Positive Petraeus Lessons - Mary Claire Kendall, Washington Times opinion.

The essence of counterinsurgency strategy (COIN), integral to defeating Sept. 11, 2001-type extremists infecting various Middle East countries, is building confidence among the population. The key is working hand-in-glove with the respective military and civilian authorities to help stabilize their combustible nations so they might be free of the specter of extremist violence, thereby enabling the buildup of family, community and nation, according to each culture's unique and beautiful character. This new, irregular warfare is fought largely on human terrain, about which Gen. David H. Petraeus has written in the COIN bible, aka "FM 3-24" - Field Manual 3-24.

He recently affirmed for me during the American Veterans Center conference that official Washington - far from bloviating when asserting what they would do to win these wars - "gets it" on the fundamentals of COIN and that it is reflected in Situation Room deliberations on Afghanistan. Fortunately, given the high stakes, especially vis-a-vis nuclear Pakistan, when it comes to executing COIN - not just bloviating, er, talking about it - Gen. Petraeus is an impresario...

More at The Washington Times.

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The massacre at Fort Hood is a reminder that the War on Terror is not fought just in south Afghanistan or Mosul. It is a global war also fought in an office building inside a military base in Texas. Many counter-terror analysts focus on the Pakistan connection and preventing The Big One that could top 9/11. But the real problem may well be the self-motivated “small ball” players like Major Hasan or a future disciple of DC Sniper John Allen Muhammad. “Small ball” terrorism won’t have the economic, political, or strategic impact that 9/11 did. But if there is enough of it, the public will eventually find political leadership that will provide an adequate response to the problem.

What should be that response? How should Western societies respond to the generalized problem of terrorism, especially the domestic variety? Constitutional law professor and former National Security Council staffer Philip Bobbitt attempted to provide a comprehensive answer in his grandly ambitious book Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-first Century. In a message that ruffled feathers on every point on the political spectrum, Bobbitt argued that in order to defend Western values of liberty and the rule of law, both domestic and international law would need to become more muscular. Bobbitt rejected that there is a trade-off between civil liberties and government power. In a future world of “market-state terrorism” he fears we are headed to, Bobbitt argued that more law authorizing more surveillance and more foreign intervention would be the only way to protect basic liberties.

After an initial flurry of attention, Terror and Consent seems to have been shelved to collect dust. Without another 9/11 or even any small ball terrorism inside the U.S., no one has had any need for Bobbitt’s theories.

Major Hasan’s case may reintroduce us to Terror and Consent. Many want to know why the electronic surveillance over Hasan was not used to stop him in advance of his rampage. A fair question. Are there other Major Hasans who have similarly self-radicalized and are preparing to strike? Or about to self-radicalize even if they don’t know it yet? Is there a government agency responsible for monitoring and preventing this? If so, what should be an acceptable level of false positive identifications and apprehensions?

Bobbitt attempted to address these and other questions in a dense and theoretical way. But maybe it won’t be just theory for much longer.

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Counterinsurgency: The Challenge for NATO Strategy and Operations (250 pages - pdf). Produced by the NATO Defense College and edited by Dr. Christopher Schnaubelt, this document includes an introduction and 11 chapters covering NATO’s COIN challenges and implications, lessons from Afghanistan, hybrid adversaries, balancing civil-military operations, measures of effectiveness, local security forces in Afghanistan, NATO special forces in Afghanistan, police training in Afghanistan, and COIN foreign assistance.

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Mr. Obama’s Task - New York Times editorial.

There is no doubt that the prospects for success in Afghanistan are so bleak right now because former President George W. Bush failed for seven long years to invest the necessary troops, resources or attention to the war. But it is now President Obama’s war, and the American people are waiting for him to explain his goals and his strategy. Mr. Obama was right to conduct a sober, systematic review of his options. We all know what happens when a president sends tens of thousands of Americans to war based on flawed information, gut reactions and gauzy notions of success. But the political reality is that the longer Mr. Obama waits, the more indecisive he seems and the more constrained his options appear.

It has been more than eight months since Mr. Obama first announced his strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, warning Americans that, for them, the border between the two - where Taliban and Qaeda forces have found safe haven - is “the most dangerous place in the world.” And it has been more than a month since his top general in Afghanistan asked for 40,000 more troops, warning that “failure to gain the initiative” over the next year could make it impossible to defeat the Taliban. Americans are deeply anxious about the war. As the debate among his advisers has dragged on, and became increasingly public, many are asking whether the conflict is necessary or already a lost cause. Democratic leaders are among the loudest questioners.

