Within this context, what follows are observations from collective experience: the distilled essence of what those who went before learned. They are expressed as commandments, for clarity, but are really more like folklore. Apply them judiciously and skeptically.
David Kilcullen intended his Twenty-Eight Articles, Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency as a guide for the company commander facing a COIN operation. Since the article first circulated, hundreds of officers have served as company commanders and in other positions in Iraq and Afghanistan. In this article some of those officers comment on how Kilcullen's thinking applied to their mission in theater. Other former or retired Soldiers measure Kilcullen's points against their own experiences in other countries, conflicts, and years. All -- including David Kilcullen -- are members of the community of interest at the Small Wars Journal and Council.
Captain Ryan Kranc, U.S. Army, served as regimental training officer and then a troop commander in 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Tal Afar, Iraq; he offers his comments on Kilcullen from the perspective of a troop (company) commander.
Captain Mike Holzbach, U.S. Army, served in a variety of staff positions before taking over the Mortar Platoon of 1-64AR, 3ID in Baghdad from April 05 until Oct 05 during OIF after which he returned to his position on staff.
Major Jon Custis, U.S. Marine Corps, has two tours in Iraq; he comments here as a battle captain in a combat operations center (COC) (tactical operations center) during the second Battle of Fallujah.
Major Robert Thornton, U.S. Army, is just completing a tour as a battalion executive officer and S3 advisor on a Military Transition Team (MiTT) in Mosul, Iraq. He comments on how Kilcullen's points applied to MiTTs.
Major Michael Sullivan, U.S. Army, served on one of the original Advisor Support Teams (AST), the precursor to today's current MiTTs. MAJ Sullivan stood up the 6th Iraqi Army Battalion from scratch, starting in Taji and conducting the majority of the training and operations in Kirkush, Iraq. He is currently working for the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and will begin the Advanced Military Studies Program this summer.
Major Mark Leslie, U.S. Army, is currently the Deputy Chief of Training and Organization for the Stryker Transformation Team, FT. Benning, Ga. He is a graduate of OCS and earned a Bachelor of Science in Criminal Justice from Troy State University and is currently pursuing an MBA. Major Leslie has served in numerous Infantry assignments to include: LRS Team Leader, Ranger Instructor, Rifle platoon leader, BN S-4 and multiple Company Commands. He has served in numerous deployments to include Operations Just Cause in Panama, Operations Desert Shield/Storm, and Operation Iraqi Freedom II. He served as an Advisor to the Iraqi National Guard with the 1st Cavalry Division in Iraq.
Major John (Jim) McDermott, U.S. Army, served as rifle company commander in the 4th Infantry division during the initial parts of OIF I in 2003. He then served as a MiTT with the Iraqi Army from January 2005 until January 2006. MAJ McDermott is currently a military liaison and project officer at the States Department's Interagency COIN Initiative in Washington DC and will begin the Advanced Military Studies Program this summer.
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Odom, U.S. Army, retired in 1996 after 15 years as a Foreign Area Officer for the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa. His final 30 months was as the U.S. Defense Attaché in Zaire 1993-1994 and then Rwanda 1994-1996. His comments on Kilcullen are from the perspective of the senior military representative on a U.S. embassy country team. Colonel Odom is the author of three books concerning COIN, contingency operations, and unconventional warfare. These include: Leavenworth Paper #14 The Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo 1964-1965, Combat Studies Institute, 1988; Shaba II: The French and Belgian Intervention in Zaire in 1978, Combat Studies Institute, 1993; and Journey into Darkness: Genocide in Rwanda, Texas A&M University Press, 2005. Colonel Odom was also a co-writer with MG Robert Scales and Lieutenant Colonel Terry Johnson on Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War, Government Printing Office, 1993.
Other contributors to this project include:
Former U.S. Army Special Forces Captain William (Bill) R. Meara was a psychological operations advisor in the military advisory group in El Salvador in the 1980s. After leaving the military and joining the Foreign Service, U.S. Department of State, Mr. Meara became the U.S. Ambassador in Honduras' main liaison to the Contras. Mr. Meara recounts those experiences in his book, Contra Cross --- Insurgency and Tyranny in Central America, 1979-1989, published by Naval Institute Press, 2006. His comments in this paper are taken from the conclusions of his book.
