Continue on for today's Small Wars Journal roundup of the news, editorials, opinions and events...

Continue reading "9 July SWJ News, Op-Ed, and Events Roundup" »

Visualizing Transition from the “Bottom Up”
Observations from Joint Urban Warrior 2008
by Dennis Burket, Small Wars Journal

Download interim version of article as PDF

Joint Urban Warrior 2008 (JUW 08) was a United States Marine Corps (USMC) and United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) cosponsored seminar wargame that was designed to objectively observe and capture operational insights during a forces drawdown from an Irregular Warfare operation/environment. Participants were presented with an “OIF-like” scenario and asked to drawdown current US and Coalition forces to an “advisory organization” in two years. Using the JUW 08 scenario, participants created many visualization tools to help them describe what a two-year drawdown of forces/event-driven transition would look like from their viewpoint. This paper discusses a doctrine-based visualization tool developed during JUW 08 that both military and non-military participants found to be especially useful. This particular model was successful because it allowed participants to look at transition from the viewpoint of a tactical commander, or from the “Bottom Up.”

The primary observation from using the “bottom up” approach was that functions were being transitioned to host nation or non-governmental organizations. From this key insight, participants developed several other insights. First, it was established that it is the timing of when functions are to be transitioned that should determine the future form (organization) of US forces; not the other way around. Second, an event-driven transition in an uncertain environment will require commanders to retain specific functions and capabilities to mitigate risks. And, third, by listing a function as transitioned on a chart doesn’t necessarily indicate a completed action. In many instances some form of “overwatch” will be needed until a “good enough” point is reached by the organization to which the function is transitioned.

Download interim version of article as PDF

Continue reading "Visualizing Transition from the “Bottom Up”" »

Iraq’s Water Woes

By Captain Timothy Hsia

News today in Iraq is centered on contracts currently being negotiated between the Government of Iraq and major oil companies. This has occupied much of the attention of America and the rest of the world as the price of oil continues to skyrocket. However, Iraqis for the vast majority are not only interested in the future of their oil but also concentrated on another pressing natural resource problem, the scarcity of water.

Sandwiched between Baghdad and Mosul is the Diyala River Valley (DRV), and within the DRV is a region known as the Breadbasket of Iraq. Farmers have worked the land here since Biblical times. Baqubah, the capital of Diyala, is Arabic for Jacob’s house. The region historically has been so abundant agriculturally that the produce from this area has been able to not only sustain the local region but also vast parts of Iraq. Today however, the way of life of these farmers has become imperiled for one simple reason: there is simply not enough water for their crops. Drought like conditions now exist in many regions of the Diyala River Valley and potable water is scarce. When Iraqi kids encounter soldiers on patrols they not only ask for soccer balls but also water bottles...

Continue reading "Iraq’s Water Woes" »

Continue reading "Iraq Update" »

Continue on for today's Small Wars Journal roundup of the news, editorials, opinions and events...

Continue reading "8 July SWJ News, Op-Ed, and Events Roundup" »

Continue on for the latest Small Wars Journal blog roundup...

Continue reading "7 July SWJ Blog Roundup" »

Continue on for today's Small Wars Journal roundup of the news, editorials, opinions and events...

Continue reading "7 July SWJ News, Op-Ed, and Events Roundup" »

Part I of selected excerpts from Small Wars II, an unpublished U.S. Marine Corps document written in 2003. Noel Williams is the primary author.

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesmen and commander have to make is to establish … the kind of war on which they are embarking.

--Clausewitz

On October 23, 1983 the world turned upside down for the U.S. Marine Corps. The deaths of 241 sailors, soldiers, and Marines in a concrete slab building in Beirut, Lebanon at the hands of a suicide bomber marked the beginning of the end of an era - an era where the enemy was a Soviet motorized rifle regiment and where Marines stood guard duty without magazines inserted because the United States was not “at war.” In retrospect, the Beirut bombing was a seminal event, heavily influencing subsequent Marine Corps organization and culture and ushering in the kind of profound change that seldom takes place in large organizations without the stimulus of a significant emotional event.

