongpoints.
BLT 2/8 probably had input on the location of actual positions because
in his postdeployment report, the battalion commander explains the
designated line and each checkpoint along the line. Plotting all the
checkpoints on the map shows a clear, neat line of positions. By keeping
the IDF to the east and southeast of the line, the USMNF created a buffer
for the heavily populated Muslim suburbs of Beirut. Major Farmer explained
how this line accomplished the mission when he stated:
The local Shiite population knew that the Israelis would not open fire
or would not continue any aggressive acts against them simply because we
were there in the way. And that is the real meaning of the presence
mission.
Unfortunately, the line established on the map was not as clear on the
ground. A considerable amount of "jockeying" had to be done to take into
account the heavily populated areas just outside the airport. Instead of
running outside the Muslim neighborhoods shielding them from the IDF, the
line ran through them. This positioning of the strongpoints made it
difficult at certain locations to see the exact location of the USMNF
lines. Additionally, the line did not extend as far as initially assigned
because to do so would cut off the IDF from the Sidon Road, a route which
they claimed they needed to resupply its forces located to the north.
In another interview conducted after the headquarters bombing, Major
Farmer reflects in hindsight how positioning the USMNF along the
originally intended line would have placed the Marines between the towns
of Kfar Shima, which was Christian, and Ash Shuyafat, which was Muslim. He
goes on to explain this may have been helpful when the IDF finally did
withdraw in maintaining the peace. However, Major Farmer who knew all the
political, physical, and cultural considerations involved in the original
positioning of forces was not present when the IDF withdrew in September
1982. While 32d MAU had originally established the line, Colonel
Geraghty's 24th MAU, which was present, was the fourth MAU to occupy the
same line. As a result of the frequent turnovers, the considerations for
positioning the USMNF lines (for example, why not extend between Kfar
Shima and Ash Shuyafat) may have become lost.
This idea is reinforced by things that happened to Colonel Stokes' 24th
MAU. This was the second MAU ashore. Colonel Stokes analyzed his
"presence" mission and decided the real way to achieve success was to get
out on the Sidon Road. He arranged for permission, and, on 5 December
1982, a Marine patrol moved along the Sidon Road. In his Doctoral Thesis,
Dr. Matthews, who also happened to be the BLT 3/8 Commander wrote, "[O]ne
elderly Druze lady asked, 'Where have you guys been? why [sic] haven't you
been here sooner? We are so tired of killing, maybe it will all end now
that you're here.'" These patrols lasted for about a week with good
results. No more ambushes were conducted along the road, and all the armed
control points of the various militias and factions had disappeared. On 10
December 1982, the Marines were order to stop patrolling. Dr. Matthews
concludes the reasons behind this decision were diplomatic in nature and
involved Israel.
Colonel Mead's 22d MAU relieved Colonel Stokes' 24th MAU. Continuity
existed here because at a minimum both Colonel Mead and Major Farmer had
been with the 32d MAU. These officers understood the USMNF positions were
based on the original mission and were constrained by diplomatic
agreements with Israel. Previously, while commanding the 32d MAU, Colonel
Mead had noticed what appeared to be some "heavy-handed" tactics on the
part of the LAF against the Palestinians and Muslim squatters living just
outside the airport. Although he was concerned at the time, he also stated
the poor treatment by the LAF did not seem to build any hostility on the
part of the Muslims towards the Marines and they were not targeted.
Colonel Mead had just come to this conclusion when his MAU rotated home.
About one month after the 24th MAU was ashore, it commenced training
the LAF on a not-to-interfere basis with other duties. In reality, the MAU
attacked this task aggressively and welcomed the opportunity to keep busy.
One can only wonder what Colonel Mead's reaction would have been to the
request to provide LAF training after he had just witnessed the LAF clear
squatter camps and buildings overlooking the airport using fire and
maneuver and leveling shanty villages with bulldozers. However, since the
24th MAU started training the LAF, when Colonel Mead returned in February
1983, his 22d MAU continued the training.
The 22d MAU was relieved by the 24th MAU which was commanded by Colonel
Geraghty. While the 24th MAU was in Lebanon, the IDF withdrew south of the
Awali River. Now, the main conflict that needed "presence" was the
conflict among the LAF, the Christian militia, and the Muslim militias.
Perhaps Colonel Geraghty would have selected different positions or
expanded Marine lines had he witnessed earlier events. At a minimum, he
may have opted to distance himself from the LAF had he witnessed earlier
harsh measures used against the communities surrounding the airport.
Another possibility is perhaps Colonel Geraghty saw all these events and
tried to take other action but was prohibited for political reasons. Even
if this were the case, it lends support to the point that frequent changes
of the MAUs disrupted continuity.
Another example that illustrates this point is the positioning of
assets ashore. Colonel Mead made the deliberate decision to leave his
tanks and artillery on ship to avoid the appearance of being a hostile
force. However, Colonel Stokes saw these assets as essential because the
USMNF was tasked to be prepared to conduct retrograde operations. While
the decision to bring these assets ashore was based on deliberate
forethought, to observers outside the USMNF, nothing significant had
happened between the departure of the 32d MAU and the arrival of the 24th
MAU to motivate an increase in combat power ashore. To the Druze and Amal
militias, the change in combat power was an increased threat, and it could
be construed as coercion.
Colonel Mead faced a similar situation when he returned with the 22d
MAU. What would be the perception if the tanks and artillery were returned
to the ships? Colonel Mead had to keep these assets ashore whether or not
he thought he needed them. To return them to the ship might show a
lessening of support to the LAF.
The presence of these weapons ashore takes on greater significance
considering the minimum use of force peacekeeping principle. Intuitively,
tanks are associated more often with offensive than defensive operations.
Since force only has to be perceived, what at first seems like a minor
decision takes on new significance.
The inconsistency between the successive MAUs' decisions can be
attributed to the frequent turnover of units and lack of direction from a
common higher headquarters. Table 3 below shows the period(s) each MAU was
ashore and the key personnel of each MAU headquarters.
MAU Continuity
|
32d MAU |
24th MAU |
22d MAU |
24th MAU |
CO |
Mead |
Stokes |
Mead |
Geraghty |
XO |
Smith |
Schmidt |
Rice |
Beebe
Slacum |
S-2 |
Winbush |
Ciano |
Winbush |
McCarthy |
S-3 |
Blanken-ship |
Tempone |
Farmer |
Converse |
S-4 |
Payne |
Moon |
Payne |
Melton |
Dates ashore |
25 Sep-
1 Nov 82 |
1 Nov82-
15 Feb83 |
15 Feb-
29 May |
29 May-
18 Nov |
# of months |
1.25 |
3.5 |
3.5 |
5.5 |
Table 3
The median tour in country was three and one-half
months. While Colonel Geraghty's MAU stayed five and one-half months, this
was only because the MAU rotation was changed from a four-battalion base
(1/8, 2/8, 3/8,and 2/6) to a three-battalion base (1/8, 2/8, and 3/8).