Sergeant First Class Stan Reber, U.S. Army, retired after more than 15 years continuous service overseas in the US security assistance and defense attaché system. As the operations coordinator for the US Defense Attaché Office in Kinshasa, Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) SFC Reber was cited for his resourcefulness and bravery during two full scale military rebellions in 1991 and 1993 as well as Operation Support Hope in 1994 when he worked with Colonel Odom in Goma.
Lieutenant Colonel Steve Franke, U.S. Army retired from active duty after a career as a Special Forces and Foreign Area Officer. He was the Assistant Army Attaché in Amman, Jordan and has served throughout the Middle East in various capacities.
Part I (Articles 1 -- 5).
1. Know your turf. Know the people, the topography, economy, history, religion and culture.
CPT Kranc on troop command: Very little difference from saying "Conduct IPB"
CPT Holzbach on platoon leadership: Do the book studying before you deploy. Learn what you can all the way from "Who's Mohammad?" to "What impact did the recently deceased or dying government/authority/power structure have on the city I'll be operating in?". Once you're in country, it has to switch to the local situation, and knowledge of that is very time sensitive and specific. It will be best garnered by constant patrolling, living amongst the locals, and talk, talk, talk.
MAJ Custis on battle captains: Kilcullen makes reference to developing a mental model of your area of operations. Try as we might to study imagery, review the maps and gain situational awareness, it took us in excess of three months to realize that battle captains need to physically see the battle space with the naked eye. We eventually caught helicopters, which flew over the turf or went out when the battalion commander went forward to check on the companies.
MAJ Thornton on MiTTs: I would say this is linked to point 2. Diagnose the problem. If you do not understand relationships, people, cultural economics, human terrain and all of those you will only see the symptoms rather than actually diagnosing the problem. You really need to analyze in depth the linkage between your turf and the problems to understand the solutions you must pursue. As advisor you must consider how your counterparts see the problems; failing to do that means you are likely to be ignored.
I would also add that you need to research your area or city. You can do this in discussions with your counterparts about politics, culture, and religion. You can also do some online research and read a few books. If you try to understand the culture and politics based solely on the context of the moment, you are going to misunderstand it. For example, you cannot define normality for Mosul based on its current status. You have to understand what it could be or what it was. .
MAJ Sullivan on MiTTs: This starts way before the MiTT members ever reach Kuwait. As soon as future advisors find out which country their advisor mission will take them, research into where they will serve. There are dozens of books, on-line resources, subject matter experts, etc where you can start to understand ALL the terrains including physical, personal and historical. Although understanding the religion of the people is important, try and delve deeper into the tribal structures both within your foreign security forces (FSF) unit and the area you will operate in. Do not wait until you are in country to start trying to find out your turf.
MAJ Leslie: We called this "knowing your neighborhood". It is imperative that units understand that every sector and every insurgency is different and that "knowing your neighborhood" may require a different skill set in each sector. In an insurgency, as recorded here many times, HUMINT is everything. Knowing your neighborhood is HUMINT. Not only for intelligence but to gauge the demeanor in your neighborhood as well as template possible responses and reactions to planned operations.
LTC Odom on country teams: Whether you are serving as a Defense Attaché as I did, a battle captain or troop commander, you can never know enough about your area of responsibility and you will certainly never know everything. Nothing replaces first hand observation, especially first hand observation backed with an unquenched thirst for knowledge.
MAJ McDermott on company command: IPB, but you have to expand the understanding of "Order Of Battle". You have to do some research and reading on your own beyond what the handy country guide says. Understanding underlying currents and historic examples of the political and economic systems that people utilize will make you more effective. It will also help you generate realistic expectations of what to expect on the ground in your AO, the old human terrain is decisive in COIN concept.
MAJ McDermott on MiTT: You have to know and learn who you are working with. When you are tasked to go on MiTT duty attempt to find out as much as possible before you leave CONUS, this will help you understand who and what you are working with. It will also increase your effectiveness because you can help make the advisor team transition appear more seamless to the Host Nation you are assisting.