Orders were quick to follow: All Marines will walk post armed; Marines will not starch their utilities; Marines will not spit shine their combat boots; Marines will read professionally. These changes did not occur overnight, but looking back from today’s vantage point, it is hard not to marvel at the profound changes that have transformed the Corps.

If there can be a silver lining to a tragedy as great as Beirut, it is that the Marine Corps began a great awakening to a new way of warfare fully two decades before her sister Services. There was recognition that Marines must prepare differently, both physically and mentally, for the new challenges posed by terrorism, transnational threats, and the more dynamic security requirements of the post-Cold War world. In attempting to discern the nature of this changing security environment and to develop appropriate courses of action, some were quick to say, harkening back to the Corps’ small wars legacy, “been there, done that.”

But is it just a question of back to the future? Or, is conflict in the new millennium fundamentally different? The short answer is yes to both. Meaning, while many small wars fundamentals remain unchanged, there are significant threats and challenges that are without precedent. It is the intent of this work to examine these emerging threats and convert the challenges they present into opportunities for improving our capabilities to provide for the national defense...

Continue reading "What is a Small War?" »

The Syria Card

By David J. Haimsky

The ongoing, peace talks between Israel and Syria have been relatively underreported in the news media, and are surprisingly seldom discussed in policy circles in Washington, despite the fact that their potential success will drastically change the political landscape in the Middle East in Washington’s favor. That is why the Bush Administration’s lack of involvement in this process is all the more puzzling.

President Bush is widely perceived as a “lame duck” president. His recent European tour failed to bring out crowds of protesters that have greeted him every time he stepped foot on the continent in the past, not because people have warmed up to his policies, but simply because they regard his tenure in office as effectively over. His popularity ratings at home and abroad remain at an all-time low and people on both sides of the political spectrum are waiting anxiously for January’s changing of the guard. Bush, however, is determined to go down in history as the president who had taken on terror networks and rogue states in defense of democracy worldwide. The prospect of an Israeli-Syrian peace provides an historic opportunity for him to at least partially meet that objective, while reversing some of the policy setbacks of his administration...

Continue reading "The Syria Card" »

Continue on for today's Small Wars Journal roundup of the news, editorials, opinions and events...

Continue reading "6 July SWJ News, Op-Ed, and Events Roundup" »

Since 1922, Military Review has provided a forum for the open exchange of ideas on military affairs. Subsequently, publications have proliferated throughout the Army education system that specialize either in tactical issues associated with particular Branches or on strategic issues at the Senior Service School level. Bridging these two levels of intellectual inquiry, Military Review focuses on research and analysis of the concepts, doctrine and principles of warfighting between the tactical and operational levels of war.

Military Review is a refereed journal that provides a forum for original thought and debate on the art and science of land warfare and other issues of current interest to the US Army and the Department of Defense. Military Review also supports the education, training, doctrine development and integration missions of the Combined Arms Center (CAC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Military Review is printed bimonthly in English, Spanish and Portuguese and is distributed to readers in more than 100 countries. It is also printed in Arabic on a quarterly basis. Widely quoted and reprinted throughout the world, it is a readily available reference at most military and civilian university libraries and research agencies.

Here is the July - August 2008 lineup:

Interagency Reform: The Congressional Perspective by Congressman Geoff Davis, speech given at PNSR/ROA Luncheon, 8 May 2008

Congressman Davis explains why we need to reform the interagency process in regard to national security and what must be considered in future legislation on this pressing issue.

Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations: Upshifting the Engine of Change by Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell IV, U.S. Army, and Lieutenant Colonel Steven M. Leonard, U.S. Army

This FM will institutionalize a whole-of-government approach to combating insurgency and sustaining success in an era of persistent conflict.

Darfur and Peacekeeping Operations in Africa by Lieutenant Commander Patrick Paterson, U.S. Navy

The crisis in Darfur, which the United States has labeled “genocide” and the United Nations has called “the world’s gravest human rights abuse,” has revealed glaring weaknesses in the African Union’s ability to conduct peacekeeping operations.