It has become a cliché in Washington that there are only bad choices in Afghanistan. But it seems clear that this is not the time for a precipitous withdrawal, nor can the United States cling to the status quo while the Taliban gains ever more territory and more power. To move forward, Mr. Obama needs to explain the stakes for this country, the extent of the military commitment, the likely cost in lives and treasure and his definition of success...

Much more at The New York Times.

Debate Shifts to Afghan Exit Plan - Peter Spiegel and Yochi J. Dreazen, Wall Street Journal.

President Barack Obama and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown have turned the focus of Afghan war planning toward an exit strategy, publicly declaring that the US and its allies can't send additional troops without a plan for getting them out. The shift has unnerved some US and foreign officials, who say that planning a pullout now - with or without a specific timetable - encourages the Taliban to wait out foreign forces and exacerbates fears in the region that the US isn't fully committed to their security. "It's not a good idea," said Rep. Ike Skelton (D., Mo.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. "When the area has been stabilized...then it's time to go home. But to set up a timetable for people in that neck of the woods, they'll just wait us out," said Rep. Skelton, a prominent supporter of proposals by Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the US commander in Kabul, to send more troops for a counterinsurgency campaign.

Mr. Obama isn't asking for the firm, publicly declared handover dates in Afghanistan that were the feature of early Iraq war plans, according to senior administration and military officials. Instead, the officials said, the administration wants the Pentagon to identify key milestones for Afghanistan to meet, in its governance and the capability of its security forces, and then give a rough sense of when each objective is likely to be achieved. Reaching these goals would allow the US role to shift away from direct combat, allowing troop levels to decline...

Much more at The Wall Street Journal.

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The Surge: the Untold Story is a 34 minute documentary produced by the Institute for the Study of War. This video documents the Iraq Surge as part of a population-centric counterinsurgency approach and features many of the top commanders and others responsible for its implementation - including GEN Jack Keane (Ret.), GEN David Petraeus, Amb. Ryan Crocker, GEN Raymond Odierno, GEN Nasier Abadi (Iraq), COL Peter Mansoor (Ret.), COL J.B. Burton, COL Ricky Gibbs, COL Bryan Roberts, COL Sean MacFarland, COL James Hickey, COL David Sutherland, COL Steven Townsend, LTC James Crider, and LT James Danly (Ret.).

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Afghan Corruption Concerns US Policy Planners - Gary Thomas, Voice of America.

Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai has been roundly criticized in the international community for presiding over a corrupt government. A new report reinforces the perception of widespread corruption in Afghanistan, naming it the second most corrupt country of all those surveyed. That worries American policy makers as they deliberate on the future US strategy in Afghanistan. In Transparency International's just-released 2009 survey of world corruption, Afghanistan was only one step above the bottom rung, ranking 179th out of 180 countries surveyed. According to the group's report, only another war-ravaged state, Somalia, is perceived as being more corrupt.

President Barack Obama is considering whether to send more troops to Afghanistan to battle the Taliban. Dispatching more troops would further commit the US to a strategy of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. The central premise of counterinsurgency is to win hearts and minds and weaken popular support for the insurgents. Georgetown University Security Studies Professor Christine Fair points out corruption concerns policy makers because it undercuts Afghans' support for their government and support among Western nations for the enterprise in Afghanistan...

More at Voice of America.

Afghan Minister Accused of Taking Bribe - Joshua Partlow, Washington Post.

The Afghan minister of mines accepted a roughly $30 million bribe to award the country's largest development project to a Chinese mining firm, according to a US official who is familiar with military intelligence reports. The allegation, if proved true, would mark one of the most brazen examples of corruption yet disclosed in a country where the problem has become so pervasive that it is now at the heart of Obama administration doubts over Afghan President Hamid Karzai's reliability as a partner. The question of whether Karzai can address his government's graft and cronyism looms large as he prepares for his inauguration Thursday for a new term, and as President Obama completes a months-long strategy review that will define the future of US involvement in Afghanistan after eight years of war.