Table 3 sheds light on the issue of continuity. Just as Commanders got
familiar with the situation and area, a new MAU with a new commander
arrived. Even when Colonel Mead remained the 22d MAU Commander, his staff
changed and (not shown in Table 3) all three of his MSEs changed as well.
Earlier studies on peacekeeping had found the ideal tour length for
peacekeeping troops was six months, but for peacekeeping staffs the ideal
tour length was one to two years. Had peacekeeping received greater study
before using the six-month forward-deployed MAUs, this fact may have been
considered. At a minimum, it would have been possible to establish a
special staff that remained permanently in Beirut for continuity sake. The
special staff could have absorbed the MAU staff similar to the way
Brigadier General Jim R. Joy's staff absorbed Colonel Faulkner's 22d MAU
staff. While this may not have solved all problems, it would have at least
minimized inconsistencies between the MAUs.
In addition to positioning forces between hostile parties, another
tactic used by the USMNF was patrolling. The 32d MAU used patrolling to
keep in contact with its squad-sized checkpoints in the Muslim town of Hay
es Salaam and its most distant positions at the Lebanese University.
Colonel Stokes expanded on this patrol plan by sending motorized patrols
north into East and West Beirut. This was intended to show the Muslims the
Marines were going to "stem any aggressive intentions by the dominant
Christian Phalange militia or other Christian forces operating under IDF
sponsorship." Finally, some saw patrols as a way to get Marines out of the
static positions and give them something to do. This would make them feel
they had contributed to the stability of Beirut. It would also prevent one
of the biggest problems--boredom.
Foot patrols were used around BIA. Major Arey, BLT 3/8's operations
officer said patrols were a way to "extend our presence and goodwill...to
the people who lived around BIA and saw the Marines in the street." One
photograph in Benis Frank's book shows a patrol at sling arms with
magazines removed walking through the street of Hay es Salaam while
civilians carry on business as normal. The photograph shows how vulnerable
Marines were to a terrorist threat, which they compensated for with
designated marksmen and by varying their routes. Patrols would vary their
times and point of departures and time of return. Using imagination,
leaders even had patrols fly out and return on foot to BIA.
In addition to "showing the flag," the patrols would look for signs
that showed aggression. For the most part, Marines were treated with open
arms at first, but Eric Hammel, author of The Root, noted Colonel
Geraghty's 24th MAU met increasing hostility as time went on. Initially,
when Marines met hostility, they called back to higher headquarters. If it
received a call, the BLT headquarters dispatched an laf liaison team. As
hostilities increased in intensity from verbal to physical assaults,
Colonel Geraghty proposed the patrols be accompanied by an laf fireteam.
The motorized patrols, because of the distances, had always used a liaison
officer to accompany the patrol. The combined U. S. and LAF patrols
through the towns surrounding BIA seemed like a good solution to a serious
problem. Had Colonel Geraghty seen the same treatment the LAF gave the
local population as had Colonel Mead, he probably would not have
recommended this solution.
As an interposition force, the USMNF was primarily concerned with
keeping the Israelis away from the city of Beirut, especially from areas
inhabited by Palestinians. Major Farmer said,
The nature of the mission was one of presence, it was peacekeeping just
to provide a stabilizing factor basically with us being there in the
general location of the IDF, to provide the local indigenous population a
feeling of security against the Israelis because of the recent military
events and political events that had Israelis involved with Sabra,
Shatilla massacre and just the general military nature of the Israeli
disposition on the ground.
The likelihood of Israeli attack against the USMNF was virtually
nonexistent, but the Israeli reaction to sniper fire and terrorist threat
posed a significant problem to Marines. Israeli response would often spill
over into U. S. lines. When this happened, Marines were sent scurrying for
cover. In addition to spill over fire, it seemed as if the Israelis were
constantly testing the legitimacy of the USMNF. Diplomatic agreements
clearly specified where the Israelis could and could not go. However, on
several occasions, the Israelis would try to enter unauthorized areas. At
first, these attempts were made under the guise of poor land navigation.
Other times they were overt attempts to force or intimidate their way into
the USMNF's sector. The perimeter at the Lebanese University was the site
of the most overt attempts.
Captain Charles B. Johnson's Company L, BLT 3/8 occupied the Lebanese
University position while Colonel Stokes' 22d MAU was ashore. In an
interview, Captain Johnson related several incidents that occurred at his
position involving the Israelis. The first incident involved the IDF
patrols along the Sidon Road. After being attacked on several different
occasions by terrorist using car bombs parked along the Sidon Road, the
IDF began to use the reconnaissance-by-fire technique as they patrolled.
They would patrol on a routine basis from south to north, set up security,
and later in the day return from north to south. As the IDF patrol moved
along the road, they would periodically fire at what they determined to be
suspected terrorist positions. This tactic was very dangerous because at
anytime the fire could spill over into civilian neighborhoods or even into
the USMNF positions.
On 10 January 1983 while using the reconnaissance-by- fire technique,
the IDF hit a local civilian bird hunter who was mistaken for a terrorist.
The hunter dropped his "primitive" muzzle-loaded weapon, got in his car,
and drove into the nearby town. The IDF trailed the man but had to go
through the U. S./LAF checkpoint to get to the town. They announced their
intentions to go inside the perimeter and search for the "terrorist." The
Marines and the LAF officer at the checkpoint refused to permit the IDF to
pass through. The company commander was at the airport at a meeting and so
the senior Marine on the scene was Captain Kelsy, a forward air controller
(FAC) attached to the company. The FAC spoke to the Israeli officer and
confirmed they would not be allowed to pass. In the meantime, Captain
Johnson, the company commander arrived on the scene.
The Israelis restated their intentions and flagged down three busses
full of Israeli soldiers that were traveling south on the Sidon Road. The
situation became a very tense standoff. Finally, all parties agreed the
IDF would not be given access but the LAF would search for the man. The
LAF went into the town and to the building where the man was last seen. A
short time later, the LAF returned and informed the IDF the man could not
be found. The IDF had no other choice but to leave. As a result of this
incident, an emergency communications net was established between the
USMNF and the IDF.
A week after this incident, on 17 January 1982, an IDF vehicle patrol
approached the combined U. S. and LAF checkpoint near the university and
demanded access. The Marine on duty denied access and called the company
commander. Captain Johnson went to the checkpoint to investigate. A
reporter who had been doing a story on Lima Company came along. When
Captain Johnson arrived, he repeated to the IDF patrol leader he could not
pass. A Marine stood in front of the lead vehicle to block the way. The
Israeli driver lurched forward by popping the clutch, hit the Marine, and
then braked the vehicle after knocking the Marine back. Meanwhile, a U. S.
Marine M60 machinegun squad and a reaction squad set up just down the road
from the Israeli patrol. Although Captain Johnson insists they did not
load their weapons, the reporter wrote his story as if they had. The
Israelis left with no further confrontation, but this incident created a
heightened awareness of tensions between the USMNF and IDF.