2. Diagnose the problem. Once you know your area and its people, you can begin to diagnose the problem.
CPT Kranc on troop command: Looks like Mission Analysis
CPT Holzbach on platoon leadership: At the platoon level, the problem will likely be something along the line of better government services and better security, but not always. These issues will be very specific and will need very specific remedies. The neighborhood full of police and military personnel may be able to protect themselves, but the one without any such residents may not.
MAJ Custis on battle captains: A battle captain's problem is not the same tactical problem a company or platoon faces. He needs to move information (reporting) as quickly as possible, have a clear understanding of what needs to happen when a commanders critical intelligence requirement is tripped, when he must roust the quick reaction force out of the ready room, and which means of communication to use in order to expedite a casualty evacuation request. Battle captains have to share lessons learned and offer ideas, and get the rest of the COC staff in synch so that they do not add to the friction when troops are in contact.
MAJ Thornton on MiTTs: see comments on point 1.
MAJ Sullivan on MiTTs: Agreed. Define the tactical problem. This includes not only determining the easily-seen surface issues, but the deeper undercurrents which will continually shift under you like plates under the Earth's surface. Getting to know both the FSF and the local population will clue you into a few different things. 1) You gain a better understanding on the interaction between the local populace, the insurgents and the local security forces. Don't forget about local police, border guards and facility guards. Just because they may not work for the same Ministry as your unit, they are key players in your AO and will effect operations, interactions and are part of your tactical problem.
MAJ Leslie: I too see this as mission analysis but on a more complicated level. This deals with the human factor. You must look at the insurgents' potential threats and at the same time detail, template, and gauge the response from your neighborhood. Again this comes back to the need to "know your neighborhood".
LTC Odom on country teams: Ignorance combined with hasty decisions often equates to stupidity. Take the time to understand your AO before you start making decisions. As you do make those decisions, you will become the subject matter expert on your area of operations.
MAJ McDermott on company command: You have to do this to support point number one. When you do your analysis and begin to develop your plan. You must have realistic facts and assumptions on what capabilities and capacities that your organization has in order to manage the expectations that you, your subordinates, your higher, and the populace have as to what the problem is and how to fix it.
3. Organize for intelligence. In counterinsurgency, killing the enemy is easy. Finding him is often nearly impossible. Intelligence and operations are complementary.
CPT Kranc on troop command: Companies don't have intelligence sections. Smart and innovative companies have developed intelligence sections that collect and analyze intelligence from the platoons. These ad-hoc sections were more often than not better suited and outperformed BN intelligence sections with actual intelligence MOS soldiers.
CPT Holzbach on platoon leadership: It's been said before and for good reason: everyone is an intelligence gatherer. The individual soldier will have his hands full with providing security, but rarely so much that he cant spare a moment to smile and say a few greeting words to the people around him. This can encourage a local who may be unsure if he really wants to talk to us. If he does, it should become the patrol leader's job to do the talking at that point. And now that single Joe just played a big part in adding a piece to the puzzle. Now it's up to the patrol leader to squeeze every drop of info possible from the source.
MAJ Custis on battle captains: The critical detail here is that COC staff needs to be organized to maximize the capture of information for analysis. Do not let the S-2 (Intelligence) staff stray out of reach of your daily battle rhythm. Because current operations and intelligence sections often report what should be the same information, up two separate paths, patrol, raid, and contact debriefs must be conducted with S-3 and S-2 representation. The patrol leader may conduct a more detailed debrief later with the intelligence rep, but ops has to reserve the right to final review of follow-on reporting offered up by the S-2. The night battle captain at regiment has queried me on significant events tidbits that the regiment briefed but regiment operations did not know. It is an unnecessarily painful experience.
MAJ Thornton on MiTTs: As an advisor this also means collecting information about your counterparts. I did this openly, telling my counterparts up front that I was collecting on them. It was not a surprise to them; certainly they had assumed all along this would happen. I also assumed they collected on me. The key point was that getting it out in the open let all of us know where we stood and actually created a stronger relationship.