Salvadoran Reconciliation by Major M. Chris Herrera, U.S. Army, and Major Michael G. Nelson, U.S. Air Force

A brutal 12-year civil war in El Salvador ended in 1992. The conflict killed more than 75,000 mostly innocent civilians and left 8,000 missing. Reconciliation has been difficult to achieve.

A Troubled Past: The Army and Security on the Mexican Border, 1915-1917 by Thomas A. Bruscino Jr.

The tempestuous historical border relationships between the United States and Mexico have always been complex.

Persuasion and Coercion in Counterinsurgency Warfare by Andrew J. Birtle, Ph.D.

Much confusion remains over the roles that persuasion and coercion play in rebellions and other internal conflicts. What is the relationship between force and politics?

After Iraq: The Politics of Blame and Civilian-Military Relations by George R. Mastroianni, Ph.D., and Wilbur J. Scott, Ph.D.

Competing post-Iraq narratives may lead to a broadening of sociological divisions between military professionals and the civil society they defend.

Legitimacy and Military Operations by Lieutenant Colonel James W. Hammond, Canadian Forces

In America’s rush to war it forgot that legitimacy, whether real or perceived, is everything. The author argues that to achieve success, the U.S. must conduct all military operations with legitimacy in mind.

Twelve Urgent Steps for the Advisor Mission in Afghanistan by Captain Daniel Helmer, U.S. Army

Without major and rapid changes to structure and execution, the advisory effort in Afghanistan will fail to arrest the growing insurgencies.

Burnout: Staff Exhaustion by Major Stephen H. Bales, U.S. Army

Commanders can proactively take initiative to mitigate conditions that cause their staffs to lose their peak effectiveness. Imaginative management can help prevent staff burnout.

Reaching Out: Partnering with Iraqi Media by Lieutenant Colonel Frank B. DeCarvalho, U.S. Army; Major Spring Kivett, U.S. Army; and Captain Matthew Lindsey, U.S. Army

Using Iraqi news reporters can the increase chances that good news stories will resonate favorably in Iraq. An expert lays out the particulars of an important dimension of the information war.

Why the U.S. Should Gender Its Counterterrorism Strategy by Lieutenant Colonel Miemie Winn Byrd, U.S. Army Reserve, and Major Gretchen Decker, U.S. Army Reserve

Gender prejudices and traditional assumptions belie an increasing threat from radicalized women. It is time to consider gender issues in designing counterterrorism strategies.

Knowledge Management by the Generating Force by Lieutenant Colonel (P) E.J. Degen, U.S. Army

The accelerated operational tempo of the War on Terrorism has forced us to take an honest, in-depth look at how we collect, analyze, debate, codify, write, and disseminate doctrine.

The Sole Superpower in Decline: The Rise of a Multipolar World by Shri Dilip Hiro

A widely published author asserts that we are witnessing the rise of a multipolar world in which new powers are challenging different aspects of American hegemony.

Book Reviews by multiple authors

Contemporary readings for the professional.

Continue reading "Military Review: July - August 2008 Issue" »

Continue on for today's Small Wars Journal roundup of the news, editorials, opinions and events...

Continue reading "5 July SWJ News, Op-Ed, and Events Roundup" »

I thought I’d share with SWJ readership an article recently published in Army magazine (May 2008). In particular - I draw your attention to discussion of our infatuation with the term “Irregular Warfare” - US Forces Do Not Conduct "Irregular War".

What is it about the US Military that tends to produce sound, pragmatic, and common sense ideas about the concrete present, and tends toward illogic, faddish paradigms and hyperbole when dealing with the abstract future? Joint Operating Concepts for dealing with post cold war security problems have proven difficult to "get right." This is because they begin from the wrong logical starting point and thus define the problem incorrectly. It is also because of inattention to historical fact, definitional subtlety and the theoretical logic within which military forces must operate. This inattention overlooks key logical inconsistencies in such documents crafted more to "sell" to constituencies within the Washington "Beltway" the capabilities and programs championed by one military interest group or another rather than to inform current decisions in the field. For this reason those who nag about these things tend to be ignored by the practical people dealing with near term problems. When the future becomes the present, the consequences of illogic, faddish paradigms, and hyperbole in abstract concepts can pose insurmountable problems for pragmatic common sense. For one, "Beltway" constituencies have been educated to think according to the attractive new paradigms military professionals have used to buttress their budget arguments. The new "Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept" signed by the Commander, United States Special Operations Command, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of Defense on 11 September 2007 deals with the abstract future and exhibits the usual tendencies. We have been here before, and are still suffering the consequences.