On 23 January 1982, a television news crew observed the now publicized
IDF reconnaissance-by-fire technique, and they decided to film the action.
The crew set up in a field adjacent to the Sidon Road and filmed so
overtly that the Israeli patrol leader demanded they turn over the film.
The news team refused and moved within the USMNF area.
The third incident, probably the best known, happened on 2 February
1983. About a week prior, Captain Johnson had noticed two Israeli armored
personnel carriers (APCs) move up to the fence marking the USMNF's
position and stop. He went down to the APCs and informed them they were at
the perimeter and could not enter. The vehicle commander acknowledged
Captain Johnson's statement and said he had orders to wait there for 30
minutes and he would leave. In almost exactly 30 minutes the APCs did
leave.
The next week, Captain Johnson was on the roof of the library building
showing the Advance party for the British contingent to the MNF some key
points of the surrounding area. He observed tanks moving down through the
city, which struck him as unusual because tanks were vulnerable to attack
in the narrow streets. He immediately went down to the edge of his
perimeter and stopped where the APCs had stopped the previous week. The
tanks came within 30 meters of the same spot when he flagged down the lead
tank. As Captain Johnson stood with pistol drawn in front of the tank, he
informed the tank commander he could not enter the perimeter and would
have to run over him to do so. The commander seemed to acknowledge and
spoke into his microphone to the other tanks. While the lead tank stopped,
the other two tanks raced forward. Captain Johnson jumped on the stopped
tank, pulled the tank commander to him, and told him to stop the other
tanks or he would kill him. The tank commander complied, and the tanks
stopped. He informed Captain Johnson he was Lieutenant Colonel Lansberg,
the battalion commander of the Israeli force positioned at Khalde, and
then he departed.
Captain Johnson immediately called his battalion commander who arrived
on the scene shortly. After walking the ground, they called the MAU
commander, Colonel Stokes, and informed him. As result of this incident,
even more attention was drawn by the media to the tensions between the
USMNF and IDF.
These examples imply Marines knew their responsibilities and the level
of force authorized. In each incident, they used absolute minimum force
often times putting themselves in great danger to comply with this
principle. Even in the absence of the company commander, other leaders
provided sufficient depth of knowledge to carry out the mission. Captain
Johnson felt awkward dealing with the Israelis because,
With the ROE the way they were and being that most Americans identify
with the religious struggle and so forth of Israel [it was difficult], but
we have our orders. Very simple,...we weren't sent there to help the
Israelis. We were sent there to keep peace and to help the Lebanese. I
mean, that's just the way the orders came down, and they will be followed.
But it was an awkward situation to deal with the Israelis. It was a no win
situation.
All three of these incidents show Marines knew what to do. Even though
the situation was awkward, the situation was also clear. When the
situation was very clear, not only did Marines know what to do, they
willingly performed their peacekeeping duty even though minimum use of
force presented great risk. Marines did not lock and load their weapons,
but they were in position ready to do so if necessary. Israelis were not
allowed to search Muslim towns inside the USMNF perimeter, and Israeli
tanks were stopped by the extraordinary action of one individual. All
these events added credibility to the Marines' presence.
Unused Tools
Two factors that should not be overlooked in these examples are the
presence of media and the status of Israel. The Israelis seemed very
concerned that their reconnaissance-by-fire was captured on tape. Later,
at the checkpoint incident, a reporter was present in addition to a
reaction squad. The Captain Johnson and the IDF tank commander incident
made international headlines. Israel, a legitimate government, had to
answer to the world body. These two facts combined may have tempered the
IDF response. Chapter Two discussed part of the theory of peacekeeping
that was the hostile parties would not want to be accused of firing on the
UN. In this situation, the same dynamic is seen between the IDF and the
USMNF. Perhaps in the case of the IDF, the USMNF's most effective tactic
would have been positioning the television mini-camera.
This concept is not without precedence. At the start of Operation Peace
For Galilee, the IDF literally ran over the Fijjian Battalion of the UN
peacekeeping force assigned to southern Lebanon (UNIFIL). Ten years
earlier, the Danes had successfully stopped the IDF by laying down their
weapons and linking their arms as they blocked the road. The difference
between the Danes and the Fijjians was the Danes had their unit
photographer off to the side in a safe position filming the entire event.
Colonel Geraghty's 24th MAU may have been able to use this tool against
the IDF during its tour. In his thesis, Lieutenant Colonel Matthews, USMC
(retired) tells of an interview he had with the 24th MAU's Intelligence
Officer, Captain Kevin McCarthy, concerning an incident with an IDF tank
unit on 8 June 1983. After hearing tank main gun fire, Captain McCarthy,
who was standing watch at the time, went to a Marine checkpoint to
investigate. He found an Israeli captain who spoke English. The Israeli
officer explained he had received rocket fire and his tanks had just
expended 100 high explosive rounds into Hay es Salaam. Captain McCarthy
was astonished but apparently felt he could do nothing except report this
incident up the chain of command. What options were available? The MAU
could not attack the IDF tanks. Even if an attack were authorized, the
tanks were no longer firing and therefore did not meet the criteria to
engage. In this situation, the media option appears to have been one of
the better options. Had the 24th MAU been able to film this action and
hold the IDF accountable to the world for their action, Captain McCarthy
might have felt less helpless and the USMNF would have been more effective
creating a stable environment.
However, care must be taken in applying this lesson. The conditions in
this situation making media tactics applicable do not always apply. When
the IDF withdrew to the south, factional fighting started up. Publicity
would not likely have quieted this fighting. It would most likely have had
the opposite effect as factions competed for world attention to view the
injustices they suffered. The factions were not legitimate governments
susceptible to international pressure. If the media and world attention
are to be used as tools, judgment must be used when to apply them.
Although the USMNF seemed to be very successful during the three
incidents with the IDF, in a way the IDF also won. These incidents were
responsible for establishing direct communications between the MAU and the
IDF. This appears to be what the IDF wanted all along. Colonel Mead
noticed a continuous Israeli attempt to bypass the government of Lebanon.
After meeting with diplomats and Israeli Brigadier General Lfikin on 24
March 1982, to work out an agreement for exchanging patrol information,
Colonel Mead noted:
The IDF continued, however, to seek coordination between the two units
instead of a simple exchange of information. This request was pressed
repeatedly by Defense Minister Arens and others. They continually failed
to acknowledge that the U. S. MNF presence in Lebanon was a result of a
request from the GOL and, since the Israelis were invaders, our stance as
peacekeepers must be pro-Lebanon and neutral toward Israel. If the Muslim
Lebanese population perceived our presence as one in coordination with the
Israelis, our safety and ability to accomplish the mission would be
drastically reduced.