As for the collection and analysis on anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) and others, I concentrated on building trust by following through on issues. As I helped the Iraqi Army (IA), they helped us. Before long, we had the coalition forces (CF) in our intelligence cycle as well. Timely dissemination of relevant information allowed different analysts to turn it into intelligence. At first it was hard to establish the right linkages, but after networking I knew who the relevant players were in both the IA and CF. In that regard I was a middle man as much as analyst.
MAJ Sullivan on MiTTs: You are working with the greatest intelligence-gathering tool available in theater...indigenous forces! You will most likely have to rely exclusively on your interpreter to not only translate for you, but to clue you in on attitudes, hidden meanings and local variations on speech to appraise how your FSF are doing with gather intelligence. MiTTs are in a good position to leverage intelligence between coalition and FSFs. As a U.S. military member, you'll have access to places and intelligence your local counterpart may not have. On the other hand, your HUMINT gathering capability with your local troops is much greater than any asset U.S. forces have available. You will work both sides of the fence to help each unit out. In the end though, it is up to the MiTTs to serve as the conduit to the U.S. commanders regarding a current, local assessment on operations.
MAJ Mark Leslie as an advisor: I agree wholeheartedly with Maj Thornton. As an advisor, you must organize and prepare for intelligence because you are going to be flooded with it. The hard part is the sorting and filtering as well as classification before it simply inundates you. Our team was always better informed than anyone else in the Task Force because we lived with the populace, saw them every day, and had established a rapport based on the understanding that our best interests were their best interests. Daily information sharing is important across the whole team; it gives everyone a chance to compare notes and is often very revealing. Each unit should do this in whatever format suits them best.
LTC Franke on advisors: In serving as a contract-training advisor to an Arab military, setting rules of engagement with counterparts was important. Last month, I was on a MTT to train, advise, and coach, the staffs of a separate brigade with a mission to secure key facilities in an outlying province. My team briefed that we normally based our training and practical exercises on intelligence preparation of the battlefield and the military decision making process on a standard scenario set elsewhere. It was sort of like saying "Your brigade needs to plan and exercise on Fort Riley, even if your brigade is based in Germany." After we pitched that generic scenario in the initial coordination meeting, the brigade commander--a Major General--said that he reported directly to his country's leaders. He added that his troops and time were precious, and therefore, training on an unrealistic and artificial scenario "would not fly." Instead he demanded IPB and MDMP training using his actual contingency missions.
With that, he turned to his S2 and directed the S2 to provide our team the brigade's controlled-distribution maps and associated intelligence estimates, overlays, and other data. I actually signed for each sheet. As the intelligence trainer I was given complete access to this unit's war plans. The brigade commander--a Fort Leavenworth graduate--told the S2 to tell us anything we wanted to know that related reasonably to "mission training." It was an intelligence collector's dream.
But I was there as an advisor. The S2 and I achieved a delicate, discreet and productive balance. I declined to take detailed notes, and I only accepted whatever paperwork he or his Assistant S2 wrote down and provided about his unit. He was a master of the art of "say nothing and mean it" and an initial defensive "conspiracy of courtesy," which dissipated over time. At the end of the exercise, the S2 retrieved his maps and gratefully claimed our various overlays, offering many "thank you very too much indeeds" and put them in his safe until we returned for another iteration.
We were flabbergasted at receiving such access and cooperativeness, as was the resident detachment of U.S. Army advisors to the brigade. They said they had never seen any overlays nor had they ever discussed the brigade's actual mission sets.
Bottom line is that until discreet ROE and related appropriate guidance are resolved about normal and incidental collection and (un-normal) external reporting, we contract trainers strictly and strongly "stay in our lanes" to build, protect and sustain our two-way relationships with our counterparts.
LTC Odom: Most attachés grasp that they are intelligence officers and that their shop is an intelligence-gathering unit. Many attachés do not understand that they are also intelligence analysts; my goal as a Defense Attaché was to provide analyzed intelligence to consumers in the rear or on the ground. If you stick to merely reporting what happened, you are leaving it up to someone else to explain why it happened. If you were indeed the subject matter expert on your AO, why would you leave such explanations to lesser-qualified people?