Continue reading "A Reflection on the Illogic of New Military Concepts" »

Rethinking “IO:” Complex Operations in the Information Age

by BG Huba Wass de Czege, US Army, Retired, Small Wars Journal

Download interim version of article as PDF

We are in a period of unprecedented and rapid change, and this realization should make us skeptics of wisdoms revealed as recently as a decade and a half ago when the problems the military faced were very different. Paradigms that might have seemed sensible then confuse more than clarify today.

In the years just prior to September 11, 2001, a new American Way of War emerged to replace Cold War paradigms -- those underlying unthinking ways of thinking embedded in our doctrines. The April 2000 Defense Planning Guidance tasked U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) to develop “… new Joint warfighting concepts and capabilities that will improve the ability of future Joint force commanders to rapidly and decisively conduct particularly challenging and important operational missions, such as … coercing an adversary to undertake certain actions or denying the adversary the ability to coerce or attack its neighbors …” The object of these operations were to be rogue states such as Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and Panama were or had been. What emerged was dubbed the “Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO)” concept. It rested on four pillars. An Air Force and Navy capable of controlling air, space, and sea domains from which to coerce enemies with a hail of precise air and naval missile power; increasingly more capable special operating forces to penetrate enemy territory and provide targets; and a new core capability called “Information Operations” to “influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decisionmaking, while protecting our own.” In this “domain,” as in the others, the term most used in the late 1990’s to describe the product of American technological superiority was not just superiority, but dominance. RDO asserted that leveraging these asymmetric superiorities in the air, space, naval, and information domains would not only conserve scarce ground forces and reduce casualties, but they would also achieve rapid and decisive results. As we saw versions of RDO applied in Kosovo in 2000, in Afghanistan in 2002, and in Iraq in 2003, it became clear to most professionals that this new paradigm oversimplified complexities then not well understood. In fact the chief failing of RDO was an utter lack of respect for the difficulty of what it set out to do: either to achieve relevant dominance in any sense; or to coerce any determined adversary to undertake any actions what-so-ever. Even denying an adversary the ability to coerce or attack its neighbors has to be approached with humility today. However, thinking about the Information Operations component of this package has been most resistant to revision, especially two prized and related tenets. One is that “the integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities” is the best way to gain the maximum benefit of so-called IO core, supporting, and related capabilities. Another is that when these capabilities are thus integrated, an independent IO “logical line of operations” can influence the behaviors of adversaries and the publics that support them with so-called “information effects” alone. This is an amateurish outlook, and not shared by all IO practitioners, especially those who have been in the trenches, and working closely with the Brigade Combat Teams most involved in the real challenges of trying to “influence” the behaviors of real people under stress. While progress is being made on other fronts of “Defense Transformation,” IO is stuck in a late 20th Century time warp. Future Shock author Alvin Toffler, in a passage from a 1996 book, makes this relevant point: "The illiterate of the 21st century will not be those who cannot read and write, but those who cannot learn, unlearn, and relearn." In this case a Pentagon bureaucracy, the tyranny of a slow-to- change, lowest-common-denominator and top-down-biased Joint Doctrine, plus engrained habits of thought stand in the way of learning, unlearning, and relearning.

Download interim version of article as PDF

Continue reading "Rethinking “IO:” Complex Operations in the Information Age" »

Continue on for today's Small Wars Journal roundup of the news, editorials, opinions and events...

Continue reading "4 July SWJ News, Op-Ed, and Events Roundup" »