Initially, the USMNF did not establish military-to-military
communications with the IDF. One reason may have been to lessen the
decisionmaking responsibility on the tactical forces. If, in a high
pressure situation such as the show-down between the Marines at the
Lebanese University and the IDF, the Marines were able to say, "Let me
check with higher headquarters," Marines would be under less pressure to
make a quick decision. Also, if Marines announced an unfavorable decision,
they would be less likely to receive additional pressure since the
decision would appear to be out of their hands.
A second reason, and probably the most likely, was to preserve the
neutrality of the USMNF. If the Marines had no communications with the IDF,
it would be difficult to accuse the USMNF of cooperating with the IDF.
Colonel Stokes on several occasions had to remind the Israelis all
communications must be directed through diplomatic channels.
Although Colonel Mead understood the IDF's intentions concerning direct
communications, another incident demonstrates his difficult position. On 7
May 1983, the USMNF came under fire from what appeared to be spill over
fire from the mountains to the east. Additionally, several rockets landed
between Black Beach and the amphibious ships just off the shore. The
rocket fire was coming from just outside Marine lines from an area
normally patrolled by the IDF. Colonel Mead ordered the Marines to standby
to sweep that area and then called the IDF and said if they did not clear
that area he would send U. S. forces out to do it. In a short time the IDF
sent a sweep through the area but never found the gunner.
This incident viewed from the gunner's perspective provides insight.
From his point of view, the gunner fires at U. S. ships and Marines, but
the IDF looks for him. The implications of these events are not hard to
conceive. The USMNF cooperated with the IDF. Similar to the idea expressed
by Captain Johnson, Colonel Mead was faced with a no win situation dealing
with the Israelis. The hotline proved to be an in-extremis
coordination net.
The question at this point is if the USMNF could negotiate in an
emergency with the IDF, why could they not negotiate with the various
militias surrounding the airport? A likely answer involves the mission to
support the legitimate government of Lebanon. Negotiations with the
militias would recognize the militias as legitimate parties. This would
not support the legitimate government that was trying to control the
illegitimate militias.
Still, LAF liaison officers were located in the building next to the
MAU headquarters. Why could the liaison officer not have had closer
contact with the militias? After all, if the Israelis started to shoot at
the USMNF, the Marines could use the hotline with the Israelis to diffuse
the situation. When the Druze or Amal militias shot at the USMNF, the
Marines had only two options: (1) take cover and allow them to continue
firing or (2) fire back to silence the fire.
When the Marines did fire back, how effectively they communicated their
message to the militias is difficult to tell. When Marines responded to
hostile indirect fire on 29 August 1983, the first rounds fired were 81mm
illumination. While the illumination rounds were intended to send a clear
message to the militias to stop firing, the actual message they sent could
have been quite different. The USMNF hoped the message was, "We have your
position located and can destroy you if you do not stop." However, there
are many other things these illumination rounds could have been saying to
the militias.
First, if the rounds were directly over the target they could have been
interpreted as "The Americans are not willing to engage us with high
explosive rounds and are weak-hearted." In a culture that places a premium
on brute force and destructive power, this message is quite conceivable.
However, another interpretation is equally likely. The militia had the
initiative. They fired first; the USMNF fired second. If the militia
wanted to alienate the USMNF from the local population, the illumination
rounds could be a sign that they had almost lured the Marines into
engaging them. They could retain the initiative by firing one more
indirect round on the Marines and then displacing. The Marines would
return fire with high explosive rounds but would only do so based on the
actions of the militia. Therefore, the militia had absolute control. If
the illumination rounds were on target, the militias might not fire on the
Marines. If the warning rounds were over an area they did not care about,
they could fire with no fear. If they wanted the rounds to hit civilians,
they could even position civilians under the illumination rounds before
they returned their second round.
A similar situation existed during patrolling activities. If a civilian
acted hostile to a Marine patrol, the practice was to call back to
headquarters and a Lebanese liaison officer was sent to investigate.
Marines had no feedback on what caused the hostility. While they were the
targets of aggression, they never really knew why. In response to a
grenade attack on a 22d MAU patrol, the LAF cordoned off an area and
arrested over 100 people. One suspect was convicted of the crime and was
sentenced to death. The LAF reported the suspect was pro-Amal. The Amal
were located around BIA in the same area the LAF had swept when Colonel
Mead was with the 32d MAU. The LAF could have fabricated the story to
justify their earlier actions. In hindsight, the LAF, which wanted U. S.
support, would not tell the USMNF it was being attacked because of its
support to the LAF. The USMNF relied on information and negotiations
through a party very much involved in the conflict. This reliance made the
USMNF a party to the conflict too and not a neutral third party.
The inability to communicate with all the local parties led to an
unclear situation. Unlike the situation with the Israelis that was very
clear, the firefights between the surrounding militias was never clear.
Major Arey said, "[T]he longer we stayed there the more we knew, [but] the
less we understood it because of the merkiness [sic] of Lebanese
politics." Had the USMNF been able to communicate with the local militias,
they could have used less force, provided more accurate intelligence to
their diplomats for negotiating, and accomplished their mission more
effectively.
Other events show the USMNF had a general idea of what they were
supposed to do but lacked the polish needed to be totally effective. One
example is a series of civil affairs operations that were not tied
together very well. All civic action programs were carried out with the
greatest intentions and sincerity, however, because they were not
coordinated and exploited, their effectiveness was negligible or even
counterproductive. For example, the 22d MAU set up a semi-pemanent dental
facility at the airport near the center of their lines. At first, Lebanese
were reluctant to come to this facility. However, over a period of four
months, MSSG 22 treated over 1,220 patients in routine dental procedures.
The immediate problem with this program was its location. By having the
dental clinic at the airport and having the patients come to the clinic,
the Marines had no control over who benefited from the treatment. Patients
could have been fairly well off Christians who did not pose a problem to
the USMNF. If the dental programs had been conducted in a Muslim
neighborhood, the beneficiaries would almost certainly be Muslim. In other
words the civic action programs were not targeted towards a specific
group, the group which the USMNF had to try the hardest to avoid
alienating.
Other civic action programs were also well-intentioned but were carried
out over too long a period. For example, 22d MAU started to build a
playground for a children's school in Burj al Burajneh. They could not
finish the playground in time and so MSSG 24 had to finish it later. What
message was being sent to the local population? The Marines could not even
build a playground.
What would have happened if the Marines had brought the materials and
equipment to the site and helped the local civilians build the playground
instead of building it for them? What if the dental programs had been
conducted in the middle of town and as people waited to be seen, they
spoke about their problems and asked why the Marines were in Lebanon? The
effectiveness of these programs could have been greatly increased. While
the Marines intuitively knew civic action was good, they lacked the
expertise to exploit the benefits it could have provided. These were lost
opportunities.