MAJ Thornton's point on collecting on counterparts is especially relevant. I used a similar technique; I told my counterparts in Rwanda that I was there to help the U.S. government better understand what was happening. In doing that I would be reporting on our efforts--and if they wanted to make certain points clear to me, I would insure that their views went forward.
MAJ McDermott on company command: You have to ensure that you put good soldiers in your company and HQ. Don't let it become a dumping ground for marginal; performers from the platoons, even the drivers. These soldiers have to be able to help connect the dots as treports come in from the platoons. They also have to be smart enough to recognize when they are hearing "good info", and how that should trigger them contacting higher if the information is critical. You have to focus on every soldier as a collector. You have too make sure these guys are paying attention to the details of their surroundings, like patterns of activity amongst the locals, and changes in the physical environment. You have to help them develop TTP's for talking with locals and receiving information from locals that does not enable an insurgent to take revenge on the cooperative individual and thus intimidate the rest of the populace.
MAJ McDermott on MiTT: We have to determine how we are going to resource intelligence collection and analysis for the MiTT. The host nation forces, in my case Iraqi, are the greatest gathers of intelligence on the battlefield. They understand the area and its problems. We have to organize and develop methods that enable their intelligence to be acted upon. Often this intelligence is stuff they picked up while home on vacation. We have to develop methods that enable this intelligence to be distributed, verified, and acted upon when this intelligence affects other units outside the Iraqi or partner U.S. units' AOs. Example, if the soldier is from Ramadi, and he is based at Taji, comes off vacation in Ramadi with intelligence about Ramadi, how does that intel go from MND-B to MND-W.
4. Organize for interagency operations -- Almost everything in counterinsurgency is interagency.
CPT Kranc on troop command: in your typical mission rehearsal exercise, a company doesn't even touch inter-agency operations. In theater, maximizing the effectiveness of inter-agency operations, particularly in the realm of civil-military projects, can make or break your combat tour.
CPT Holzbach on platoon leadership: You'll be patrolling with the likes of civil affairs and who knows what else. Be ready to learn from them and provide the support they need to accomplish their mission. A good relationship with them can pay big dividends down the road, such as being able to "borrow" that soldier who can speak Arabic. He can listen to local chatter on the streets when the people think they're out of earshot of your interpreter.
MAJ Custis on battle captains: Even if the battle captain doesn't organize anything regarding interagency operations, he should know where these folks live, and stop by for a chat when they are on the forward operating base. A fellow battle captain and task force information operations officer introduced me to the civil affairs headquarters responsible for our AO. A couple of visits helped us explain matters to the company commander who was justifiably frustrated that his recommended pump house project hadn't seen movement for several weeks.
MAJ Thornton on MiTTs: This one was a work in progress. I was just getting to know the provincial reconstruction team (PRT) and some of the other players. The MiTTs are not Adapted for this. I recommend an additional smart guy at say the brigade or division MiTT level to become the inter-agency coordinator. I did this by default but never as much as I wanted.
MAJ Sullivan on MiTTs: This is especially hard for a small MiTT element, especially if you are operating in a remote location. Find out who the State Department reps are (if any), NGOs operating in your AO, and make points of contact with your attached coalition unit. They have the resources to conduct the liaisons with interagencies. Harness what you can based on your location, your communications architecture and the availability of interagency personnel operating where you are. During your MiTT training, see if you can get out into the local government agencies to gain a better understanding how SWEAT-MS works in our country. Parcel out your team to familiarize themselves with trash removal, sewage systems, water companies, electric companies, police stations, etc. This will pay big dividends later on.
MAJ Mark Leslie on advisors: Interagency coordination is a plus, but one often overlooked and not planned for in train up. Preparing for this prior to deployment and designating one team member for this is key. Consider having functional areas: give a staff Captain the additional duty of the "garbage guy" and another that of "water guy" and so on. Place one person in charge to coordinate the effort and develop a training plan would help out when doing interagency coordination. Talking intelligently to these agencies and having a narrow field of fire when requesting assistance is conducive to cooperation.