Karzai is coming under intense international pressure to clear his cabinet of ministers who have reaped huge profits through bribery and kickback schemes. Although he announced a new anti-corruption unit this week, the president has been reluctant to fire scandal-tainted ministers in the past, and it is unclear whether he is ready to do so now. Meanwhile, Afghans' perceptions that they are ruled by a thieving class have weakened support for the government and bolstered sympathy for the Taliban insurgency...

More at The Washington Post.

Ridding Afghanistan of Corruption Will Be No Easy Task - Alexandra Zavis, Los Angeles Times.

Afghans have a name for the huge, gaudy mansions that have sprung up in Kabul's wealthy Sherpur neighborhood since 2001. They call them "poppy palaces." The cost of building one of these homes, which are adorned with sweeping terraces and ornate columns, can run into the hundreds of thousands of dollars. Many are owned by government officials whose formal salaries are a few hundred dollars a month. To the capital's jaded residents, there are few more potent symbols of the corruption that permeates every level of Afghan society, from the traffic policemen who shake down motorists to top government officials and their relatives who are implicated in the opium trade.

Cronyism, graft and the flourishing drug trade have destroyed public confidence in the government of President Hamid Karzai and contributed to the resurgence of the Taliban by driving disaffected Afghans to side with insurgents and protecting an important source of their funding. With casualties mounting and a decision on military strategy looming, President Obama and other Western leaders are finding it increasingly difficult to justify sending troops to fight for a government rife with corruption...

More at The Los Angeles Times.

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The latest U.S. Army / Marine Corps COIN Center SITREP - Includes Counterinsurgency, Stability Operations, and Security Forces Assistance updates.

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Army Tells its Soldiers to 'Bribe' the Taleban - Michael Evans, The Times.

British forces should buy off potential Taleban recruits with “bags of gold”, according to a new army field manual published yesterday. Army commanders should also talk to insurgent leaders with “blood on their hands” in order to hasten the end of the conflict in Afghanistan. The edicts, which are contained in rewritten counter-insurgency guidelines, will be taught to all new army officers.

They mark a strategic rethink after three years in which British and NATO forces have failed to defeat the Taleban. The manual is also a recognition that the Army’s previous doctrine for success against insurgents, which was based on the experience in Northern Ireland, is now out of date. The new instructions came on the day that Gordon Brown went farther than before in setting out Britain’s exit strategy from Afghanistan. The Prime Minister stated explicitly last night that he wanted troops to begin handing over districts to Afghan authorities during next year - a general election year in Britain...

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1st Battalion, 5th Marines PowerPoint AAR - COIN in Helmand: After the Clear, Thoughts and Tips on Non Kinetic Actions - most certainly worth a thousand words.

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A Strategy of Exhaustion
by Vegetius

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Most Jihads do not die with a bang; they have historically gone out with a whimper. The first great wave of Islamic holy war effectively petered out within a century of the death of the Prophet Mohammed and Arabs were no longer actively leaders in the expansion of the Muslim faith after the tenth century A.D. when the peoples of the Turk branch of the Eurasian peoples picked up the banner of Islam. The last of a succession of waves of pre-industrial Jihad petered out at the walls of Vienna in 1683. As we deal with post-industrial Jihad, we may be able to learn something about Islamic holy wars of expansion that have been dealt with in the past.

Jihad was a powerful enough force that it was impossible to permanently defeat by purely military means. Unlike their Christian foes, the Muslim holy warriors were generally content to stop killing when their enemies surrendered and decided to convert to Islam. Jihads died because they reached a point of exhaustion. The most fervent warriors who sought martyrdom in battle could get it easily. This eventually left the Jihad bereft of its most enthusiastic fighters. Those less fanatic or more skillful collected enough slaves and riches in the holy wars to feel that God had rewarded them on earth for their fervor, and settled down to enjoy the good life that successful Jihad made possible. A final element in the death of successive waves of Jihad was internal dissention and struggles for power among the Jihadist leadership. The contest for control for leadership of the first Caliphate began almost immediately with the death of the Prophet Mohammed and culminated in the great Sunni-Shiite schism.

As Edward Luttwak points out in his new book, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire, the Byzantines studied this new enemy closely and came to realize that their only hope of survival against the lethal threat of expansionist Jihadism was a strategy of exhaustion. Luttwak’s work is the first really comprehensive modern study of how the Eastern Roman empire survived and largely thrived in the face of expansionist Islam for eight centuries.

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The author is a government employee and a former infantryman.

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