Another event involved the 22d MAU during rescue operations in the
Chouf mountains after the area had been hit by a huge snowstorm. The
Marines carried out a very difficult mission to reach civilians stranded
in the mountains. In addition to the environmental factors, the mission
was especially complex because the civilians were stranded behind Syrian
lines. The 22d MAU order is a textbook example of a five-paragraph order
with numerous details coordinating the activity of all three MSEs. The
Marines were successful in this operation. They did relieve suffering for
some civilians; however, their overall mission was to support the
legitimate government of Lebanon. Instead, the USMNF took over a function
of the legitimate government of Lebanon. While only the USMNF had the
equipment that made it possible to conduct this mission, the LAF could
have accompanied the Marines on this mission. If legitimacy were the
issue, then credit for the rescue operation should have gone to the LAF.
In the Commander's comments section of a special situation report
concerning the rescue operations, Colonel Mead wrote, "Professionalism
displayed by all Marines and sailors further boosted the reputation and
image of the Marine Corps in the eyes of the Lebanese people." Colonel
Mead's concern for the can-do image of his Marines may have
influenced his decision to exclude the LAF during this mission.
There are numerous other examples that show Marines were
well-intentioned and eager to carry out their mission but lacked the
expertise and knowledge to fully and effectively carry it out. As
discussed in Chapter Two, one of the principles of peacekeeping is minimum
use of force. Some types of force are very easy to understand. The use of
weapons is a clear use of force. Some other types of force, such as the
use of barriers, are not as clear but qualify as force. The threat of
force is also the use of force. The threat of force does not have to be
actual; it only has to be perceived. With this as background, we will now
discuss crosstraining with other members of the MNF.
The Marines recognized their peacekeeping mission was detracting from
their primary mission of warfighting. To compensate for this, the 22d and
24th MAUs sent about 120 Marines to Camp Des Garrigues, France for
training to maintain their combat skills. In addition to training outside
Lebanon, Marines began to train inside Lebanon as well. This training
often included other members of the MNF, especially the French. While the
Italians were invited, they always seemed too busy to come. Some of the
multinational crosstraining involved firing each country's small arms.
This was a low visibility exercise involving platoon-sized units from both
the U. S. Marines and the French. Other training exercises took on higher
visibility.
The 22d MAU and both 24th MAUs conducted amphibious assaults from U. S.
ships to Black Beach. The U. S. ships were highly visible and no doubt
these amphibious operations were visible from the coastal road and
especially from the hills surrounding BIA. Amphibious assaults are
unquestionably offensive operations. With no formal announcements
explaining the purpose of these exercises to the local populace, one can
imagine what the Muslim militias thought as amphibious vehicles and
helicopters stormed the beach. Even prior announcement unless done
extremely well, may have been greeted with skepticism.
Another highly visible crosstraining evolution was parachute
operations. Both the 22d and 24th MAU conducted parachute jumps using the
Beirut golf course as a drop zone. In Benis Frank's book, several
parachutists high above the city of Beirut are seen in a photograph.
Parachute operations are a means to project power and in no way can be
construed as defensive. Additionally they were highly visible operations
and not something that happened everyday in Lebanon. While the USMNF could
not have know for sure how the local militias perceived these operations,
clearly, not much thought was put into whether this would create the wrong
perception.
Whether the Italian contingent's decline to participate in these
operations was intentional or coincidental is also uncertain. However,
whenever senior Marines spoke of the Italian peacekeeping force, they had
nothing but praise for the contingent because of its professionalism and
ability to carry out one of the hardest missions in the center of the
Palestinian refugee camps. Additionally, the Italians kept the same
Commanding General, Brigadier General Angioni, and his staff in Lebanon
for the entire length of MNF II. Interestingly, the Italians did not
suffer the same type of terrorist attack experienced by the USMNF and the
French. With this information, the Italian Commanding General's decision
appears to be more deliberate than mere coincidence.
The last example of lack of preparation for peacekeeping involves
cultural aspects. Leaders had a big concern that Marines would naturally
align with the Christian population in Lebanon. Lieutenant Colonel
Anderson was concerned his Marines would find it easy to align with the
Christians because:
Christians speak the same language and wear western clothes. Moslems
dress different[ly] and speak a different language. It is much more
difficult to feel comfortable with them.
Although leaders were aware of culture, they had a hard time operating
in a cultural environment they did not fully understand and that was
predisposed to hostility toward U. S. forces.
In his thesis, Lieutenant Colonel Matthews relates several stories in
which Marines were unconsciously maneuvered into situations that made them
look as if they were aligning with the Christian population. While the
Marines felt they were being honored at gala events and extravagant
banquets, they often ended up on the pages of local magazines eating
dinner with quite possibly the "same forces responsible for the Sabra and
Shatilla massacre just ninety days earlier." When Marines realized their
errors, they quickly stopped, but the damage had been done. First
impressions are lasting impressions.
Another example of cultural insensitivity is similar to the French flag
incident in the Beirut port area before the evacuation of the PLO. A story
in a June 1983 edition of the Root Scoop praised Lance Corporal
Benson D. Stalvey of BLT 1/8 for motivating his fellow Marines every day
when he played "colors" on the bugle. While this is not a major incident,
it seems to be in quite a contrast to Colonel Mead's earlier lesson to his
MAU on the use of symbolic gestures to show support for Lebanon. If colors
had been raised without a bugle, they might have gone unnoticed. With the
addition of the bugle and the short distance to Muslim villages from
Marine lines, the color raising ceremony was quite visible. Although this
story was on the front page of the MAU's own weekly newspaper, it did not
seem to strike any of the 24th MAU leaders as improper.
Finally, the words and actions of individual Marines show a clear shift
in attitudes towards peacekeeping. Michael Petit was a Marine corporal
assigned to the 24th MAU Operations Section when the BLT headquarters
building was destroyed. In his book, Peacekeepers at War, he shows
strong contempt for an officer who tried to explain the "presence mission"
to members of the press. While Petit was only one Marine, consider that he
worked in the MAU headquarters as a clerk. He worked daily filing messages
from higher headquarters (which he must have read because he includes
excerpts from these messages in his book) and was privy to conversations
between the operations officer, various staff officers, and even Colonel
Geraghty himself. If any enlisted Marine should have understood the
situation and purpose for being in Lebanon, that Marine should have been
Corporal Petit. His contempt and anger show a lack of understanding of the
peacekeeping mission. If he did not understand the purpose and political
aspects of the 24th MAU's mission, consider the understanding of the
individual rifleman at a remote checkpoint several miles away from the
headquarters.
Other examples show Marines were proud they were allowed to use force
very effectively; however, few examples show they related the use of force
to failure of their mission. Benis Frank's book shows a series of
photographs of a hardbacked tent that was used as a soda mess in Alpha
Company, BLT 1/8's position. A sign outside the tent changed over time
from the "Can't Shoot Back...," to the "Can Shoot Back...," and finally to
the "Did Shoot Back Saloon." In a letter written to his sister just before
his death, Staff Sergeant Ortega wrote this:
When the bombs hit, all you could see was Lebanese people flying and
dying. We had a couple of Marines hurt, but nothing serious. The best part
is we got to fire back for the first time.