LTC Odom on country teams: Throw a rock in a place like Goma, Zaire during Operation Support Hope and you would probably hit an international aid worker, a soldier, or a refugee. Get the rock to skip a bit and you would probably tag all three. The international worker could have come from a long list of countries or agencies. The soldier could have been Rwandan, Zairian, French, British (in mufti), or Irish (also in mufti). The same was true inside Rwanda only with greater United Nations representation. The program that worked all available avenues was the program most likely to succeed.
MAJ McDermott on company command: Be —to provide combat power to secure these guys when they go do their interagency "thing". You also have to be aware that the interagency might not show up in a timely manner. That means that you need to think about what you can accomplish with organic resources in these areas because a little goes a long way. Make sure these plans have the ability to be handed to off to whoever with minimal heartburn for all involved. Be prepared to provide resources that enable reaching the agreed upon endstate that the interagency folks just don't have.
MAJ McDermott on MiTT -- Help your unit establish cooperative programs with other security forces owned by other ministries in your area. Encourage your Iraqi counter-part to develop rapport with the various police organizations operating in his Area of Operations.
5. Travel light and harden combat service support (CSS).
CPT Kranc on troop command: It doesn't take a Rhodes scholar to see that CSS convoys were getting hammered right off the bat (remember PVT Lynch). We didn't do a good job in training our logisticians to fight on the roads. Conversely, for every tank or Bradley with a good load plan in theater I saw eight "gypsy" wagons for tanks with all kinds of crap hanging off them that their crew would never use. Store what you don't use.
CPT Holzbach on platoon leadership: NCOs must enforce common sense equipment load out plans whether mounted or dismounted.
MAJ Custis on battle captains: All I can speak to is the travel light piece, and you've got to maintain the ability to revert to pens, maps, and acetate to fight the fight. For hardening, don't let digital communications rest on a single point of failure. Test back-up systems regularly.
MAJ Thornton on MiTTs: Using a hierarchical supply system does not work especially well; we coined the term "Wal-Mart Logistics" to describe the blend of local economy and regional support units (RSUs) that seems to work best. As for traveling light, my kit looked much different on the way out than it did on the way in; I'd stripped to one magazine in the weapon, with a ready magazine set up on the side, a bandolier with six extras in the truck, my side plates, and a PRC 148. I also had my 9mm with one extra magazine, helmet, and body armor.
MAJ Sullivan on MiTTs: Think about your load plan while going through training, not once you get in theater. As a MiTT, you are alone and unafraid while out with your Iraqi unit. There is not a better potential propaganda coup for the bad guys than to capture a U.S. Advisor. Plan to sustain yourself long enough to either a) reach the nearest coalition FOB or b) wait until help arrives.
MAJ Mark Leslie on advisors: Travel light is good, but tailoring the load to the mission is better. No need to "need and not have" when mounted. It is always better to have and not need with some common sense. If you tailor your load according to the operation and pre-package the rest for an "on the spot" delivery if needed, it is a safer method. I agree with the train of thought on "don't rely solely on technology". Carbon paper, grease pencils, alcohol pins, and a good old-fashioned paper maps are what I used daily. I could share these with my Iraqi counterparts, and could distribute them easily and quickly, no matter what my digital status.
LTC Odom on country teams: Travel light is good but traveling with a verified packing list is better. The most likely person to forget something is the solitary traveler. Traveling light does not mean going without communications, necessary supplies, and means of protection. It also means arming oneself with the latest information possible. Those who travel without a "flight plan" cannot even hope for assistance. I can attest personally that two brains are better than one when it comes to this type planning; I could communicate with the Joint Staff via cellular phone for hours from Goma, Zaire because my NCO jerry-rigged satellite communications batteries to work on a DC adaptor.
MAJ McDermott on company command: Optimize your load plans based on having to execute 72 hours of operations without resupply. Focus on necessities not "nice to haves". Understand that you going to have to provide combat power to support LOGPAC operations outside of secure areas. Furthermore, manage your platoons so that maintain a good rotation plan that doesn't compromise your security when conducting resupply operations.
MAJ McDermott on MiTT: Always have plan on having 96 hours of nothing but host nation forces. Always have a retrograde plan that factors only the advisors executing. This might appear drastic, but you have to have a plan. Travel heavy as advisors, because you are going to have be very self-reliant out and about.