Other statements made by Marines show a similar attitude. U. S. News
and World Report quoted a Charlie Company, BLT 1/8 Marine as saying,
"The other night our unit fired with everything we have, even a tank. Yet
some politicians back home claim we're not in combat. That's bull!" The
article goes on to say Marines were cheering for the U. S. Navy ships
firing in support until they learned they were being fired in support of
the LAF in Suq el Gharb. In their frustration with being shot at, Marines
seem to have forgotten their peacekeeping mission.
In his book Beirut Outakes, Larry Pintak, a television
journalist, comments on the differences in response when talking to the
press depending on whether a Marine was an officer or enlisted. When the
journalist asked Corporal John Ruffner if he was certain the Muslim gunmen
were shooting at him, he responded without hesitation, "Certainly,
certainly were, sir. I was looking right down the barrel of their guns. It
felt good to finally start hitting back." When the journalist posed the
same question to Corporal Ruffner's Company Commander, Captain Roy, the
answer was much different. Captain Roy answered, "There were so many
rounds that came in, some of which landed on us, some of which landed
across the airstrip. I don't know if we were the target. I don't know if
they were meant for us." Pitkin goes on to say Captain Roy's company had
suffered several casualties by this time. Given his position as commander,
the significance of those casualties was probably much more closely felt.
Despite this, his response supported the mission and guidance much better
than the Marine who was probably less affected by the deaths of those
Marines.
More likely, as an officer, Captain Roy had a better understanding of
the political connotations of his statements, and therefore, was more
restrained. However, in decentralized peacekeeping operations,
noncommissioned officers must understand their mission just as well as
their officers. Enlisted Marines led patrols, stood outposts, and trained
their subordinates. All of these statements show the average Marine may
not have understood the tools of peacekeeping and the political aspects of
his mission, but, in at least this one case, his officer did.
The reason for this is not that the Marines were poorly trained. They
had outstanding skills. Junior Marines were leading patrols in built up
terrain with live rounds and in a foreign country. To the contrary, the
Marines were very well trained for conventional combat operations.
However, as shown earlier, they had very little peacekeeping training.
Even the word "training" may be the wrong word because the Marines were
trained very well to recite their ROE, mission, and even some facts about
the local culture and political situation. What they lacked was education.
In a book review for the Marine Corps Gazette, Lieutenant General
Bernard E. Trainor expresses this same idea with the following:
Unschooled in the complexities of Levantine politics and culture, the
United States, and Marines on the ground, mistook Lebanese praise for
their tough stand against early Israeli provocations around Beirut airport
as an endorsement of the "presence" mission.
The Marines knew they needed to remain neutral and use minimum force
but they were not educated well enough to know they were violating these
principles.
The undesired effect of insufficient training and education for
peacekeeping operations is a recurring theme throughout MNF II. When faced
with relatively clear problems, such as keeping the IDF out of certain
areas, Marines knew what to do. However, when involved with more complex
problems, such as how to handle the IDF after it had already fired into a
Muslim town, the USMNF was bewildered. When the IDF withdrew, the 24th MAU
lacked the prudence to change its own mission when it was apparent its
higher headquarters would not. The 24th MAU continued to follow its
original task instead of adapting to a changing situation that made its
original task irrelevant.
While the USMNF thought it was doing a good job, in reality, it was
unwittingly violating all the rules of peacekeeping. The USMNF forfeited
its impartial status by interacting exclusively with the LAF. The MAUs
trained, patrolled, and manned checkpoints with the LAF even though common
knowledge was that the LAF used "strong-armed" tactics against the Muslim
villages surrounding the airport. While numerous signs that the USMNF was
targeted because of its association with the LAF existed, this lesson was
not fully learned until after the BLT headquarters bombing.
Even if the USMNF had not aligned with the LAF, its cultural
insensitivity slowly eroded its impartial status. Conversely, intimate
knowledge of American and U. S. military culture allowed the IDF, LAF, and
Muslim factions to exploit the USMNF. Operating under restrictions imposed
by the ROE, the USMNF's response to hostilities was easy to determine and
predictable.
The USMNF tried in vain to bolster its impartial status by setting up
civic action programs designed to show goodwill toward the local Muslim
population. While a noble effort, these programs, lacking command emphasis
and professional expertise, were not tied into other aspects of the
USMNF's operations. The media, a tool the USMNF thought it was using to
its advantage, became the tool of extremist factions that wanted to send a
message to the U. S. government and American people.
Faced with increasing violence, individual Marines changed their
attitudes from impartial observers to hostile participants who were glad
to finally shoot back. Their response to increased hostility was to use
the tools of conventional combat instead of "negotiation, mediation, quiet
diplomacy and reasoning, tact and the patience of a JOB."
These adverse factors could have been avoided or their effect at least
lessened through proper training and education before commitment of the
USMNF. Since they were not, these factors interacted creating a dynamic
situation in which the Marines were targeted and eventually failed to
accomplish their mission.
CHAPTER FIVE: Comparisons and Conclusions
Chapters Three and Four analyzed MNF I and II individually, and
evaluated the effectiveness of the USMNF during these operations. Possible
conclusions that might come from comparing the two operations are: (1) the
32d MAU proved forward-deployed forces can conduct peacekeeping operations
by its success in MNF I, and (2) the USMNF's failure in MNF II was the
result of numerous factors that would have caused failure for any
peacekeeping force. Since the 32d MAU participated in both MNF I and II,
another conclusion might be that forward-deployed forces were not
effective peacekeepers as proven by failure in MNF II, and that the
success experienced in MNF I was only the result of a very simple
situation unique to that operation.
Although one operation succeeded and the other failed, there are
similarities and differences between the two. Comparing the
characteristics of each operation will provide insight into the different
results. This insight will help differentiate whether the MAUs were an
appropriate type force that happened to fail, or if the MAUs were
an inappropriate type force that contributed to failure. This
insight will also help determine the feasibility of using similar type
forces in future peacekeeping operations.
Similar But Different
The first major similarity between MNF I and II is the type unit
employed. In both operations the MAU was the basic unit. One unit, the 32d
MAU, participated in both operations. The MAU's battalion-sized GCE,
although stretched thin, was able to establish positions between hostile
parties and provide a calming influence. During MNF II, the GCE carried
out patrols to: (1) show support for the GOL, (2) show the flag, and (3)
monitor the general attitude of the local populace. The GCE's organic
motor transport assets provided sufficient tactical mobility to support
patrolling several miles to the northeast into Christian East Beirut.
Also, the assault amphibious vehicles (AAVs) were able to travel well into
the mountains to carry out a rescue mission, and the mobility of the GCE
became even greater when supported by the ACE using troop transport
helicopters.
The MAU always had sufficient combat power and equipment because, in
addition to its normal assets, the MAU received any other assets its
commander requested. However, perhaps the MAUs had too much equipment to
be effective peacekeepers. Given the offensive and highly lethal
characteristics of tanks and artillery, the MAU may have appeared as a
combatant instead of a peacekeeping force. Too much equipment is also not
a factor because the MAU commander always had the option of leaving
equipment on ship as Colonel Mead had decided both times the 32d MAU went
ashore. Therefore, even if the MAUs had too much equipment, this excess
was the result of judgment and not the MAU's Table of Organization.
The ACE and MSSG allowed the MAUs to be self- sufficient. The ACE was a
valuable asset for sustaining the force with supplies from outside of
Lebanon. The MSSG kept the MAU from depending on the Lebanese government
for food, water, and fuel. While fresh vegetables and produce were
available at different times, these were luxuries. Marines could subsist
on prepackaged rations and food prepared on ATF shipping. Independence was
essential. As described in the last chapter, the USMNF was dependent on
the LAF for intelligence. This had an undesirable consequence. Dependence
meant the USMNF got only what the GOL wanted to give them. As a result,
the USMNF was not able to determine the Muslims perceived it as aligned
with the LAF and, by extension, Christian and Israeli forces. If the USMNF
had also relied on the GOL for food, water, and gas, this would have been
another impediment to distancing itself from the LAF once the MAUs
discovered why they were targeted.
Another attribute of the MAU that made it an especially desirable
peacekeeping force was its relationship to the Phibron. The mobility of
the ATF was a major factor for using the MAUs in Lebanon. Ambassador
Dillion explained Marines were chosen for the USMNF contingent because:
They looked good. This was a political job and because of their
discipline and esprit de corps, they could carry it out very
well...they were mobile. They can pack up and leave in 24 hours.
Ralph A. Hallenbeck, a former Pentagon staff officer whose day-to-day
dealings were with the USMNF, reinforces the idea that mobility was an
important factor. During a symposium held ten years after the bombing of
BLT 1/8's headquarters, Hallenbeck remarked that the security mission at
the British Embassy and Duraford Building had created more concern with
Pentagon planners than the bombing of the U. S. Embassy itself because it
made the Marines' mission more permanent. Permanence made them more
difficult to withdraw.
The only deficiency from an organizational perspective was the MAUs'
intelligence sections. The Long Commission report noted the inadequacy of
the MAU's intelligence capability, but this problem was fixed with
Brigadier General Joy's 22d MAU when the intelligence section was
reinforced. Therefore, because the MAUs had sufficient combat power, were
self-sufficient, and had strategic and tactical mobility, they appear to
have been ideally equipped and organized for peacekeeping operations.
The training of all MAUs for both MNF I and II was basically the same.
The individual Marines and small units were very well trained for
conventional combat. With combat training comes discipline. In MNF I,
discipline proved to be critical, and Marines carried themselves well in a
chaotic environment. During MNF II, the same type discipline allowed the
Marines to live in field conditions for extended periods with little
adverse effect from environmental factors.
However, the MAUs received very little training on Lebanese culture,
history, background, and the theory of peacekeeping. While Marines were
able to "parrot" back their ROE and mission, they knew very little on the
reasons why force was restricted or the political aspects of their
mission. When faced with unfamiliar situations, Marines became frustrated
and responded with greater violence. They tried to solve problems with the
tools that they were most familiar instead of with the unfamiliar tools of
peacekeeping. Lack of specialized training affected the decisionmaking
abilities of key leaders and the attitudes of individual Marines.
Lack of confidence in the Marines' peacekeeping skills led to
restraints being placed on the USMNF that prohibited direct communication
with the hostile parties during both MNF I and II. This prohibition lead
to potentially volatile situations between the USMNF and the IDF, and to
communications through mistaken perceptions with the Muslim factions.
Additionally, it took decisionmaking responsibility away from the
individual on the scene and forced a rigid and predictable response based
on highly publicized ROE. This precarious situation for the USMNF provided
keen public interest that was heightened by an aggressive international
media.
How Different?
Even though these conditions existed during both MNF I and II, the
differences between the two operations caused these conditions to have a
different effect. The most obvious difference between the two operations
is the length. MNF I lasted just sixteen days, but MNF II lasted almost
thirteen months before the headquarters bombing incident.
The short length of MNF I compensated for the lack of peacekeeping
training. Key leaders could remain constantly vigilant and ready to act.
The unique aspects of the evacuation created "adrenaline," that kept
individuals alert at all times. This allowed small-unit leaders to analyze
every situation with great scrutiny and make deliberate decisions. Even if
poor decisions were made, the USMNF withdrew from Beirut before the
consequences of those mistakes could have an effect. Finally, the 32d MAU
reached the MNF I operational end state and withdrew. The 32d MAU was the
only unit involved. Therefore, it did not experience continuity problems
between successive units as was the case in MNF II.
The length of MNF II was long enough so that mistakes made early in
this operation could result in consequences to the USMNF before mission
completion. A lack of cultural awareness led to the perceived alignment
with Christian and Israeli forces even though Marines were conscious of
this danger and tried to avoid it.
Also, the extended time ashore changed decisionmaking. The significance
of earlier decisions, made only after rigorous and deliberate forethought,
was taken for granted. While the factors that influenced those decisions
changed, the decisions themselves did not. The longer tour lengths and
limits on mental endurance prohibited decisionmakers from pouring energy
into every new decision. Instead of using an analytical approach to every
decision, leaders had to use an intuitive approach. Since they lacked the
education and expert background in peacekeeping, they did not always
recognize the significance of their decisions. The difference between the
Lebanese flag raising during MNF I and the Marine bugle player during MNF
II shows this contrast. During MNF I we see a very deliberate effort to
use symbolism to achieve a favorable image, but in MNF II we see a failure
even to recognize how symbolism might adversely affect the mission.
Numerous other intuitive decisions were made concerning LAF training, type
of forces ashore, and multinational crosstraining. As shown in Chapter
Four, when subjected to analysis, these decisions had greater significance
than realized at the time the decisions were made.
The complexity of the situation also distinguishes MNF II from MNF I.
In comparison, MNF I had fairly "clear lines." It was characterized by
East Beirut versus West Beirut, IDF versus PLO, Italians along the
Damascus Highway, French along the Green Line, and the USMNF along the
port perimeter. The "clear lines" were literal as well as figurative. The
relative clarity of the situation compensated for the lack of peacekeeping
training.
MNF II started with clear lines when the situation called for
separating the IDF from the Muslims. The lines became "blurred" as the IDF
first tried to draw the USMNF closer through aggressive action and then
followed with proposals to formalize coordination between the forces. The
situation became even more confusing after the IDF withdrew altogether and
the USMNF was faced with factional fighting. Only after the headquarters
bombing did the Marines realize why they were targeted. In an interview
immediately after leaving Beirut, Major Converse, the 24th MAU Operations
Officer explained he did not feel the Marines were being directly targeted
"but the joint [sic] LAF/USMC checkpoints were being attacked." He went on
to say he felt the attacks were a message the USMNF was getting too close
to the LAF.
The 22d MAU, which relieved Colonel Geraghty's MAU, had a good
understanding of the new lines. Not only had the mission changed to
"defend their positions," but the leaders knew the LAF had something to do
with the fire directed at the USMNF. When explaining how firefights with
various militias started, Major Steve Anderson, BLT 2/8's Operations
Officer explained, "A lot of times I felt the LAF initiated it. A lot of
times I thought they abutted up next to us just to draw us into it because
of our preponderance of fire power."
Finally, the affect the media had on the two operations was clearly
different. During MNF I and early months of MNF II, the media had a
positive affect by forcing the IDF to use restraint. Although not realized
at the time, all MAUs could have used the media to communicate its
intentions to the local factions. The media could have favorably
influenced local opinion while the Muslim factions were still neutral to
the USMNF. Even though the MAU had a relatively large Public Affairs
detachment, no evidence shows that this detachment worked with the local
media to enhance local perceptions of the USMNF. Although the media had
generated considerable support for the USMNF, the highly visible Marines
became a lucrative terrorist target because of the same media attention.
Interestingly, while the USMNF was making headlines in Beirut, the MFO
operations in the Sinai were successfully underway and continue to be
successful today. Not surprising, news of the MFO is infrequent and
normally only found in professional journals.
Conclusions
MNF I was so different from MNF II that conclusions from one operation
must be qualified with the distinct characteristics of that operation.
Because MNF I was successful, an appropriate conclusion is MAUs can be
used in peacekeeping operations but only under specific conditions. By
extension to their modern equivalents, forward-deployed and
rapid-deployment combat forces can also be used in peacekeeping operations
under the same special conditions. These type forces have the equipment,
personnel, and discipline required for peacekeeping. If the mission is
carefully defined, operations are carefully specified, and the situation
is fairly constant, these forces will probably succeed.
However, peacekeeping forces do not normally operate under these
conditions. Peacekeeping operations are decentralized, conducted in a
continually changing environment, and require a long-term commitment.
Under these conditions, forward-deployed forces lack the specialized
training and education required to conduct typical peacekeeping
operations.
Combat forces, which are not trained in peacekeeping theory and
tactics, are restricted to operate in a predictable set-piece pattern as
directed by their higher headquarters. This pattern creates a
vulnerability in the peacekeeping force that is easily exploited by
parties hostile to the force. Additionally, in unfamiliar stressful
situations, these forces tend to respond as they would in conventional
combat, and not the way they should respond in peacekeeping. Excessive
force makes peacekeepers a party to the conflict instead of a neutral
third party.
Since forward-deployed and rapid-reaction forces are frequently used to
respond in crises, they may find themselves engaged in peacekeeping
operations. Although these forces have the personnel, equipment,
discipline, and mobility to be used initially, their use must not become
permanent. If these type forces are employed initially in peacekeeping,
they need to be replaced by specially trained peacekeeping forces before
the mission or environment changes.
If committed, the staffs of untrained peacekeeping forces should be
augmented with staff officers who are experts in peacekeeping to assist in
decisionmaking. This augmentation should stay when the unit is relieved
and become the continuity between initially deployed and follow-on forces.
While forward-deployed and rapid-deployment combat forces can be used,
their extended use in peacekeeping operations appears to be an inefficient
use of combat power. Contingency forces possess more combat power than
required for true peacekeeping. The employment of these forces prevents
their employment in other contingencies.
Finally, even if untrained peacekeeping forces are committed only for a
short time, the huge benefit to non-state actors by humiliating an elite
force in front of an aggressive international media, puts the force at
high risk. Decisionmakers committing forces must recognize and be willing
to accept this risk.
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Oral Histories
Amos, Lieutenant Colonel Granville R., USMC. Commanding Officer HMM
261, 22 MAU at Camp Lejeune, NC, interview by Benis M. Frank, 22 May 1984.
Anderson, Major Steve, USMC. S-3 BLT 2/8, 22 MAU at Camp Geiger, NC,
interview by Benis M. Frank, 21 May 1984.
Anderson, Lieutenant Colonel Donald F., USMC. Commanding Officer BLT
2/6, 22d MAU at MAU Headquarters, Beirut, Lebanon, interview by Benis M.
Frank, 25 May 1983.
Arey, Major Christopher M., USMC. S-3 BLT 3/8, 22 MAU, interview by
Benis M. Frank, 17 March 1983.
Barnetson, Major William H., USMC. CO MSSG 32, 32d MAU at Camp Lejeune,
NC, interview by Benis M. Frank, 12 January 1983.
Blankenship, Lieutenant Colonel Dennis R., USMC. S-3 32d MAU at Camp
Lejeune, NC, interview by Benis M. Frank, 13 January 1983.
Converse, Major George M., USMC. S-3 24th MAU, on USS Iwo Jima,
interview by Benis M. Frank, 20 November 1983.
Ettore, 2d Lieutenant Michael L., USMC. 1st Plat Cmdr, F/2/8, 22d MAU,
interview by Benis M. Frank, 22 May 1984.
Farmer, Major Jack L., USMC. S-3 32d MAU, interview by Benis M. Frank,
26 May 1983.
_____.S-3 32d MAU at Washington Navy Yard, interview by Benis M. Frank,
20 December 1983.
Faulkner, Colonel James P., USMC. Commanding Officer 22d MAU at Camp
Geiger, NC, interview by Benis M. Frank, 25 May 84.
Geraghty, Colonel Timothy J., USMC. Commanding Officer of 24 MAU at 22d
MAU Headquarters Beirut, Lebanon, interview by Benis M. Frank, 28 May
1983.
_____, on USS Iwo Jima, interview by Benis M. Frank, 20 November
1983.
Guenther, Captain Christopher J., USMC. Commanding Officer Wpns Co, BLT
2/8, 22d MAU at Camp Geiger, NC, interview by Benis M. Frank, 22 May 1984.
Johnson, Captain Charles B., USMC. Commanding Officer L Co 3/8, 22d MAU
at Camp Geiger, NC, interview by Benis M. Frank, 16 March 1983.
Johnston, Lieutenant Colonel Robert B., Commanding Officer BLT 2/8, 32d
MAU at Camp Geiger, NC, interview by Ron Spector, 13 January 1983.
Joy, Brigadier General Jim R., USMC. Commanding Officer 22d MAU at Camp
Lejeune, NC, interview by Benis M. Frank, 26 May 1984.
McCabe, Captain Kenneth T., USMC. Commanding Officer Echo Company, 32d
MAU at Camp Geiger, NC, interview by Benis M. Frank, 14 January 1983.
Stokes, Colonel Thomas M., Jr., USMC. Commanding Officer 24th MAU at
Camp Geiger, NC, interview by Benis M. Frank, 15 March 1983.
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